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THE
SCIENCE
OF
NATURAL THEOLOGY;
OR,
GOD THE UNCONDITIONED CAUSE,
AND
GOD THE INFINITE AND PERFECT,
AS REVEALED IN CREATION.

BY

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"DOCTRINE OF THE WILL," ETC.

"In the beginning, God."

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PREFACE.

IN the judgment of the author of the following treatise, the time has now arrived when the questions at issue between Theism on the one hand, and the various forms of Antitheism on the other, may be permanently settled, and that upon scientific grounds. All these questions now, in reality, stand out before the world in visible dependence upon a single issue, *the validity of the human Intelligence as a faculty of world-knowledge*. Antitheism, in all its forms, has openly based itself upon the assumption, and this is its final stronghold, that all our world-knowledge, subjective and objective, is exclusively phenomenal, mere appearance, in which no reality of any kind appears; and that, consequently, "the reality existing behind all appearances is, and ever must be, unknown." The fact is also being "known and read of all men," that, this principle being admitted, all questions in regard to causation, proximate or ultimate, are undeniably at an end. "What can we reason but from what we know?" Equally manifest to all sober thinkers has the fact become, that if it be granted that we have a valid knowledge of "the things that are made," the proposition is undeniable, that we have an equally valid knowledge of the being and perfections of a personal God, "the Creator of the heavens and the earth." "Reason," says the

antitheistic philosophy, “demands an *unknown* substratum of the visible, and an *unknown* essence of the intelligent, and may thus be led to an *unknown* cause of both, wherein to find the cause and explanation of their marvellous relationship.” Reason, says the theistic philosophy, demands a *known* substratum of the visible, and a *known* essence of the intelligent, and a *known* cause of both, wherein to find the cause and explanation of their marvellous relationship; it being undeniably the perfection of absurdity to attempt to find “the cause and explanation” of relationships of the existence and character of which we affirm our ignorance to be absolute. “Whether, in the absolute nature of things,” says Mr. Thompson, “the mind is wholly distinct from the world, or in any way related to it, is beyond the reach of man’s intelligence.” Is it not an infinite marvel, that any thinker should talk of finding in “an unknown cause,” “*the* cause and explanation” of relationships, even the existence of which, as he himself affirms, “is beyond the reach of man’s intelligence”? It is by the enunciation of such principles that leading theistic thinkers, such as Messrs. Thompson and Mansell, have of late years been forging weapons for scepticism,—weapons which such writers as Messrs. Mill and Spencer are now using with terrible effect against religion. No deduction can be more self-evidently valid, and no deduction is being more generally recognized as absolutely logical, than this, that if it be granted that we have, and can have, no valid knowledge of nature, we can have no corresponding knowledge of the ultimate cause of the facts of nature. If, therefore, we would vindicate for religion “a *reasonable* service, and escape the just charge of knowingly “worshipping we know not what,” we must assert and vindicate the valid-

ity of the human Intelligence, as a faculty of world-knowledge. This, we repeat, is the single issue on which the conflicting claims of Theism and Antitheism now visibly depend. Hence, the pains which we have been at, in the following treatise, to assure, among other ends, a scientific settlement of this one issue. All, who have duly reflected upon the subject, are aware, that when an appeal is made to the intuitive convictions of the Universal Intelligence, to the direct and immediate testimony of Consciousness, and to all criteria by which forms of knowledge that have absolute validity for the reality and character of their objects are to be distinguished from those which are void of all claims to such validity, the truth of the theistic philosophy becomes strictly demonstrative; and all this, while there is the equally manifest total absence of all forms of proof, positive evidence, or antecedent probability, in favor of the opposite hypothesis. So distinctly conscious are antitheists of the truth of these statements, that they have abandoned all forms of argument upon the subject but one, the assumption that our world-conceptions and necessary ideas must be void of objective validity, for the affirmed reason that they are all self-contradictory and absurd. Hence the care with which we have scrutinized these affirmed contradictions, these "antinomies of pure reason." To the careful reader of the introduction, and the last two chapters of the following treatise, it will be rendered demonstratively evident that these conceptions and ideas, when taken as they actually exist in the mind, are utterly void of even the appearance of self-contradiction, no incompatible elements whatever, being found in them, and that these cognitions are made to *appear* self-contradictory wholly by means of totally false definitions and

sophistical psychological procedures, — procedures utterly subversive of truth, and as utterly unworthy the dignity of science.

A fundamental aim of the author of this treatise has been not only to subvert utterly the antitheistic philosophy in all its actual and possible forms, and to verify for Theism an immovable foundation; but, also to bring out into distinct isolation the real theistic problem and syllogism in all its varied forms, so that the argument throughout may be seen to be, and to have been, conducted upon truly scientific principles. With these suggestions, the work is commended to the most rigid scrutiny of the friends of truth.

ADRIAN, MICH., *July 27, 1867.*

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THE SCIENCE OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

TRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF DISCUSSION.

THERE are two distinct and opposite methods in conformity to which the questions at issue between the friends of truth and the advocates of error may be investigated and argued. We may, without any special reference to fundamental principles, join issue at once upon the points of disagreement; attempting, by force of argument, the establishment of the truth, and the refutation of error. In this way, much is often accomplished in both the directions named. Yet, it almost as frequently happens, perhaps, and that with reference to the most important problems of human thought and concern, that deep and abiding mental satisfaction and conviction are not obtained, while a painful feeling of doubt and uncertainty is left permanently upon the mind,— a feeling which ultimately bears not a few inquirers after the truth, into the embrace of error. Mr. Abercrombie, for example, commences his treatise on intellectual philosophy with a chapter in which he attempts to prove the immateriality of the soul. No analysis of the phenomena of the two substances, matter and spirit, is given: no self-evident principles which may be laid down as the basis of deductions upon the sub-

ject, are developed and applied. On the other hand, without any such lights to guide his investigations, the author enters at once upon the argument, and after presenting a multiplicity of reasons for the belief that spirit is not matter, and matter is not spirit, he finally sums up the discussion with the following grave conclusion: "Whether in their substratum or ultimate essence they are the same, or whether they are different, we know not, and never can know, in our present state of being." Why, then, argue at all, a question about which, "in our present state of being," we can know nothing and determine nothing?* Yet this state of painful doubt and uncertainty is the only state to which such a method can conduct the mind in reference to this and kindred subjects. As long as the great problems in Metaphysics and Natural Theology are investigated and professedly solved according to this method, they will deservedly stand before the world as ranking among the most uncertain of all the sciences, and investigation and argument will tend but to one result, — to deepen the prevailing conviction that these problems are of impossible solution.

According to the principles of the method which we will next consider, the friends of truth, in arguing the questions at issue between themselves and the advocates of error, begin their inquiries, first of all, with a full and distinct

* The result of Mr. Abercrombie's deductions, which at first thought appears perfectly harmless, does not stop here, but will, in many instances, be unconsciously extended over the whole field of inquiry in respect to ultimate causation, or the doctrine of the being and perfections of God. For, if our knowledge of "things that are made" is so uncertain and unsatisfactory, equally uncertain and unsatisfactory must be all deductions based upon this knowledge, deductions pertaining to God, duty, and immortality. It is thus that Christian theologians and Christian philosophers are often, without being themselves aware of the fact, laying the foundation for all forms of unbelief.

development of the *nature* and *specific characteristics* of these questions themselves, together with the specific relations of these distinct and opposite systems to one another. There will, then, be another determination, equally distinct and definite, of the *assumptions* or *principles* which lie at the basis of the opposing systems whose claims are to be investigated, together with the all-authoritative principles, or first truths, *in the light of which* every problem presented is to be solved, and on the authority of which every conclusion reached is to be deduced. Last of all, the great facts bearing upon the questions at issue will be adduced and elucidated *in the light* of said principles, and the conclusions demanded, deduced accordingly. This, every one will perceive, is the only scientific method in conformity to which deep and permanent mental satisfaction and rational conviction can be obtained, on any great and important subject. It is the only method, in conformity to which any great truth of Metaphysics or Natural Theology can be so developed, that it shall legitimately take rank as a truth of science.

In the above remarks we have indicated the method in conformity to which we shall attempt, in the following Treatise, to develop and elucidate the science of Natural Theology. We propose in this, the introductory chapter, the statement and elucidation of certain important principles, which have a general, but fundamental, bearing upon our investigations.

MYSTERY AND ABSURDITY DEFINED AND ELUCIDATED.

We will commence with a definition of the terms *mystery* and *absurdity*, — terms of common use in almost all departments of human thought, but which, for want of accurate

philosophical definition, are not unfrequently employed with no appearance even of scientific precision. Every one, on reflection, must become distinctly conscious, that before we can intelligently affirm of any given judgment or proposition, that it is absurd, or that it involves the element of mystery, we must have in our minds a scientifically accurate conception of the ideas represented by the terms mystery and absurdity, as distinguished the one from the other. What, then, are the ideas represented by these two terms?

Every judgment which can properly be pronounced absurd, will be found, on analysis, to come under the principle of *contradiction*; that is, it will really affirm that the same thing is, at the same time, true and not true of the same subject. Suppose, for example, that something is affirmed of an object undeniably incompatible with its known and existing attributes. Such affirmation is equivalent to the assertion that said attributes do, and do not, at the same moment, belong to the same subject. All such judgments, therefore, are absurd, and none of them can, by any possibility, be true. So also, when *all* the elements represented by the subject and predicate of a given proposition are fully and distinctly apprehended by the mind, any proposition affirming the opposite of what the intelligence perceives must be true of the relations of said subject and predicate to each other, involves an absurdity, and must be false. The opposite supposition would imply that the intelligence might affirm the same thing to be, at the same time, true and not true of the same subject.

On the other hand, let us suppose that an event stands revealed to us as a fact of actual occurrence, while the *reason* or *cause* of its occurrence is wholly unknown and undis-

coverable by us. The *event*, in that case, would take rank as a fact falling within the sphere of actual knowledge, while its *cause* would belong to the class represented by the term *Mystery*. On the other hand, let us suppose that the elements represented by a given term — God, for example — are in part known, and in part unknown, to the mind. One proposition may be affirmed of the object represented by that term, in view of what we know, and its opposite, in view of what we do not know. There would be then a mystery involved in the relations of these propositions to each other. They could not, however, be properly ranked together under the principle of contradiction. The truth and harmony of the two propositions might be admitted as facts, while the grounds of their harmony and validity might remain a mystery. Suppose a class of disembodied rational beings, to whom mankind are known only as rational beings like themselves, should find, in an admitted revelation from God, the two following propositions: “All men are immortal beings,” and “All men are mortal beings.” The rational beings referred to might very properly conclude, that the first proposition pertains to men as rational beings exclusively, and that the second refers to them in some other relations not revealed, and hence, that both alike may be true of the same class of existences. In other words, they would recognize themselves as in the presence of a mystery, but not of an absurdity. Let us now consider some important deductions arising from the principles and distinctions above elucidated.

EXISTENCE INVOLVES A MYSTERY.

On reflection, it will be perceived, at once, that *existence* is and ever must be, to our minds, a profound and impene-

trable mystery. We may *know*, absolutely, that a certain substance does, as a matter of fact, *exist*. But when we attempt to go beyond the mere fact, and to determine the question *why* the substance does exist instead of not exist, we find that we can discover, neither in the fact referred to, nor in the nature or relations of the substance revealed as existing, any light whatever in regard to such inquiries. We often meet with the affirmation, for example, that God exists of necessity. If the idea intended to be conveyed by such a statement is this, that the divine existence is necessarily supposed by the facts of the universe, said statement presents an important truth. But if it is meant that there is, in the divine nature, a reason why God exists, — that is, a reason why he is an existing instead of a non-existing being, — the statement, in that case, means nothing, or affirms as true what is self-contradictory. To affirm that there is a reason, in the divine nature itself, why God exists, implies, if it conveys any intelligible meaning at all, that this reason is the cause of the divine existence, which is an undeniable self-contradiction.*

* The idea of God is commonly and correctly affirmed to be necessary. The sense in which it is necessary, however, has not, for the most part, been considered. The ideas of space and time are necessary and absolute, for the reason that it is absolutely impossible for us to conceive of their objects as not being. The ideas of substance and cause, on the other hand, are necessary *relatively* to qualities and events. If the latter are real, the former objects must exist. But if we do not suppose qualities and events to be real, we are not necessitated to suppose the reality of substances or causes. The ideas of substance and cause, then, are *conditionally* necessary, not *absolutely* so, like those of time and space. Now, since the idea of God is that of a cause, it can be only conditionally necessary, like those of substance and cause, and not absolutely so, like those of time and space. The want of this important distinction has given rise, in the cases of Dr. Clarke and others, to the logical fiction of an *à priori* proof of the being of God. From the fact that the idea of God relatively to the facts of the universe, like that of cause relatively to events universally, is necessary, it has been inferred that there must be, in the divine nature, an absolute reason why God does exist, rather than not exist, which, as we have seen, is a fundamental mistake. From this mistake another not unimportant one has arisen, to wit,

These remarks are equally applicable to all classes of substances of every kind — substances finite and infinite, material and mental. That matter as a substance possessed of extension and form, and mind as possessed of the faculties of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, exist as a matter of fact, we know absolutely; because we have a direct and immediate *perception* (presentative knowledge) of them as existing, and as such existences. That God exists, we perceive with equal absoluteness, because, as we shall see hereafter, the fact of his existence is necessarily *implied* by the facts of nature, which are to us, as facts, objects of absolute knowledge. But why mind, on the one hand, or matter, on the other, exist, we cannot, by any possibility, find any reason whatever in the nature of the substances themselves, nor in their relations to each other. We can perceive no more reasons in the nature of mind, why matter should exist, rather than not exist, than we can find in matter why mind should exist, rather than not exist.

It follows as a necessary deduction from the above statements, the validity of which we are quite sure none will deny, that all knowledge with us, without a revelation from a higher power, must be wholly and exclusively confined to

the attempt to determine, *à priori*, what the character of God, as a necessary being, must be. From the element of necessity in the divine nature, supposing it to exist, we can determine nothing relatively to the divine character. This element does exist in time and space. Yet, as realities, they are fundamentally unlike each other, and we cannot determine from the element of necessity, common to both alike, what either in fact is. So if the same element, in the same sense, did attach to the idea of God, we could not determine from it alone what His particular attributes must be. When, on the other hand, a certain reality is necessarily supposed by certain facts, its character must be determined through said facts, and not from the one element under consideration. From the facts of the universe we reason to the being and perfections of God, and from the character of the facts, exclusively, must we determine the attributes of God. Any departure from this principle is fraught with error.

the mere *facts, nature, and modes* of existence. That we may not be misunderstood here, we would remark that the questions why an object *exists*, and how we *know* it to exist, are questions totally diverse from one another, and should never be confounded the one with the other. To the latter question we are able to give a definite answer. In regard to the former, our ignorance is, and must be, absolute.

From the fact that we know, and can know, absolutely nothing in regard to the question, why any substance does exist rather than not exist, it follows, as a deduction equally absolute, that we cannot, in any form, determine *à priori* what substances do and do not exist, whether one or more substances actually exist, or in what modes, conditions, or relations, they do exist, or we shall find them existing. If we cannot determine *à priori*, or *à posteriori* either, why substances exist, we cannot determine surely in the former sense, what substances do and do not exist, or in what modes and relations they actually exist.

Hence we remark, in the next place, that the supposition that one class of substances exists, is just as reasonable, in itself, as the supposition that any other exists; and the supposition that two or more distinct and separate substances exists, is a supposition just as reasonable and admissible in itself, as the supposition that but one substance exists, and *vice versa*. Of the two substances, matter and spirit, we can, as we have seen, perceive no reason in the fact that one does exist, why the other should exist. It is equally self-evident, that we can perceive no reason in the fact that one of these substances does exist, why the other should not exist. In the fact, also, that matter and finite mind do exist, we can perceive no reason why God

should not exist. The propositions, matter exists, mind (finite mind) exists, and God as infinite and perfect exists, are not contradictory, or in any form incompatible propositions.

Our final deduction from the train of thought thus far pursued is this: *facts* of existence, that is, the questions, what substances do, in reality, exist, what is their nature, and what are their relations as such existences, must be determined wholly *à posteriori*, and in no form *à priori*. As we cannot determine *à priori*, what substances may and may not exist, much less can we thus determine what substances do and do not exist. A knowledge of all such facts, if obtained at all, must be obtained wholly *à posteriori*. There is no possibility of escaping this conclusion.

The existence of a power of knowledge involves a mystery equally profound.

The entire remarks made above in regard to existence itself, are, in all respects, equally applicable to the existence of a *power of knowledge*. That such a power does exist, in fact, we perceive as a matter of consciousness. But when we ask *why* it exists at all, and exists as such a power, we find, at once, that we have gone wholly beyond our depth, and that we can obtain no light whatever in respect to such questions. We know absolutely, and that *à priori*, that the sphere of the conceivably knowable is all existences and all modes and relations of existence — that the exclusive conditions of the possibility of knowledge, in all cases, are the existence of objects, on the one hand, and of a power of knowledge relatively to such objects, on the other, and these (the power and objects of knowledge), in such relations to each other, that knowledge necessarily arises

in consequence of the correlation referred to — and that the extent and limits of the actually knowable in any given case, depend upon the fulfilment of the conditions of knowledge, in the first instance, and, in the next, upon the extent and limits of the correlation under consideration. All this we know must be true, because the opposite supposition involves a contradiction. But when we ask the questions, What power of knowledge does or does not exist, and why it exists as such a power, what are to it particular objects of knowledge, whether any conditions at all are requisite to the actual exercise of the power, why knowledge arises when such conditions are fulfilled, and what are the limits and extent of knowledge in any given case, we find that we can determine absolutely nothing *à priori* in regard to such questions. It is undeniable that the great question in science, “What can we know?” can be answered correctly, but through another, to wit, what *do* we know, and what is *implied* in the facts of such knowledge? The fact of knowledge, and that alone, reveals and can reveal the existence and nature of the power of knowledge, together with the extent and limits of the sphere of said power.

Principles by which we are to determine our theory of existence, and answer the question, “What realities do in fact exist?”

The principles by which we are to determine our theory of existence, or answer the question, What realities do exist? now admit of a ready statement. No reality can become known to the faculty of knowledge, as actually existing, but upon one condition, that it is actually *manifested*

to said faculty as existing. The following, then, are the principles referred to :

1. Nothing is to be admitted as existing, which has not been *manifested* as real.

2. All that is thus manifested, that is, all that the faculty of knowledge directly and immediately perceives to exist, and all that is *implied* as existing, by the reality of such existence, are to be admitted as real. The existence of one reality may be necessarily implied in that of another. In admitting the existence of the latter, we must admit that of the former. Nothing on this subject, not falling under the principle of contradiction, is to be, or can be determined *à priori*, but all *à posteriori* exclusively.*

The idea which is to be represented by the term creation as employed in a system of Natural Theology.

Two distinct and opposite ideas are represented by the term *creation*, as that term is commonly employed, to

* If a reason for the validity of the above principle be asked for, an answer can very readily be given. When any object whatever is directly and immediately manifested to the knowing faculty as a real existence possessed of certain manifested qualities, the fact of such manifestation must be held as absolute proof of the reality of the object and characteristics referred to, unless reasons still more absolute exist for the opposite supposition. But no such reasons, in any form or degree, in the case referred to, do or can exist. Existence being, in itself, an absolute mystery, no positive evidence of any form or degree, not even the remotest antecedent probability, does or can present itself, that said object does not exist, and exist as manifested to the intelligence; and the proof that it does thus exist must be held as absolute. Suppose, for example, that matter is thus manifest, as a reality, having actual extension and form. As the supposition that it does thus exist, as such object, is just as conceivable, and therefore just as probable in itself, as the opposite supposition, and as we can know absolutely nothing of the object but as manifested, we have in favor of its existence as the object referred to, and in opposition to the opposite supposition, absolute knowledge on the one side, as opposed to the total absence of all forms and degrees of evidence on the other. We violate all the laws and principles of science, when we refuse, in any like instance, to admit the fact that we are in the presence of a known entity, having the actual qualities manifested to our intelligence as real.

wit, *formation*, that is, from pre-existing materials producing something which had no existence before, and especially inducing organization and order from a state of disorganization and disorder, — and *origination*, that is, bringing into being substances which had no existence before. By some of the first thinkers, such, for example, as Sir William Hamilton, the possibility of creation, in this last sense, has been denied. They affirm that the true meaning of the undeniable principle, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, is not this, that non-being cannot originate any real existing substance, but that no power whatever can, from nothing, produce a real substance which, as a substance, did not exist before. On reflection, it will appear undeniable, that the possibility of creation in this sense is, to say the least, to our minds absolutely inconceivable. Power, in the only form in which we can conceive of it, is a relative term, and supposes an object upon which it may be exerted. Let us suppose a power absolutely infinite to exist, and that absolutely alone, no other substance whatever having being. It is undeniable, that there are but two directions conceivable or possible in which this power can act. In the first place, its direction may be internal, that is, upon the subject itself. In that case, the result would be simply and exclusively a change of state in said subject. If this change of subjective state is called creation, it would be a creation according to the principles of Pantheism. Or we may suppose the direction of the action under consideration to be outward, or in the direction out of the subject. But here absolutely nothing, or nonentity, exists as an object of power. What can be made of this nonentity? Is it conceivable that real being can be drawn from non-being, real substance from absolute nonentity? If such power

does exist in the divine nature, the fact can become known to us only by express revelation. The idea of creation in this sense, therefore, does not belong to our present inquiries, in which we determine the evidence of the *being* of God, and not truths which, if they are such, can be known to us but by an express revelation from God already known as existing. Facts of creation, in the former sense of the term, to wit, that of *formation*, constitute the exclusive basis of all our deductions in Natural Theology. It is of the highest importance that this principle be kept distinctly in mind, in all our investigations and deductions. We shall employ the terms creation and creator in accordance with this one idea exclusively, excepting in cases when their use, according to the former idea, is, at the time, expressly indicated.*

Origin and genesis of the systems of Antitheism explained.

The origin and genesis of the various systems of Antitheism now admit of a ready explanation. They all rest upon an absolute denial of the possibility of creation, in any other than the one sense exclusively, that of formation. Then they all, the system of Ideal Dualism excepted, assume, as a first truth, and the basis of all subsequent deductions, the original existence of but one substance with its inhering laws. Facts of creation, then, must be the

* The principle which we have laid down is identical with that really assumed by Paley and other writers on Natural Theology. They base their deductions upon *relations* of existence, and not upon the mere fact that objects exist. The latter principle Paley formally repudiates. So, in reality, does the whole design argument. That we may not be misunderstood here, we would say, that we do not deny the power in God of creation in the sense of *origination*. What we maintain is this, that this attribute, if it exists, can become known to us only by special revelation. The evidence of the being of God, therefore, is not to be argued from the mere fact that something else *exists*, but from the *relations* of existing things.

exclusive result of the action of said substance upon itself through and in accordance with said laws. If matter be assumed as this substance, then creation is nothing but the phenomena of matter self-developed through its own inhering laws, and we have the system of material Pantheism. If we assume the real existence of two and only two unknown and unknowable somethings, as constituting all that really exists, and that the phenomena of creation are the exclusive results of the mutual action and reaction of these two entities (noumena) upon each other, we then have the system of Ideal Dualism, of which Kant is the great expounder. If, in connection with the maxim that no new substance can be originated, we assume *spirit* to be the only reality, two systems arise. We may assume the I, the subject, to be this reality. Creation, with all its facts, would then be nothing but the phenomena of this subject in its process of self-development. Hence arises the system of Subjective Idealism of which Fichte is the prominent representative. Or we may assume the Absolute to be this sole reality. Creation, with all its facts, would then be the phenomena of this one substance in its processes of self-evolution, and we have the system of Pantheism proper, of which Schelling is the great modern expounder. Or, finally, we may assume that *thought* itself, with its inhering laws, is this sole existence. Creation, with all its facts, would, in that case, be nothing but the phenomena of pure thought in its processes of self-development. This gives us the system of Pure Idealism, of which Hegel is the great modern expounder. Each of these systems is the logical consequence of the one principle, that Creation, in the sense of origination of substance from non-being, is an absolute impossibility, and of the peculiar and special assumption

of said system, in regard to what does originally exist as the sole and exclusive reality. Grant to any one of these systems this principle and its own assumption in respect to what is the original and sole reality, and all its subsequent deductions follow by a logical necessity.

The fundamental error that lies at the basis of each and all of these systems is this, the assumption, that if the principle that creation, in the sense of origination from nothing, is an absolute impossibility, be granted, then but one substance, or at most but the two unknown and unknowable entities of Kant, do or can exist. Now, the question what substances do, in fact, exist, has no connection whatever with that of the validity or non-validity of the principle under consideration. Suppose we should affirm that because creation from nothing is an impossibility, therefore no substance or reality at all can or does exist. What connection is there between the premise and conclusion in such a case? Just as much as between the same principle and the assumption that, therefore, there is but "one principle of all things," or but two, according to Kant. Grant the principle in all its force, and, for all this, there may be, notwithstanding, a creation constituted of two distinct and opposite entities, matter and spirit, a creation originated and presided over by one all-wise and all-perfect creator, God. The questions whether creation from nothing is possible, and what realities do in fact exist, are questions totally independent of each other, and the solution of the one has no connection whatever with that of the other. Each is to be investigated upon totally independent grounds. When we raise the question, what realities do in fact exist, we have but one principle to guide us, to wit, whatever is directly and immediately manifested as existing, and all

realities implied by those thus manifested, and none others, must be admitted as real.

FORMULAS AND TEST OF VALID KNOWLEDGE.

The question, What can I know? has ever been regarded as one of the grand problems of philosophy, and all systems of ontology of every kind—Realism, Materialism, Idealism, for example—have, without exception, their exclusive basis in certain definite answers to this one question. Materialism affirms that we do have valid knowledge of matter, and can have such knowledge of nothing else, and hence denies the existence of every affirmed reality not material. Idealism affirms that nothing is or can be, to the knowing faculty, an object of real knowledge, but states of the subject of knowledge, that real or valid knowledge and its objects must pertain exclusively to one and the same subject. Hence this system, in all its forms, Ideal Dualism apparently excepted, denies absolutely the possibility of valid knowledge of “things without us,” and consequently the reality of external existences. Realism, on the other hand, affirms that we have, in fact, valid knowledge of the subject, finite mind, on the one hand, of the external object, matter, on the other, and through these, of God, the Infinite and Perfect, as the creator and governor of the universe, and that, consequently, all these are to be held as real existences. How shall the claims of these conflicting and totally incompatible systems be determined? On one condition exclusively. We must have a strictly universal and absolute criterion of valid knowledge. Till we have obtained such a criterion, we are not, and cannot be, prepared to take, upon scientific grounds, a single step in the discussion of the question before us. In

the Logic we have attempted to meet this great scientific want, by giving the criterion demanded. On account of the fundamental bearings of this subject upon our present inquiries, we will give an extract which contains the criterion referred to :

“ *Distinction between Presentative and Representative Knowledge.* ”

“ As preparatory to the solution, we would restate a distinction made in a previous department of this treatise between *presentative* and *representative* knowledge. We will give the distinction in the language of Sir William Hamilton :

“ 1. A thing is known immediately or proximately when we cognize it in itself; mediately or remotely when we cognize it in or through something numerically different from itself. Immediate cognition — thus, the knowledge of a thing in itself — involves the fact of its existence; mediate cognition — thus, the knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself — involves only the possibility of its existence.

“ 2. An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is itself presented to observation, may be called a presentative; and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed by the mind face to face, may be called an intuitive cognition. A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be called a *representative* cognition.

“ 3. A thing known is called an object of knowledge.

“ 4. In a presentative or immediate cognition there is one sole object; the thing (immediately) known and the

thing existing being one and the same. In a representative or mediate cognition there may be discriminated two objects, the thing immediately known and the thing existing being numerically different."

That we have these two kinds of knowledge, no one does or can doubt. Of some realities, to say the least, we have a direct and immediate knowledge. Of other realities our knowledge is not direct and immediate, but indirect and mediate. All forms of mediate knowledge, as all admit, are originally given through one source — *sensation*. We shall employ the words presentative knowledge to represent knowledge of the first kind, and representative for that of the second.

In addition to these two kinds of knowledge, we have two other kinds also, which have the same validity as these, to wit, those truths which are necessarily presupposed by these as their logical antecedents, and those which necessarily result from them as logical consequents. All that is logically presupposed and which logically follows from any form of knowledge, must undeniably have the same validity that the latter has. No one will or can doubt the truth of this principle.

The Formula stated.

We are now prepared to give a distinct statement of the formula above suggested. It is this: *Presentative knowledge, with all its logical antecedents and consequences, must be held as universally and absolutely valid for the reality and character of the objects to which it pertains.*

Representative knowledge, with its logical antecedents and consequences, must be held as *relatively* valid. In the consciousness of a sensation, for example, we at once

recognize the fact that it had a cause — a cause adequate and adapted, while we remain constituted as we are, and that cause sustains its present relation to us, to affect us as it now does. So far our knowledge of that cause, with all that is necessarily implied in its existence, must be held as having the same validity that our knowledge of the sensation has.

The *test*, the *criterion*, by which we are to determine whether any given form of knowledge is presentative, or representative, is *consciousness*. If we are conscious of a direct and immediate perception of any object whatever, we must admit that our knowledge of that object is *presentative*. If we are conscious of knowing the object through the medium of sensation, then our knowledge of said object must be held as *representative*.

The question whether any particular cognition must be held as absolutely valid for the reality and character of its object, will in reality stand thus :

Presentative knowledge, with its logical antecedents and consequences, is universally and absolutely valid for the real nature and character of its objects.

These cognitions are or are not constituted of this one form of knowledge. Proof — consciousness.

These cognitions, consequently, are or are not thus valid.

The syllogism of representative knowledge will stand thus :

Representative knowledge, with its logical antecedents and consequences, is universally valid for the relative character of its respective objects.

These cognitions are or are not constituted of this form of knowledge. Proof — consciousness.

Therefore they are or are not thus valid.

As all cognitions are, in fact, presentative or representative, these formulas must, of necessity, include all forms of knowledge. The only question which here arises is this: Are these formulas themselves really valid for the high purpose here assigned to them? That they are, we argue from the following considerations:

The formulas and test verified.

1. We must admit their absolute and universal validity, or deny that of all knowledge of every kind. Presentative is, in fact, the highest form of knowledge of which we can, by any possibility, form any conception. Its validity can be denied on but one condition, the impeachment of the integrity of the intelligence itself as a faculty of knowledge, and pronouncing the idea of valid knowledge on any subject whatever an absolute chimera.

2. No other formulas and test beside these are even conceivable. We must, consequently, admit their validity, or affirm, that if valid or invalid cognitions do exist, we have no criteria by which we can distinguish one class from the other. Those who deny the validity of these, are bound to furnish some others possessing really valid claims. This, we are quite confident, they will never even attempt to do.

3. Every form and system of knowledge, as a matter of fact, admits the validity of these formulas and test in certain cases, — in all cases where they profess to find valid knowledge, — and all profess to find such as far as their own fundamental principles and deductions are concerned. No one will deny these statements. Now the validity of these formulas and test is to be admitted universally, or denied universally. If one form of knowledge given in consciousness

as presentative, and for the reason that it is thus given, is to be received as valid for the nature and character of its object,—and all admit that some forms thus given are thus valid, and none pretend that any form not thus given is thus valid, and that any form of knowledge can be valid for any other reason,—if any form of knowledge given in consciousness as presentative, is, we say, for the reason that it is thus given, to be regarded as valid, every other form thus given must be regarded as thus valid; or we make a discrimination without a difference, and assume that things which are equal to the same things may not be equal to each other. With these considerations the subject is left to the reflection of the thoughtful reader.

The validity of the above formulas and test can be denied but upon one sole condition, the assumption that the intelligence itself is a lie, and that it is perfectly absurd to attempt to obtain real knowledge on any subject whatever. If knowledge which pertains, by direct and immediate intuition or perception, to its object, is not to be held as valid for the existence and character of said object, no other form can be regarded, without absurdity, as possessed of any degree of validity whatever. These formulas and test, we would also remark, must be regarded as having absolutely universal validity, or none at all, on any subject. No conceivable reasons can be assigned why presentative knowledge, for example, should have validity in any one case, and not equal validity in every other. These criteria, then, are to be denied universally, or admitted universally. None will dare deny their absolute validity in certain cases. We must, therefore, admit their universal validity, or involve ourselves in the most palpable absurdity and contradiction.

*Bearing of these principles upon the Conflicting Systems
under consideration.*

Yet the admission of the validity of these criteria enables us to settle, at once and forever, and that upon purely scientific grounds, the conflicting claims of the systems above named, to wit, Realism, Materialism, and Idealism in all its forms. That we are distinctly and absolutely conscious of a direct and immediate, that is, presentative knowledge of matter as a substance possessed of the qualities of extension and form, on the one hand, and of mind as a distinct and separate substance, possessed of the powers of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, on the other, no one will deny. The reality of these two substances, as distinct, and separate, and also *known*, entities, must be admitted as truths of science, and as such, laid at the basis of all our deductions. Realism, consequently, stands revealed as a system whose validity has been demonstrated on scientific grounds; and Materialism, on the one hand, and Idealism in all its forms, on the other, as systems demonstrated, upon similar grounds, to be false. Neither the one nor the other of these systems last referred to, can, by any possibility, be true, if presentative knowledge, with all its logical antecedents and consequences, is to be held as valid for the reality and character of its objects; and the question whether our knowledge of matter, on the one hand, and of mind on the other, is of this character, is to be decided by an appeal to consciousness, and if the validity of this formula and test is admitted; and it cannot be denied, the system of Realism must be true.

Bearing of these deductions upon our present Inquiries.

In thus demonstrating, upon scientific grounds, the validity of the claims of Realism, in opposition to all other systems incompatible with it, we have practically settled and established the claims of Theism in opposition to Antitheism in all its forms. The validity of the claims of Theism has never, as a matter of fact, in any age of the world's history, been denied, or questioned even, but upon one exclusive condition, the confounding of the distinction between matter and spirit as distinct, and separate, and known entities, and resolving all existences into matter and its laws, on the one hand, or into spirit or its phenomena, on the other. Admitting the real existence of these two substances, as distinct, and separate, and known entities, and the argument for the divine existence becomes so obviously demonstrative, that no Antitheist would, for a moment, think of joining issue with the advocate of Theism.

On the other hand, let us suppose that this distinction is confounded, in the first instant, by resolving all realities into matter. What place have we, then, for a God? What idea will the term, then, represent? Nothing but an inhering law of this one substance. This is undeniable, and the advocate of Materialism is well aware of the fact. Hence, the tenacity with which he adheres to his system.

Let us suppose again that this distinction is confounded by resolving all realities into spirit or its phenomena. In that case, the intelligence itself, in having so absolutely affirmed the distinct and separate existence of itself, as the subject, and of matter as the object of presentative knowledge in external perception, is so undeniably convicted of fundamental error, that it stands unmasked before

the world as nothing else than a "liar from the beginning," and all attempts to arrive at truth through its intuitions or deductions, on any subject whatever, become absurd and ridiculous. We have before us no actually existing nature of which we can know or affirm anything certain, and through which, consequently, we can "travel up to nature's God." All we can say of God is, that he is the internal principle of we know not, and cannot know what, a mere "regulative idea" of no objective validity whatever, or a simple law of thought, and no distinct and separate, much less self-conscious, existence, whatever.

Once more, we may suppose the distinction under consideration confounded by the affirmation of the reality of two wholly unknown and unknowable entities, called the subject and object. This is the system of Ideal Dualism. According to its fundamental teachings, the universe given in our intelligence as real has no existence out of the intelligence itself. The God given by such a universe can be nothing but a "regulative idea," a wholly subjective law of thought. If from this universe we turn our thoughts to the somethings assumed as really existing, as these by the hypothesis are in themselves wholly unknown and must remain so, they afford no basis whatever for any deductions of any kind, on any subject. Whether they are created or uncreated, controlled or uncontrolled objects, and, consequently, whether any such creator or governor exists, on this and all other subjects, we can know absolutely nothing, and of course can draw from them no deductions whatever relatively to the being or character of God.

Such are the necessary logical consequences of confounding the distinction under consideration. They are nothing less than an utter subversion of religion in all its forms,

and, we may add, of truth itself on all subjects alike. Granting the distinction to be real, however, admitting the existence of both matter and spirit as wholly distinct, separate, opposite, and, at the same time, *known* entities, and the claims of Theism then stand out visibly, as having a basis no less immovable than eternal rock. To us it has appeared a matter of surprise, that the advocates of the truth have not seemed to perceive how perfectly fundamental this one distinction is to the validity of the theistic argument, in all its forms. The validity of this distinction has, we believe, been settled upon scientific grounds. For the sake of distinctness we will give the argument upon the subject in the syllogistic form.

Presentative knowledge, with its logical antecedents and consequents, must be held as universally valid for the nature and character of its objects, and whatever form of knowledge is given in consciousness as presentative, must be held as such.

Our knowledge of matter and spirit, as distinct and separate entities, the former as having real extension and form, and the latter as possessed of the powers of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, is given in consciousness as exclusively presentative.

This knowledge is, therefore, valid for the reality and character of said objects, and they must, as the basis of all our deductions, be held as distinct, and separate, and known entities, having the real qualities referred to.

This conclusion can be evaded but by a denial of the validity of the major premise of this syllogism, and no man can deny its validity but by falsifying his own immutable convictions of what is and must be true, without falsifying his own denial the moment he begins to reason on any sub-

ject whatever, and without rendering it absurd for him to attempt to reason on any subject. Those who would see this whole subject fully discussed are referred to the article on Sense, in the Intellectual Philosophy, and to Part IV. in the Science of Logic, and also to what Sir William Hamilton has published on this fundamental subject. We think we are quite safe in saying, that the opposers of Theism will never join issue with the argument, as presented in either of the works above referred to; nor will they ever attempt to invalidate the claims of Theism but by confounding the distinction, which, in said works, is demonstrated to be real.

FIRST TRUTHS AND PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE, AND ASSUMPTIONS EMPLOYED AS SUCH TRUTHS.

Every thinker is aware that there is a fundamental distinction between *first truths*, or principles of science, that is, universal and necessary intuitive (analytical) judgments, and mere *assumptions* employed as such truths in the construction of professed systems of science. Every such person is also equally aware of the fact, that while the former class of judgments have universal and absolute validity, as the basis of deductions which are to be regarded as having correspondingly absolute validity for truth, any deductions arising from the latter class of judgments have no validity for truth whatever. Yet nothing is more common in the construction of systems of knowledge than the confounding of these two classes of judgments, employing the latter as belonging to the former class. Hence the vast importance of universal criteria, by which we can scientifically distinguish the one class of judgments from the other. These criteria we have attempted to furnish in the

Logic, and, on account of their fundamental bearings upon our present inquiries, will here repeat the substance of what is there fully elucidated.

What, then, is an analytical judgment (first truth), as distinguished from mere assumptions? It is a judgment whose certainty is immediately evinced by an analysis of, or reflection on, the *conceptions* constituting the subject and predicate of the judgment itself. Those judgments which are evincible only through other and more elementary ones, are called *synthetical judgments*. All analytical judgments, those having immediate and intuitive certainty, will be found to be comprehended in one or the other of the following classes: 1. Those in which the predicate represents an essential or known and admitted quality of the subject, as in the judgment, All bodies are extended. The predicate, in this case, represents a necessary quality and element of the subject, it being impossible for us to conceive of a body which has not extension. Such judgments, therefore, are analytical, that is, have and must have, from a mere analysis of the subject and predicate, intuitive certainty. 2. Those in which the predicate is the logical antecedent of the subject, that is, when the reality of the *object* represented by the former conception is necessarily implied by the reality of that represented by the latter; as in the judgment, Body implies space. The fundamental conception that we have of body, is that of an object existing in, and occupying space. If body exists, therefore, space must exist. Hence the proposition, Body implies space, has necessary, intuitive certainty; that is, it is an analytical judgment. So of the judgments, Succession implies time, Events, a cause, and Phenomena, substance, &c. 3. We may reckon as belonging to the same class,

those judgments in which, by definition, there is an intuitive incompatibility between the subject and predicate, and when the judgment affirms this incompatibility. Of this character is the judgment, A straight line cannot inclose space. By definition the predicate represents a portion of space included within a line which departs from a given point in certain directions, by which it returns to the point of departure. A straight line, on the other hand, is one which never returns to said point, but always advances to greater and greater distances from it. The idea of a straight line, therefore, and of one including space, are incompatible with each other, and cannot be predicated of the same subject; and the judgment affirming this incompatibility is analytical, having necessary intuitive certainty. This last class is not referred to in the Logic, and is here adduced for the sake of distinctness.

Now, we affirm that, upon no other conditions, actual or conceivable, than the above, can any judgment have intuitive certainty, and consequently have any validity, when employed as a first truth or principle of science, and we have here the scientific criteria of all such truths, those criteria given by Dr. Reid and others, being rather accidents than scientific characteristics of such truths. What now are the essential characteristics of assumptions as distinguished from such truths? We answer: *An assumption is a judgment not known to be true, but employed in the construction of systems of knowledge, as a first truth or principle, that is, a judgment having necessary intuitive certainty, or one evinced as true.* Every such judgment will possess one or the other of the following characteristics: 1. It may be a problematical judgment which is true in itself, but whose truth has not yet been ascertained. 2. It

may be a judgment which, whether true or false, cannot be proved to be true. 3. It may be a judgment which is, in fact, false, and one the error of which can be established, it being in itself contradictory, or undeniably incompatible with some other judgment known to be true. Suppose that any of the above classes of judgments be employed as principles, or as ascertained truths, in the construction of systems of knowledge. Such systems are nothing but logical fictions, and we are false to all the demands of science upon us, if we give them any higher place in our regard. All deductions arising from such judgments are fallacies and nothing else. We will elucidate these distinctions by a few examples.

The fundamental distinction between true and false systems of Knowledge or Science.

We will suppose that two professed systems of science are before us, each possessing equal claims with the other, as far as accuracy of definition, perfection of logical division, and arrangement of topics, and logical connection with the assumed principles which lie at the basis of the deductions throughout, are concerned. Yet one system presents and embodies throughout nothing but important truth, and the other is, throughout, fraught with fundamental error, or with deductions which have no claim to validity. What are the fundamental differences between these systems?

In regard to the former, it will be found to possess the following essential characteristics: 1. The *principles* on which the whole superstructure is based, and from which all its conclusions are deduced, are exclusively *analytical judgments*, necessary intuitive judgments, which can, by no possibility, be false. 2. All its deductions are the

necessary logical consequents of these principles, and the fundamental and well-ascertained facts ranged under said principles. 3. Hence all such deductions legitimately take rank as truths of science. The above are the immutable characteristics of all systems of knowledge scientifically developed, and no deductions not resting upon such a basis can have any claims whatever to be regarded as truths of science, that is, real truths.

In examining systems of the second class, we shall find, that however fixed the connections may be between their deductions and the facts adduced, and the assumed principles under which said facts are ranged, all such systems have one or the other of the two following characteristics: 1. The facts adduced are unreal, or not properly authenticated. 2. The principles assumed as known, first, or ascertained truths of science, are mere assumptions, with no claims to validity whatever. Hence said systems stand revealed as nothing but logical fictions.

Fundamental and common assumption of Materialism and Idealism.

In examining fundamentally the system of Materialism, on the one hand, and of Idealism in all its forms, on the other, we shall find that both systems alike, Ideal Dualism apparently excepted, rest upon one and the same assumption, to wit, that when we pass from phenomena to substance (real being), or from the facts of the universe to the substratum (real existences) which underlie and determine these facts, that there really and truly exists but *one* substance, a substance which remains ever one and the same amid the ever-varying phenomena which it exhibits, and that these phenomena or facts are nothing but the necessary

results of the necessary activity of this one substance in its self-necessitated processes of self-evolution and self-development. Such is the principle. What are its fundamental characteristics? To this inquiry we answer:

1. It is not in any form an *analytical judgment*, that is, a self-evident, intuitive, and consequently universal and necessary truth. Let us look, for a moment, on the proposition itself, to wit, the phenomena of nature, or the facts of the universe, are nothing but the manifested results of one single substance in its self-necessitated processes of self-evolution and self-development. Is there any necessary connection between the subject and predicate of this judgment? Does the predicate represent a necessary element of the subject? In other words, do the facts of the universe, by necessary implication, imply the existence of one and but one substance, and contradict every other supposition? Or is the conception represented by the predicate of this proposition, the logical antecedent of that represented by the subject? In other words, is the reality of the object represented by the predicate of this proposition, the idea that but one substance does exist, necessarily implied by the supposition that the facts represented by the subject are realities, and supposed for the same reason that the reality of space is necessarily implied in the supposition that body really exists? No one will dare pretend to believe any such thing. If the proposition before us is true, no one will pretend that its truth is self-evident. It has, then, no claims to take rank as a first truth of science.

2. Nor is the truth of this principle capable of being established by any process of argumentation. There is no self-evident truth lying back of this proposition, nor any facts falling under such truth, from which the validity of

any such proposition as this can be logically deduced. This is self-evident, and will not be denied. What have we, then, in the proposition before us? Nothing but a mere *assumption*, an assumption which is not, and cannot, by any possibility, be known to be true. All the deductions based upon it, therefore, are nothing else but logical fictions, without any claims to validity whatever.

3. But this is not the worst that can truly be said of this baseless assumption. It has, we remark, in the next place, no *antecedent* or *deductive probability* even, in its favor. Of these two substances, matter and spirit, it is just as antecedently probable that one exists, as that the other exists, and just as probable, in itself, that both exist together, as that one exists alone. This is absolutely undeniable. The supposition that the Finite exists presents no antecedent probability against the supposition that the Infinite and Perfect exists also. Nor does the supposition that the latter exists, involve the least antecedent probability against the supposition that the former also exists, and the supposition that both exist is just as probable in itself as the hypothesis that one exists alone. Existence in all its forms, we should ever bear in mind, is a profound mystery. We know that realities do exist. Beyond the mere fact of their existence, actual nature, and relations, we know and can know absolutely nothing. Of all conceivable forms of existence, not involving a contradiction, the supposition that any one form is real is just as antecedently probable as the hypothesis that any other is, and the hypothesis that all actually exist is just as antecedently probable as any other hypothesis upon the subject. The hypothesis of one and only one real substance, substratum of all things, has not a shadow of antecedent probability in its favor.

4. There is, on the other hand, the highest antecedent probability against this hypothesis. How a substance absolutely simple, without separable parts, with nothing else in existence upon which it may act, and by which it may be acted upon, should act at all, in any direction whatever, is, of all suppositions, the most incomprehensible. The supposition of a process of self-evolution or self-development in such a substance, makes an approach, to say the least, towards the principle of contradiction. That two or more substances existing together should act and react upon each other, is much more conceivable, and hence the hypothesis, that the facts of the universe are the result of such form of activity, is far more antecedently probable, than the supposition that they are the result of the action of any one single and simple substance, in a process of self-evolution and development.

5. We have, we remark finally, in every act of external perception, the most absolute knowledge of the fact that this hypothesis is not, and cannot be true. In every such act, two distinct, separate, and opposite substances stand revealed, with absolute distinctness, to the mind, as realities. Here are the subject and object, "the me, and the not me," directly and immediately revealed to the consciousness, not as one substance, but as two distinct and opposite realities, the knowledge that one exists being just as absolute as the knowledge that the other does, and the knowledge that both, as distinct, separate, and opposite, entities exist, being just as absolute as the knowledge that either or any other reality exists at all. Either the universal intelligence is a lie, or this hypothesis is and must be false.

Such is the baseless assumption before us, the assumption upon which world-makers have so long been erecting

their logical fictions, and then imposing these upon the world as the highest deductions of science. Take away this one assumption, and we have absolutely no foundation on which we can, by any possibility, erect the superstructure of Materialism, on the one hand, or Idealism, on the other.

The special fundamental assumption peculiar to Idealism.

In addition to the assumption above refuted, there are two others peculiar to Idealism in its different forms, and these are fundamental to its claims to validity. They are the two following: that in all instances of valid knowledge “there is, 1, a *synthesis of being and knowing in the I,*”—that is, that the condition of valid knowledge is this, that the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge are always one and identical, —in other words still, that valid knowledge always pertains to the attributes or states of the subject of knowledge, and to nothing exterior to said subject; or, 2, that there is, in all forms of valid knowledge, “*an actual identity of being and knowing,*”—that is, that knowledge itself, and the object of knowledge, are always one and identical. Upon the former assumption, such forms of Idealism as Pantheism and Subjective Idealism rest; and upon the latter that of Pure Idealism. If we grant the assumption, that there really and truly exists but one substance, or principle, of all things, and that in all cases of valid knowledge, the subject and object of knowledge are one and identical, then one of the two forms of Idealism first named must be true. The subject of knowledge, spirit, must be the only reality, and that subject must be one and only one substance. If, on the other hand, we grant the doctrine of one and only one substance,

and also the principle, that being and knowing are one and identical, — that is, that thought and the object of thought, are, and must be, one and the same, — then thought is, and must be the only reality, and Pure Idealism is, and must be, the only form of real truth. Let us now examine these two assumptions, that of “a synthesis of being and knowing in the I,” and that of “an absolute identity of being and knowing.” On reflection, it will be seen at once that the same remarks made above in regard to the assumption of one substance or principle of all things, are equally applicable to each of the assumptions before us.

1. Neither of these assumptions has the least possible claims to be regarded or employed as First Truths or Principles of science. If they are true, their truth is not self-evident; in other words, they have none of the characteristics whatever of *analytical judgments*. How do we, how can we know, *à priori*, that there may not be two realities, one sustaining to the other the relation of a *power*, while the latter sustains to the former that of an *object* of knowledge? *A priori* we do not and cannot know that any power of knowledge exists at all, much less what is its nature, and the conditions of its valid action. Neither of these assumptions has any claim whatever to the place which they occupy in the different systems of Idealism, that of principles in science, and all the consequents deduced from them have no claims to validity in any form.

2. Nor can the validity of either of these assumptions, as problematical judgments, be established by proof. There are no analytical judgments, or First Truths, nor any facts of consciousness, nor of any other kind, from which the validity of these assumptions can be deduced. This is undeniable. They are, then, mere assumptions, without

any *à priori* or *à posteriori* claims to regard as original or deduced principles of science.

3. Equally evident is it, that they are both alike, utterly void of any form of antecedent probability in their favor. Equally probable, in itself, as either of these, is the assumption that there may be, and in fact is, a power of knowledge, on the one hand, and on the other, realities wholly exterior to said power, realities sustaining to it the relation of *objects* of real valid knowledge. From aught that we do or can know *à priori*, there may be, in some cases, an actual identity of being and knowing, — that is, thought may be an object of thought, and the fact of knowledge an object of knowledge. In others, there may be a synthesis of being and knowing, — that is, the subject of knowledge may be to itself an object of knowledge. In others still, the subject and object of knowledge may be entirely distinct and separate entities. That real valid knowledge, in all these forms, should exist, is just as antecedently probable, as that it should exist in either form exclusively, which is claimed by Idealism.

4. Hence, we remark finally, that each of these assumptions, when presented as universal and exclusive principles of science, are demonstrably false. That valid knowledge in the two forms implied in these assumptions does exist, is, as stated above, to be admitted, because that both forms alike are given as real in consciousness. Equally direct and absolute is the testimony of consciousness to the existence of real valid knowledge in the third form, that is, to a form of real knowledge in which the subject and the object are given as distinct and separate entities. We might, with the same propriety, claim this last as the only real form of valid knowledge as either of the other cases.

The assumptions under consideration, when presented as they are in systems of Idealism, as First Truths or principles of science, and as including the exclusive forms of valid knowledge, are not only mere assumptions, utterly void of all claims to validity of any kind, but are demonstrably false in fact. In traversing systems based upon these assumptions, we are ever to bear distinctly in mind, that we are in the regions of exclusive scientific fictions and baseless error, and nowhere else.

Now, if we take away the assumption of one substance or principle of all things, and the two under consideration, we have removed, entirely, the foundation on which every form of Idealism rests, Ideal Dualism apparently, but not really, excepted. The authors and expounders of these systems have, without exception, laid down these assumptions as the exclusive basis of all their deductions. What claims, then, have these systems upon our regard? They have no more claims to be regarded as systems of valid knowledge, than the Arabian Night's Tales have to be regarded as true authentic records of real facts of history. On the other hand, we have the same reasons to regard these systems as systems of error, that we have to regard these tales as not being authentic historical records. Resting, as they undeniably and exclusively do, upon mere assumptions and nothing else, they have and can have no higher merits than logical fictions imposed upon the world as systems of eternal truth. As resting exclusively upon assumptions demonstrably false, in fact, they also stand revealed as nothing but systems of error. These statements and deductions will be verified at full length in a subsequent part of this treatise.

Coleridge's attempted demonstration of the Validity of the two assumptions above refuted.

Coleridge, in his "Biographia Literaria," has attempted to prove the validity of the two assumptions above refuted. Let us consider, for a moment, his argument upon the subject. "During the act of knowledge itself," he says, "the objective and subjective are so instantly united that we cannot tell to which of the two the priority belongs. There is here no first and no second; both are coinstantaneous and one. While I am attempting to explain this intimate coalition, I must suppose it dissolved. I must necessarily set out from the one, to which, therefore, I must give hypothetical antecedence, in order to arrive at the other. But as there are but two factors or elements in the problem, subject and object, and as it is left indeterminate from which of them I should commence, there are two cases equally possible.

"1. Either the objective is taken as the first, and then we have to account for the supervention of the subjective which coalesces with it.

"2. Or the subjective is taken as the first, and the problem, then, is, how there supervenes to it a coincident objective." "The final consequence logically deducible from each of these hypotheses alike," he concludes, "is the doctrine of a perfect identity between the subject and object; that is, between the self, the intelligence which knows, and the object known." How this consequence follows from these suppositions, our author fails wholly to show us. He only affirms that it *must be* so. But how does the mind get rid of the natural belief in the reality of an external universe, and arrive at the conclusion of a perfect identity of

the subject and object? By an act of will, in the first instance, assuming that our belief in the reality of said universe is invalid; and in the next, by a similar act, compelling ourselves to *treat* this innate and necessary belief, as nothing but a prejudice. On this subject we will permit our author to speak for himself. The reader will then perceive that we have not misunderstood or misrepresented him. "This purification of the mind," he says, "is effected by an absolute and scientific scepticism to which the mind voluntarily determines itself for the specific purpose of future certainty." Descartes, who (in his meditations) himself first, at least of the moderns, gave a beautiful example of this voluntary doubt, this self-determined indetermination, happily expresses its utter difference from the scepticism of vanity or irreligion: "*Nec tamen in eo scepticos imitabar, qui dubitant tantum ut dubitent, et preter incertitudinem ipsam nihil quærant. Nam contra totus in eo eram ut aliquid certi respirarem.*" — DESCARTES, *de Methodo*. Nor is it less distinct in its motives and final aim, than in its proper objects, which are not, as an ordinary scepticism, the prejudices of education and circumstances, but those original and innate prejudices which nature herself has implanted in all men, and which, to all but the philosopher, are the first principles of knowledge and the final test of truth.

Now, these essential prejudices are all reducible to the one fundamental assumption THAT THERE EXIST THINGS WITHOUT US. As this, on the one hand, originates neither in grounds nor arguments, and yet on the other hand remains proof against all attempts to remove it by grounds or argument (*naturam furca expellas tamen usque redibit*); on the one hand lays claim to IMMEDIATE certainty as a

position at once indemonstrable and irresistible, and yet, on the other hand, inasmuch as it refers to something essentially different from ourselves, nay, even in opposition to ourselves, leaves it inconceivable how it could possibly become a part of our immediate consciousness (in other words, how that which ex-hypothesi is and continues to be intrinsic and alien to our being), the philosopher therefore compels himself to treat this faith as nothing more than a prejudice, innate, indeed, and connatural, but still a prejudice?"

The procedure described above accords perfectly with the fundamental method of Idealism in all its forms, as explained by all its great expounders. "I put myself," says Krug, the successor of Kant, "when I begin to philosophize, into the state of not knowing, since I am to produce in me for the first time a knowledge." "I accordingly," he adds, "regard all my previous knowledge as uncertain, and strive after a higher knowledge that shall be certain or be made so." This accords with the method of all idealistic philosophers, from Descartes down to Hegel. The conviction of the coexistence of two known realities, the knowing subject and the object known, is wholly and at once set aside by a mere assumption that all "previous knowledge" is invalid. In reference to the subject, as now presented, we would invite special attention to the following suggestions :

1. The consequences which Mr. Coleridge adduces from the two hypotheses which he lays down do not logically follow from those hypotheses, granting their validity. If, for example, we suppose, in the first instance, the object of knowledge to exist, it by no means follows that in order to find a subject, — that is, one which shall sustain to the object

a power of real valid knowledge, — this power must be one and identical with its object. For aught that we do or can know either by intuition or deduction from valid principles, the object and power of knowledge may be distinct and separate entities. The same holds equally, if we assume the subject (the power of knowledge) to be real, and attempt to find for it an object of knowledge. It is neither intuitively certain, nor can it be rendered so by deduction, that, in order to find for said subject an object of knowledge, we must find it by supposing an identity between the subject and object. For aught that we do or can know, *à priori* or *à posteriori*, the object, as a reality, may be wholly distinct from the subject.

2. If we grant, on the other hand, that this common consequent, the real and absolute identity of the subject and object of knowledge, does follow from each of the hypotheses given by our author, the validity of this doctrine of identity is by no means established thereby. The reason is obvious; we need not begin with either of these hypotheses, and Mr. Coleridge erred fundamentally in assuming that “we must necessarily set out” from one or the other of them. Without either taking the subject or object first, we may take both together as coexisting but separate and distinct substances, and suppose that one sustains to the other the relation of a power, while the latter sustains to the former the relation of an object of real knowledge. Valid knowledge on this is just as conceivable, and, consequently, as antecedently probable, as on the theory of an absolute identity of the subject and object.

3. While it is true that in some cases there is an identity of subject and object in the act of knowledge, as in all cases of exclusive self-knowledge, it is also equally true

that in other instances knowledge equally valid arises in accordance with the other principle. In every act of external knowledge, the mind becomes equally and absolutely conscious of the self, as the *subject*, and of a not-self, a reality wholly separate and distinct from the self, as the *object* of knowledge. What the universal intelligence has thus distinctly and absolutely separated, nothing but "science falsely so called" will ever attempt to confound.

The reasons assigned by Mr. Coleridge why "the philosopher compels himself" to treat what he himself admits to be a natural, innate, and necessary intuition of the universal Intelligence, "that there exist things without us," "as nothing more than a prejudice," next demands our special attention. The reason given is simply this: It is "inconceivable *how* it could be possible" that an object "essentially different from ourselves, nay, even in opposition to ourselves," should "become a part of our immediate consciousness;" that is, be to the mind an object of direct perception or knowledge. Suppose that the author had asked himself this one question, How is it practicable for us to conceive of the possibility of the same entity being, at the same time, both the subject and object of knowledge? Especially how is it possible that that which is exclusively subjective, and has no existence exterior to the mind, but exclusively as a part of its own being and substance, should be given in consciousness as "something essentially different from ourselves, nay, even in opposition to ourselves?" Had he reflected at all upon the subject, he would have perceived that it is just as difficult, and no more so, to conceive of the possibility of knowledge in this form as in the other. Had he further asked himself the question, How is knowledge *in any form whatever* possible? he would

have perceived at once that but one answer can be given, to wit, such is the *nature* of mind, as a faculty of knowledge. Whatever is to the mind an object of knowledge, whether it be the mind itself or a part of its substance, or some of its states, or, finally, something wholly exterior and independent as an existence, of the mind, it must be such object upon one exclusive condition, and can possibly be upon no other, to wit, that such is the correlated nature of the object, on the one hand, and of mind, on the other, that as a consequence of this correlation, the former is to the latter, when the requisite conditions are fulfilled, an object, and the latter is to the former a power of real knowledge. Now this, the only possible reason for knowledge of any reality whatever, renders the possibility of a knowledge of what is external to the mind, just as conceivable as a knowledge of what is exclusively subjective. This also leaves us open to the simple question, What do we know? One form of knowledge has the same antecedent probability in its favor, as far as the question of its possibility or actual existence is concerned, as another.

But suppose we could not conceive how a knowledge of objects external to the mind is possible. How infinitely absurd and contradictory to all principles of true science is it, for such a reason, to assume that, therefore, such knowledge does not and cannot exist, and then compel ourselves to treat an innate, necessary, and universal intuition of the intelligence "as nothing but a prejudice," and to construct our system of existence upon the presumption that such an intuition is, in fact, a lie! This attempt to determine *à priori* what the mind does and does not know, and especially the act of setting aside and repudiating acknowledged necessary intuitions of the universal intelligence, on the ground

of mere assumptions, is one of the darkest errors of the dark ages.

5. Let us now consider the necessary consequences of the assumption of our author, that those intuitive convictions which "nature herself has implanted in all men, and which, to all but the philosopher, are the first principles of knowledge and the final test of truth," are "nothing more than a prejudice, innate, indeed, and connatural, but still a prejudice;" that is, innate and connatural intuitions of the universal intelligence which are not only void of validity, but false in fact. This is the dogma of Idealism in all its forms. Kant, for example, affirms that the belief that "there exist things without us," is not a prejudice of education, which may be eradicated by reasoning, but a principle "inhering in reason itself," a principle consequently which, as he himself affirms, philosophy can never eradicate. What are the consequences of such an assumption? One undeniable consequence is this: the deductions of philosophy and the innate, connatural, and necessary intuitions of the universal intelligence are, in fact, irreconcilable antagonisms. The next consequence is this: if the assumptions and deductions of Idealism are valid, then the intelligence itself is "a liar from the beginning;" for it commences its activity by the absolute intuitive affirmation that that which is exclusively subjective according to the teachings of this philosophy, is as exclusively objective and exterior to and independent in existence of the mind. The last consequence is, that we are bound to consider all the assumptions and deductions of this philosophy as nothing but a mass of error and delusion; for the assumptions and deductions are given exclusively by this very intelligence which fundamentally errs and falsifies in its primary

and necessary intuitions. Such are the necessary and undeniable consequences of the fundamental assumption of Idealism in all its forms.

6. We are now prepared to notice the real character of Idealism in all the various forms which it assumes. We would here remark, in general, that there is an absolutely necessary connection between the principles that lie at the basis of every form which this system assumes and all its subsequent deductions. When we depart from these principles no fallacy whatever appears in the subsequent processes. All here has the most absolute logical consistency. When we examine the fundamental principles on which the superstructure is so proudly and imposingly reared, we find that, without exception, they are mere assumptions, utterly void of all *à priori* or *à posteriori* claims to validity, assumptions utterly void, too, of all antecedent probability in their favor, on the one hand, and demonstrably false, being undeniably contradictory to known intuitive truths, on the other. The philosopher of this school *assumes*, as we have seen, in the first instance, that all our present knowledge, intuitive or deductive, is invalid. His next assumption is, that there exists, in reality, but one substance, one principle of all things; and his last, that in all cases of valid knowledge there is and must be real synthesis or identity of being and knowing. Granting these assumptions, and Idealism must be true. But what is their character? As we have already shown, they are not only utterly destitute of all claims of any kind, intuitive or deductive, to validity, but demonstrably false. Systems thus constructed can be nothing better than logical fictions, on the one hand, but must be systems of fundamental error on the other.

The real nature, and true proper sphere of Knowledge à priori.

We know of no philosopher of any standing who maintains the validity of the fundamental principles of the philosophy of Locke, to wit, that the elements of all ideas and of all forms of knowledge existing in the human mind were originally derived from one source exclusively, EXPERIENCE, or external and internal perception. All now admit, that while there are, in the mind, forms of knowledge given by experience, there are also, in the same intelligence, universal and necessary truths and principles which could by no possibility have been given by experience, — the ideas of space, time, substance, and personal identity, and the principles, Body implies space; Succession, time; Events, a cause; and Things equal to the same things are equal to each other, for example. For the sake of convenience and in accordance with scientific usage, we will call the forms of knowledge first named *empirical*, and those last named *à priori*. The elements of empirical knowledge are of two kinds, the external and the internal, those pertaining to matter, and those pertaining to mind. The function of the intelligence which gives us the former class of elements, we denominate sense, or the faculty of external perception, and that which gives us the latter we denominate consciousness, or the faculty of internal perception. That function which gives us necessary ideas, those of space, time, substance, etc., we denominate Reason. These three are the primary functions of the intelligence. From these exclusively the elements of all our knowledge are and must be derived. Of the secondary functions of the intelligence we will here specify but two, — the Understanding which

blends the elements given by the primary faculties into *notions* or *conceptions* particular and general, and the Judgment which affirms the relations existing between these conceptions; as, for example, A is or is not B.

On a moment's reflection it will be perceived, that it is a question of fundamental importance in science, what are the real relations of the *à priori* and *à posteriori* elements of knowledge to each other? To this question we believe that the only true answer has been given in the "Intellectual Philosophy," pp. 38-46, and the *Logie*, pp. 312-320. The substance of the answer there given is this: When we contemplate any intuitively valid judgment, in which one conception is an empirical and the other an *à priori* conception, as in the proposition, Body implies space, we shall find this to be the immutable and universal relation existing between them, to wit, the reality of the object of the latter conception is necessarily implied by that of the object of the former. The reality of space, the object of the *à priori* conception in the above proposition, is necessarily implied by that of body, the object of the empirical conception. So of the judgments, Succession implies time, Events a cause and Phenomena substance, and in all instances of similar classes of judgments. This, then, is the fixed relation between the *à priori* and *à posteriori* elements of thought. The validity of the latter presupposes that of the former, and the object of the latter can be known only as thus presupposed. In the order of development in the intelligence therefore, the *à posteriori* element always arises prior to its implied *à priori* element: In the logical order, however, the *à priori*, or implied element, is always first. In other words, it is the logical antecedent of the *à posteriori* element. This, then, is the exclusive relation of Reason to

the other functions of the intelligence. In the primary action of the Intelligence, Sense and Consciousness give the phenomena, facts, and qualities of matter and mind, while Reason gives the necessary truths implied by such phenomena, to wit, space, time, substance, and cause, etc. The secondary ideas of Reason, those of right and wrong, the beautiful, the true, the good, the perfect, the infinite, &c., are similarly related to conceptions and affirmations of the Understanding and Judgment. Reason is always and exclusively, in the order of time, secondary in its action, giving what is implied by the facts affirmed as realities by the other faculties. Thus, when by Sense and Consciousness body, succession, phenomena, and events are perceived, Reason gives the ideas of space, time, substance, and cause, as the truths implied in and by the facts above named. When the conception of an agent possessing certain powers, and existing in certain relations, is given by the Understanding, Reason gives its logical antecedents, the ideas of right and wrong, obligation, &c. Such is the exclusive sphere of *à priori* elements of thought, and of Reason as the organ of said elements. From this view of this fundamental subject, a view which a careful analysis of intellectual phenomena will not fail to recognize as correct, the following consequences necessarily arise :

1. We see why it is that all *à priori* elements of thought are valid not only *relatively*, but for *truth itself*. That which is necessarily implied in something else, must undeniably have the same validity as that by which it is implied. Now, all *à priori* elements of thought are, in fact, implied and necessarily so, by forms of empirical knowledge which are valid, not merely subjectively, but for truth itself, that is, for realities as they are in themselves. This we have already

rendered demonstratively evident. All *à priori* elements of thought, then, are valid, not merely in a relative sense, but for realities as they are, or for objects in themselves.

2. We see why all the deductions of the pure, or *à priori* sciences, such as the pure mathematics, are applicable to all facts of observation and experience in the universe around us. These deductions are the logical consequences of *à priori* ideas and principles which are *implied* in and by those facts, and must, of course, have the same validity, relatively to them, that those ideas and principles have. That, for example, which is true of any parts of space occupied by any material substances (bodies) must be true of the bodies which occupy said parts. So in all other instances. We always explain facts by a reference to what is implied by them. For this reason knowledge *à posteriori* is explained by knowledge *à priori*.

3. We are now able to explain the nature and character of all First Truths, Principles of science. They are analytical judgments, that is, judgments whose necessary and universal validity is directly and immediately *implied* in a view of the nature and necessary relations of the subject and predicate of such judgments. There are and can be, as we have seen, but three relations which do or can yield such judgments, to wit, — those in which the predicate represents an essential element of the subject, as in the judgment, All bodies have extension, — those in which the reality of the objects to which the predicate pertains is implied in and by the reality of that to which the subject pertains — and, finally, those in which, by definition, the subject and predicate sustain to each other the relation of incompatibility, and the judgment affirms that incompatibility, as in the judgment, A circle is not a square.

4. We are now prepared to state definitely the distinction between the sciences, pure and mixed, together with the fundamental characteristics of each. In the mixed sciences, the elements of empirical knowledge, the facts of matter and mind, are explained and elucidated in the light of analytical judgments, or valid first truths. In the pure sciences, the mathematics, for example, the facts of *à priori* knowledge, such as quantity, number, power, cause, &c., are explained and elucidated in the light of similar judgments.

5. We see why it is, we remark, in the last place, that the sciences, when rightly conducted, are to be regarded as the valid interpreters, not of knowledge, which has a mere relative and no real validity, but of truth itself. The great facts elucidated by each class of the sciences alike pertain, as we have shown, to realities as they are in themselves, and the principles, in the light of which these facts are explained, have an absolute or apodictic certainty.

Error of Idealism on this subject.

Now, what is the nature and sphere of knowledge *à priori* according to Idealism, as interpreted by all its great exponents from Kant to Hegel? To this inquiry we answer:

1. From laws inhering in Reason itself, such knowledge arises in the mind wholly independent of and prior to all knowledge *à posteriori*. Here is the first and great error of this system in all its forms. Knowledge *à priori*, in fact, is, in its origin, subsequent to, and in consciousness is given as implied in, knowledge *à posteriori*.

2. According to the universal teachings of Idealism, knowledge *à priori*, in the order of actual development, is not only prior to all elements and forms of knowledge *à*

posteriori, but as laws of thought, the former generates and determines the entire characteristics of the latter. The ideas of space and time, in the first instance, determine external perception by causing a mere objective state, a sensation, to *appear* as an extended object existing externally to and independent of the mind itself. Here we have the second great error of this system. Knowledge *à priori* does not, in fact, as this system affirms, originate in the intelligence prior, but subsequent, to knowledge *à posteriori*, and the former, instead of originating and determining the latter, is itself originated, and in important senses determined, by the latter, being given in consciousness as implied by it, and not as implying it.

3. If we grant, as this system affirms, that Reason simply and exclusively by virtue of its own inherent laws originates, in the first instance, knowledge *à priori* in all its forms, and then, in the next, originates and determines the character of all forms of knowledge *à posteriori*, the following consequences deduced by the expounders of the system follow by a logical necessity. (1.) Knowledge *à priori* has a mere *subjective*, and can, by no possibility, have any *objective* validity. That which is originated exclusively by laws inhering in the subject can have no legitimate claims to validity relatively to anything external and foreign to said subject. This is undeniable. (2.) As knowledge *à posteriori* is originated and determined by knowledge *à priori*, the former can have no higher claims to validity than the latter. This also is self-evident. (3.) All procedures of the intelligence, whatever their form, and to whatever they pertain, are alike void, and utterly so, of all claims to objective validity. The sciences are not the interpreters of truth itself, but of cognitions

which are valid representatives of no realities of any kind. These are the necessary logical consequences of the fundamental psychological errors above elucidated. Every one who admits that the nature and sphere of knowledge *à priori* is rightly given in the system under consideration, must, to be logically consistent, take these consequences in all their length and breadth. All knowledge must be admitted to be nothing but empty shadows of no realities whatever, mere appearance in which absolutely no reality of any kind appears. Those who have rightly interpreted the nature and sphere of knowledge *à priori* and *à posteriori* both, will not fail to perceive that all such persons have, as we have stated in another work, been deluded by a false philosophy into the belief that they are looking only at shadows, when, in fact, they are beholding with open face realities as they are.

General consequences of such an error in regard to the nature and sphere of Knowledge à priori.

As knowledge *à priori*, that is, *à priori* principles, lie at the foundation of all systems of knowledge, a natural consequence, which cannot fail to arise from the error which we have pointed out in regard to the nature and sphere of this form of knowledge, should not be overlooked in this connection. It is this. Such an error cannot fail to occasion the wildest and most unauthorized *assumptions* in the construction of systems of philosophy. It will, almost of necessity, lead the subject to confound in his own mind the distinctions between the merest assumptions and real analytical judgments, or first truths, and to mistake the wildest conjectures for eternal verities, and to place the former at the foundation of systems of science.

THE IDEA OF GOD NOT SELF-CONTRADICTIONARY.

Within a few years past, a dogma has been pushed into the sphere of religious thought, a dogma which, if admitted to be valid, renders all theistic inquiries the perfection of absurdity. We refer to the dogma that all our ideas of God are self-contradictory, in other words, intrinsically absurd and of impossible validity. "The conception of the Absolute and Infinite," says Mr. Mansel, "from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active; nor without equal contradiction be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum." Yet this same author affirms that "it is our duty to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite." In other words, it is our duty to hold, as valid, ideas known to be self-contradictory and absurd. Mr. Herbert Spencer says, that if Mr. Mansel's argument is valid, "duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality." We affirm, that, if Mr. Mansel's reasoning is correct, duty requires us to affirm that God exists, and to deny that he exists; to affirm that he is infinite, and to deny that he is infinite; to affirm that he is personal, and to deny that he is personal; to affirm that he is active, and to affirm that

he is inactive ; to affirm that he is the sum of all reality, and that he is only a part of that sum. By the immutable law of contradiction we are absolutely bound to affirm every self-contradictory proposition to be utterly false. By this law, therefore, according to Mr. Mansel, we are absolutely bound to affirm and to deny of God, and that in the same sense, existence and non-existence, finiteness and infinity, personality and impersonality, activity and inactivity, unity and plurality. Mr. Mansel tells us, that it is a contradiction to affirm that God exists. Then, if he is correct, we are immutably bound to deny the divine existence. Again, he tells us that it is a contradiction to affirm that God does not exist. Then again, if he is still correct, we are under obligations equally absolute to affirm that God does exist. The same holds true in all the cases referred to, and in all relations in which the principle of contradiction really obtains.

But how does Mr. Mansel verify, or attempt to verify, the validity of these contradictions? By special definitions of the terms infinite and absolute ; definitions whose validity can be sustained by a reference to no standard lexicon or authority in existence, and which no intelligent theist will accept, or ought to accept, as representing his idea of God. "The metaphysical representation of Deity, as Infinite and Absolute," says Mr. Mansel, "must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality." Again, "If the Absolute and Infinite is an object of human conception at all, this and none other is the conception required." If this be the only true representation of God as the Infinite and Absolute, then, in the name of all intelligent theists, we affirm that God is not the Infinite and Absolute, and

we never thought of him as such. In our representation, we have ever separated the Most High from infinite space and duration, on the one hand, and from all finite realities, on the other. "God," in our representation, "is a spirit," a self-conscious personality, infinite and perfect, and, as such, possessed of a certain number of definable attributes. It is only in view of these attributes, and of his known relations, as the unconditional cause, to all forms of conditional existence, that we have ever represented God as the Infinite and Absolute. In this, the only true representation, no metaphysician can detect even the appearance of contradiction. Nor do we discover the element of contradiction that our author professes to find in his own definition of the idea of God as the Infinite and Absolute. His idea, as he defines it, is identical with that expressed by the words, "the sum of all reality," and these words may be substituted for the term God in the proposition, God exists. Let us, then, contemplate this proposition in this form, to wit, The sum of all reality exists. In other words, All that is real is real. Where is the contradiction here? Further, if the idea represented by the term God is identical with that represented by the words "the sum of all reality," then it is no more a contradiction to affirm of God that he is both finite and infinite, cause and effect, personal and impersonal, a unity and a plurality, than it is to affirm of man that he is mortal and immortal.

If we further contemplate the separate definitions that Mr. Mansel has given of the terms infinite and absolute, we shall perceive at once that neither of them is more applicable to the proper idea represented by the term God, than it is to infinite space or duration. "To conceive the Deity as he is," says Mr. Mansel, "we must conceive him

as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By First Cause, is meant that which produces all things, and is produced of none. By the Absolute, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being. By the Infinite, is meant that which is free from all possible limitation, that than which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not from all eternity." It is by a play upon these three terms, First Cause, Absolute, and Infinite, that all our author's theistic contradictions are made out. To conceive of God as a cause, for example, is to conceive of him as related "to the things that are made," and that contradicts our idea of him as Absolute, which "implies a possible existence out of all relation." If we should escape this difficulty by saying that, "the Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause," "we are checked by a third conception, that of the Infinite." "How can the Infinite become that which it was not from eternity?" In reply, we would say that, "if we would conceive of Deity as he is," we must not conceive of him as Absolute or Infinite, according to the above definitions of those terms. In creation and by revelation, God is revealed to us, not out of all relations, but as a Cause, "the Creator of the heavens and the earth," the unconditioned Cause of all conditional existences. To conceive of him out of all relation, is to conceive him as he is not, and not as he is. According to our author's definition of the term Infinite, God cannot be infinite, unless, from eternity to eternity, he exists in a state of absolute inaction, or at each moment of duration repeats the identical act which he puts forth at every other moment. Now this we hesitate not to pronounce the most senseless idea

of the Divine Infinity of which we can well form a conception. If we would conceive of Deity as he is, we must conceive of him as a free, intelligent, self-conscious personality, infinite and perfect. Nothing can be more foreign to any proper idea of such a being than the conception that infinity in him implies absolute and eternal inactivity, or an eternal repetition of one and the same act. Take away, these utterly false and unauthorized definitions of the terms Absolute and Infinite, and all contradictions which our author professedly finds in the theistic idea wholly disappear.

IDEA OF GOD NOT NEGATIVE, BUT POSITIVE.

Nor is the Theistic Idea, as Sir William Hamilton and others affirm, an exclusively negative idea. The idea of Cause is an absolutely positive idea, and this is the central element of that of God. Power, wisdom, goodness, eternity, ubiquity, and immutability, are all in common positive elements of thought, and these are fundamental elements of the divine idea. Nor when we conceive of God as in respect to all his attributes, infinite and perfect, does that conception fade away into "a bundle of negations." Our idea of God is, in no form, negative, but in the respects in which we deny materiality, finiteness, and imperfection of him. In all other respects, that idea is as absolutely positive as any other is, or can be.

THE IDEA OF MATTER AND SUBSTANCE AS A MERE FORCE.

In opposition to the teachings of the doctrine of Realism, a certain class of philosophers now affirm that matter, and all substances in common, exist and act in space as mere *forces*, forces void of extension and form. That sub-

stances of all kinds are real powers or forces, no reflecting mind will deny. What has such an admission, however, to do with the question, what substances or forces do exist, or what are their nature and attributes? A force possessed of real extension and form is just as conceivable as one void of these attributes. *A priori*, as we have seen, we can determine nothing whatever in regard to the nature or attributes of the forces which exist in space. *A posteriori*, the evidence is absolute, that forces having real solidity, extension, and form, do exist in space and occupy space. Nor can the so-called philosophers who deny the reality of such forces adduce the remotest degree of proof, evidence, or antecedent probability, to sustain such denial. The dogma of impalpable, immaterial, and undefinable forces, and the substitution of said forces for the goodly creation affirmed as real by the universal Intelligence, rests exclusively upon mere assumptions, unsustained by any form or degree of evidence of any kind. The advocates of such a senseless dogma are themselves perfectly aware that they are building up their theory of existence upon the wildest conjectures that ever danced in the brain of a crazy philosophy. According to the universal and fundamental teachings of this philosophy, all our knowledge of realities within and around us, if such realities do, in fact, exist, is wholly indirect and mediate, and has, consequently, only a *relative*, and no *real* validity. All that we know of what we call matter, or the external world, for example, we know, it is affirmed, exclusively through sensation, our real knowledge, in no form, extending beyond this exclusively mental and sensitive state. Of sensation, all that we can do or can know is, that it has *some* cause. But what that cause is, whether it is external or internal, finite or infinite,

material or spiritual, extended or unextended, remains, and must remain, as far as sensation itself is concerned, forever undetermined and indeterminable. Such are the immutable teachings of this philosophy, as universally expounded by its advocates. By the immutable principles of that philosophy, therefore, said philosophers are held absolutely bound to a profession of absolute ignorance of the character of the substances which we call nature, and of all other realities in common, and forever to cease all attempts and pretensions to develop and teach the nature, forms, principles, and laws of that of which, by profession, they know absolutely nothing.

Yet these so-called philosophers, after affirming their own absolute and hopeless ignorance on all these subjects, dogmatically assume an absolute knowledge of what they themselves affirm to be the unknowable and unknown, and imperiously impose upon us their science of the same. Mr. Herbert Spencer, for example, after affirming all our knowledge of nature, external and internal, to be exclusively phenomenal, that is, appearance, gives us the following proposition as embodying the ultimate and immutable deduction from the necessary principles of this philosophy, to wit, "the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must ever be, unknown." Permit us here, in sober earnestness, to ask Mr. Spencer, before the world, the following questions: 1. Is he not bound, by his own deduction, to eternal silence in respect to the nature, properties, laws, and ultimate cause of this reality? 2. How does he know but that behind all appearances there does, in fact, exist a real universe, constituted, on the one hand, of actual entities, having real extension and form, and, on the other, of actually embodied spirits, endowed with the attributes of

thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, — a universe “made by the word of God,” and presided over by a free, intelligent, and self-conscious personality, infinite and perfect? 3. In his attempt to reconcile the Theist to the loss of his God, our author tells us that “the choice is not between personality and something lower than personality; whereas the choice is between personality and something higher. Is it not just as possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will, as these transcend mechanical motion?” Permit us to ask, in this connection, if we have not here as near an approach to absolute philosophic idiocy as thought can make? A thing, a higher mode of being than a person! A thing utterly void of Intelligence, Sensibility, Will, a higher form of being than a free, self-conscious Personality absolutely infinite and perfect! In what locality but a brain in which Philosophy has run mad, could such a thought find a place? It is not at all wonderful that, in the esteem of such a mind, the idea that we are the descendants of a monkey ancestry is a far higher and more ennobling conception, than that involved in the idea that “we are the offspring of God.” 4. The idea that nature, as now organized, is the result of the all-formative agency of infinite Intelligence and almighty Power, is undeniably, aside from the question of its validity, the highest, the most sublime, and perfect conception, that ever entered the human mind. On what grounds, then, can this writer justify himself before the world for sneering at that idea, as “the carpenter theory”? But enough of this for the present, as the subject will come up again in another connection.

Character of systems of Knowledge as developed by the German mind, and the conditions on which such systems can be refuted.

In examining professed systems of knowledge developed by the great thinkers of Germany, systems which are now being urged upon the public mind in this country and Great Britain, the intelligent reader will hardly fail to recognize the absolute logical *consecutiveness* which everywhere obtains between the *principles* and subsequent *deductions*, which appear in all such systems without exception. In their deductions these thinkers very seldom err. He who adopts their principles must, to be logically consistent, adopt in full their remotest deductions.

In arguing against such systems, with very few, if any, exceptions, it is perfectly vain to attempt to break the connection between the principles and facts assumed and the consequences deduced from them, on the one hand, or by declaiming against said consequences, on the other. The connection referred to cannot be broken, and the consequences have been adopted *con amore* by the expounders and advocates of these systems. The only successful points of attack are the *assumptions* which lie at the basis of these systems, and the facts adduced as the foundation for deductions. Here, of almost all men that ever appeared in the sphere of philosophy, these thinkers are the weakest and most easily vanquished. Of all thinkers, the schools of Idealism are the most rigidly exact and consecutive in deduction, and the most reckless in the assumptions of principle, and the most careless in the induction of facts. The great scientific want of the present age is a fundamental examination and refutation of these imposing and

logically consistent systems upon strictly scientific grounds, that is, by a fundamental examination of the *assumptions* which lie at the basis of these systems, and the character of the facts adduced in their construction. This, in addition to what we have already done, we shall attempt to accomplish in a subsequent part of this treatise.

The errors into which the advocates of Theism have commonly fallen in their assaults upon these systems, now become manifest. One class begin with admitting the principles assumed, especially that in regard to the nature and sphere of knowledge *à priori*, now under consideration, and then attempt to escape the final deductions of said systems. In doing this, they only reveal their own logical inconsistency, and thus really betray the truth into the hands of its enemies. The other class, without a scientific examination of the systems in their principles, facts, or deductions, array arguments against the logical consequences of said systems. By such a method, they only array before the world consequences for which the systems themselves were, in fact, constructed and are now advocated, and which commend said systems to the heart of fallen humanity in its alienation from the only living and true God. These systems must, upon purely scientific grounds, be demonstrated to be systems of error, or they will continue to maintain their hold upon the public mind.

WHAT WE PROPOSE TO ACCOMPLISH IN REGARD TO THE CLAIMS OF THEISM, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THOSE OF THE VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF ANTITHEISM, ON THE OTHER.

We are now prepared to state distinctly what we propose to accomplish in the following treatise, in respect to the

claims of Theism, on the one hand, and in respect to those of the various systems of Antitheism on the other.

In regard to the claims of Theism, we propose to show, 1. That at the basis of the theistic deductions, in their entirety, there are valid analytical judgments, that is, universally absolute and necessary intuitive truths. 2. That under these principles the entire facts of the universe, bearing legitimately upon our inquiries, do, in fact, take rank. 3. That all these deductions are the necessary logical consequences of these facts and principles, and therefore have not merely a relative, but real and absolute validity. Consequently, 4. The deductions of Theism are, in fact, really and truly truths of science.

In regard to the claims of the various systems of Antitheism, we propose to prove, that these systems, without exception, rest ultimately upon mere *assumptions*, — assumptions which are not intuitively true, which are wholly incapable of being verified by argument, which have no antecedent probability, even, in their favor, but which, on the other hand, are demonstrably false.

CHAPTER II.

A PRIORI OR ANALYTICAL JUDGMENTS, FIRST TRUTHS OR PRINCIPLES, IN THE SCIENCE OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

CONDITIONS ON WHICH WE CAN LEGITIMATELY REASON FROM FACTS TO CAUSES.

WHENEVER we reason from facts (events) to causes, causes immediate or ultimate,—and all men do and must thus reason,—we assume that facts of a certain character do reveal the causes by which they (the events) are produced. What we assume as true in this case is not a mere unauthorized assumption, but an analytical judgment which lies at the bases of all the inductive sciences. Every step we take in scientific investigation is taken upon the authority of the principle, that facts may be of such a character as to reveal their particular causes, and that the facts under consideration are of this very class.

Facts classified.

All facts, actual and conceivable, must, in their relations to their real and proper causes, belong to some one of the three following classes: 1. Those which present no indications whatever of their particular causes, immediate or ultimate. All that we do or can know of them is their actual occurrence as facts, and also, as every event must

have a cause, that these facts have some real and adequate cause; while the nature and character of this cause is wholly unknown and beyond our conception. Such facts, to employ a term manufactured for the occasion, may be denominated non-indicative, or un-indicative facts.

2. Those which suggest a certain number of particular hypotheses as each *possibly true*, and that without affirming either, in distinction from the others, as true. In all such cases the facts will sustain such relations to the hypotheses referred to, that it will be perceived that one of them must be true, while said facts are all, without exception, equally accordant with, and consequently explicable by, either of these hypotheses. In explaining facts of this character, we may assume either of these hypotheses as true, provided we grant that either of the others might as properly be assumed for the same purpose. Facts of this character may properly be denominated *sceptical* facts. This term is particularly applied to hypotheses of ultimate causation. The sceptical philosophy affirms that the entire facts of creation, as given in the universal intelligence, are of such a character as merely to *suggest* a certain number of distinct and opposite hypotheses of this kind, without affirming either in distinction from any of the others as true, all of the facts being equally consistent with each and every hypothesis, and consequently sustaining to each the same relations. All that we can say of these hypotheses is, that some one of them *must* be, and that each alike *may* be, true, and hence, as convenience requires, either may be assumed as true, provided the same liberty is granted relatively to all the others. In reference to our knowledge of the universe, scepticism affirms that we cannot prove or know our knowledge of it to be valid or not valid.

In regard to the hypotheses of Theism, Materialism, and Idealism, it affirms of each alike, that we cannot either prove or disprove this hypothesis, and hence must not affirm it, in distinction from the others, as true. 3. The third class of facts are of such a nature and character that they not only suggest a given number of hypotheses, but affirm some one of these, in opposition to all the others, to be true. The facts not only affirm this one hypothesis as true, but with the same absoluteness contradict all the others. This class of facts may be denominated *dogmatic* or *dogmatical*, or more properly, perhaps, *indicative*, requiring us to hold some specific hypothesis as true, and all others of a contradictory character as false. Dogmatic theories of ultimate causation each alike affirms that the facts of the universe, relatively to such questions, are of this specific character.

Characteristics of dogmatic facts.

Dogmatic facts of every kind possess the following characteristics: 1. They yield or suppose certain analytical judgments which, on the supposition that facts of a specific character do exist, affirm absolutely the one specific hypothesis, and as absolutely contradict every other. 2. The facts referred to take legitimate rank under this one hypothesis, and cannot be made to accord with any other. 3. The validity of this one hypothesis as a truth of science, then follows by a logical necessity, and all opposing theories must be held as false. These analytical judgments are the major premises, the first truths or principles, in all the syllogisms which yield scientific deductions in regard to any class or classes of facts in the universe of matter or mind. The facts ranged under these principles constitute

the minor premises in such syllogisms. It is only by means of such principles and such facts that we do or can obtain real or scientific conclusions relatively to questions of proximate or ultimate causation. In order to determine, in accordance with the true principles of scientific deduction, which of the hypotheses of ultimate causation, the theistic or antitheistic, is, in fact, true, and which consequently false, we must first of all determine what specific analytical judgments, supposing the facts of the universe to accord with the same, would affirm each of these hypotheses and deny all others, and then determine under which of them real facts do, in truth, take rank. The hypothesis thus affirmed as true then legitimately becomes a truth of science, and no hypothesis can become such on any other conditions. Our first procedure, then, is to find these analytical judgments, and this is the specific design of the present chapter.

NOTE. — The error and absurdity of the common supposition, that there are different modes of proof of the being and character of God, such as the *à priori*, the *à posteriori*, the ontological, teleological, &c., now becomes sufficiently manifest. The absurdity of such methods would, as we have shown in the Logic, become manifest, if they were applied to the determination of the nature and character of *proximate* causes in the universe around us. A question arises, to wit, what is the immediate or proximate cause of a given class of specific facts, the rise and fall of mercury in a tube, for example? A philosopher proposes a given hypothesis upon the subject, and then presents, 1st, an *à priori*; 2d, an *à posteriori*; 3d, an ontological; 4th, a teleological argument to prove said hypothesis. What would the world think of such a procedure? Yet, such a method would be no more erroneous and absurd in such a case than

when adopted in the attempted determination of questions pertaining to ultimate causation. Every truly scientific argument in reference to questions of causation, of every kind alike, whether proximate or ultimate, has and must have, two and only two elements, and can have no more than these, — the *à priori*, embracing the analytical judgments referred to, and the *à posteriori*, containing the valid facts, which, as the minor premise, are arranged under said judgments. Had the opposite method obtained in the conduct of the natural sciences, the world would now be in doubt, if not disbelief, in respect to the possibility of philosophy in general, just as many who have most profoundly studied the supposed forms of proof of the being of God, and that under the conviction that these are the only forms of real proof that do exist, are in painful doubt in regard to the possibility of certainty in the sphere of Natural Theology.

ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT OR PRINCIPLE COMMON TO ALL
FACTS OF EVERY KIND, AND TO ALL HYPOTHESES OF UL-
TIMATE CAUSATION.

All hope of attaining to real unity of conviction and sentiment, in the investigation of any question of common interest, depends upon the fact that there is some one principle bearing fundamentally upon that question, a principle the validity of which all alike admit. Such a principle does in fact exist relatively to the inquiries before us. We thus have a common ground on which all inquiries may and must meet, and from which all our investigations must take their departure. The principle to which we refer is this: There is *an ultimáté reason* why the order and arrangement existing in the universe within and around us are

what they are, and why the sequence of events occurs as it does, and not otherwise. This is strictly an analytical judgment, its opposite being inconceivable and impossible. Every event, of whatever character it may be, necessarily implies it, inasmuch as there can be no event without a cause, and consequently without an ultimate cause. Every theory of ultimate causation, and all have some theory upon the subject, affirms by necessary implication the validity of this same principle, the inquiry itself being after this one reason or cause. All inquirers after truth, too, admit and assume, whatever their views of nature or the facts of the universe may be, the absolute and necessary validity of this same principle, and no one will deny its validity.

Now, if we call this common and universally admitted reason or first cause, God, then all men do, in fact, believe in God, and no one denies, or wishes to be understood as denying, his existence. The only question in difference must pertain to his attributes, and not at all to the question of his existence.

Further, whatever is necessarily *implied* in the one great fact before us, the reality of this ultimate reason, or first cause, must necessarily be true of God considered simply as such cause. This, all will and must admit. The question which here arises, and which should be specifically determined in this connection, is this: What are the attributes necessarily implied in the idea of God as the ultimate reason or first cause of the facts of the universe? To this question we will now proceed to give the answer required. Among these attributes we notice the following:

Attributes necessarily implied in the idea of God, considered as the ultimate reason or first cause of the facts of the universe.

1. The first that we notice is *eternity*. Did not this cause exist from eternity, it would be the effect of some other cause, and therefore would not itself be the first or ultimate cause.

2. *Immutability* is another attribute which must be affirmed of God as the cause under consideration. That which is itself mutable must be determined, in its activity, by something besides itself, and that which thus determines, and not the determined, must be the ultimate or first cause. God then, as such cause, must possess this one attribute. That which conditions all facts must, self-evidently, be itself unconditioned.

3. The next implied attribute that we notice is *unity*. The very idea of an ultimate reason or cause implies that this reason or cause is one, and not many. If we suppose many realities eternally to exist, and that the facts of the universe are the results of the action and reaction of such realities upon one another, still the direction of this activity and its peculiar results would be determined by the *common correlated nature* of said realities. This *common nature*, then, which must ever be one and identical, would be the ultimate reason or first cause of the facts under consideration. In whatever point of light we consider the subject, therefore, we must affirm a certain form of absolute unity of God considered as the cause after which we are inquiring.

4. God considered as this eternally existing and immutable unity must also possess intrinsic *efficiency, adequacy,*

and *adaptation* to produce the great facts under consideration. Did he not possess efficiency, he could be the cause of no facts whatever. Did he not possess the adequacy and adaptation referred to, he could by no possibility be the cause of these particular facts.

5. Hence we remark, finally, that the particular cause assigned for these facts must possess an *intelligible* adequacy and adaptation to produce said facts. The cause is assigned for the specific purpose of accounting intelligibly for these specific facts. If it does not possess an intelligible, that is, perceived adequacy and adaptation to produce the facts, then they are not accounted for, and the hypothesis assigned comes under the principle of contradiction, and may and ought to be set aside as an absolute absurdity.

THE GRAND PROBLEM IN NATURAL THEOLOGY.

We are now prepared to state definitely the grand problem in Natural Theology. It is to find an eternally existing and immutable unity, which alone, in distinction from and in opposition to all other conceivable hypotheses of ultimate causation, shall possess an *intelligible* efficiency, adequacy, and adaptation to produce the great facts of the universe which fall within the sphere of our investigations, and to which consequently these facts *must* be assigned, as their first or ultimate cause. This is the problem, the scientific solution of which is undeniably the great scientific want of the world at the present time. This, we judge, no one will deny.

Fundamental characteristics of the true and proper solution of this problem.

The fundamental characteristics of the true and proper

scientific solution of this problem next claim our attention. They are the following :

1. The solution will take into account *all* the valid facts of the universe bearing upon the case, with all their essential characteristics. Nothing will be supposed which is not real, and nothing omitted, ignored, or denied, which is real. If any real facts bearing upon the question, or any of their essential characteristics, are omitted or denied ; or if any not real are assumed in the argument, — this would utterly vitiate the whole proceeding.

2. The hypothesis assigned must *intelligibly* account for *all* the facts, with *all* their essential characteristics in their entirety. If anything really involved in the issue is left unaccounted for, especially if it should appear that such things cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis assigned, this would undeniably indicate that the true one has not been found.

3. The facts must be shown not only to be perfectly *compatible* with this one hypothesis, but obviously and undeniably *incompatible* with, and *contradictory* to, every other. If the facts can be shown to consist with two or more distinct and opposite hypotheses, then said facts are sceptical in their character, and each hypothesis has equal claims. Nothing whatever is proven. Any one hypothesis of ultimate causation demonstrated to sustain all the above-named relations to the facts under consideration, would thereby have an absolute claim to take rank as a truth of science.

The problem of Natural Theology stated in another form is this, — to find an eternally existing and immutable unity sustaining precisely these relations to the facts under consideration. This being accomplished, Natural Theology legitimately becomes a science, and that in the true and

proper sense of the term. On no other conditions can it properly be ranked among the sciences. If, on investigation, the facts of the universe bearing upon our inquiries shall be found to be dogmatic, that is, indicative in their character, they will yield us such an hypothesis, and we shall have a science of Natural Theology. If, on the other hand, they should be found to be sceptical or wholly unindicative, then we shall find a certain given number of hypotheses, each having equal claims with every other, or shall be landed in the conclusion that there is some final cause, with no indications whatever of its real or possible nature. In either of these cases, Natural Theology, as a science, will be shown to be an utter impossibility.

THE TWO HYPOTHESES OF ULTIMATE CAUSATION WHICH NECESSARILY EMBRACE AND IMPLY ALL OTHERS.

There are two distinct and opposite hypotheses of ultimate causation which necessarily include and imply all others. The first is that which assumes nature with its inhering laws to be the only reality, and refers all the facts of the universe to these laws as their ultimate cause. The second is that which affirms that this cause is a reality out of and above nature, a reality which originated and established nature's laws, and exercises an absolute control over nature itself. Every one will perceive, on a moment's reflection, that these two hypotheses do and must embrace all others, and that consequently one of them, to the exclusion of the other, must be true. Whatever our ideas of nature may be, whether they accord with the doctrine of Realism, Materialism, or Idealism in any one or all of its various forms, we must admit that the real first cause of the facts of the universe is an inhering law of nature itself, or

a reality out of, above, and independent of, nature, and exercising a supreme control over it. The latter is the hypothesis of Theism, the former that of Natural Law. If we select the term G. to represent the idea of the ultimate cause after which we are inquiring, and T. to represent the hypothesis of Theism, and L. to represent that of Natural Law, then the problem of Natural Theology may be thus announced: G. is either T. or L., and the question to be determined is, which?

The validity of the above statement of the problem none will deny. Every theory of ultimate causation which ever has been, or can be presented, as standing opposed to that of Theism, whether its advocate affirms matter, spirit, or some attribute of spirit, or finally something wholly unknown, to be nature, presents natural law as the exclusive ultimate cause of the facts or phenomena of nature. This, then, is the generic hypothesis which stands opposed to that of Theism, and which includes all specific ones which are thus opposed. If we should prove the former, the generical one, true, the question would subsequently arise, which of the latter, the specific ones, is true. If, on the other hand, we should prove this one hypothesis false, we should disprove it, in all the forms which it ever has assumed, or ever can assume. We would now invite special attention to the following general remarks upon these two distinct and opposite hypotheses.

Some general remarks upon these distinct and opposite hypotheses.

1. The truth of each, in common, is, in itself, equally conceivable, and therefore possible. The doctrine of Natural Law is no more self-contradictory than that of Theism.

Mr. Hume has undeniably announced the truth as it is upon this subject, to wit, that the idea of a nature eternally existing in a state of order without a cause other than the eternally inhering laws of nature, is no more self-contradictory than the idea of an eternally existing and infinite mind who originated this order, a mind existing without a cause. The idea of order in the Finite without a cause, is no more self-contradictory than the idea of order in the Infinite without a cause.

2. Hence we remark, that the question which of these hypotheses is, and which is not, true, cannot be determined *à priori*. As the truth of each in common is given, as in itself equally conceivable and equally possible with the other, there can, by no possibility, be any form or degree of evidence or proof *à priori* of the truth of one, in distinction from the other. The question, which is, and which is not, true, must ever remain in itself problematical, and must be determined by an appeal to facts.

We shall be necessitated to adopt the same conclusion, if we refer to the nature of, so-called, *à priori* ideas existing in the mind,—ideas such as those of space and time, on the one hand, and of cause, power, and substance finite and infinite, on the other,—realities given as existing in space and time. Space and time must be, whether anything else does or does not exist. The ideas of these realities, therefore, are given in the universal intelligence, as in themselves not only necessary, but absolute. In other words, the objects of these ideas are given as existing unconditionally,—that is, whether any other reality does or does not exist. But while we thus conceive of space and time, we do not conceive of the ideas of cause, power, and substance,—realities existing in space and time, as in themselves, thus un-

conditioned and absolute. The reason is obvious. Whenever we conceive of any reality as existing in time and space, and that without reference to facts which necessarily *imply* its existence, we find the idea of the being, or non-being of that object as, in itself, equally conceivable. The hypothesis of Natural Law, on the one hand, and of Theism, on the other, for example, is each, as we have seen, in itself, equally conceivable. The idea of neither, then, is absolute, like the ideas of space and time. If events are real, cause must be, for there can be no event without a cause. The idea of cause, then, is not absolutely, but conditionally necessary, and this holds just as true of ultimate as of proximate causation. *A priori*, therefore, we cannot determine what causes, finite or infinite, do or do not exist.

Some maintain that by Reason we have a direct and immediate perception of the being and perfections of God, just as we do of mental and material facts by external and internal perception. If this were so, our knowledge of God would not be, as the advocates of this theory affirm, *à priori* at all, but wholly empirical. The fundamental element of our idea of God is that of a cause, the unconditioned cause of all that conditionally exists. Now, causes of every kind are known, not *à priori*, but wholly through the effects which they produce. It is equally a doctrine of science and revelation both, that God is known, not *à priori*, nor by insight of Reason, but “by the wonders which he *performs*,” “by the things that are made.” There is no chimera more wild than the idea that there is any *à priori* proof of the being of God, or that he is known by the direct and immediate insight of Reason, and not “by the things that are made.”

3. Equally undeniable and self-evident is the proposition that the question, which of these hypotheses is, and which is not true, cannot be determined by a mere reference to *facts of order* existing in nature,—facts of order, irrespective of their intrinsic character and origin. Every hypothesis of ultimate causation does and must, as we have already seen, involve the idea of order without a cause. Mere facts of order, then,—the idea of such facts being the common element of all hypotheses upon the subject,—cannot determine which particular hypothesis is, and which is not true.

4. Nor can the question under consideration, we remark finally, be determined by any argument drawn from the idea of an *infinite series of events*. The possibility of accounting for the facts of nature through natural law, has, by many theists, been denied, on the ground that such a supposition involves a necessary contradiction, implying, as it does, an infinite series of events. The argument urged against this dogma is this: a series of events implies a first, and an infinite series implies that the event which stands at the head of the whole is at an infinite distance, while the one which stands next in order is only at a finite distance from the present moment. Thus an infinite distance must be supposed to exist between two immediately successive events,—events removed at the distance of but a single moment from each other. This is a contradiction. Such is the argument against this doctrine. In reply we remark:

(1.) That the series under consideration is one which, by hypothesis, has no first. The eternity past has no beginning, and a series coextensive with it could have no individual standing at its head. The objection, therefore, does not hold.

(2.) The reality of *objects* actually existing from eternity must be admitted as a matter of fact, — the fact that anything now exists, implying, of necessity, that something must have existed from eternity. Now, that which existed from eternity must have existed in a state of activity or inactivity, both suppositions being equally conceivable. In the former case, we have an infinite series of acts; in other words, we have, in fact, a series, the possibility of which is denied in the argument before us. In the latter case, we have an infinite succession of *moments*, in which the reality referred to did not act. Here, too, is an actual series, absolutely infinite; and the argument affirming the impossibility of such a series, in any form, stands revealed as a demonstrated fallacy.

(3.) Duration itself, we remark again, must be admitted as, relatively to the past, absolutely infinite. Now, infinite duration implies necessarily an infinite series of successive moments; in other words, it implies the reality of the series itself objected against. Further, if there may be an infinite series of successive moments, — and the fact of its existence cannot be denied, — then there may be a similar series of successive acts on the part of substances or powers which must have existed from eternity.

(4.) That God has existed from eternity, we remark, finally, those who urge the argument under consideration admit and affirm. Now, if he thus existed, he may, in some form or other, have acted from eternity, and at each moment of the eternity past. Here, too, we have undeniably an infinite series of actual or possible acts or events. In whatever point of light the argument against the possibility of an infinite series of events is scientifically viewed, it stands revealed as nothing but a logical fallacy. The

doctrine, then, of ultimate causation by natural law cannot be overthrown by any objections urged against the idea of an infinite series of events as involved in that doctrine. We now advance to a consideration of some of the

Specific Characteristics of the hypothesis of Natural Law.

If this hypothesis is true, it is undeniable that the order, arrangement, and general laws, which now exist and obtain in the universe, must have existed and obtained from eternity. Any inhering law of nature which would, from eternity up to any given period, prevent and consequently render absolutely impossible the existence of order, arrangement, and general laws in the universe, would prevent and render impossible the existence of the same to eternity. Inhering law, or any other cause, acting from necessity which, from eternity to any one period, prevented, and consequently rendered impossible, the existence of the present order, arrangement, and general laws of the universe, would do the same to eternity. It should be borne in mind here that what occurs through Natural Law, with no existing extraneous power to prevent its acting or change its direction, must of necessity occur, and whatever does not occur is, in the circumstances, of impossible occurrence. If natural inhering law is the ultimate, determining, and exclusive cause of the facts of the universe, then whatever, from eternity to any given period, did not occur, was, during that whole prior eternity, of impossible occurrence. If, then, from eternity to any given conceivable or actual moment, order, arrangement, and general laws, or any particular form of the same, did not obtain, the absence of order, arrangement, and general laws, or a state the opposite of the particular forms referred to, is and must be an abso-

lutely fixed and immutable law of nature, and by no possibility through said law could the events under consideration occur to eternity. The conclusion is absolutely undeniable that if inhering Natural Law is the exclusive, first, and determining cause of the facts of the universe, then the *present* order, arrangement, and general laws of nature must, in all their essential features and forms, have existed from eternity.

According to this hypothesis, also, the entire *series* of events, from eternity to eternity, must be throughout in the absolute relation of immediate and necessary antecedence and consequence. There can be no break in the chain; not a solitary link can be wanting, and each one must hang in absolute dependence upon and be in all respects, and by absolute necessity, what it is from what *immediately* preceded it. On no other conditions can the facts of the universe be determined by Natural Law as their exclusive first or ultimate cause. This is self-evident.

According to the same hypothesis, we remark, once more, there can be in nature no *law* of progression from the *less* towards the *more* perfect, or vice-versa; nor can the series of events be of this character. Each of these suppositions implies a beginning, a commencement of the existing order of events. A series by Natural Law, however, can have no beginning. Were the series of events in nature exclusively by Natural Law, and were there in nature a law of progression from the less towards the more perfect, there would be in nature now absolute infinity and perfection; for that which has been growing from eternity, must now, to say the least, be infinite. How strange it is, that believers in this theory of Natural Law, also nearly, if not quite universally, hold and glory in a doctrine of a law

of progression in nature from the less towards the more perfect, — thus affirming and denying the same thing ; attributing the facts of nature exclusively to Natural Law, and then affirming the existence in nature of an immutable law, absolutely incompatible with that theory. This prepares us to appreciate fully the following undeniable specific facts and considerations which have a fundamental bearing upon this hypothesis.

1. On no conditions whatever can this hypothesis be established as true. If it is true, the fact of its validity is wholly unsusceptible of proof. If we suppose the series of events in the universe to have had, in fact, no beginning, and to have possessed from eternity the appearance of immediate and uninterrupted antecedence and consequence, — facts which, if real, we can never know, but which we have absolute evidence are not real, — if all this, however, be granted, still the facts are just as consistent with and explicable by a reference to a cause out of and above nature, as by the theory of inhering law. No conceivable arrangement or condition of facts can do any more than prove this last hypothesis as a *possible* truth. By no possibility can it be established as actually true. This is undeniable.

2. Nor is it possible to adduce in favor of the doctrine of Natural Law any form or degree of *positive evidence whatever*. Facts equally consistent, in all respects, with two distinct and opposite hypotheses, not only fail wholly to prove or disprove either, but they present, and can present no form or degree of positive evidence in favor of one and in opposition to the other. Now, every fact of nature which can be adduced in favor of the doctrine of Natural Law is equally explicable on the opposite hypothesis. This is undeniable. The doctrine under consideration is not only

insusceptible of proof, but no form or degree of positive evidence of any kind can, by any possibility, be adduced in its favor. There is no evading this conclusion.

3. Equally evident and undeniable is the fact that this theory has, and can have, on no conditions actual or possible, any *antecedent probability* in its favor, over and above that of Theism. The existence of nature, of any finite reality, or of all such forms of existence actual and conceivable, does not render, in any form, the being, perfections, and universal dominion of a God of nature in all respects absolutely infinite and perfect, in any sense even an *improbability*. The hypothesis of Natural Law can never be held as true, even on the ground of an antecedent probability in its favor, without a palpable violation of all the laws and principles of reason and science.

4. Such being the undeniable facts of the case, any form of positive evidence against the theory of Natural Law, and in favor of that of Theism, would bind us, by all the laws of scientific deduction bearing upon such subjects, to hold and treat the latter hypothesis as true, and the former as false. Of two opposite hypotheses, when no positive or even probable evidence does or can exist in favor of one, and in opposition to the other, any positive evidence of any kind in favor of the latter binds us to hold it as alone true, and the other as false. This cannot be denied. If, then, we can adduce *any* real *positive* evidence in favor of the hypothesis of Theism, and in opposition to that of Natural Law, this fact would bind the conscience of every man to hold and treat the latter as false and the opposite as true. There is no escaping this conclusion.

5. Another undeniable consideration having a fundamental bearing upon this hypothesis here claims our special atten-

tion. We refer to the only conceivable or possible conditions on which said hypothesis can be shown to be even *possibly* true, — conditions, which, by no possibility of human observation or experience, can be fulfilled. It must be established undeniably, (1st,) that the present order of nature, in its essential forms, has had, as far as we have any evidence bearing upon the case, no beginning; (2d,) that there has been, as far as we can trace the chain of events, no break in it,—that the order of succession, as far as we can perceive, has never been broken, the entire facts of any one moment being as adequately accounted for, by an exclusive reference to what went immediately before, as in any other case of apparent causation; and (3d,) that there are no other known facts indicating any other power in or over nature than that of inhering law. If all this can be shown, then the impossibility of proving the theistic hypothesis has been demonstrated, and the fact of ultimate causation by Natural Law has been correspondingly proven as a *possible* truth. This, then, is the burden resting upon the advocate of the doctrine of Natural Law, and this is the least that can be reasonably required of him. If he will advance into the theatre of the great facts of the universe, and show by irresistible arguments that the series of events around us had no beginning, as far as any evidence exists to the contrary, that no break whatever appears anywhere in the chain, and that other facts of a contradictory character do not anywhere exist, — then, and then only, is he permitted to hold up his hypothesis as a possible truth. If he fails in any of these fundamental respects, his theory stands revealed as demonstrably false.

6. While the theory of Natural Law cannot be proven true, it may, on certain conditions, be rendered demonstra-

bly false. Let us suppose that the order and arrangements of nature stand revealed as having had a beginning, and as having been, from time to time, interrupted, in forms which can be accounted for by no reference to any inhering law or laws of nature, and, finally, that other great facts do exist, facts of mind, for example, which undeniably indicate the truth of Theism. Then we should have absolute proof that the hypothesis of Natural Law is and must be false. While no form of evidence whatever can be adduced in favor of the theory of Natural Law, on certain conceivable conditions, it stands revealed as demonstrably false, and the opposite hypothesis as demonstrably true. This will be the case relatively to these hypotheses, one of which must be true, should the facts of the universe be found to accord with such conditions.

7. Our last remark upon the theory of Natural Law is this: No man can hold this hypothesis as positively true, and that of Theism as false, without a palpable and undeniable violation of all the laws of true science. In that case, he holds a theory as true, for the truth of which there can, on any conditions, actual or conceivable, exist not only no positive proof, but not even any form of antecedent probability in its favor; while he holds another hypothesis as false, for the truth of which there may exist, and for aught he does or can know, does exist somewhere in the universe, to say the least, demonstrative evidence. Such, undeniably, is the hypothesis of Natural Law. We will now advance to a consideration of the essential characteristics, and of the fundamental principles which pertain to the opposite hypothesis, that of Theism.

The hypothesis of Theism. Its general characteristics and ultimate principles.

In regard to this hypothesis, we would remark, in general, that, as we have already seen, it may be true in fact; that against it no antecedent probabilities of any kind do or can exist; and that on certain conditions its validity may become demonstrably evident. The question which now arises is this: What are the conditions referred to? What are the conditions on which we should be bound to receive and hold the theistic hypothesis as a truth of science? Let us suppose that God exists as a self-conscious personality, possessed of all the attributes implied in the ideas of infinity and perfection, and that it was his purpose to reveal to his intelligent offspring, through the arrangements and operations of nature, his being and perfections. By what means conceivable to us might this revelation be made? They are the following:

1. If we suppose that the order and harmony in nature had an actual beginning in time, and did not exist from eternity, and that such is the nature and character of the leading facts of creation, that the fact of its having had such a beginning stands distinctly revealed to the universal intelligence, and is absolutely affirmed by all the deductions of science bearing upon the subject; if we suppose the facts of creation to be of such a character as this, we must affirm, as a necessary and absolute deduction, that the ultimate cause of the facts of the universe is, not an inhering law of nature, but an all-controlling power out of and above nature. Order having its origin and ultimate cause in an inhering law of nature, must have existed from eternity, and could, by no possibility, have had a real be-

ginning or origin in time. This is undeniably a necessary intuitive truth. If, then, the scientific order and harmony, existing everywhere in nature, once did not exist, and had an actual and manifested origin in time, the deduction is demonstrative, that the cause of this order is a power out of and above nature, and not an inhering law of the same. No antitheist will, we are quite certain, deny or doubt the absolute validity of this principle.

2. If we suppose that the order of nature and the current of events have, from time to time, been interrupted and changed in their direction, in forms which cannot possibly be accounted for by a reference to natural law, and that these facts are distinctly revealed to the mind, then also the deduction becomes demonstratively evident, that the ultimate cause of the facts of nature is not an inhering law, but a power out of and above nature; and such facts would yield this deduction wholly independent of the question of the origin of the order existing in nature. Any series of events resulting exclusively from an inhering law of nature must, of necessity, as we have before seen, be everywhere and at all times alike, absolutely, uninterruptedly, and immediately successive in its progress. There can be no break in the chain, and no fundamental change in the nature or directions of the order of events. If, in tracing out the series of events, we find that from time to time the chain has undeniably been broken; if we find the order of facts assuming, before and after the break referred to, in essential particulars entirely new characteristics and moving in correspondingly new directions; if, in short, vast chasms present themselves, rendering impossible a connection by natural law in the relation of determining antecedence and consequence between the order of events on the

one side with that on the other, — then the theistic hypothesis of a first cause out of and above nature possesses demonstrative certainty. If we further find that the parts of this chain, though thus separated and distinguishable, yet sustain to each other the relation of parts to an intelligible whole, such as an all-wise, all-controlling, and all-comprehending personality might and would originate, then we obtain positive revelations in regard to the character of the great First Cause.

3. There may be, in the arrangement of the parts of given series of events presented in certain portions of the universe, — series having an undeniable origin in time, — there may be, we say, in such series such an arrangement of the parts as to indicate absolutely that the series could not have been determined by any law inhering in nature itself. Suppose that it is demonstrably evident that the series, if determined by natural law, must have a certain fixed arrangement, and could have no other, and that another, different, and opposite order does in fact obtain. In this case we should have absolute disproof of the theory of natural law, and proof equally absolute of that of Theism. In this form, also, as we clearly perceive, an intelligent Creator might distinctly and absolutely reveal his being and controlling agency in nature.

4. We may suppose, finally, that nature, in all its material departments, should stand revealed to the universal intelligence, as arranged throughout as a means to one end, the wants of mind; that mind should be so constituted that it should necessarily conceive, as it progressed in knowledge, of the Creator of the universe as a free, intelligent, self-conscious personality, possessed of the attributes involved in the ideas of infinity and perfection, on the one

hand, while, on the other, all the spiritual and higher departments of its nature should stand revealed to itself in conscious and immutable correlation to this one idea of ultimate causation, and in corresponding opposition to every other, so that the existence of such a personality should be an absolute demand of the nature of the mind itself. We may suppose, still further, that mind exists in conscious correlation, equally absolute, to another idea, that of immortality, and is self-conscious of the possession, in its nature and the laws of its being, of the elements of endless progression. In such an arrangement of the facts of nature, the theistic hypothesis, in its final and highest form, the idea of God as a self-conscious personality absolutely infinite and perfect, would be brought under the universal principle absolutely revealed in nature; that for every want of sentient existence there is a correlated provision, and for every fundamental adaptation of such existences a correlated sphere of action. We must, then, conclude that the First Cause of all is such a personality; or assume, contrary to all known and universally acknowledged facts of the universe, that nature itself, in its highest manifestations, the immutable laws of mind, is a lie, and refuse to reason at all, from the facts within or around us, to any questions of immediate or ultimate causation. The conditions now under consideration would reveal absolutely the being and perfections of God, as infinite and perfect, and that independently of those above elucidated. By such an arrangement of the facts of the universe as is given in the above formulas, God, supposing him to exist as a self-conscious personality, infinite and perfect, might give to his intelligent offspring an absolutely authoritative and demonstrative revelation of his being and perfections; and when the fact has

been established that such are really and truly the facts of creation and providence, the theistic hypothesis will then take rank as a demonstrated truth of science. We will now present the theistic syllogism in its different forms as arranged under the above formulas, including, as we conveniently may, numbers two and three under one formula.

THE THEISTIC SYLLOGISM.

First Form.

The supposition that the order and arrangement existing in nature had a beginning, — that is, that they once did not exist and began to be, — necessarily implies that the ultimate cause of this order and arrangement is a power out of and above nature, and not an inhering law of nature itself.

The order and arrangement existing in nature had a beginning in time, and did not exist from eternity.

The ultimate cause of this order and arrangement is, therefore, a power out of and above nature, and not an inhering law of nature itself.

Second Form.

The supposition that the order of events in nature has been, from time to time, changed, and that parts of given series of events are arranged in forms which can, by no possibility, be accounted for by a reference to natural law, necessarily implies that the ultimate cause of the facts of the universe is a power out of and above nature, and not an inhering law of the same.

Fundamental facts of each of these classes do exist in nature.

The ultimate cause of the facts of the universe, there-

fore, is a power out of and above, and not an inhering law of, nature.

Third and all-comprehending Form.

The supposition that mind, for which all things else are arranged and determined, exists in absolute and exclusive correlation to one idea of ultimate causation, that of an infinite and perfect self-conscious personality, necessarily implies, that the first cause of the facts of the universe is such a personality.

Mind does, in fact, exist in absolute and exclusive correlation to this one idea of the ultimate cause of the facts of the universe.

The ultimate cause of these facts is, therefore, an infinite and perfect self-conscious personality.

General remarks upon these syllogisms.

Such are the various forms of the theistic syllogism. In regard to them we would request special attention to the following general remarks: —

1. In no mind will there be any doubt of the validity of the *major* premises in any of the forms of this syllogism above presented, each of these premises being strictly an analytical judgment whose validity none will question. The only division of opinion that can arise will pertain exclusively to matters of fact in regard to the minor premises, to wit, do the facts of the universe in reality accord with the formulas under which they are arranged?

2. This accords strictly with the demands of science, to wit, that in every argument the major premise shall be a universally admitted truth, — an admitted first, or a demonstrated, truth, — while all matters in dispute shall pertain

exclusively to the minor premise, that is, to the matters of fact ranged under said truths.

3. If, then, these several premises, the minors, or any one of them, be undeniably established, the theistic hypothesis will legitimately take rank as a demonstrated truth of science. The necessary connection between the premises and the conclusions deduced from them will not be questioned. The major premises will be granted as self-evident and universally valid truths. The minor premises, then, being established, no one will question the right of the theistic deductions from said premises, to a place among the immutable and eternal truths of science.

Postulates of the science of Natural Theology.

Every valid science has its scientific postulates as well as axioms. Of the postulates of the science of Natural Theology, we need specify only the two following :

1. Mind, relatively to the facts of the universe bearing upon our present inquiries, is a faculty, and they are to it objects of valid knowledge.

2. Whatever conclusions bearing upon questions of ultimate causation are necessarily implied, either immediately or deductively, in the facts of the universe given in consciousness as the objects of immediate, intuitive, or presentative knowledge, must be received as valid absolutely for truth on these subjects.

No one can deny the validity of either of these postulates, without a universal impeachment of the integrity of the faculty of knowledge itself, on all subjects alike, and thus destroying the validity even of his own impeachment of said power. To deny the validity of intuitive or presentative knowledge for the the reality and character of its objects,

or of what is immediately or deductively implied in such knowledge, renders infinitely absurd any attempts to arrive at truth on any subject whatever. A witness may invalidate his own testimony by affirming himself void of integrity. The human intelligence, however, possesses no such power of self-impeachment and self-invalidation, and that surely must be "science falsely so called" which attempts to employ the intelligence itself to invalidate any of its own presentative intuitions.

FUNDAMENTAL DEFECTS IN THE COMMON METHODS OF DEVELOPING THE THEISTIC ARGUMENT.

In the Intellectual Philosophy and Logic we have fully expressed our views of the general method in which the theistic argument is developed in the common treatises on Natural Theology. We would, in this connection, simply indicate a few of the thoughts, which, in the works referred to, are expressed at full length.

1. One fundamental defect we have alluded to in the Introduction, the assumption that there are different kinds of proof of the being of God, such, for example, as the *à priori*, *à posteriori*, the ontological, and teleological. No one can examine any one of these forms of proof by itself, without pronouncing it totally inadequate to the accomplishment of the end for which it is employed.* When these are as-

* It may be well, in this connection, to give an illustration of one form of the professedly theistic argument, as developed by one of the greatest thinkers of the age. We refer to Dr. Emmons. His argument is this: 1. "The world *might* have had a beginning." 2. "If this world *might have begun* to exist, then it *might* have had a *cause* of its existence." 3. "If the world *might* have had a *cause*, then it *must* have had a cause." It is said, that when this argument rose before the mind of this great thinker, he was almost as much affected by it as was Archimedes, when he made the great discovery which has immortalized his name. Yet there never was an argument more utterly fallacious. Throughout it is utterly *à priori* in its character. The fact that the world *might* have had a

sumed as the only forms of proof that do exist, the impression is thus left upon the mind, that there are no really valid proofs of the divine existence, the case coming apparently under the principle, that what is true of all the parts of a given whole, must be true of the whole itself. Let it be assumed that there are only a certain number of possible forms of the proof of the being of God, and let each of these forms, on a critical examination, be found to be in its nature fundamentally inadequate, and the impression can hardly fail to be left upon the mind, that we have, and can have, no valid proof upon the subject. From all these difficulties we are at once relieved by the disclosure of the fact, that the assumption that there are, or can be, such diverse forms of proof on this or any other kindred subject, is a violation of all the laws of inductive science. From the nature of all questions of causation, immediate or ultimate, there can be but one method of proof upon such subjects, and that in one or the other or both together of its two forms, the direct or indirect.

2. The want of a proper development of the real question at issue between the theist and anti-theist is another fundamental defect in the common treatises on the science under consideration. To argue any such question with any reasonable hope of success, there must, first of all, be a distinct statement of the point in debate between the parties concerned in the issue, — the principles and facts upon the

beginning and a cause, is affirmed simply and exclusively from the undeniable fact that we can *conceive* that it had a beginning and a cause. From the fact that it is possible for us to *conceive* of the world as having had a beginning and a cause, the absolute deduction is drawn that it *must* have had a cause. Now, no such connection of necessary antecedent and consequence exists between the conceivably possible and necessarily real as has been affirmed. No premises yield, or can yield, a deduction more absolute than themselves. From what *may* be, we can, in no case, affirm what *must* be.

point about which they agree, the nature and character of the hypotheses which each party holds and is bound to prove, the kind of proof of which such an hypothesis admits, and the principles and facts which will yield such proof, etc. Most, to say the least, of these indispensable preliminaries are wholly neglected in the common treatises upon this science. Without such preparatory processes, on the other hand, the argument is commenced, and, as might be expected, no very definite or satisfactory results are reached. In the opening chapters of this treatise there is an attempt to remedy these fundamental defects. In the present and preceding chapter, these necessary preliminary questions, which have more remotely or immediately a fundamental bearing upon our present inquiries, have been subjected to a rigid scrutiny, and have, as we hope, received a sufficiently distinct and satisfactory elucidation. The way is thus prepared to enter, with a reasonable hope of a satisfactory result, upon the examination of the only remaining question at issue, to wit, the matters of fact constituting the minor premises of the different forms of the theistic syllogism.

3. In the method of argumentation commonly pursued on this subject, the principle has been assumed that the *burden of proof* rests almost if not quite exclusively with the advocate of theism. The antitheist is permitted to assume almost exclusively the position of an objector, and to select from time to time any hypothesis he pleases, as the ground of his objections. Now, this is a fundamental defect in the conduct of an argument on almost any subject, and above all on such an one as that under consideration. In all such cases the real question at issue should be fully and most distinctly disclosed, and the exact position which the oppo-

ment must assume should be as fully and distinctly expressed, and he should be compelled to defend his own position as well as assail that of his adversary. All these conditions, as we judge, are fulfilled in the method according to which the argument is conducted in this treatise. After the discussion of other fundamental preliminaries, we are shown, first of all, the principle in respect to which there is a perfect agreement between the theists and anti-theists of all schools, to wit, that there is an ultimate reason or cause for the facts of the universe being what they are, and not otherwise, and that the only point about which they do or can differ is the single question, What is the nature of this reason or cause? It is then shown that this cause must be an inhering law of nature, or a power out of and above nature; while the nature and character of each hypothesis are as distinctly disclosed, together with the forms of proof possible to each. The antitheist, like his opponent, is thus compelled to enter the field as the advocate of a definite, exclusive, and visibly assailable, hypothesis, — an hypothesis which he must successfully defend, or yield the whole ground to the theist. We may reasonably hope, then, for a final and satisfactory settlement of the great question before us.

4. The last defect which we notice is found in the nature of the theistic syllogism as given in the common treatises on the subject, together with the conduct of the argument under that syllogism. The syllogism referred to is this :

Marks of design, that is, facts of order, imply an intelligent cause of such facts.

The universe presents such facts.

Therefore the universe has an intelligent author.

Every one, on a moment's reflection, will perceive that

the *minor* premise of this syllogism presents an absolutely universally admitted truth. No one, whether he is a theist or an antitheist, does or can doubt, or was ever known to deny, that facts of order do exist in the universe around us. The major premise, on the other hand, is denied by all antitheists of every school. In this denial, also, they are sustained by many of the first thinkers among the theists. It is assumed, in this premise, that facts of order do not and cannot exist unless they are produced by some cause, and that an intelligent one. Now, in the divine mind, order, or facts of order, do exist without a cause. If order may exist in *mind* without a cause, for aught that we can do or can know to the contrary, it may exist in matter, or any real substance, without a cause. The principle, then, constituting the major premise of this syllogism is not a self-evident truth, as it is assumed to be, on the one hand, nor is it, in the form presented, a real truth, on the other. In the conduct of the argument, also, we have this one very singular, and, as far as our knowledge extends, unexampled phenomenon. The major or disputed premise is very seldom, aside from a few illustrations, argued at all, while the minor, the universally admitted one, is argued as if the whole issue depended exclusively upon sustaining its validity. The theistic syllogism, therefore, as commonly stated and argued, presents the following very singular violations of all the laws of true scientific procedure, — to wit, a syllogism with a disputed major, and a universally admitted minor premise, while the former is assumed as a universally admitted principle, and the latter argued as the only disputed premise. Who can wonder that even the Christian student, when traversing such works as that of Paley, begins, it may be for the first time in his life, to doubt the possibility

of valid proof of the fundamental article of all religion, the being of God? Nothing higher can be reasonably expected from such a method.

In regard to the theistic syllogism, as presented in the present treatise, no one will question the fact of a necessary connection between the premises, and the conclusion deduced from them. Nor will there, or can there be, any doubt of the absolute validity of the major premises. The minor, in all probability, will be disputed, and this is just what should occur, if a dispute does arise in the conduct of an argument. Such disputes should always pertain to the matters of fact ranged under the general principle, and not to the principle, or major premise, itself. The minor premise then, in our syllogism, being established, the theistic deduction will possess demonstrative certainty. The verification of this one premise, and the subsequent deduction of the consequences thence resulting, is the task which we now assume.

CHAPTER III.

THE THEISTIC HYPOTHESIS ESTABLISHED AS A
TRUTH OF SCIENCE. OR, THE MINOR PREM-
ISES OF THE THEISTIC SYLLOGISM.

WE now proceed to the accomplishment of the fundamental aim of this treatise, the establishment of the Theistic Hypothesis, as a truth of science. Two and only two hypotheses of Ultimate Causation lie out before us,— the theory of Natural Law, on the one hand, and that of Theism, on the other. One of these must be true. In favor of the former, as we have seen, no form or degree of proof, evidence, or antecedent probability, can be adduced. The latter — on certain definable and defined conditions — may justly take rank, as a demonstrated truth of science. We now proceed to vindicate, for this hypothesis, this its proper place in the sphere of human thought. In the present chapter we propose to consider, in order, the following topics:— the present state of the question; the great leading facts which lie at the basis of the Theistic deductions; and the deductions necessarily resulting from these facts; closing with certain suggestions of a general nature.

SECTION I.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE QUESTION.

In arguing any important question, it is of fundamental moment that we distinctly apprehend, and keep constantly

in mind, not only the real issue presented, but the actual state of the case, as, at the present time, it lies out before the general intelligence. From this one stand-point, let us now turn our attention upon the two distinct and opposite hypotheses of Ultimate Causation under consideration. On this topic we remark, —

No evidence whatever exists in favor of the doctrine of Natural Law.

1. The present question is not an issue between contradictory hypotheses, in favor of each of which real valid evidence may be adduced. From the nature of the case, on the other hand, the doctrine of Natural Law, as we have already shown, is absolutely incapable of being proven as true. Nor can the remotest form or degree of positive evidence, or even of antecedent probability, be adduced in its favor. Take, as an illustration, the assumption set forward recently by Mr. Herbert Spencer and others, in favor of this doctrine, to wit, that the conviction is rapidly becoming general among scientific men, that nature throughout is governed by fixed laws, — a dogma, the validity of which has never yet been established. This dogma, if we grant its universal validity, — which we do not and ought not to grant, — is equally compatible with each of the hypotheses under consideration, and from it, not a shadow of proof, positive evidence, or antecedent probability, can be drawn in favor of either against the other. If we suppose nature to be under the supreme dominion of a self-conscious Spirit, infinite and perfect, and that it is best that nature should be immutably governed by fixed laws, we should have the precise form of government in nature that these philosophers assume as existing. In

whatever light the subject is viewed, the principle holds a demonstrated truth, that not the remotest degree of proof, positive evidence, or antecedent probability, can be adduced in favor of the Dogma of Natural Law.

The validity of the Hypothesis of Theism possible as a demonstrated truth of Science.

2. On the other hand, on definite and assignable conditions, the error of the Dogma of Natural Law, and the validity of the Hypothesis of Theism, may be established as an absolutely demonstrated truth of Science. The validity of this statement has already been verified, and it is repeated here but for the purpose of bringing distinctly into mind, the real state of the issue before us.

The least form or degree of evidence in favor of the Hypothesis of Theism requires all men to receive it as true.

3. While, for these undeniable reasons, no one, without a palpable violation of all the demands of true science, can receive the Dogma of Natural Law as true, the least form or degree of positive evidence in favor of the Hypothesis of Theism absolutely requires every man to receive and adopt it as the great central truth in the sphere of human thought and action. By no possibility, as we have before seen, can we escape this conclusion.

The Theistic Hypothesis affirmed as true by the intuitive convictions of the Universal Intelligence.

4. While all the above statements are absolutely undeniable, and have a fundamental bearing upon our present inquiries, the validity of the Theistic Hypothesis has been

absolutely affirmed by the intuitive convictions and deductions of the Universal Intelligence.

From its nature and laws, mind cannot exist, without an idea of Ultimate Causation, any more than it can exist, without those of Right and Wrong, Duty, Immortality, and Retribution. Hence it is, that, among all nations and tribes of men, the ideas represented by the terms Creation and Creator are omnipresent, and that with an immutable conviction of their absolute validity. In the convictions of universal mind, also, in its spontaneous, intuitive procedures the Creator and Governor of all is not an unconscious Principle, or Law of Nature, but a free, self-conscious Personality. The belief in a Personal God, excepting where that conviction has been clouded by "the Antitheses of Science falsely so called," is, in fact, coeval and coextensive with the human race. The validity of these statements none will deny.

This conviction rests upon a basis which Science can never invalidate.

5. This conviction, also, not only exists in the Universal Intelligence, but rests there upon a basis which Science can never invalidate. In its spontaneous and intuitive procedures, the Intelligence has universally and fundamentally distinguished between matter and spirit, never confounding, or identifying, these two substances, the one with the other, any more than it has "scarlet color with the sound of a trumpet." To universal mind, unbewildered by false Science, these two distinct and opposite entities are omnipresent, — the one as possessed of real exteriority, solidity, extension, and form, and the other with the attributes of subjectivity, intelligence, sensibility, and will, —

each being present as possessed of essential attributes, in all respects fundamentally unlike those possessed by the other. To universal mind, also, these distinct and separate entities are ever present, not as unknown and unknowable somethings, but as directly, and immediately, and absolutely known realities. To universal mind, also, creation is omnipresent as an *event of time*. There is not a nation or tribe of men on earth that does not entertain this distinct belief, that creation had a *beginning*, and, as a necessary intuitive consequence, that “in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” Such is the basis of the immutable conviction, existing in universal mind, of the being and perfections of a personal God. All men intuitively believe in nature, the world of matter and spirit, as known and knowable realities. As a consequence, all men intuitively believe in a God of nature. All men believe that creation had a beginning in time. As a necessary intuitive deduction from that belief, all men intuitively believe that “the worlds were made by the word of God.”

Now, this intuitive belief of the race in a personal God, rests upon a basis which Science in its valid procedures will and must confirm and strengthen, but can never, by any possibility, overthrow. No philosopher of any school, in any age of the world — we repeat what we have said before — ever questioned the validity of this belief without basing his denial exclusively upon a formal impeachment of the validity of our knowledge of nature, of the world of matter or of spirit, or of both united. Upon what has that impeachment ever been based? Upon a *mere assumption* exclusively, — an assumption, as we have shown, wholly unsusceptible of proof, and in favor of which no form or

degree of positive evidence or antecedent probability can be adduced.

The fact, that this impeachment rests upon a mere assumption, these philosophers themselves, as we have shown, distinctly admit. The connatural and necessary belief of the race in an external world, "the philosopher," Coleridge tells us, "*compels* himself to *treat* as a prejudice." The same fact, as we have also shown, Kant admits and affirms, and no philosopher of any note denies. Now, an intuitive and necessary natural belief in universal mind can never be weakened, much less invalidated, by a mere assumption; and mere assumption is all that can be adduced against the belief under consideration. If our knowledge of the essential facts of nature is merely relative, no philosopher can prove the fact, or render its truth, upon scientific grounds, even probable. To accomplish such an object he must impeach the Intelligence by the Intelligence, and compel it, on the authority of assumptions or derivative knowledge, to pronounce invalid its own original, connatural, necessary, and consciously presentative intuitions. The idea that Science, in any stage of its advancement, can invalidate a necessary, primitive, and consciously presentative intuition, is one of the most palpable absurdities of which we can form a conception. Science must accomplish this very end before it can, in the least degree, invalidate the necessary belief of humanity in nature or in nature's God.

The only show of argument that has ever been presented, in favor of the validity of the impeachment under consideration, has been based wholly upon the old "Antitheses of Science falsely so called," and upon "the antinomies of Pure Reason" as presented by Kant, and by Mr. Herbert Spencer made the basis of all his deductions and sweeping

generalities. In the "Intellectual Philosophy," pp. 117-119, we have fully explained these antitheses and antinomies, and shown them to be, in reality, nothing but parallogisms, — mere philosophical puzzles utterly unworthy of the insight and dignity either of ancient or modern science.

While Science, also, can by no possibility invalidate the faith of humanity in nature as a known reality, it is equally impotent against the great central fact on which the belief in a personal God is based, — the idea of creation as an event of time. Science, on the other hand, as we shall hereafter show, absolutely verifies this belief, and thus reveals faith in a personal God as resting upon no other basis than the rock of eternal truth.

The Theistic Hypothesis to be held as true, until invalidated by absolute proof. .

6. While Science can never disprove the facts which lie at the basis of the theistic deduction as affirmed by the general Intelligence, nor invalidate the deduction drawn from the same, this deduction must be held, and must command the conscience, as true, until its invalidity has been absolutely demonstrated. In denying this deduction, anti-theism impeaches the original and intuitive procedures of the general Intelligence of fundamental error. That impeachment, by all the demands of true Science, must be held as utterly invalid, and the faith impeached be held as true, until the validity of said impeachment has been established by absolute proof, — proof which, as we have shown, can never be adduced.

True state of the present issue.

7. The real state of the present issue now admits of a

very ready explication. We are in the presence of a case in which, in the undeniable absence of all evidence on one side, the least positive evidence affirming the validity of the other, must absolutely bind the intellect and the conscience. We have also before us two distinct and opposite hypotheses, one of which must be true and the other false. In favor of one of these, that of natural law, no form or degree of real proof, valid evidence, or antecedent probability, can be adduced. In favor of the other, that of theism, a form of proof does exist which Science can, by no possibility, invalidate. In proof of this hypothesis, therefore, the issue is, in fact, and that upon undeniable scientific grounds, immutably settled, and we are now to enter upon our subsequent investigations without a shadow of doubt in our minds about the validity of the hypothesis for the foundations of the proof which we are searching. We are, in short, in the presence, not of a problematical judgment, which we are to prove true or false, but of a proposition known to be true, and the proof of the validity of which we are to find. In our search for this proof, we are not for a moment to doubt the validity of our common faith, nor cease to be true and earnest worshippers of the Father of our spirits.

SECTION II.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE BEING OF GOD ESTABLISHED AS A TRUTH OF SCIENCE IN VIEW OF ALL THE FACTS NOW KNOWN AND WHICH HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL BEARING UPON THE SUBJECT.

In the argument, as conducted in the preceding section, we purposely took into account those facts only in view of which the *universal* Intelligence has affirmed the being and

perfections of God. In the present argument a wider induction will be made, including all the facts bearing upon the subject which science has developed. In arguing from facts to causes two forms of procedure present themselves, either of which may be adopted. We may, after stating the conclusion to be reached, adduce single facts or classes of facts, and then immediately show their bearing; or, we may first classify and arrange *all* the facts to be adduced, and then, in view of their combined results, make our deductions. The latter is the method which we have chosen for the conduct of the present argument.* As our present deductions are to be drawn from a distinct view of all facts bearing upon the subject, the reader will find, in a few instances, a restatement, in other forms, of facts and arguments adduced in preceding chapters. There are two distinct, and in some respects opposite, points of light, in which the theistic idea of the being and character of God may be contemplated, to wit, the idea of Him as a free, self-conscious personality, sustaining to the facts of the universe the relation of unconditioned cause, and as such a personality possessed of all the attributes involved in the ideas of infinity and perfection. Facts, which have a fundamental bearing upon the idea of God in the form first stated, might have no bearing whatever upon it in the second. What we propose to accomplish in the present chapter is, *the demonstration of the validity of the doctrine of the being of God as a free, self-conscious personality, sustaining to the facts of the universe the relation of unconditioned cause.* The class of

* When a given class of facts has been elucidated, we shall, in some instances, show their bearing upon the doctrine of natural law as opposed to the theistic hypothesis of ultimate causation. After all the facts bearing upon this question have been elucidated, their united bearing upon this question will be shown.

facts which we shall now adduce will have a special bearing upon this one proposition. The evidence of the divine infinity and perfection will be presented in the next chapter.

The validity of the idea of God, considered simply as the ultimate or unconditioned cause of the facts of the universe, we would further remark, we have assumed as a universally admitted truth. The attributes necessarily implied in this idea, and which must be admitted as real, are, as we have seen, eternity, immutability, and adequacy and adaptation to produce the facts referred to. So far, there is a perfect agreement among the advocates and opposers of Theism. The problem before us, then, is this : to find a cause existing from eternity to eternity, unchangeably and immutably the same, and having an intelligible adequacy and adaptation to produce these facts and render them, in all respects, what they are ; a cause, too, necessarily implied, in and affirmed by these facts. We will now proceed to an induction of the facts bearing upon this problem in the form in which it is to be argued in the present chapter.

FACTS OF THE UNIVERSE BEARING UPON OUR PRESENT INQUIRIES.

Among the great facts of the universe bearing upon our present inquiries, very special attention is invited to the following : —

Creation, an event occurring in time, and not a reality existing from eternity.

I. Creation is an event occurring in time, and not a reality existing from eternity. In other words, the order existing in nature once did not exist, and, at some point of time in

the past, began to be. As this idea of creation is perfectly fundamental to our whole argument, we shall argue its validity at full length. What, then, is the evidence that the present order of things in the universe had a beginning? To this question we answer :

1. The universe, material and mental, we remark, in the first place, presents us with not a solitary fact or indication which bears in the least degree against the idea that creation had a beginning, an origin in time, and in favor of the hypothesis of the eternity of the present order of things. Nothing known to the race, and absolutely nothing developed by any of the sciences, presents us with any such fact or indication. While there is, as we shall see, the most absolute proof of the non-eternity of the present order of things, there is absolutely no evidence whatever against this hypothesis. No one has ever attempted, and no one of common understanding ever will attempt, to arrange the known facts of the universe so as to make them even *consist* with, much less *affirm*, the opposite hypothesis. Creation throughout, as we shall see, wears but one aspect, that of absolute infancy of age, as compared with the eternity that is past; and not a solitary known fact gives any other indications. We have shown, in a former chapter, that the present order of things must, if the facts of the universe owe their origin to any inhering law of nature as their unconditioned cause, have been, in all essential particulars, eternally the same and could not, by any possibility, have been originated in time, or have had a beginning. On the supposition of its eternal existence, the order of succession would present no indications of recency of origin, much less of having had a beginning in time. This is undeniable. Now the facts are, in all respects, the opposite of what they could not but

be were this hypothesis true. Not a solitary fact appears, presenting the remotest indications that the present order of things had no beginning. All the facts of the universe, on the other hand, arrange themselves in favor of the opposite hypothesis. This leads us to remark,

2. That the non-eternity of the present order of things is positively affirmed by the united intuitive convictions of the race. No known tribe or nation of men exists, without an avowed belief of this one fact. This doctrine is indeed one of the great central convictions of the race, in regard to the universe. Now, an intuitive conviction so universal and absolute can be accounted for but upon one supposition, that the facts of the universe, as presented to the entire race, wear but one aspect, the most absolute indication of a recency of origin; and this conviction must be held as valid, till absolute proof to the contrary is presented. The burden of proof lies wholly upon him who denies this doctrine. No such proof, however, does exist, and we may rest in the absolute assurance that none such will ever be presented.

3. All forms of authentic and unauthentic history rest upon this one assumption, and all relics of tradition affirm the same thing. The history and traditions of different nations may carry back the origin of the race and the beginning of the present order of things to different periods; but all absolutely harmonize in this, that both alike have their limits, in other words, had their beginning in time. The most adverse sceptic will not deny the truth of these statements, and the highest reasons require us to hold them as true, until absolute proof to the contrary is adduced.*

* Each of the above arguments, when stated in a negative form, have all the force of absolute demonstration. If the present order of things has existed from

4. All theories of the universe, theories which profess to account for the great leading facts of creation, agree in this one fundamental principle, the doctrine that the present order of things had a beginning in time. The history of the race, we believe, presents no exception to this statement. Diverse theories assume the eternity of matter, on the one hand, or of spirit, on the other. None, however, affirm it of either in their present *forms* of development; but all alike assume the opposite. The fundamental agreement of all theories in this one central principle, demonstrates the doctrine, that the facts of creation are explicable upon no other principle.

5. We now adduce another fundamental fact of nature, — a fact which admits of but one possible explanation, — to wit, the non-eternity of the present order of things. We refer to the fact, that creation is, and from the first has been, *progressive*, and progressive in one fixed direction, from the *less* towards the *more perfect*. The fixed and changeless progress of creation in this one direction, is affirmed by undeniable facts, and admitted in all theories of the universe of every kind. Materialism and Idealism, in all their forms and teachings, agree in this one fundamental

eternity, then mankind have thus existed. This is undeniable. Now the eternity of the human race is absolutely contradicted by the most fundamental and decisive facts conceivable. There is no accounting, on such an hypothesis, for the existence of the universal conviction, among mankind, of the origin of the entire race within a few thousand years past. If the race has existed from eternity, and consequently had no beginning, how could the conviction of the recency of its origin be lodged in the breast of every member of the human family without exception? The thing is absolutely inconceivable and impossible. If the above supposition was true, history and tradition would also extend infinitely farther back toward the eternity past than they now do. There would be monuments also of human events which occurred interminable ages ago. No such things, however, appear, and their total non-appearance can be accounted for but upon one supposition, the origin of the present order of things in time.

particular, in maintaining the doctrine of universal progression, and progression in the one direction under consideration, from the less towards the more perfect, and maintaining this as an immutuable law of nature. The existence of this law is also affirmed by all the valid facts of the universe known to us. Now, progression, in this one direction, implies a beginning. The very nature of the great leading law of the universe, therefore, implies that this very law once did not exist in nature, and was consequently introduced into it, by a power out of and above nature. There is no explanation of undeniable facts on any other supposition.

All the legitimate deductions of science, bearing upon the subject, affirm absolutely the same great fact, the non-eternity of the present order of things, or their beginning in time.

6. The entire deductions and observations of the science of Geology, for example, culminate in this one conclusion exclusively, that the time was, when all the varied races of animals, human and brute, now existing upon the face of the earth had no existence upon it. Advancing still further in our researches, all indication of the existence of animals or plants of any kind disappear totally. A still further advance presents, with equal distinctness and absoluteness, the total disappearance of the vital principle in all its forms, and even of organization of any kind. Prior to organization, matter existed in a state purely elemental. "The earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep." Such are the undeniable and absolute teachings of Geology on this great subject. If it has not established the non-eternity of all forms of organiza-

tion, animal, vegetable, and mineral, it has established nothing whatever. All the great geological eras of the earth's history are most clearly marked as having had their origin in time. In these eras, also, there is a *progression*; a progression not such as is affirmed by the "development theory," but a real progression, by successive creations, from the less to the more perfect. Such progression as above remarked, necessarily supposes a beginning in time, however remote that period may have been. We have given the above as a great central fact of creation, a fact in the assertion of which the entire deductions of geological science culminate.

Now, what is so undeniably true of the world we inhabit, we are bound to hold as true of the entire material universe, of which the earth constitutes a part. If the earth existed in a state of total isolation from the rest of the universe, analogy even then would favor the conclusion before us; but not so strongly as at present. The universe, on the other hand, is one great systematized whole. That therefore, which is an essential characteristic of any one part of the system, we must hold as belonging to the system itself. If a single wheel of a given organism presents undeniable indications of being the product of a designing artist, the same, of course, without farther examination, we might safely affirm of all the other wheels of said organism which work into this one. If one wheel gives absolute indications of an origin in time, no further examination is requisite as the basis of the affirmation, that all the others had a similar origin. A relation, precisely similar, exists between our world and the entire system of worlds of which this is a part. Since creation, as far as our world is concerned, is an event occurring in time, the same must

be held as true of all others. There is no escaping this conclusion.

The science of astronomy also presents another, and entirely independent proof of the great fact under consideration. We refer to the ascertained existence of a *resisting medium* in the portion of space occupied by the material universe. The argument, from this source, is so happily and concisely expressed by Mr. Harris, that we will give it in his own language. "The non-eternity of the planetary system," he says, "or the fact that the present order of things had a commencement, might be argued from the admitted existence of a resisting medium in space. The argument is mathematical, and may be regarded as the continuous summation of infinitely small quantities. For, only admit that planetary motion encounters resistance, and though it be so small as to be inappreciable within a thousand millions of years, still, if it had been from eternity, the motion resisted must have come to an end. Now, the motion of Enck's comet, as well as that discovered by M. Beila, renders the existence of such a medium almost certain. True, its effect even upon the whisp-like vapor of a comet may be so small as to require between twenty and thirty thousand years to reduce the cometary motion to one half its present value. To reduce the present velocity of Jupiter by one half, might require a period of four hundred and ninety millions of years. Still, as that reduction has not taken place, the planet cannot have existed from eternity. Its motion must have a beginning. The chronometer of the heavens must have been wound up within a limited time, for it has not yet run down."

The entire creation, then, as now organized, had a beginning. The time was when the entire present system

of nature had no existence; when space was not peopled with the systems of suns and worlds that it now is; when “the earth was without form and void,” and when it was the habitation of no living beings whatever, and when none of the forms of verdure and beauty, with which it is now adorned, had any existence upon it. The time, also, was, when, from some cause, creation *began* to take form; when light first *began* to shine out of darkness, and order to rise out of confusion. The reality of this great fact is undeniable. We lay down, then, in the first place, as an immovable rock, on which to base our future deductions, the great fact of creation as an *event happening in time*, and not *a reality existing from eternity*.

The only possible hypothesis on which the theistic deduction yielded by this great fact can be avoided.

The non-eternity of the present order of things is a fact so obvious and so universally admitted, that no sane mind would dare assert the opposite hypothesis before the world. There is but one conceivable hypothesis in which the theistic deduction yielded by this great fact can, by any possibility, be avoided; to wit, that there is in nature an inhering law of this character,—a law which, while the original elements of which creation is now constructed, are in a state of universal chaos, organizes the same into a universe such as now exists, and continues said organization for certain periods, and then resolves all things into their original chaos, from which state the process of reorganization again commences, and so on from eternity to eternity. We thus have an infinite series of creations from natural law,—creations in the progress of one of which we now are. This theory, let us say in general, has but one claim upon our regard,

— its utter remoteness from all facts of observation, on the one hand, and its intrinsic and monstrous absurdity on the other. Nothing conceivable can be more absurd than such a theory when compared with any or all the *known* facts of matter and spirit, and we can only, in such cases as these, reason from the known to the unknown. Indeed, no one, to our knowledge, ever hinted such an hypothesis as even possibly true, but upon one assumption, that matter and spirit are both alike absolutely unknown to us; thus rendering all deductions from the then imaginary facts of either the perfection of absurdity. We do, on the other hand, know matter and spirit both, and do know their laws, and are therefore fully qualified to reason from said laws to this and other theories of a kindred nature. In regard to the theory before us, the following remarks only are deemed requisite, in addition to those made above :

1. This theory is nothing but an imaginary assumption, unsustained, and unindicated as even possibly true by any known fact of matter or spirit. This none will deny.

2. No hypothesis conceivable appears more intrinsically absurd, when compared with the *known* facts and laws of nature. The only power even apparently existing in nature of producing vital organizations of any kind, an insect or vegetable, is that of *perpetuating*, according to immutable laws of *propagation*, species of organization already existing. Nature, if we may reason from her *known* laws, is not an originator at all, but simply and exclusively a propagator. No other inhering law is even remotely indicated by any known facts of the universe. This is undeniable. Nothing is more intrinsically absurd than the supposition that nature, for a time, acts simply and exclusively as an originator, and then instantly substitutes this mode of op-

eration for a different and opposite one, — that of propagation, — and all this through necessary natural law. Natural law is not thus mutable and self-contradictory. If there is any principle which is both self-evident and affirmed as true, it is this, — that nature never changes her own laws, and, above all, never carries on a system of operations according to one fixed and immutable law up to a given period, and then drops that wholly and completes the system by another and opposite law. No greater absurdity can be conceived of than this; and this very absurdity this theory assumes as the basis of an explanation of the facts of the universe. First, original production is the exclusive and universal law. Then this is wholly dropped, and another and totally different one is substituted as the equally universal and exclusive law, — to wit, that of mere propagation of species previously produced. This is continued for a time, and is then as wholly replaced by another and still different law, that of utter destruction and dissolution. This principle having completed its mission, is wholly dropped, and the one first named again becomes the exclusive law of universal nature; and so on forever. An individual must have an almost infinite power of digesting absurdities who will attempt to explain the facts of the universe on such an hypothesis as this, and all this without a single fact or consideration indicative of even the possibility that this theory can be true.

3. This theory reverses all the principles of scientific deduction. Science requires us to explain facts by law, only when said law is revealed and affirmed as real by the facts explained by it. This theory, on the other hand, requires us to explain all the facts and *present* laws of the universe by a law nowhere now existing or operating in nature, and

not only not affirmed as real by present known facts and laws, but palpably contradicted by the same.

4. As we shall see hereafter, the origin of the *present* order of things cannot be explained by a reference to any conceivable inhering law of nature, but must be referred to a power out of and above nature. The supposition, therefore, of an eternal series of universes, produced by natural law, becomes simply an infinite absurdity.

5. On the supposition that the theistic hypothesis is the true one, nothing is more contradictory than the supposition, that from eternity God has been creating and annihilating universes. This none will pretend to question. All our deductions, then, in the sphere of natural theology, must be based upon the principle that the present order of things furnishes the only facts from which we are to reason, and that this order of things had a beginning in time.

Bearing of this great central fact of the universe.

The reality of this great central fact of the universe, we now assume as an admitted truth. We are thus furnished with the *minor premise* of the first form of the theistic syllogism, as given in Chapter II., to wit :

Facts of order, having a beginning in time, suppose a cause out of and above nature.

The facts of order in nature are of this inclusive character.

They are, therefore, to be referred to a cause out of and above nature.

The individual who denies this conclusion is confronted by a self-evident principle on the one hand, and by undeniable facts on the other.

This central fact, we remark further, not only affirms the

reality of such a cause, but also furnishes us with proof equally absolute of the specific nature of that cause. The fact, that the order existing in nature had a beginning in time, implies, in the Unconditioned Cause, which must be held as forever immutably one and the same, and determined in its activity by no cause out of itself, a power, at each moment of duration from eternity to eternity, to create or not to create ; because, when it put forth the first creative fiat, it was determined to that act by no cause *ab extra*, and by no change within. The first great problem before us is consequently to find such a cause. We make this suggestion here to prepare the way for our necessary deductions, when our induction of facts shall have been completed. We would here simply present the suggestion, and leave it, for the present, for the reflection of the reader, whether any conceivable power can, by any possibility, fulfil these conditions but a Free Will, — a Free Will as opposed to all form of necessitated causation.

Creation, in its present form and state, the result of a series of independent creations.

II. The next great leading fact of the universe which we adduce is this : Creation in its present state is the result of a *series of independent* formations. If geological science has established anything, it has rendered two facts demonstratively evident : 1. Creation had a beginning. In other words, the order and arrangement now existing in the universe once was not, and began to be. 2. The present order of things is the result of a series of creations, each of which, though related to what went before it, was not derived from it, in the order of natural and necessary antecedence and consequence. We need only allude here, in illustra-

tion, to four great eras of transformation; eras which gave character to a corresponding number of periods in the earth's history; periods which some geologists have denominated the reign of fishes — the reign of reptiles — the reign of mammals — and the reign of man. The state of the earth, in neither of these periods, together with the orders of sentient existences which then existed upon it, can be explained by a reference to the preceding era. The former was preparatory to the latter, but cannot, upon scientific grounds, be referred to it as its originating cause. The beginning of order was not more independent, in its origination, of the chaos which preceded it, than was any of these secondary creations of the state of order by which it was preceded.

The development theory refuted.

There are two, and only two, theories, in conformity to which the facts of the universe can be explained, — the Lamarckian, or the theory of development, and that of successive, separate, independent creations. Between these two exclusively, philosophers and the world must make their election. Now, in favor of the latter, and in opposition to the former, we urge the following most decisive facts and considerations:

1. The History of the world, since the origin of the human race, presents us, with not a solitary fact, indicating the remotest tendency, on the part of any one species of animals or plants, towards a transmutation into a different or opposite species. Each species is a fixed fact, no changes occurring, except such as are necessitated by climate or cultivation, and none occurring even under such influences, indicating any tendency towards a transmutation

into fundamentally different or opposite species. In this respect it is literally and absolutely true, that "all things remain as they were from the beginning of the creation." Now, if this tendency to transmutation ever existed as a law of nature, and, above all, as the exclusive, ultimate and unconditioned law of creation, then it exists as such law now, and no reasons can be assigned why we should not be continued spectators of its results. Nothing conceivable can be more absurd and unphilosophical than an attempt to explain the entire facts of the universe upon an hypothesis most undeniably and palpably contradicted by all the *present* known facts of the universe.

2. Each existing and extinct species of animals were as perfect in their organization, at their *origin*, as at the time of their *extinction*, or as they are now, and, during the entire period of their existence, present no indication of an intrinsic tendency towards different or higher forms of organization. The teachings of observation and science are absolute on this point, and at no period of the earth's history do any facts present themselves of an opposite character. All the facts of the universe could not but be the opposite of what they are, were the Lamarckian theory true, and that of a series of separate, independent creations false.

3. If the Lamarckian theory were true, — if fish were developed into reptiles, reptiles into mammals, and monkeys into men, — then the creatures first formed would and could not but be most remote and opposite in their organization, from those into which they were finally developed, and vice versa. Now, the opposite of this is true in many important particulars. "Of the vertebrata," says Mr. Hugh Miller, "fishes rank lowest, and in geological

history appear first. We find their remains in the upper and lower Silurians, in the lower, middle and upper Old Red Sandstone, in the mountain limestone, and in the coal measures; and in the latter formation the first reptiles appear. Fishes seem to have been the master existences of two great systems, mayhap of three, as the age of reptiles began. Now fishes differ very much among themselves; some rank nearly as low as worms, some nearly as high as reptiles; and if fish could have risen into reptiles, and reptiles into mammalia, we would necessarily expect to find lower orders of fish passing into higher, and taking precedence of the higher in their appearance in point of time; just as in the *Winter's Tale*, we see the infant preceding the adult. If such be not the case, — if fish make their first appearance, not in their least perfect but in their most perfect state, — not in their nearest approximation to the worm, but in their nearest approximation to the reptile, — there is no room for progression, and the argument falls. Now, it is a geological fact, that it is fish of the higher orders that appear first on the stage, and that they are found to occupy exactly the same level during the vast period represented by five succeeding formations. There is no progression. If fish rose into reptiles, it must have by sudden transformation; it must have been as if a man who had stood still for half a lifetime, should bestir himself all at once, and take seven leagues at a stride. There is no getting rid of miracle in the case; there is no alternative between creation and metamorphosis. The infidel substitutes progression for Deity, geology robs him of his God." How absurd and unphilosophical to attempt to explain the entire phenomena of the universe by a theory which is so palpably

contradicted by such undeniable and fundamental facts as these.

4. The different orders of animals and plants which have appeared on earth are connected together by no *intermediate links* indicating, in the remotest degree, the present or past existence and operation of the law of transmutation. Where is the intermediate order between the fish and the reptile, the reptile and the mammal, the monkey and the man, to indicate the passage of creation from one species to the other? There are intermediate links in abundance, but absolutely none of the character under consideration, and creation could not but abound in such, were the Lamarekian theory true. "Geology," says Hugh Miller, again, "abounds with creatures of the intermediate class; there are none of its links more numerous than its connecting links; and hence its interest, as a field of speculation, to the asserters of the transmutation of races. But there is a fatal incompleteness in the evidence, that destroys its character as such. It supplies in abundance those links of generic connection, which, as it were, marry together dissimilar races; but it furnishes no genealogical link to show that the existences of one race derive their lineage from the existences of another. The scene shifts as we pass from formation to formation; we are introduced in each to a new *dramatis personæ*; and there exist such proofs of their being at once different and yet the same, as those produced in the *Winter's Tale*, to show that the grown shepherdess of the one scene is identical with the exposed infant of the scene that went before. Nay, the reverse is well-nigh as strikingly the case, as if the grown shepherdess had been introduced into the earlier scenes of the drama, and the child into its concluding scenes." That certainly is a false phi-

losophy of the universe which is not only not sustained by any fundamental facts, but which is so palpably contradicted by all the facts of the universe bearing upon the subject.

5. Comparative Anatomy places an impassable gulf between existing and extinct species of animals, fully demonstrating, from a development of their external and internal constitution, that the latter cannot have been originated by transmutation, from the former. It is a *self-evident* truth that the process of transmutation, if it has occurred at all, must have been very gradual, preserving throughout fundamental resemblances as far as internal structure especially is concerned. Now, no such resemblances appear. On the other hand, where a fundamental resemblance must exist, if the theory of transmutation were true, a fundamental difference presents itself.

6. The different races of animals, which have existed on the earth, sustain *external* relations to each other the opposite of what they would sustain were the development theory true. The following extract from the "Footprints of the Creator" will present this department of our subject in its true light:— "There are two kinds of generation in the world," says Professor Lorenzo Oken, in his "Elements of Physio-Philosophy," "the creation proper, and the propagation that is sequent thereupon, — or the *generatio originaria et secundaria*. Consequently, no organism has been created larger than an infusorial point. No organism is, nor ever has one been, created, which is not microscopic. Whatever is larger, has not been created, but developed. Man has not been created, but developed." Such, in a few brief dogmatic sentences, is the development theory. What, in order to establish its truth, or even to render it in some degree probable, ought to be the geological

evidence regarding it? The reply seems obvious. In the first place, the earlier fossils ought to be very *small* in size; in the second, very *low* in organization. In cutting into the stony womb of nature, in order to determine what it contained mayhap millions of ages ago, we must expect, if the development theory be true, to look upon mere embryos and fœtuses. And if we find, instead, the full-grown and the mature, then must we hold that the testimony of Geology is not only *not in accordance* with the theory, but in opposition to it. Such, palpably, is the *principle* on which, in this matter, we ought to decide. What are the *facts?*” The author then demonstrates, as far as any truth can be rendered demonstrably evident, by facts, that geological facts are fundamentally the reverse of what they could not but be if this theory were true. The earliest fossils are not very small in size nor very low in organization, but in many important respects the opposite. Such is the universal testimony of Geology on this subject.

7. Equally absolute are the teachings of the science of Astronomy against the fundamental principles of the development theory. According to the necessary demands of that theory, the distances of the planets from the sun would, and must, be as their specific gravity, with very little if any variation, and the motions of all, together with their satellites, would be “all in one direction from west to east.” Such is the statement of the author of “the Vestiges” himself. Now, precisely the opposite is true of the solar system, in very important and fundamental particulars. Planets at different distances from the sun, — Venus, Earth, and Mars, for example, — possess nearly the same density, that of Mars being greater than that of Venus and less than that of the Earth, while that of Mercury is greater than that of

either of them, or any other in the system. The density of Uranus is greater than that of Saturn, which is nearer the sun; and that of Neptune, still more distant, much greater than that of either of them. The motion of the satellites of the former are retrograde, or contrary to that of all the other planets and their satellites, and their orbits are, moreover, nearly perpendicular to the ecliptic. The velocity of the planets is equally inexplicable on the development hypothesis. If this theory were true, the velocity of these bodies could not but be as their distance from the sun, while the reverse is true in particulars perfectly fundamental, — velocity in the case of Mars, for example, being slower than in that of the Earth, and slower in Saturn than in Jupiter. All these are very remarkable peculiarities, and wholly inexplicable by the development hypothesis. The difficulties of this hypothesis, however, do not end here. The asteroids present difficulties nearly, if not quite, as fatal to the claims of this theory, while the “comets,” in the language of the “*Edinburgh Review*,” “cut in eccentric orbits through our whole system and obey a common central law, yet seem to scorn all kinship to rings thrown off by a revolving sphere.” Where absolute uniformity should, and could not but appear, were this theory true, a wide diversity presents itself. Where diversity is demanded, there a striking uniformity presents itself; and the uniformity, on the one hand, and the diversity on the other, are exactly the reverse of what they could not but be, were this theory true. “The collocation and motion of the system,” as Mr. Harris has well observed, “cannot be referred to chance, because of its calculated uniformity, nor to natural law, owing to its departures from uniformity.” It is only among those who have the most superficial acquaintance with the facts of the universe, or

who, with their eyes closed to all the real teachings of true science upon the subject, have obstinately given themselves up to the belief of baseless assumptions, that the development theory can obtain credence for a single hour. As the development hypothesis, or that which we maintain, must be true, and as the former cannot be true, we are at liberty to lay down the doctrine that the present order of things in the universe is the result of a *series* of independent creations, and to lay down this great fact as the basis of future deductions in relation to the great inquiry before us. It is undeniable, that if the present order of things in nature was the result of any inhering law of nature, then the progress of creation would and must be in exact accordance with the fundamental principles of the development theory. We are accordingly furnished with another minor premise of the theistic syllogism. The argument stands thus: Facts of order which can be accounted for by a reference to no inhering law or laws of nature must be referred to a cause out of and above nature. The order of creation is of this precise character. This order, therefore, supposes a cause out of and above nature.

Every species of animal and vegetable organization originally produced by original, independent acts of creation.

III. Not only has the earth been the theatre of successive independent creations, but every species of organized beings that now exists, or ever has existed upon it, owes that existence to such a creative fiat. This follows of necessity from the train of argument just completed. Every distinct form and species of animal and vegetable organization, the first excepted, became what it is or was by transmutation, or by some immediate originating fiat. The

former hypothesis cannot be true. The latter, therefore, must be true. Then all the facts of observation and science affirm, most absolutely, the same thing. "Had spontaneous production and the transmutation of species," says Mr. Harris, "been among the processes of nature, we might have expected to meet with abundant indications in the bosom of the earth. The subterraneous fossil museum might have been expected to be created with monstrous malformations. The fact is, however, that, amidst all the vast accumulations of animal remains, not a single abnormal specimen has yet been found. Every organic part is finished; every animal complete, — the first of his race as complete as its offspring of the present day; every species articulating with every other species, and falling into the place appointed for it, in a perfect, all-comprehending plan. Accordingly, the verdict returned by all the enlightened geologists of the day — some of them by no means unduly biased in favor of the view — is, that species have a real existence, and that each was endowed at the time of its creation with the attributes and organs by which it is now distinguished." "It is necessary," says Professor Agassiz, "that we recur to a cause more exalted" (than the scheme of natural production or development), "and recognize influences more powerful, exercising over all nature an action more direct, if we would not move eternally in a vicious circle. For myself, I have the conviction that species have been created successively at distinct intervals, and that the changes which they have undergone during a geological epoch are very secondary, relating only to their fecundity, and to migrations dependent on epochal influences." Every species, then, has an independent origin, and owes that origin to some originating fiat which brought it into being in a

state of absolute completeness of organization, with all the laws of sustentation and propagation immutably established from the beginning. This also is a great fundamental fact to be laid down as the basis of our subsequent deductions.

All the leading species of animated existence must have been brought into being in such a state of maturity as from the first to be capable of self-sustentation.

IV. All the *leading* forms and species of animated existence, that now people or ever have peopled the earth, must have been originally created, not in an *embryo* or *infantile* state, but in a state of *maturity*, such a degree of maturity as to be capable, from their origin, of self-preservation. This is self-evident, when we have rejected, as we have seen that we must do, the theory of transmutation. All the leading tribes of animals that ever have appeared, and man the most of all, are in the state first named, totally incapacitated for the sustentation of themselves, and can be preserved only through parental care or miraculous interpositions. Admitting, then, the direct and original creation of all the various species of animated existences which have peopled the earth, and the form of that creation becomes self-evident. There was a period when they had no existence. The next moment they have being in a state of perfection and maturity of organization capable of self-preservation. Such are the facts, — facts which, we repeat, cannot be denied but upon the theory of transmutation, which, as we have seen, is most palpably contradicted by all the leading facts of the universe, and favored by absolutely none of them. The immutable law of creation has been undeniably this: Each species of organized being is, at the beginning, originated in a state of maturity capable, from the

first, of self-sustentation, and that with its organization perfected, and its laws of propagation and perpetuation immutably fixed, and fixed in this form, that the original pair is, in all fundamental particulars, the type of the species, from the commencement to the close of its existence.

The order of successive creations has been throughout in the relation of wisely adjusted adaptation.

The successive creations of distinct and separate races and species of animated existences, together with the extinction of preceding ones, have all been, we remark in the next place, attended with revolutions on the earth's surface, which have sustained to said creations a fixed and immutable relation of *wisely adjusted* adaptation. The extinction of one race has been occasioned by a revolution, often violent, and not unfrequently general, in the physical condition of the earth, — a revolution which, in its final necessary results, has prepared it as a habitation for the race or races which were subsequently introduced upon it. The revolution was the means, and the existence and well-being of the races referred to, the end. Everything wears the indications of intelligent foresight. All things are just what they would be if resulting from such foresight in the great first cause, and what we should suppose they would not be if not resulting from such a cause. Every stage in the progress of creation from the beginning has been in one direction exclusively, from the less to the more perfect, and all as a means to one end exclusively, the preparation of the earth as a fitting habitation for man. If the *great first cause* did indeed “see the end from the beginning,” and most wisely arrange all the movements of creation accordingly, the world, as the grand theatre for the reign

of man, would not be different from what it is. How immeasurably remote are many of the formations beneath the earth's surface, the coal formations for example, and yet how wisely adapted, and how indispensable to the wants of man, and how utterly useless for any other purpose! The progress of creation has undeniably been that of a "wise master-builder." The foundations were laid with a wise reference to the goodly superstructure that was to be reared upon it. Each stone was previously prepared for the place it was subsequently to occupy, and, throughout the whole, the ideas of order, fitness, proportion, and wisely adjusted adaptation, are most perfectly realized. These are the facts, and they are undeniable and undenied. The conclusions to be deduced from them we are to consider in another place.

General application of the facts above adduced.

In reasoning from facts to ultimate causes, we must, if we would proceed with any rational hope of success, most rigidly adhere to facts just as they are, with all their essential characteristics. In whatever form we contemplate the universe, whether we turn our thoughts upon the system of nature in general, as organized into systems of suns and worlds, or fix attention upon the various classes of organized existences, mineral, animal, and vegetable, immediately around us, we must bear this one great fact in mind, that the time was when, as science itself absolutely affirms, no such organizations whatever existed. All things as they now exist, once were not and began to be. Nothing whatever in the form of an eternal series presents itself. Every series, on the other hand, had a beginning. If we suppose that the elementary substances, of which

these forms of being are constituted, existed from eternity, we must suppose, as we have before shown, that, from eternity to a certain period, they existed with no inhering power of taking on any such forms. At a certain moment of the past they began to take on such forms. Order, which is now the universal law of nature, was once unknown to nature. It is itself a great central fact of the universe, — a fact which once was not, and then began to be. It is, therefore, a fact to be accounted for, — an event for which we are to find a cause. What, then, must this cause be? It must be, as we have already shown, a natural, or inhering law of nature itself, or a power out of and above nature. In our attempts to determine which of these hypotheses is the true one, we are to reason wholly and exclusively — we repeat what we have said before — from the *known* facts and laws of nature, and from what is *implied* in the same. All mere conjectures and assumptions are to be wholly excluded.

Now, nothing can be more demonstrably evident than the proposition, that taking nature in its elementary state, the state in which it undeniably was prior to all forms of organization, and by no conceivable hypothesis of inhering law, and above all, by none indicated by the *known* facts and laws of nature, can we account for the facts of order subsequently developed. Prior to the existence of the planetary universe, for example, matter existed with no inhering law of self-organization into such a system. On that hypothesis, said universe must have been, not an event of time, but with no beginning. In other words, on the theory of natural law, matter must have existed from eternity in the form of a planetary system, or it could never have assumed that form. This great central truth aside, however, we will now suppose matter to exist in the ele-

mentary state referred to, with an inhering tendency to organize itself into a planetary system. Through such tendency, we should have a system of this character of *some* kind; but, by no possibility, could we have *the* system which now exists. Nature is strictly *uniform* in her operations. This is one of her immutable laws. In the same circumstances, she invariably produces the same results. Any theory of the universe which palpably contradicts this principle is demonstrably false. In a planetary system organized by natural law, supposing the event possible, a law inhering in matter in an elementary and totally unorganized state, there would undeniably be throughout, a mechanical uniformity in the structure of said system; that is, there would be a very strict relation of uniformity between the relative *density* and *velocity* of planets, and their respective distances from the central body about which they revolve. The *direction* of the motion of the planets and their satellites about their own axes, and around their central orbs, all being immutably determined by one and the same immutable law, could not but be in the same direction; so of the system in all other important particulars. Now, the system which we have in fact, is, as we have seen, in particulars perfectly fundamental, the reverse of what is immutably demanded of any system developed exclusively by natural law. In the system we have, we find a fixed and intelligible order which demonstrates the all-pervading presence of law. At the same time, the nature of this order is such as to indicate with the same absoluteness that the dwelling-place of that law is not in, but out of and above nature. The orbits of the comets inclined at all angles to the sun's equator, and often totally out of the plane of his rotation; the moons of Uranus revolving in directions con-

trary to all other bodies ; planets nearer the sun of far less density than others much more remote from that central orb, and planets more remote moving with velocities much less than others more near the common centre ; present fundamental exceptions to the facts of the universe, — exceptions which can, by no possibility, be accounted for, on any hypothesis of natural law. There can be no doubt of the fact, that the Author of nature, anticipating the progress of astronomical science, *intentionally* thus arranged the planetary universe, so as to confront, confound, and annihilate every such hypothesis. The facts can be intelligibly accounted for on no other supposition.

The same remarks are equally applicable to the great facts recorded in the volume of nature by the science of Geology. Every conceivable system of creation by natural law falls to pieces on these great facts. Here, again, we have an omnipresent order, the all-pervading presence of law. It is order, however, interrupted and changed in its directions, in forms demonstrably indicating the truth, that these facts of order, or laws, are not principles inhering in nature, but are themselves, on the other hand, the exclusive results of the action of a cause out of and above nature. Animal and vegetable creation exclusively by natural law must be, a fact which all admit, first, the origination of infusoria containing *in germine* all forms and species of vitalized existence which subsequently appear, and these infusoria must then be very slowly and gradually developed into forms next higher, these into others more perfect, and so on, till the series is perfected, — the series constituting all the diversified classes, races, and species, vegetable and animal, which now exist, or ever have existed, on earth. Now, the order of nature, or the progress of creation, can,

by no possibility, be made to conform to what cannot but be the character of any series of organizations thus originated. The series which is, as compared with any which must result from any infusorial creations by natural law, does not and cannot be made to appear as a connected chain, every link of which hangs in natural dependence upon the one which goes before, and so on to the beginning of the series. All, on the other hand, presents but one appearance, that of masses of broken links, which cannot be brought together. The series, from time to time, is broken and the parts separated by impassable gulfs, across which no cable can possibly be stretched. At the same time, the *character* and *direction* of the series are changed in fundamental particulars wholly incompatible with the idea of creation by natural law. Fishes do not, for example, through myriads of ages, produce their own kind exclusively, and then instantaneously, while they continue to produce their kind as before, also begin to produce, in the completeness and perfection of their organization, monstrous land animals, that go on and for similar periods produce exclusively their own kind, and then suddenly begin to produce mammals of various species, — each species distinct and separate from all others, and in the perfection of its organization from its origin, — while one of these species, the monkey tribe, after propagating its own kind exclusively for similar periods, begins on a sudden to produce its own proper offspring as before, but for a time also to produce perfectly organized rational human beings, — a process continued for a little period, when the whole monkey race falls back under its first immutable law of producing exclusively its own kind. This is the order of nature, on the assumption of creation by natural law.

There were no gradual changes from one species to another. Everything, on the other hand, must have been, by sudden leaps, sudden transformations from one form of production to others, in all respects fundamentally different, and this under the same circumstances. Nature remaining for untold ages, to say the least, without the power of producing vital organizations of any kind, by sudden throes, never afterwards repeated, produces infusoria containing in themselves the germs or principles of all forms and species of existence which subsequently appear, — the most wonderful creative act conceivable. These infusoria, after producing for untold ages nothing but their own kind, begin to mingle with their own proper productions those of totally distinct and higher orders, all in the perfection of organization from the first. So of these last, and onward up to the present. Such must have been the order of nature, if creation has been by natural law. There is no escaping this conclusion. Now, if we can know anything of nature, she does not thus, *per saltem*, change from time to time her own laws.

If we, on the other hand, suppose that the order of creation has been from the beginning progressive, indeed, but by successive creative fiat, as the successive states of nature demanded, and in new and higher forms according to an original and wisely projected plan, — that is, that the cause of the order in nature is a power out of and above nature, — then the facts presented to the race, and developed by the researches of science, all take form in accordance with that hypothesis, and we have a series with no links wanting, and whose diverse parts are separated by no impassable chasms. Suppose we take any one leading species of organized existence, the human race for example, and

trace it back to its origin. From the beginning, we find that organization, physically considered, perfect and complete, wanting nothing, as perfect as it now is, the original pair presenting the perfect type of all their offspring to the remotest generations. In what state must this original pair have been created? They were not developed from lower species, that is, born of mere monkeys. That theory must now be dismissed as one of the monstrosities of "science falsely so called." This pair must have been originated by a direct, immediate, and independent creative fiat of some kind. In what state must they have been originated, the idea of their sustentation by miracle being left out of the account? They could not have been produced in a mere embryo state, and developed into manhood by natural law. This is self-evident. Nature would destroy instead of developing such embryos thus exposed. The same holds equally true, on the supposition that they were produced in a state of infancy. No species is, or can be, more absolutely helpless than the human kind under such circumstances. The conclusion is inevitable. The original pair must have been brought into being in a state of maturity, capable, from their origin, of self-preservation, or they must have been sustained to manhood by miracle; thus demonstrating the error of the doctrine of natural law. The same remarks are equally applicable to a very large proportion of the animal creation around us, the orders of mammals almost, if not quite, without exception. How shall we account for such creations, on the hypothesis of natural law? If we know or can know anything of nature, this we know with absolute certainty, that she does nothing *per saltem*. All her organizations are gradual, and not sudden, instantaneous forma-

tions. She never does, and never did, by sudden, self-originated throes and leaps, produce full-grown elephants, or full-grown men. Such must have been her originations, if creation is and ever has been by natural law. This doctrine falls to pieces upon immovable rocks the moment it is brought to bear upon undeniable facts pertaining to the *origin* of things.

We are thus furnished with our minor premise of the second form of the theistic syllogism, as presented in Chapter II., to wit :

The supposition that the order of events in nature has, from time to time, been changed, and that parts of given series are arranged in forms which can, by no possibility, be accounted for by a reference to natural law, necessarily imply that the ultimate cause of the facts of the universe is a power out of and above, and no inhering law of, nature.

Fundamental facts of each of these classes do exist in nature.

The ultimate cause of these facts, therefore, is a cause out of and above, and no inhering law of, nature.

While the major premise of this syllogism is undeniably self-evident, it is equally undeniable that the facts adduced are real, and do fall under that principle, and thus affirm the validity of the minor premise, and consequently yield the conclusion as a truth of science. We have now said enough to indicate the general character and bearing of our facts thus far adduced, and shall proceed to complete our induction.

Matter and Spirit—their relations, etc.

V. To universal mind, two orders of existence, or two distinct and opposite substances, stand revealed in the uni-

verse, to wit, matter and spirit. The conviction of the actual existence of these two substances in the universe, and that as substances they are not the same, but opposites, in their nature, is just as extensive as the race of man. No mind does or can exist without this conviction. In certain systems of philosophy this distinction has been confounded and denied. No professed demonstrations of philosophy, however, have ever been able to shake this conviction in the general intelligence, and no philosopher ever convinced himself that mind is matter, or matter spirit, by his own reasonings. In this connection, we deem it important to make merely the following observations upon this subject:

1. The universal conviction under consideration must be held as absolutely decisive on the subject, till its falseness has been absolutely proved. The burden of proof is wholly with the objector.

2. Not only is it impossible to disprove the validity of this conviction, but equally so to bring any form or degree of valid evidence of any kind against it. It is certainly not intuitively true that matter is spirit, or that spirit is matter. On the other hand, it is an absolute intuition of the universal Intelligence that both substances exist in fact, and that one of them is not the other. Equally impossible is it to invalidate this conviction by any process of inductive proof or of logical deduction. There are no valid principles, that lie back of any of our intuitive convictions, from which any disproof of, or evidence against, this conviction can be deduced. Nor are there any facts of observation which throw a shadow of doubt over its validity.

3. No form or degree of antecedent probability can be adduced against the validity of this conviction. This we have most absolutely proved to be true in the preceding part

of this treatise. If we contemplate either of these substances by itself, it is just as antecedently probable that it does, as that it does not, exist; and the fact that one of them exists presents not the remotest antecedent probability against the supposition that the other exists. It is, on the other hand, just as antecedently probable that both exist together, as that either exists alone, or that one of them exists at all.

4. While this conviction presents the highest proof of the real existence of these two substances, and of their existence as distinct and opposite entities, we have in it also the highest antecedent probability of its validity. It is undeniably infinitely more probable in itself that realities do, than that they do not, accord with the presentative perceptions and intuitive convictions of the universal Intelligence. In other words, it is infinitely more probable that what the universal Intelligence has absolutely affirmed to be real, is, than that it is not, real. None will deny the validity of this principle.

5. We must deny the great fundamental principle of all science, to wit, that substances are as their phenomena, and affirm the opposite to be true, before mind can be resolved into the developments of matter, on the one hand, or matter into those of spirit, on the other. It is not enough to say, that, for aught we know, there may be unknown properties common to the two substances which will identify them, in their ultimate essence. Before such a supposition is to be admitted at all, it must be shown that the existence of such properties is indicated by those that are known. This is the only principle on which we are at liberty to reason from the known to the unknown. Besides, we cannot but know that there cannot be unknown properties in an extended

and solid substance, which identify it ultimately with one utterly void of all these qualities. Thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, on the one hand, and solidity, extension, and form, on the other, are irreconcilable contradictions, or opposites, and cannot inhere in the same substance. Mind and matter, the universal Intelligence has fundamentally separated the one from the other, and philosophy cannot join them together. Mind, therefore, is, and can be, no mode of material existence or development, nor is matter any form of spiritual existence or manifestation. They are, on the other hand, in all respects, totally distinct and separate orders of existence. We will now advance to a consideration of their relations, the one to the other.

RELATIONS OF THESE TWO SUBSTANCES TO EACH OTHER.

To appreciate fully the bearing of the great central facts now to be brought under review, we must bear distinctly in mind, that, whatever we may conclude in regard to the doctrine of original creation of substance from non-being, the time was when neither of the substances under consideration had any existence in their *present* forms and relations to each other. The time was when mind, finite mind, as exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, and matter as now organized and acting, had no existence. Matter, for example, now stands related to mind as an *object*, and mind to matter as a *power* of knowledge. Matter sustains to mind the relation of a cause of certain sensitive states, sensations; and mind to matter, that of a subject of such states. Matter exists as the subject of certain changes of state induced by the action of voluntary determination in mind; and will exists in mind as the *cause* of such changes of state in matter. Matter, in

all its organizations, exists exclusively as a means, and mind as the end. Matter, too, is everywhere organized in fixed correspondence with fundamental ideas of pure science pre-existing in mind. Such, in brief, are the relations *now* existing between these two substances. The great fact to be kept distinctly and continuously in mind is this: These relations once had no existence. The time was when mind and matter both had no being in their present relations to each other. These great central facts of the universe once had no existence, but are themselves facts of recent occurrence, and must have had an adequate cause. Let us, for a few moments contemplate some of these facts.

The body and the soul.

1. We will, in the first place, contemplate the relations existing between the body and the soul. But a few thousand years since, neither of these objects, as now constituted and related to each other, had an existence. If matter and mind then existed at all as substances, they existed wholly independent of each other. Neither owed its existence to the other, and the states of neither, as far as we have any evidence, were, in any form, determined by those of the other. The body is constituted of parts immensely numerous and diversified, and capable of functions endless in number and diversity, and yet so blended as to present the most beautiful, majestic, and goodly structure which the mind has ever perceived or apprehended. This structure, so “fearfully and wonderfully made,” exists simply and exclusively as a special means to one end,—a locomotive habitation and instrument of the mind. All the organs and functions of the former are in fixed and absolute correlation to the powers, susceptibilities, and wants of the latter. Here is a

substance with its peculiar and special powers of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination. And here is a structure constituted wholly of elements of a totally diverse, distinct, and opposite substance. Yet this goodly structure has, in all its endlessly diversified parts and functions, an absolute correlation to the necessities of its mysterious occupant. Now, the great fact here presented, the fact which has a fundamental bearing upon our present inquiries, is this: This body, with all its functions of respiration, nutrition, reproduction, and of voluntarily determined locomotion, etc., is a structure which once had no being, and was subsequently produced. There was a time when the various elements which constitute its diversified parts were, for the first time, blended, and when the parts themselves were put together. Whence the originating cause of such a wonderful event? The mind inhabiting the structure did not surely originate its own habitation. Nor is this organization the propagated effect of previously existing ones of a different species. The dogma of transmutation now stands among the exploded errors of the past. The human body, as originally produced, was undeniably the result of some direct and immediately originating fiat in nature. Was that fiat the result of the action of a cause inhering in nature itself, or of a cause out of and above nature? If the former, why had not that cause, having, as we must, on the theory of natural law, suppose, existed in nature from eternity, why had it not, we say, acted in the production of similar organizations before? If that cause existed in nature then, it exists there now. Why does it not act now in the production of similar results? What known fact, natural law, or principle, indicates the existence in nature itself of an inhering power of this kind? By no possibility can we con-

template the fact of the *original* organization of the body, together with its existence as a habitation of a rational spirit, as an event occurring in time, — and that by a direct and immediate originating fiat, and not as the propagated result of some previously existing organization, — and not affirm, that this event is the result of the action of no inhering law of nature, but of a cause out of and above nature, — as the body, like the watch, is a thing *made*, — made and adapted for specific, intelligible ends. We may then reason as safely from the character of the thing made to that of the maker, in the one case as in the other.

The action of the vital principle in nature.

2. The vital principle, as it exists in nature, exists in two forms, the vegetable and animal, and its action in the first form has a relation of fixed subordination to its action in the second. The animal cannot subsist upon the material elements in their unorganized state. Matter must be first subjected to the action of the vital principle in the vegetable kingdom before it can sustain the action of the same principle in the animal economy. This, to say the least, is the general law. The final cause of the action of this principle in both kingdoms alike is the wants of mind in man. The final cause of the action of this principle in the vegetable is to subordinate the elements of crude matter around us to the action of the same principle in the animal kingdom; and the final cause of the action of this principle in the animal economy is, we repeat, the necessities of rational mind. Now, the existence of this principle in nature, together with its results in the production of the various forms and species of vitalized existence, animal and vegetable, in the world around us, as well as the sub-

ordination of the whole to the end referred to, are all events of time, — events for which we are to find an adequate cause, and we are to find that cause in nature, or out of it. If it exists in nature, why are the results of its action a series of events having a beginning in time, and not a series coeval with that in which said cause exists, and whose activity it controls; that is, nature herself being uncreated, coeval with past duration itself? Such questions as these, — questions which science forces upon us, — can never, by any possibility, be answered on the hypothesis of final causation by natural law.

Relations of the earth itself considered as an organized whole to the wants of mind.

3. If we turn our attention from particular facts to a contemplation of the globe itself which we inhabit, and consider it as it is, as an organized whole, we shall find throughout the same fixed law of subordination to one end, the wants of mind. The body was not more manifestly constructed for one exclusive purpose, — a habitation of the mind, — than was the earth itself as a dwelling for the human race. The world, as an organized whole, existed long before man. Its organization was not only begun, but perfected, before man had a being upon it. Yet the world exists but for man. Its entire organization throughout; its form, position in the solar system; its revolutions, diurnal and perennial; its mineral treasures, vegetable and animal productions; the blending of its diversified elements; its atmosphere, its oceans, seas, lakes, rivers, continents, mountain ranges, and deserts even; have one exclusive and specific final cause, the wants of man as a physical and mental being. The wider our inductions, and the more

perfect our knowledge of man, on the one hand, and of the earth as an organized whole, on the other, the more absolute does the conviction become that the earth exists and was constructed as a means to one end, the wants of the human race.

The entire universe throughout constructed in accordance with ideas and principles of pure science pre-existing in the mind itself.

4. The universe, as we have before said, is in its entirety, an absolute unity, an organized whole complete in all its parts. When we contemplate this majestic structure from this one stand-point, we find it organized throughout in absolute accordance with fundamental *ideas* and *principles* of pure science as they exist in the mind itself. The laws and principles of the pure mathematics, for example, are undeniably "the patterns of things in heaven, and things on the earth." They are, in fact, the laws and principles in conformity to which the whole universe, in all its departments, was constructed. To this statement, there are absolutely no exceptions. Before man can read the book of nature so as to "understand what he reads," he must first graduate in the pure sciences which exist for the intelligence alone. When he has comprehended the formulas and solved the great problems in the school of pure abstractions, then and then only, can he interpret nature without him. Then, and then only, for example, can he explain the mechanism of the heavenly bodies, the nature of their orbits, their motions, and revolutions. On the supposition, that "the builder and maker of all things" is an infinite and perfect mathematician and architect, and has intentionally constructed the entire universe throughout

in perfect harmony with fundamental ideas and principles of pure science, as they exist in the mind, the universe would, in all respects, be just what it now is, and in no conceivable respects otherwise.

Not only is it true that the universe is constructed in absolute conformity to ideas and principles of science, but one of the most manifest final causes of this arrangement is the *scientific education* of the human race. The universe is so constructed and presented to the human intelligence as to awaken thought and inquiry, in the first instance, and as to then lead the mind back into the school of pure science, as soon as it fixes its attention upon any of the leading problems presented for solution, in the next. Without a knowledge of the facts of nature there can be no science, and without prior discipline in the school of pure science, these facts remain and must remain, absolutely inexplicable. Thus nature is the great scientific educator of mind, and to this great end its form and structure throughout sustain the relation of an intelligibly adapted means. We might extend these illustrations, and show that there are in the universe throughout, specific adaptations to the education of each specific faculty and susceptibility of the human mind. The fact is too obvious to need illustration, and too fundamental in its bearing upon our present inquiries, not to be presented as one of the constellation of great central facts of the universe. Had the Author of nature an absolute knowledge of mind as it is, and had he constructed the universe with a specific reference to the development of each and every specific faculty and susceptibility of that substance, the goodly structure of said universe would be, in all respects, what it now is. The fact is undeniable, whatever its bearings may be.

General bearing of these great central facts.

Such is a very concise view of the relations of these two substances, matter and rational finite spirit. Let us, for a few moments, contemplate the general bearing of these great central facts of the universe. We have before us two substances, in all respects in their natures totally unlike and opposite to each other, substances which, but a few ages past, had no existence in the relations which they now sustain to one another. Yet, when we contemplate these relations, we find that the states of these two substances are absolutely correlative to each other, and that those of the former are all predetermined by the relation of specific subordination to the laws, susceptibilities, and wants of the latter. The grand problem now before us is, to find an ultimate cause intelligibly adequate and adapted to the production of these facts, — a cause necessarily supposed by the facts themselves.

If we suppose a power out of and above nature, — a power which had an absolute and perfect knowledge of the two substances, and intentionally brought them into their present correlative relations to each other, — we have a full and intelligibly adequate explanation of the entire mass of facts before us. If we reject this hypothesis, and refer the facts to that of natural law, three and only three conceivable theories present themselves, — theories, one of which, to the exclusion of all others, must be true. 1. We may suppose this cause to be an inhering law of the substance of finite mind, a law, which prior to all present relations of these entities to each other, first determined matter to take form in absolute conformity to the laws, principles, and wants of mind, when in its present state of self-conscious devel-

opment, and then having organized its existing habitation, the body, it located itself in the same in its present conscious relations to the universe. 2. We may suppose, on the other hand, this cause to be an inhering law of matter, a law which first determined this substance to take form in absolute correspondence with the laws of mind as now developed, and then having organized for it its present habitation, the body, located the mind in the same, and thus brought it into its present conscious relations to itself and the universe around it. 3. Or, finally, we may suppose this cause to be an inhering principle or law, common to the two substances,—a law first of all organizing matter as above stated, and then bringing mind into its present state and relations. Of these theories, it would be impossible to determine which is the most absurd.

FACTS OF MIND, OR OF AN EXCLUSIVELY MENTAL CHARACTER.

VI. We now advance to a consideration of a class of facts which have a most direct and special bearing upon our present inquiries, those furnished by rational finite mind itself. Mind, — it should be kept in distinct remembrance, — mind, in its present state of self-conscious development, is undeniably a creation of quite recent origin as compared with the duration of even the external material creation. Long after the material universe was perfected in its organization, mind, which now exists in this world as the sole interpreter of nature, and perceives in her wondrous productions a perfect realization of its own internal ideas and principles of pure science, and contemplates with wonder the pre-created provisions for its own specific necessities, — mind, as a free, rational, self-conscious activity, had no be-

ing. For this mysterious existence we are to find an adequate cause. To proceed intelligibly in our inquiries, we must know the object before us as it is. The following statements will lay open this department of our inquiries with sufficient distinctness to our contemplation.

Mind constituted with three distinct, separate, and independently originated faculties.

1. In turning our thoughts upon our own minds, we are at once impressed with one fundamental fact, a threefold division of the mental powers, to wit, the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will. These faculties are separated from each other by phenomena perfectly fundamental, and the existence of neither in the same subject can be accounted for by a reference to either or both of the others. There is, in these faculties, an adaptation to act upon and influence one another, but only on the condition of their having a prior existence and constitution already established. There is in neither any adaptation whatever to produce, that is, cause to exist, and then constitute either of the others. Each faculty, then, has an origin wholly independent of every other. This is undeniable.

These faculties correlatively related to each other.

2. While each of these faculties has, in the sense explained, an independent origin and constitution, they are so constituted that the activities of each are immutably and specifically correlated to those of each of the other. The action of the Intelligence, for example, has a special and intelligibly specific reference to that of the Sensibility, on the one hand, and of the Will, on the other. As possessed of In-

telligence, the mind sustains to all existences, material and mental, the relation of a power, while they sustain to it that of objects of knowledge. When, from a contemplation of the fixed and fundamental laws of the Intelligence, we turn to those of the Sensibility, the latter appears as an instrument scientifically constituted to be acted upon in specific forms by the truth, as apprehended by the former. Every fundamental idea developed in the Intelligence finds its specific correlation in some specific but independently constituted susceptibility in the Sensibility. Such are the immutable relations of these two independently constituted departments of our nature. The specific functions of each are indefinitely numerous and diversified. Yet every such function is the specific correlation of some specific and independently constituted function of the other.

A similar correlation obtains between the functions of these two faculties and those of the Will, the executive faculty of the mind. The Intelligence, for example, presents to the mind the endlessly diversified forms of good and evil which, as a free voluntary activity, the mind is to seek and avoid, while to every such form there is, in the Sensibility, a correlated susceptibility, whose specific and exclusive function is to impel the Will to seek the good and avoid the evil. The more we study the mind, the more distinctly revealed do these great facts become.

There is one department of our mental constitution, however, in which the correlation of which we are speaking appears, if possible, more distinct and impressive than in any other. We refer to the department of our moral nature. That function of the intelligence denominated the Conscience has one specific and exclusive office, to wit, to reveal to the mind what, as a free voluntary activity, it ought and ought

not to be and to do, and to assert its desert of good or ill, as it has thus become or done the one or the other. In the Sensibility we find, also, a specifically correlated function, whose exclusive office is to impel the will to choose the good and refuse the evil, before action, and, after the mind has obeyed or disobeyed the behests of Conscience, to effect in it corresponding retribution, — that is, to render it happy or miserable. In the very centre of our mental constitution there is, as a matter of fact, moral government in actual operation, — a government in which there is absolute moral legislation, moral activity, and moral retribution according to deeds, and all this on account of the correlated, but independently constituted, functions, of the other distinct and separate faculties of the mind. Free will is the only power actual or conceivable to which moral ideas are in any form applicable. The specific and exclusive function of the Conscience is to reveal those ideas, while the Sensibility has specific functions exclusively correlated to moral ideas, on the one hand, and to moral action on the other. Thus mind stands revealed before us, — mind, an absolute unity of substance, on the one hand, but with its three distinct, separate, and independently constituted, but absolutely correlated faculties, on the other.

Mind, in the higher and spiritual departments of its nature exclusively correlated to the theistic idea of Ultimate Causation.

3. Another great central fact of universal mind is this: While the Intelligence is so constituted that it must attain to the theistic idea of ultimate causation, all the higher departments of that nature, the moral and spiritual, are immutably and exclusively correlated to this one idea, the

idea of the Unconditioned Cause as a *self-conscious personality*. In the depth of mind there is a profound consciousness of dependence, for the supply of its necessities, upon a power out of itself. The great sources of good to which its nature is adapted, are all out of itself. Of this it has, and cannot but have, a deep and profound consciousness. In its connection with nature, it instinctively seeks for a power out of nature and above it,—a power by whom the elements around may be controlled, in accordance with the ever-varying exigencies of its own existence. In the hour of pain and affliction, in the midst of peril, when sudden danger impends, how instinctively does the voice of prayer ascend for deliverance, and ascend to a power out of and above nature. The direction of the needle to the pole is not more fixed than that of universal mind to such a power under such circumstances. Then, when encircled with the powers and movements of nature, universal mind also has a consciousness of necessities of the deepest character, which nothing in nature has any adaptation to meet. Everything around it is mutable, finite, and imperfect, and it aspires after the permanent, the immutable, the infinite, and the perfect. Worship and prayer also are universal and immutable instincts of mind. Now, all these instinctive and immutable tendencies and laws of universal mind are the equally changeless correlatives of a free, self-conscious personality, and of nothing else. We may admire a blind, necessary, unconscious principle, but we never do nor can worship it. A personality is the only object of such a sentiment. We dread the pestilence, the tempest, and the earthquake, and we may fear to violate a law of nature; but we never pray to either. A personality is the exclusive object of worship and prayer. Take from God the attri-

butes of self-conscious personality, and there is no sphere whatever for the action of the religious principle in man. That principle presents a universal and immutable want of sentient existence, with no corresponding provisions and fundamental adaptations on the part of such existence, with no corresponding spheres of activity. This fact will be considered at length in another connection. All that we now insist upon is the undeniable fact of the fundamental and immutable correlation between all the higher intellectual and spiritual departments of our nature and the theistic idea of God.

Another remark, which we deem it of the highest importance to make, in this connection is this: From the immutable laws of his moral nature, man is a *governmental* being. He is equally adapted not only to the exercise of authority over individuals dependent on him, but also himself to be subject to similar authority so far forth as he exists in the relation of dependence upon others. Government is a demand of the *social* nature of man. It is just as natural for communities to organize governments for the protection and promotion of their mutual rights and interests as it is for individuals of opposite sexes to form marriage alliances. Subjection to authority, in the relations referred to, — authority exercised in accordance with the principles of righteousness and justice, and for the promotion of the ends of benevolence, — gives to every department of our moral nature the most beautiful and perfect forms of development. How universally, for example, do the exercise of parental authority in accordance with those ends, on the one hand, and cordial subjection to it, on the other, blend the hearts of the parent and child in mutual love and esteem, and at the same time tend to beautify and dignify the character of

each; while relaxing the reins of authority, on the one hand, and resistance to it, on the other, tend, as immutably, to induce mutual hatred and disesteem, and to deprave and degrade the character of both parties in common. No child can be effectually prepared for the exercise of the functions of a freeman, or for honorable and useful activity in any important sphere of life, but by being habituated to subjection to proper authority. Above all is this true in the relations of universal mind to the Author of our being. The omnipresent influence of the idea of God as having a direct personal concern in all our rights and interests, and as exercising a moral government over his creatures, commanding obedience and prohibiting disobedience to the law of duty, and holding before the mind retributions according to deeds, tends to beautify character by developing in it every possible virtue, and that in its most perfect possible forms; while the mere absence of this idea, or action in opposition to it, tends, in the highest possible degree, to deprave the morals and degrade character. The history of the world presents not a solitary exception to these statements.

While mind universally is thus adapted to subjection to government, the immutable demand of its moral nature is a great central power of universal control, a moral government under whose control all rights and interests shall be ultimately adjusted in perfect accordance with the principles of immutable justice, truth, and rectitude. When wrong is perpetrated, how instinctively does our moral nature cry out for the interposition of such a power for the adjustment of that wrong. Thus it is, that the moral nature of universal mind points to the throne of eternal justice and order, and to a personal Deity seated upon that throne as the arbiter of universal destiny. The reality of this great

central fact of universal mind now before us is undeniable, and is another revelation of the immutable correlation between the moral nature of universal mind and the divine idea of Theism.

The adaptation of universal mind to be influenced by positive *commands* and *prohibitions* from recognized lawful authority should not be overlooked in this connection. We are in the presence of the idea of the right and the wrong. We feel an internal conviction, that we *ought* to do the one and avoid the other, and at the same time experience a strong internal impulsion to act accordingly. The presence of an individual who simply seconds the voice and impulsion of conscience by advising and urging us to act according to its dictates, adds greatly to the moral influence to which we were previously subject. How vastly, how immeasurably, is this influence increased when some recognized lawful authority lays a positive command upon us to do the right and avoid the wrong! When the child, for example, receives from the parent a positive command to do an act which it perceives to be right, and not to do that which it perceives to be wrong, what an additional weight is given to the behests of conscience in such a case! The nature of the child is fundamentally adapted to be swayed in its activity by authority thus exercised. On the same principle it is that universal mind is immutably constituted to receive the highest possible influence in favor of the right and against the wrong, by the consideration that it is positively commanded, by an all-wise personality, who presides, in absolute wisdom and rectitude over the destiny of the moral universe, to do the right and avoid the wrong. That universal mind is fundamentally constituted to be controlled by such an

influence, none who rightly read and candidly interpret the facts of consciousness will deny.

Then, finally, the idea of God, as a free, self-conscious personality, is the very idea which the universal Intelligence, in its natural, spontaneous procedures always forms of the Unconditioned Cause. To the Intelligence in such procedure God is not a principle, an unconscious law of nature, nor a blind instinct, but a *person*, a free, intelligent, self-conscious personality, existing above and independent of nature, and presiding in wisdom and beneficence over it. All such facts conduct us to one conclusion, and fundamentally contradict all others, to wit, that universal mind is constituted in immutable correlation to one idea of God, that of a free, self-conscious personality. Whether that constitution is in harmony with the real or the unreal, in the Unconditioned Cause, yet remains to be argued. About the facts there can be no dispute among those whose object is truth.

LAWS OF NATURE — PHRASE DEFINED.

VII. The class of facts to which we would next direct attention is included under the phrase, *Laws of Nature*. This phrase is used in senses quite diverse and distinct the one from the other. As distinguished from the idea represented by the term nature, quality, or property of particular substances, this phrase represents *the rule* in conformity to which such quality produces it appropriate effects. Thus the power or principle of attraction, for example, inheres in all material substances as a property or quality, or as belonging to the nature, of said substances. The rule in conformity to which this power acts, that is, the general fact, that such bodies attract each other, directly as their matter, and inversely as the squares of their mean distances, is

called the law of attraction. When, also, we have discovered *the conditions* under which a certain event or class of events always occurs, we have discovered a law of nature, and the phrase under consideration often represents this fact. Thus, when the conditions on which the electric fluid will pass along the telegraphic wire were discovered, a law of nature was developed. This same phrase, we remark, in the next place, is employed to represent the *mode of existence* pertaining to any particular substance. Thus, the fact, that every body at rest, or in motion, will ever after continue in the same state, unless that state is changed by the action of some power *ab extra*, is called a law of matter, and is numbered as one of the laws of nature. The phrase under consideration is employed, we remark in the next place, to designate any fixed *order of sequence* among events in nature; as, for example, the law of reproduction pertaining to animals and plants. We notice but one other sense in which these words are employed, to wit, to designate a state of *order*, especially that form of order in which objects are related to each other *as means and ends*, and this, as opposed to the opposite state, a state of disorder. This is the peculiar and special form of the order which everywhere obtains throughout the wide domain of nature. All the powers of nature are everywhere arranged in accordance with this one principle. Everything exists and acts as a means or an end, and the combined results of the entire activities of all the powers of nature are in exclusive accordance with this law.

Laws as stated in their positive and negative forms.

There are two forms in which a law of nature is commonly presented, — the *positive* and *negative*. In the first

form, we state, in direct and affirmative terms, the law itself. In the second form, we state what is necessarily implied in the law, to wit, that facts opposed to it never do and never can occur through the laws of nature. Many of the laws of nature are stated almost exclusively in this last-named form, and as thus stated, they are the most distinct, impressive, and easily apprehended. Thus, the universal fact, principle, or law, that all the perfected productions of nature, — a tree, mature plant, or animal, for example, — are of gradual formation, is commonly stated, not in the affirmative, but negative form, to wit, “nature produces nothing *per saltem*,” that is, by sudden leaps or instantaneous flats. So in many other instances.

Laws of nature classed as necessary and contingent.

The laws of nature, in whatever form stated, may be divided into two distinct and opposite classes, which, for the sake of convenience, we will denominate *necessary* and *contingent*. Those which result from the direct and immediate action of substances in all circumstances and relations alike are called the necessary laws of nature. Thus two bodies, matter remaining what it is, cannot exist at all, without attracting each other, and doing this in accordance with one fixed and immutable law. This, then, is a necessary law of nature. On the other hand, those universal facts in nature, which result from the combined action of the powers thereof, in the relations which said powers or substances *now* sustain to each other, and which would not occur, were these substances placed in different relations to one another, are called the contingent laws of nature. Motion, for example, does not, like attraction, pertain to matter as a substance, and especially motion around some

centre, and in that form in which the centripetal and centrifugal forces are equal. The laws of motion, in accordance with which all the heavenly bodies move, are pure accidents of matter, as far as its nature as a substance is concerned, and not the necessary results of its qualities as matter. This law, therefore, like many others, and, indeed, most of the so-called laws of nature, must be ranked as a contingent law of nature.

Examples of the laws of nature.

It may be important, in this connection, to specify as examples a few of the universally admitted laws of nature. Among these, we would notice the following :—

1. The universal fact that the powers of nature are so organized and relatively adjusted, that the entire action of these powers is, as we have above stated, in absolute accordance with the principles of a wisely adjusted and intelligible system of *means and ends*. This undeniably is the present all-controlling law of nature. Nature is throughout a systematic unity, or an organized whole complete in all its parts. In its system of organization, there is a place for everything, and everything is in its place. The law of unity, that which determines the place of every power, and consequently the results of its activity, is the principle of which we are speaking, the law of means and ends. Hence we notice, in the next place,

2. As an absolutely universal law of nature, a law to which there are absolutely no known exceptions, the fact, that for every fundamental want of sentient existence there is a corresponding provision, and for every fundamental adaptation of such existences, a corresponding sphere of activity ; in other words, that for every *end* in na-

ture there is a corresponding means. No one will pretend that there is known to man a solitary exception to this law. The widest inductions, on the other hand, most clearly evince that this is an absolutely universal law of nature.

3. The law of production, noticed above, next claims our attention, to wit, that nature produces nothing *per saltem*, "by leaps, or by fits and starts." Nature is uniform and gradual in all her operations. All her productions are of slow growth and result from comparatively small beginnings. The validity of this law is evinced by all the facts of nature known to man. The conviction of its absolute validity is also a necessary consequence of the idea of production by inhering law controlled in its activity by the principle of necessity. Such a law must be absolutely uniform in its activity, and the organizations resulting from it must be of gradual formation. Hence the principle above stated must be regarded as a fixed law of nature.

4. We next direct attention to the law or laws of vital organization in nature. That the power of originating such organizations, animal or vegetable, is not *now* existing and acting in nature, no one, well informed, professes to believe. Propagation, in which each species of animals and plants produces its kind, is the present exclusive law of vital organization in nature. If the principle of origination, or transmutation of species, once existed and acted in nature, it does not exist and act there now. This is undeniable.

5. We mention but one other principle, which is very properly denominated a law of nature. We refer to the law of relative fitness, which pervades universal nature in the structure of animal organizations. No part or or-

gan of such structure exists for itself alone, but has a perfect and fixed adaptation to every other. So absolute and universal is this law, that the scientific naturalist is able, when shown a single bone of an animal of some extinct species, to determine, at once, the class to which the animal belonged, its general form and structure. Here, then, we have a universal and immutable law of nature. We might specify other laws. These, however, are sufficient for our present purpose, which is mainly to prepare the way for the following remarks of a general character upon the so-called laws of nature. On this subject we remark :

General characteristics of the laws of nature.

1. A vast majority of these laws are not only contingent in their character, but once actually had no existence in nature. Whether finite substance, material and mental, is or is not a created thing, one fact is undeniable, and is as universally admitted, to wit, that all substances, now called nature, once existed, if they then existed at all, in a state of total and universal unorganization. The time was, for example, when the planetary system, with its various laws of motion, etc., had no existence. The earth, as a globe and planet, once had no being. It once existed as a globe and planet with no animal or vegetable formations upon its surface, with no vital forms or principles from which such organizations now result, and with no soil or provisions adapted to sustain them, if they did exist. The laws of order, means and ends, adaptation, production, relative fitness, etc., consequently once had no existence in nature. They are themselves, on the other hand, facts having their origin in time, — facts whose existence is to be accounted for. Hence, we remark,

2. That these laws are not themselves ultimate facts, and are not themselves the ultimate cause or causes of any facts in nature. To account, therefore, for the occurrence of any of the present or past facts of nature, or for the existence and action of these laws in nature, we must look out of and beyond the laws themselves. This is self-evident. That which once of necessity was not, and at a definite period, from a like necessity, began to be, does not, and cannot, of course, contain in itself the ultimate reason of its non-being, on the one hand, and of its subsequent existence and action, on the other. The grand problem before us, then, is this : to find an ultimate reason or cause which shall adequately and intelligibly account for the existence and action of these laws in nature, — laws in conformity to which she herself now exclusively exists and acts. This leads us to remark,

3. That the existence and action of these laws, in the forms in which they really appear, cannot be accounted for by reference to any higher inhering law, actual or conceivable, existing and acting potentially in nature itself. The necessary laws of nature, as above defined, contain no explanation whatever of the existence and action of the contingent ones. The law of attraction, for example, is just as consistent with the existence and action of the powers of nature in a state of disorder, as in a state of order, and presents, therefore, the explanation of no fact of order in the universe. So of all other laws of a kindred character. The same holds equally true of any conceivable or imaginable law inhering and acting potentially in nature itself. If the present laws of nature owed their existence and action ultimately to any law thus inhering and acting in nature, then, by no possibility, could there have been a period

when these laws did not act in and control nature as they now do. By hypothesis, the exclusively determining cause existed and acted potentially in nature from eternity. The necessary results of that action, the existence and action of nature in exclusive accordance with present laws, must consequently have been from eternity. Suppose, for example, — what the present hypothesis necessarily implies,—the existence in nature of any inhering law whatever, necessarily determining it to exist and act in a state of order, as opposed to that of disorder, and especially in a state of universal organization in accordance with the law of means and ends; then undeniably nature could never, by any possibility, have existed in any other state. If we refer to any inhering law of nature, as the ultimate cause of the facts of nature, we must suppose that law to exist, as the exclusive, all-determining cause in nature, from eternity. If this law is a necessitating cause of order in any form whatever, then, from eternity, nature could, by no possibility, have existed in any other form. The laws of nature, therefore, would have existed and acted, as universally determining principles, from eternity. There is no escaping this conclusion. These laws, however, have not thus existed and acted in nature. They can, therefore, be accounted for by a reference to no law or principle of ultimate causation inhering and acting potentially in nature itself. All the laws and facts of nature, on the other hand, lead us to a cause not only out of, above, and beyond themselves, but out of, above, and beyond nature itself. Every view and aspect of nature conduct us, by inevitable consequence, to this one conclusion.

The progress of creation has been from one absolute ultimate to another of a totally opposite character.

VIII. We now, in the last place, adduce a great general central fact, which really comprehends all others which we have considered, and to which very special attention is invited on account of its special bearings upon our present inquiries. We refer to the fact that creation has, in the sense explained, not only been progressive, but has progressed from one *absolute ultimate* to another of an *opposite character*. Chaos and order are two ultimate states, and as such, each is, in all respects, the total opposite of the other. Neither can be contemplated as the antecedent or cause of the other. Neither has any intrinsic or extrinsic tendency to consummate in the other. Each, on the other hand, has an immutable tendency to self-perpetuation. Every theory of the universe admits and affirms the fact, that the original state of nature was chaos absolutely universal; that, in this state, creation commenced and progressed onward till order has become the first law of nature in absolutely all departments of existence. These are the facts as universally admitted and affirmed as real by all the deductions of science bearing upon the subject. How shall we account for the commencement of creation in, and its progress from, one of these absolutely universal ultimates to the other? The undeniable fact must be accounted for by a reference to natural law, or to a power *ab extra*. If we suppose the state of chaos which preceded creation to have been from eternity, then chaos was undeniably the immutable law of universal nature, and order, by natural law, must have been to eternity an absolute impossibility. If we suppose this state of universal chaos

to have been preceded by one of order, the change from the latter to the former cannot be accounted for by reference to natural law, there being no conceivable relation of antecedence and consequence in such a case, but rather an undeniable and irreconcilable contradiction. Further, if we contemplate this absolutely ultimate and universal chaos, the revealed and admitted original state of nature, without reference to the question of the prior continuance of that state, we shall then find it equally impossible to account for the commencement and actual progress of creation, by any reference to natural law. What known, indicated, or rationally conceivable natural property of crude matter in a state of absolute chaos is there, to indicate in it the power of universal self-originated order? Especially, what is there in nature, in the former state, adapted to induce those *forms* of order which now exist in the universe? Nothing can be more contradictory and absurd than the ideas of nature in the former and the latter state, with the idea that the latter is the necessary consequent of the former. No ideas can be conceived of more absolutely incompatible. Suppose, once more, that it is suggested that there may be in nature two distinct and opposite principles, — a tendency, first of all, to exist, for a period, in a state of universal order, and then to resolve itself into universal chaos, from which state it shall spontaneously emerge again, through successive transformations, into a state of universal order; and so on, swinging like a pendulum, between these two opposite and contradictory ultimates from eternity to eternity. Such a supposition is just as self-contradictory and absurd as the idea that a body in motion will, from its own inhering laws, spontaneously change the direction of that motion, without any force acting upon it *ab extra*. Two

ultimates which are absolutely contradictory the one to the other, can, by no possibility, sustain to each other the relation of necessary antecedence and consequence. No proposition can be more self-evident than this. The same thing might, at the same time, be and not be, if such a proposition can be true. The fact, that nature has existed in these two ultimate and utterly incompatible states, is a great central fact of the universe which cannot be denied, and is, in reality, universally admitted. An impassable gulf lies between these two states,—a gulf which can never be bridged over by natural law.

SECTION III.

FACTS APPLIED.

We here conclude our induction of facts, and will now proceed to deduce from them the conclusions which they yield bearing upon our present inquiries. The reality of the facts, we may safely assume, will not be questioned by any honest inquirer after truth, and hardly by even dishonest minds, their reality being so obvious and so universally admitted. The object of the induction has been to furnish the *minor premise* for the theistic syllogism in its entirety, the idea of the infinity and perfection of God excepted. The facts are admitted, together with the doctrine of the being of God considered simply as the ultimate determining Reason, or Unconditioned Cause of these facts; a cause possessing the attributes of *eternity*, *immutability*, and *intelligible adequacy* and *adaptation* to produce these facts and render them what they are. The specific inquiry now before us is this: What are the attributes necessarily

supposed as existing in this cause, by these facts? This cause, we must also bear in mind, must be an inhering law of nature itself, or a power of a specific character existing out of and above nature, and exercising an absolute control over it. Our object is, not only to determine the *location*, but *character*, of this cause. To this inquiry, the answer to which, so far as the location of the cause is concerned, has already been given, we now, without further introduction, advance; our great object being to determine upon scientific principles the attributes necessarily implied in God, considered as the Unconditioned Cause, and implied by the facts of the universe.

CHARACTER AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, AS THE UNCONDITIONED
CAUSE OF THE FACTS OF THE UNIVERSE.

The Unconditioned Cause not a fortuitous concurrence of the substances or powers of nature.

I. In answering the question before us, we remark, in the first place, that the Ultimate Reason, or Unconditioned Cause, after which we are inquiring, is not, of course, a *fortuitous concurrence of the substances or powers of nature*. That the endlessly diversified powers of nature, after continuing from eternity in a state of universal disorder, took their present form, for such a reason, is an idea so monstrously absurd and self-contradictory that no philosopher or thinking mind now avows the theory. La Place affirms that the probabilities against such a theory are as infinity to unity. This theory, therefore, we need not dwell upon, and we allude to it only as an hypothesis long since exploded. The Unconditioned Cause after which we are

inquiring must be a law of order of some kind. No other supposition is admissible.

This cause no inhering law or principle of matter.

II. This cause, we remark in the second place, is no *inhering law or principle acting potentially in matter*. This theory can be maintained but upon one of two hypotheses. We may resolve all existences into matter, — the doctrine of real Materialism, — and refer the entire facts of the universe, as their ultimate cause, to the inhering principles of this one substance. Or we may admit the validity of the distinction between matter and spirit as separate and opposite substances, and explain all the facts of both these substances by reference to laws or principles inhering and acting potentially in the former. This last-named hypothesis, is, if possible, even more monstrously absurd than the theory of Fortuitous Concurrence, — so undeniably absurd that it has never, to our knowledge, been proposed as even possibly true. No one, who admits the real existence of matter and spirit as distinct and separate substances, ever thinks, as we have said in another connection, of denying the claims of Theism in their entirety. To admit this distinction, and then explain the entire facts of the universe by a reference to any supposed law or principle inhering in the former, is to explain the existence of the powers, susceptibilities, phenomena, and relations of the highest forms of being, by a reference to the inhering principles of the lowest actual or conceivable; for there is no conceivable form of being lower than that of crude matter. It is more than this, to explain the entire phenomena and relations of two distinct and opposite substances, one of which exists and acts exclusively as a means, and the other as an end,

by reference to the inhering principles of the former ; than which nothing can be more monstrously absurd. On this hypothesis, therefore, nothing further need be said. The only real question to be argued pertains exclusively to the claims of Materialism in its true and proper sense. The question, in this form also, has, in fact, been settled already. We have shown, by arguments which we feel quite safe in affirming cannot be properly ignored, or refuted upon scientific or any other valid grounds, that matter and spirit do in reality exist as distinct, separate, and opposite substances. As the proper resolution of this question is perfectly fundamental to the end we have in view in this whole discussion, we shall argue the matter at full length, not avoiding, when necessary to our present purpose, a repetition of some things already presented. On this subject, then, we invite very special attention to the following considerations :

Dogma of Materialism not only void of proof, but of all evidence in its favor.

1. The dogma of Materialism rests throughout upon a mere assumption, not only void of all proof, but of all forms or degrees of evidence in its favor. That matter is the only substance really existing, no one surely attempts to *prove*. Nor, by any possibility, can the least shadow of evidence be adduced in favor of such an idea. We have just as much reason for the assumption that spirit is the only really existing substance, as we have to assume that matter is ; and we have, as we have elsewhere shown, absolutely no evidence whatever for either dogma. The dogma of Materialism, on the one hand, and of Idealism, on the other, stand upon precisely the same grounds, in the one respect

now under consideration. Neither can, by any possibility, be proved true, nor in favor of either can the least shadow of evidence be adduced. The admission that mind, the knowing subject, exists, is no proof, or evidence even, that matter, the object, does not exist. So, the admission of the reality of the object presents no form or degree of proof, or evidence even, that the subject is not a reality also.

The dogma of Materialism has no antecedent probability in its favor.

2. This leads us to remark, in the second place, that the dogma of Materialism has no form or degree of *antecedent probability* in its favor. It is undeniably just as antecedently probable that spirit exists as the only reality, as that matter thus exists, and it is just as probable in itself that both substances are real existences, as the idea that either does or does not exist at all, or that one or the other exists alone. The absolute validity of all these statements has been established in another connection. These statements, too, one and all of them, are so self-evident, that no reflecting mind will question them for a single moment.

The highest conceivable degree of antecedent probability exists against this dogma.

3. While no form or degree of proof, evidence, or antecedent probability exists in favor of this dogma, the highest conceivable degree of antecedent probability exists against it. What is there, in our fundamental idea of crude matter, that renders, in the remotest degree, probable, the supposition of the existence in it not only of the law of its own organization according to the principles of pure science, but also the power to exercise, when self-developed, the high func-

tions of thought, feeling, and, above all, of free will? No one idea can, by any possibility, stand at a greater remove from another, than does our fundamental conception of rational spirit from that of mere matter; and, hence, no hypothesis has, or can have, a greater antecedent probability against it, than the dogma that the fundamental phenomena of mind are the result and manifestation of a power inhering in matter. Nothing can be more improbable in itself than such a supposition.

This dogma opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race.

4. The dogma of Materialism, we remark, in the next place, is not only, as a doctrine in itself, but as related to the idea of Ultimate Causation, opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race. There is not a race or tribe of men on earth, be they ever so rude or barbarous, that has not apprehended the distinction between matter and spirit, and in thought fundamentally separated the two substances the one from the other. Equally universal is the idea and conviction that the ultimate cause of the facts of the universe is mind and not matter. On no subjects are the convictions of the race more strictly universal and absolute than on these two. The race universally believe in the real existence of matter and spirit both, and that, as distinct and separate substances, on the one hand, and in God, the Unconditioned Cause of all things, as a spirit and not an inhering law of matter, on the other. This is undeniable.

This dogma, as a doctrine, opposed to the immutable principles and necessary deductions of science.

5. Our next position is this: Materialism as a doctrine stands fundamentally opposed to the immutable principles

and necessary deductions of science pertaining to substances. The immutable principles of science relative to substances are these: Substances are, in their nature, as their essential qualities. Substances, in their presentatively known qualities essentially alike, are to be ranked as the same in kind or nature. Those, in their fundamental qualities thus known, essentially unlike, are to be ranked as distinct, separate, and unlike substances. Now, as we have shown in another connection, the fundamental qualities of matter, on the one hand, and of spirit, on the other, are to the mind the objects of immediate or presentative knowledge, and the essential qualities of one are fundamentally unlike those of the other. To resolve all realities into matter, on the one hand, or into spirit, on the other, or to deny the real existence of both alike as distinct and separate, but actually existing substances, is a violation of the immutable principles and deductions of science in regard to this subject. Materialism as a doctrine of existence confounds what science has fundamentally distinguished, and thus utterly saps the foundation of all scientific procedures in regard to substances. This dogma must be false, or the sciences of nature, mental and physical, in all their procedures, without exception, are running upon a totally false foundation; for the principles above stated constitute their sole basis, — principles which this dogma denies, — and must itself be false, unless that denial is valid. If substances, in their essential presentatively known qualities fundamentally unlike, are to be regarded as in their nature correspondingly unlike each other, then Materialism is and must be false. If substances, in their essential qualities thus known, are to be assumed as one in nature and kind, then we have no principles whatever by which we can reason at all about

realities within and around us, and the professed sciences of nature are throughout a lie, and nothing else. And what reasons can Materialism offer us for this sweeping assumption? None whatever. Science is to be totally ignored and condemned without proof, without evidence, without a hearing even, and that in opposition to the intuitive convictions of the race, and the absolute presentative intuitions of the Universal Intelligence, or this dogma must be set aside as foundationless and false. Any person that, in the face of such undeniable facts, will still avow himself a materialist, is certainly at liberty to do so. All that is needful for the cause of truth is, that the world should distinctly apprehend the character of the assumption upon which his whole system exclusively rests, — an assumption for the validity of which no form or degree of proof or evidence even, can, by any possibility, be offered, and which is affirmed absolutely to be false by the highest possible proof, the direct, and immediate presentative intuitions of the Universal Intelligence.

In accordance with this dogma it is impossible to account for any one of the classes of facts above adduced.

6. We now advance to a consideration of one of the most fundamental arguments of all against the hypothesis of Materialism. It is this: By no possibility can we account for any one of the classes of fundamental facts which we have adduced in Section II. of this chapter, and there adduced as the basis of our present deductions. Every one of these classes of great facts, on the other hand, fundamentally contradicts this hypothesis. This we have already shown to be true undeniably of every hypothesis which refers the facts

of the universe, as their ultimate cause, to any inhering law of nature of any kind whatever. Above all, if possible, then, must this hold true of any hypothesis which assumes that this law inheres exclusively in matter. For the sake of distinctness, we will specify a few of these classes of facts :

(1.) We remark, then, in the first place, that, on this hypothesis, it is absolutely impossible to account for the undeniable fact that creation had a beginning in time. Suppose, what this hypothesis fundamentally implies, that an all-controlling law eternally inhered in matter necessarily determining it to exist and act in a state of universal scientific order as opposed to the opposite state, and that this law is the ultimate Unconditioned Cause of all the facts of the universe, mental and physical. Then, undeniably, nature could, by no possibility, ever have existed in any other state. It must, from eternity, have existed in a state of scientific order, according to the immutable principle of means and ends, and could never, at any moment, have existed in any other state. But nature, as a matter of fact, has not existed in this state from eternity. The order which is now its first law, and which pervades nature universally, once had no existence in it, but is itself an event of time, and therefore to be accounted for. The ultimate cause of this order, consequently, is and can be no inhering law or principle of matter.

(2.) We next allude to the facts of immediate, original creation, animal and vegetable, with which the past history of the universe abounds. It is an immutable and universal law of nature, that in the same circumstances the same results arise, and none others. The appearance of new results supposes the action of new causes. No one imagines,

that while nature remains as now constituted, and while acting under its present laws, any new races of animals or plants, and especially of the former class, will be directly and immediately originated, — races especially like the leading ones that do exist, — the human race, for example. If we suppose that, at the moment when the original pair which stands at the head of the race was originated, nature existed throughout in a state similar, or even analogous, to the present, no one will entertain the absurdity that that pair was immediately originated by any inhering law of nature. What were the real facts of the case? Nature then did exist throughout in a state, in all essential particulars, the same as the present. The organization of the planetary system was then completed, — the earth and other planets revolving round their own axes, and moving round their common centres as now. The external and internal organization of the earth itself was also complete. The atmosphere, the ocean, and the dry land, with all its varied rock and other formations, with their varied races of animals and vegetables each producing immutably its kind and that only, existed as they now do. If matter does not now, — and no one imagines that it does or can, — by direct, immediate, and originating acts, create human beings, all the immutable laws and principles of induction require us to suppose and affirm that the pair referred to was not thus originated. This conclusion is not a truth of analogy, but of induction. The supposition, that matter now, by sudden, spontaneous throes, does, from time to time, first eliminate from the atmosphere, the waters, the rocks, and vegetable formations, the various elements which, in endlessly diversified forms, enter into the composition of the human body, and then combine them into completed and mature

human organizations male and female, infusing into the same the vital and rational principles, and then sending them abroad, as the progenitors of new races of human beings, — such a supposition, we say, is not more incredible or more absurd in itself, or more contradictory to all known facts, than is the supposition that the two progenitors of our race were thus originated. Such a supposition is undeniably out of the question. No man can possibly put the two ideas together,—that of two animated human bodies, a male and female, in the full perfection and maturity of organization, and the earth in the state in which it actually was at the time when the pair under consideration were actually originated,—and for a moment suppose these creations were the spontaneously originated results of any law or power inhering in matter. But two suppositions remain as even conceivably true, to wit, origination by transmutation from pre-existing species of animated organizations, or by the interposition of some creative power out of and above nature. The former supposition is also out of the question. The individual that, in the presence of all the present known laws and facts of nature, together with all the facts developed by the science of geology, will still maintain that the real ancestors of our race were baboons or monkeys, or any other species of the irrational creation, is, in no proper sense, slandered, when it is affirmed that, on this one subject, he exercises a form and degree of intellectual acumen hardly superior to that possessed by our reputed progenitors. The only conclusion which the facts at all permit is this, that humanity owes its origin to the immediate creative fiat of some originating power out of and above matter.

(3.) The class of facts, to which we next refer, may be denominated the properties and accidents of matter, facts

which are to be carefully distinguished from one another. If the Unconditioned Cause of the facts of creation is to be found in this substance, it must, of course, be found in its properties, and not in its accidents. There are but two properties which intrinsically inhere in any one particle of matter, relatively to any other properties to which we need now to refer, those of attraction and repulsion. Motion is not an inherent property, but an accident of this substance. Now, among the most important facts of the universe, as far as matter itself is concerned, must be reckoned its accidents,—accidents which have no necessary connection with, and could never have resulted from, its inherent properties. Yet the organization of the universe is such that there is a perfect balance between the results of the pure accidents and the action of the necessary properties of matter. We may refer, in illustration of the above remark, to the solar system. There, the centrifugal force, which is a pure accident both in its degree and direction as far as matter is concerned, is so perfectly balanced by the centripetal, which is the equally pure result of the action of the inherent properties of the same substance, that the entire movements of the planets about the sun are in absolute accordance with the principles of perfect science. Now, this motion must have been eternal, both in its degree and direction, and then the system itself, in its entire organization, the earth with all its inhabitants, rational and irrational, must have been from eternity, or that motion must have been communicated by a power out of matter. But this organization is not from eternity, and, therefore, the motion cannot be eternal in its existence, and must have been communicated by some power out of matter. From no law or property of matter, when once void of this motion, either in its degree

or direction, can we account for its existence. "Give me matter and motion," says Descartes, "and I will construct you the universe." Motion cannot be granted, but through a power out of matter, excepting as an accident eternally pertaining to it; in which case, the facts of the universe, as we have seen, could not be what they now are, events of time, and not realities existing from eternity. The Unconditioned cannot be found in matter, unless we can find properties inhering in it, from which *all* the facts of the universe cannot but result. Now, the accidents of matter, which constitute a most essential part of these facts, have and can have no necessary connection with such properties, and cannot have resulted from them, nor have said accidents, as a matter of fact, existed in connection with that substance from eternity. They must, therefore, have been communicated by a power out of matter, and exercising a control over it, a control absolute in itself and in its direction, in full accordance with the principles of pure science.

(4.) When we lift our contemplation from the earth to the heavens above us, we are at once confronted with fundamental facts which might properly be ranked as accidents in nature, but which we prefer to mention by themselves; facts which, as we have shown, can never be explained on the hypothesis that the planetary system owes its origin to any inhering law of nature of any kind, much less, if possible, to any law inhering in matter. Aside from the fact, that this system once did not exist, and then took form, as an event of time, there is in it, as we have seen, a calculable uniformity on the one hand, and a form of variety on the other, which can never be explained by a reference to any law or principle inhering in matter. The same identi-

cal and necessary cause, operating in the same circumstances, can by no possibility produce directly opposite results; the motion of different bodies in the same system in opposite directions around their central orbs, for example. Such facts, and others of a kindred nature which we have adduced, could not result from any inhering law of matter.

(5.) We next allude to the facts of mind, and, in this connection, will adduce but one, the existence and action of Free Will in nature. If matter is the only reality, and its inhering laws the sole cause of all the facts of the universe, then undeniably there can be no such agency as Free Will, and no such events as free acts, in nature. The contrary sentiment no one professes to hold. Now, Free Will is a real power, and free acts real events in nature. Of this we are just as absolutely conscious as we are of existing and acting at all. There is a power existing and acting in nature, — a power which does not inhere in matter, and whose activity is not determined necessarily by any law inhering in it. Here, as in other respects, the argument against the hypothesis of Materialism has demonstrative certainty. The phenomena of mind universally, and those of Free Will above all, are absolutely incompatible with, and contradictory to, this hypothesis. So absolute is the proof here found, that such authors as Sir William Hamilton suppose that here is to be found the main and absolute element of the demonstration of the being of God. Whether this is true or not, one thing is certain, that here the argument does assume the aspect of absolute demonstration. For the existence and action of this one power in nature cannot be denied without affirming that universal consciousness is a lie, and thus sapping the foundation

of all knowledge on all subjects alike ; and can be accounted for as admitted facts by reference to no inhering law of nature of any kind, and above all to any such law of matter. This is undeniable.

(6). The only other class of facts, to which we will allude in this connection, is the laws of nature themselves. These laws, it should be borne in mind, — the majority of them, to say the least, — once had no existence in nature. Their existence and operation are events of time. How shall their introduction, as controlling principles in nature, be accounted for? Not, as we have shown, by any mere ultimate law of any kind inhering in nature itself. Any principles resulting, by necessary consequence, from such a law, must, like their cause, be from eternity, and not events of time. There is no escaping this conclusion. Now, if these laws, as facts occurring in time, could, from no ultimate inhering law of nature whatever, be introduced as controlling causes into nature, much less could such results arise from any law inhering in matter. Every law in nature, necessary ones excepted, — that is, every *contingent* law in nature, — is demonstrative proof of the absolute impossibility of the hypothesis of Materialism being true.

Thus we might go over every class of facts which we have adduced, and show, absolutely, that not one of them can be made to consist with this hypothesis. The above cases are abundantly sufficient to verify this statement, and show that it cannot be false. We are now prepared for our next fundamental argument against this hypothesis of Atheism, — an argument to which very special attention is invited.

Much less can all these classes of facts taken together be accounted for by this hypothesis.

7. This leads us to notice another very important consideration bearing upon the question now before us. While the hypothesis of Materialism falls to pieces when tried upon any one of the classes of facts taken by itself, much more must it be true of it when confronted by all these classes taken together. We have before us an hypothesis for the validity of which there is and must be the total absence of all forms and degrees of proof or evidence whatever. We have, in the next place, a large number of classes of fundamental facts, not one of which can, by any possibility, be reconciled with this hypothesis, and while each alike absolutely contradicts it. What, then, must be our conclusions when all these classes together are arrayed against this hypothesis? If any truth of natural or moral science is capable of demonstrative certainty, much more, if possible, must this be the case of the proposition that the hypothesis under consideration is and must be false. The universe itself, with all its fundamental facts, mental and physical, in one impenetrable mass confronts this hypothesis, and with demonstrative evidence affirms its utter invalidity.

This hypothesis based upon the assumption that the great central fact of the universe is a lie.

8. Our next general consideration bearing upon our present inquiry is this: While the hypothesis of Materialism is professedly based upon the facts of the universe, and is put forward as the only one which really and truly ex-

plains them all, it is, in truth, based upon the assumption that the greatest of all facts, those of mind, and that in the highest department of our nature, the moral and spiritual, is a lie, being the correlations of the unreal instead of the real. It is, as we have seen, a universal and immutable law of nature, as far as facts are or can be known to man, that for every fundamental want of sentient existence there is a corresponding provision, and for every fundamental adaptation a corresponding sphere of action. As we have also seen, the moral and spiritual departments of the nature of universal rational mind are immutably correlated to one exclusive idea of ultimate causation, that of a free, intelligent, self-conscious personality, of whom humanity is the miniature image and likeness. Now, the hypothesis of Materialism is based upon the assumption that this law, in this its highest possible application, is a lie, and nothing else, and cannot be true, unless this assumption is valid. The facts of mind, whatever may be said of its nature, whether it is assumed to be material or not, are undeniably the highest facts of the universe, and the laws of mind are the highest laws of the universe. What must we think of an hypothesis which is based wholly upon the assumption that these great central facts and laws are the correlatives of the unreal instead of the real in reference to the Unconditioned? If the great law of nature, above referred to, is valid, there exists for mind a personal God. Materialism, instead of being in accordance with the laws of nature, and affirmed as true by the same, cannot itself be true, unless the highest of all these laws affirm most absolutely, as the great reality, an infinite untruth. If all other facts should fail us, — and none of them do, — mind itself, the great supreme fact of nature, would still remain an absolute demonstration that Materialism

and all other antitheistic hypotheses are and must be false. Of this, more hereafter.

While the hypothesis of Materialism does not, that of Theism does, accord with all the facts of the universe.

9. We have but one additional consideration to present on this subject. It is this: While the hypothesis of Materialism does not and cannot be made to accord with any of the great central facts of the universe, that of Theism does, in reality, accord with all these facts. We can find in matter no known properties, nor can we conceive of any, which are, in the remotest degree, indicated by those that are known; nor can we find anywhere else any facts of any kind to indicate that in it is to be found the Unconditioned Cause of the facts of the universe. The entire facts of nature, on the other hand, as we have seen, array themselves against this hypothesis, and deny most absolutely all its claims. While this is so, there is another hypothesis, which we are hereafter to consider, with which all the facts under consideration do most perfectly harmonize. We refer, of course, to the doctrine of Theism, the idea of the Unconditioned as a free, intelligent, self-conscious personality. The entire universe is, in all respects, what it would be, if creation was the result of the agency of such a cause; and in all respects what it could not be, were the Unconditioned an inhering law of matter. Of all this, however, we are to speak at full length in the proper connection. How strange it is, that an assumption like that of Materialism — an assumption unsustained by any kind of evidence whatever, and contradicted by all the leading facts of the universe — should ever find a place in any intelligent mind, and this in the presence of another hypothesis, which not

only accords with and adequately explains all the facts of the universe, but, as we shall see hereafter, is affirmed as alone valid by them all. With these suggestions, we for the present leave this department of our subject to the reflection of the thoughtful reader.

THE UNCONDITIONED NO INHERING LAW OF NATURE.

III. Our next general position is this: The Unconditioned Cause of the facts of the universe is and can be no inhering law of nature of any kind, the term nature being employed to represent all finite realities, mental or physical, whatever they may be. This proposition has been so fully and distinctly argued in the former section that very little need be added in this connection. In reference to all the classes of leading facts in creation, we have already seen that not one of them can be accounted for on any such hypothesis. Much less, then, could all these classes of facts, taken together, be thus accounted for. If we deny the distinction between matter and spirit, and, in opposition to Materialism, resolve all realities into the latter or any of its phenomena, we are at once confronted by the absolute, direct, and immediate, or presentative affirmations of our own and of the Universal Intelligence. We have just as much reason to assume matter to be the only reality as to assume the same thing of spirit, and we have absolutely no reasons whatever for either assumption. One form of being is just as antecedently probable in itself as the other, and the co-existence of both is just as *à priori* probable as the sole existence of either. This we have already seen. While no form or degree of evidence does or can exist against the doctrine that both substances exist as distinct and opposite known realities, we have the absolute affirmations of the

Universal Intelligence that this is the case. We cannot assume mind to be the only reality, without affirming the Intelligence itself to be a lie, and that for no reasons whatever. If we admit, on the other hand, the distinctions between matter and spirit to be real, and that both substances do exist as known realities, we shall find it equally impossible to account for the facts of matter by a reference to those of finite mind, as to account for those of the latter by a reference to those of the former; and by reference to any inhering law of either or both together, to be absolutely impossible to account for all the facts of the universe taken as they are. All the specific arguments, we need only add in this connection, which go to show that the Unconditioned is not any inherent law or property of matter, bear with equal absoluteness against the hypothesis that it is any law inhering in nature. In the one case as well as in the other, for example, creation could not have had a beginning, and must possess an absolute uniformity,—a uniformity contradicted by the great central facts of the universe. This is self-evident. If the Unconditioned is any law inhering in nature, and consequently acting from necessity, as the conditions of its activity must have been fulfilled from eternity, it must have acted from eternity. Creation, in that case, could have had no beginning, but must have been, like its Unconditioned Cause, eternal in its existence. There is no escaping this conclusion. Nor from any law inhering in nature can we account for the existence of the power of free determination in mind. No one power can generate another with attributes higher than its own. The power of free determination, undeniably existing in the Conditioned, renders absolutely evident the reality of a similar power in the

Unconditioned, which, therefore, is not and cannot be any power or law inhering in nature.

Whatever our theories pertaining to the facts of the universe may be, whether we assume the ground of Materialism on the one hand, or Idealism on the other, one thing pertaining to these facts is, we remark finally, undeniable. The developments of nature are, as we have seen, *progressive* from the *less* to the *more perfect*. This undeniable fact — a fact admitted and affirmed in all theories alike — supposes, of necessity, that the *entire series* of developments, whatever their nature may be, had a beginning in time. Now, this fact is absolutely incompatible with the supposition that the Unconditioned is any law or principle inhering in nature. In that case, the series would and could have had no beginning. The cause exists immutably the same from eternity, with all the conditions of its activity perfectly and absolutely fulfilled from eternity. Being subject to the law of necessity, it must have acted from eternity. This great central fact of creation is equally fatal to the claims of Materialism on the one hand, and to those of Idealism on the other. We may, if we please, professedly resolve all finite realities into matter, or into spirit, or finally into pure thought; still, the fact of *progression* in the *developments* of nature remains, and also its immutable direction from the less to the more perfect. No philosopher, whatever his ontological views may be, would dare, in the presence of the world, to confront nature with a denial of these facts. Nor, by any possibility, can he avoid the conclusion necessarily resulting from them, to wit, that the *series* referred to had a beginning in time, and that, consequently, the Unconditioned cannot inhere in the series itself, as a necessary law or principle of ultimate causation,

the immutable characteristic of every such inhering law, but must have its ultimate dwelling-place in some power of nature.

THE UNCONDITIONED NO NECESSARY CAUSE OF ANY KIND.

IV. Our next position is this : The Unconditioned Cause of the present order of things is, not only not any law or power inhering in nature, but no necessary cause of any kind. A necessary cause must act as soon as the *conditions of its activity* are fulfilled, and it cannot but continue to act in the same direction until a power out of itself shall necessitate a change in the direction of its activity. This is the fundamental element of our necessary conception of a cause acting from necessity. If the originating cause of which we are speaking is a law inhering in nature, it must, as we have seen, have acted from eternity, or not at all, as no change in the *conditions* of its activity could have occurred. A law, inhering in nature, which prevented organization from eternity to a given period, must have prevented the same to eternity, unless the direction of the action of that law was changed by a power out of nature.

The same does and must hold equally true of every originating Unconditioned Cause acting under the law of necessity. The conditions of its activity must have been fulfilled from eternity ; else its activity would depend upon something out of itself, and then it would be neither in itself immutable, nor really and truly the originating cause. If the conditions of its activity were fulfilled from eternity, then it could not but have acted from eternity, or not at all, and creation would be from eternity, and not, as it in fact is, in time. That which rendered it impossible for the originating cause, supposing it subject to the law of neces-

sity, from eternity up to a given period, to create, must have rendered it equally impossible for it to create to eternity. On the supposition that the originating cause of the present order of things is a necessary cause, by no possibility can we account for the origin of this order of things in time. It makes no difference, at all, whether this law is inherent in nature, or in any power whatever out of it. If that cause, being in itself eternal and immutable, and determined in its activity by nothing out of itself (the necessary condition of its being the originating and Unconditioned Cause).— if that cause is subject to the law of necessity, it must have created from eternity, or not at all. The conditions of its activity must have been fulfilled from eternity, else that which fulfilled these conditions and necessitated action would itself be the unconditioned and originating cause. If those conditions were fulfilled from eternity, creation could not but have been from eternity; and if it did not occur from eternity up to any given period, it never could have occurred at all. Creation must have been from eternity, or it never could have occurred from any form of necessary causation. There is no possible escape from this conclusion. The entire known facts of creation totally falsify the central facts of original causation, or this conclusion must be true. The above remarks are perfectly applicable to the Unconditioned Cause, whatever attributes we affirm of him, and yet suppose him governed by the law of necessity. All these attributes would exist in such Cause eternally and immutably the same. Absolutely the same motives would be before the divine mind, in absolutely equal force at one moment as another, as each moment is in itself in all respects precisely like every other, and each equally distant from the eternity past and the eternity to

come. What could there be in attributes remaining in all respects immutably the same, and eternally acted upon by precisely the same considerations and influences, to render it impossible for God to put forth creative power from eternity up to a given period, and then to render it impossible for him not to create at that moment? The thing is undeniably just as impossible, as an event without a cause. Indeed, it would be nothing else than this very thing, a change with absolutely nothing to occasion it. We must take the ground that creation is a fact from eternity, and then we are confronted by all the facts of the universe; or we must affirm that it had a beginning in time, and then draw the inevitable conclusion that it is and can be the result of no form of ultimate necessary causation. We are forced to assume one or the other of these positions. The first, we cannot assume, without palpably denying all the great fundamental facts of the universe. The second, then, we must assume, as necessarily implied in, and affirmed by, these facts.

THE UNCONDITIONED A FREE WILL.

V. Hence, we remark directly and positively, that the Unconditioned Cause is and must be a *Free Will*, in opposition to all other forms of necessary ultimate causation. If we suppose that God, as such cause, is a free and not a necessary agent, then the entire facts of the universe, together with their occurrence in time, can be readily accounted for, and they cannot be accounted for on any other supposition. If he is a free and not a necessary agent, from eternity to eternity, he might, at each successive moment, create or not create. This would be the immutable law of his existence and activity. He might consequently

commence creation in time, and not from eternity ; and creation commencing in time, and advancing onward from a period unknown to us, but really fixed and determinate in itself, becomes a conceivable, and, therefore, a possible fact. On no other condition, we repeat, is such a fact conceivable or possible. The fundamental element in our idea of a necessary cause, is this : that it cannot possibly but act, the moment the conditions of its activity are fulfilled. In the Unconditioned Cause, the entire conditions of its putting forth creative energy must have been fulfilled from eternity, or not at all. The essential element of our ideas of a free cause, on the other hand, is, that when the conditions of its activity are fulfilled, it may or may not act, in any one given direction. As with the Unconditioned Cause, the conditions of its creative activity must have been equally and perfectly fulfilled at each successive moment, from eternity up to any given period, the putting forth of such power at any one given moment in time, and not from eternity, is conceivable and possible upon one supposition only, namely, that the Unconditioned is a Free Will, in opposition to all conceivable or possible forms of ultimate causality acting from necessity. This conclusion has all the force of absolute demonstration, and can, by no possibility, be avoided, but by the assumption that creation is not in time, but from eternity ; in which case, we are, as we have said, confronted at once by all the leading fundamental facts of the universe. If we suppose that creative power is associated in the Unconditioned with infinite Intelligence, the former must be limited in its activity by the dictates of the latter. As each moment of duration is in itself absolutely like every other, and absolutely equidistant from the eternity past, on the one hand, and the eternity to come,

on the other, infinite Intelligence could discover no reason why any one moment should be selected for the commencement of creation, rather than any other ; and as no reasons could present themselves to the divine mind for *beginning* creation at any one moment, which were not equally present at every other, creation must have been commenced from eternity, as by no possibility could it have been commenced in time. But, if God is a free and not a necessary agent, then, at each successive moment, such beginning might or might not have occurred, and consequently its occurrence in time is conceivable and possible. We are quite certain that this conclusion cannot be invalidated.

Further, just such a power does, in fact, exist in the Conditioned, as one of the great central facts of mind. To suppose that the same power does not reside in the Unconditioned, is to suppose that the stream rises higher than the fountain, that the Conditioned is more perfect than the Unconditioned, and that the Finite has higher attributes than the Infinite, than which no supposition can be more absurd and self-contradictory. The Unconditioned, then, is and must be a Free Will, in opposition to all forms of ultimate causality acting from necessity.

The argument summarily stated.

The argument in this department of our inquiries may be concisely and summarily stated in the following form :

1. The Unconditioned is undeniably a cause out of and above nature.

2. No power conceivable out of and above nature is, in any form, adapted to act upon and control its activity, but a Will. This will not be denied, whatever ideas may be entertained about the nature of the Will.

3. All the fundamental facts of the universe, demand the supposition that the divine will is not a power of necessitated but free determination. A necessitated cause may be thus defined. The antecedent being given, but one consequent can, by any possibility, arise, and that consequent must arise. With the Unconditioned, at each moment of time, from eternity to the period when creation began, we have in all respects the same identical antecedent. This we have clearly seen. If, then, creation did not occur at any one moment, its occurrence at any other, on the supposition that the divine will is governed by the law of necessity, would be an event without a cause, a new and different consequent in connection with the same antecedent. A free cause, on the other hand, may be thus defined: The antecedent being given, either of two or more consequents may arise. Postulating the divine will as a power of free determination, and from eternity to the period when creation began we have the same identical antecedent with the possibility of the occurrence or non-occurrence of creation at each successive moment. Its occurrence, at the moment when it did occur, is a possible and, therefore, a conceivable event. On no other hypothesis is the fact of creation, as an event happening in time, a possible or rationally conceivable event.

4. In the higher forms of Conditioned existence, the human mind, we find the element of Free Will as a matter of fact. We find nature within and around us also constituted in fixed correlation to this one power in man. We must suppose, then, that this same power of free determination exists in the Unconditioned, or assume, and that in the total absence of all evidence, that the Conditioned has higher attributes than the Unconditioned, the Finite than

the Infinite, than which no assumption can be more absurd. The Unconditioned, therefore, is, in fact, a Free Will, and no form of necessitated causation.

THE UNCONDITIONED A SELF-CONSCIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

VI. As the Unconditioned Cause, God is, we remark, in the next place, a *self-conscious intelligence*. The great facts of the universe which necessitate such a conclusion, are, among others, such as the following: 1. The universe is, in its entirety, a system of means and ends; the end, the highest good of mind, being, in all respects, worthy of the election of even Infinity and Perfection; and the means, the organized universe, being most wisely and intelligibly adapted to the end. 2. Creation is exclusively one great and perfectly systematized whole, constructed, in all its parts and departments, upon principles of pure science, in perfect conformity to fundamental ideas of science pre-existing in the Intelligence. 3. This vast and goodly structure, also, is not a reality existing from eternity, but an effect originated in time. 4. The Unconditioned Cause of this wonderful system is nothing else than a Free Will, in opposition to all forms of necessitated Causality. The necessary deduction from these facts is, that this cause is, and cannot but be, associated with self-conscious Intelligence in the same subject. The action of Free Will implies election, choice, intention, which are absolutely impossible in the absence of self-conscious Intelligence in the same subject, — self-conscious Intelligence presenting appropriate *objects* of election, choice, intention. Such action is utterly inconceivable on any other supposition, and when the results of such action are all, as in the case of creation and providence, in absolute conformity to the idea

of means and ends, and to the laws and principles of pure science, as developed in the Intelligence, the necessary deduction from such facts is, that the Unconditioned Cause of such results is and must be, not only a free agent, but also a self-conscious Intelligence. The mind, in the presence of such facts, can no more conceive the opposite to be true, than it can conceive of an event without a cause. Everything in creation wears the exclusive aspect of intelligent foresight, and corresponding election and predetermination, — the intentional realization of an absolutely perfected plan pre-existing in the Intelligence. The necessary logical consequent of such facts is the supposition of self-conscious Intelligence in the Unconditioned Cause of such results. No intuition is more self-evident, and no demonstration is or can be more absolute than such a conclusion. Postulate, as we have seen that we must do, the Unconditioned Cause as a Free Will, and creation itself as an effect originated in time, and the entire facts of creation as being throughout in perfect and exclusive accordance with the most perfect ideas of means and ends, and of the laws and principles of pure science (and these facts admit of no other supposition, and no one pretends that they do), and we can no more conceive that this Unconditioned Cause is not a self-conscious Intelligence, than we can conceive of the annihilation of space, or that the whole is not equal to all of its parts. If creation was not an effect originated in time, if the Unconditioned Cause, consequently, could be anything else than a Free Will, then, and only then, could we avoid this conclusion.

All the facts of the universe, we remark finally, accord with one supposition only, to wit, that they are the result of free choice, guided by Intelligence in the Unconditioned,

and not of any necessary law inhering in nature. In the latter case, there could not but be, throughout the wide domain of nature, an absolute uniformity. In the former, supposing that God designed to manifest his own agency in his works, there would be a *calculable* uniformity, indicating the control of Intelligence, as in the movements of the heavenly bodies, and at the same time a manifest variety, indicating that the powers of nature are arranged as they are, from choice and not from necessity. Now this, as we have seen, is the precise state of the facts throughout the universe. No account can be given of the *origin* of creation at the particular moment when it did occur, but this: God willed that it should be so, and not otherwise. No other reason can be assigned why the event occurred at that particular moment, and not at some prior or subsequent one, each point of duration being in itself absolutely like every other, and each being absolutely equidistant from the eternity past and the eternity to come. The same holds equally true of the *time* in which each species of animals and plants was originated, and of the *forms* of organization which they put on. All indicate most undeniably the interposition of Will, guided by intelligence, and are explicable on no other supposition. Not one of them can be accounted for by a reference to any known law of nature, or by any reasonably conceivable law inhering in it. We have already alluded to the facts of astronomy bearing upon this supposition. Why, for example, is the density of Mercury nearly twice as great as that of Venus or the Earth, — which are more remote from the Sun, — while that of Uranus is nearly twice as great as that of Saturn, which is nearer the Sun? Why is the motion of the satellites of Uranus the opposite of that of all the other planets and their satellites; and why

have the satellites of that one planet an inclination to the ecliptic so diverse from that of all the others? What is the cause of the amazing eccentricity of the orbits of the comets? Why this marked variety, and yet, in the midst of it all, such a calculable uniformity? But one answer can be given to such inquiries. The arrangements of creation are the result of a fiat of Will guided by Intelligence, and not of any law inhering in nature. In the latter case, no such calculable uniformity on the one hand, and striking variety on the other, could, by any possibility, arise. All would not only be a calculable, but an absolute uniformity. On the other supposition, we might suppose, *à priori*, that the facts of creation would be just as they are, and not otherwise. Not a solitary fact, in any form or degree, contradicts this one hypothesis, while the whole are explicable on no other; but all alike affirm its validity. God, then, as the Unconditioned Cause, is, and must be, a free, self-conscious Intelligence. Hence, we remark, —

SPIRITUALITY AN ATTRIBUTE OF THE UNCONDITIONED.

VII. That *Spirituality* is another attribute which must be affirmed of the Unconditioned Cause. That which peculiarizes spirit from matter, and distinguishes rational mind from all other forms of existence, is Intelligence and Free Will. As possessed of these, God is and cannot but be a spirit. Such are the necessary deductions of science on this subject. The conclusion is absolute, and any enlargement, for the purpose of adding weight to it, would be wholly superfluous. The existence in God of a triunity of mental powers, Intelligence, Free Will, and Sensibility, such as exists in man, is not implied in the above argument. The existence of the latter attribute, however, will

be denied by none who admit that of the two former. We must admit its reality, also, or affirm that mind is intentionally constituted in fixed and immutable correlation to the unreal, instead of the real, in God ; for one of the changeless demands of universal mind is, that God should be to it an object of *sympathy*, which he cannot be while he is contemplated as void of desire and emotion, that is, of a sensibility. God, then, is and must be a spirit, of whom man is the miniature "image and likeness ;" a spirit possessed of the attributes of Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will. If anything is wanting to the completeness of the demonstration of this great truth, the writer has not been able to perceive the fact.

THE UNCONDITIONED A FREE, SELF-CONSCIOUS PERSONALITY.

VIII. As the Unconditioned Cause, God is a *free, intelligent, self-conscious Personality*, in opposition to the unconscious impersonality of Pantheism, or "the regulative Idea" of Idealism. Spirituality, Intelligence, and Free Will, acting in harmony with Intelligence, are the necessary elements of self-conscious Personality. These elements being given, such Personality cannot but be. The moment we conceive of the Unconditioned Cause as a Free Will acting in connection and in harmony with Intelligence, instead of an unconscious principle acting by a law of necessary development, then God is and must be ever present to our minds as an all-wise, self-conscious Personality, "in whose image, and after whose likeness" we ourselves were created. As we have seen, Spirituality, Intelligence, and Free Will must be affirmed of God. He cannot therefore be anything else than a self-conscious Personality. On the other hand, he cannot be the unconscious, self-developing imperson-

ality of Pantheism, nor "the regulative Idea" of Idealism, nor the "Law of Thought" of Nihilism. That God is such a Personality, as we have shown that he cannot but be, may be further argued from the following considerations :

1. This is the central element of the idea of God as spontaneously developed in the Universal Intelligence. Wherever the Intelligence has acted uninfluenced by ideas and principles of "science falsely so called," God, as none other than a self-conscious Personality, is to the mind an omnipresent reality. We as naturally think of him as such a Personality, as we do of ourselves as such personalities. Now, ideas of God which stand opposed to the necessary, spontaneous intuitions of the Universal Intelligence, as those of the unconscious, undeveloped, self-developing impersonality of Pantheism, and "the regulative Idea" of Idealism do, cannot but be false. Else the Universal Intelligence is itself a lie.

2. To the idea of God as such a Personality, our entire intellectual, moral, and spiritual nature is, as we have already seen, in fixed, immutable, and exclusive correlation. All our intellectual, moral, and spiritual ideas and principles pertaining to God, centre in him, as a being to whom prayer "in time of need" is to be addressed; as a source of consolation in affliction, — a being who is to be loved and sought unto as the "Father of our spirits," to be feared, revered, and obeyed, as the moral governor and "judge of all," and to be worshipped and sought unto, as the pure embodiment of all perfection. Take away from God the element of self-conscious Personality, and there is no place for the action of any of these principles or sentiments. An undeveloped, self-developing Impersonality, — "a regula-

tive Idea," or "Law of Thought," — can no more be to the mind a proper object of prayer, or religious worship of any kind, than infinite space or duration. We must hold the idea of God as a self-conscious Personality to be valid, or assume that the entire intellectual, moral, and spiritual nature of universal Humanity is the immutable correlative of the unreal, instead of the real: an assumption of all others most absurd and subversive of all the universally admitted principles of philosophy, — the central element of all of which, as far as they bear upon this subject, is, that mind, in its fundamental laws, tendencies, and adaptations, is the correlative of the real, and not of the unreal, in God.

3. The undeniable fact, that man himself is such a Personality is demonstrative proof that God, "the Father of our spirits," can be nothing else than such a Personality himself. If man is conscious of anything in reference to himself he is of this: that he is an intelligent, free, self-conscious Personality. Now, we can no more conceive it possible for a necessary and unconscious Impersonality to produce an intelligent, free, self-conscious Personality, than we can conceive of an event without a cause. No absurdity can be greater than the idea of a cause producing an effect greater than itself, and which it has no intelligible adaptation whatever to produce. God, then, as the Unconditioned Cause, is not, and cannot be, the unconscious, undeveloped, self-developing Impersonality of Pantheism, nor the "regulative Idea" or "Law of Thought" of Idealism. On the other hand, he is and must be, the free, intelligent, self-conscious, all-perfect Personality, which the Universal Intelligence has affirmed him to be.

THE UNCONDITIONED A MORAL AGENT.

IX. *Moral agency* is another attribute which, as a necessary consequence of the principles above elucidated, we must affirm of God. The essential, fundamental elements of moral agency are Spirituality, Intelligence, Free Will, and, consequently, self-conscious Personality. These last cannot possibly exist without the first. God, then, as the Unconditioned Cause, must be a moral agent. Such deduction also is but the embodiment of the spontaneous intuition of the Universal Intelligence on the subject, — an intuition expressed by the ancient patriarch in the celebrated passage: “That be far from thee, Lord, that the righteous shall be as the wicked. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?” Then how infinite the absurdity that man, himself a moral agent, should be the creation of a cause wholly void of all moral ideas and sentiments! The human mind cannot make a deeper descent in the abyss of absurdity than in entertaining such a sentiment, — an absurdity as great as the idea that the Infinite may be a real creation of finite causation. Suppose we wholly abstract from the Unconditioned Cause all the elements of moral agency. How can we conceive the possibility of the origination, from such a form of causality, of a free, self-conscious Personality, endowed with all the attributes of such agency? Must man regard himself as an infinitely higher existence than the originator of his being and immortal powers?

Such would be the teachings of all who would deny the attributes of moral agency to God, and yet, as they must do, affirm the same of man, these being infinitely the highest attributes of which the mind can conceive. How can a stream rise higher than its source? How can an effect em-

body not only different, but infinitely higher, characteristics than its Unconditioned Cause? The thing is inconceivable and impossible. In the consciousness of the powers and relations of moral agency, we know absolutely that the Author of our being cannot be destitute of moral ideas and attributes.

THE UNCONDITIONED THE MORAL GOVERNOR OF THE UNIVERSE.

X. As the Unconditioned Cause, God exists as the *moral governor of the moral universe*, exercising the high functions of moral administration in perfect harmony with the laws of *perfect goodness and justice*. That there should be such a great central power of universal moral administration is, as we have seen, an immutable demand of the moral nature of all rational moral agents. God exists, then, as such a governor, or universal mind, in the highest department of its being, is the immutable correlative of the unreal in the Unconditioned Cause, and that intentionally on the part of the Creator. One of the deepest and most universal wants of mind exists also without a corresponding provision, and one of its highest adaptations, without a corresponding reality, — an exception to a principle absolutely universal throughout the domain of sentient existence, unless it be in the highest of all, the moral and spiritual constitution of mind. How absurd and unphilosophical the idea of such exception here!

If we cannot reason from the laws and demands of our moral and spiritual nature to the character of the Unconditioned Cause, there are no facts of the universe from which we can safely reason upon any subject.

That the character of the government which God exercises over the moral universe is in perfect harmony with the

principles of absolute goodness and rectitude, is rendered demonstratively evident to universal mind, from what is continually passing under the eye of consciousness in the depths of our inner being. Here a moral government in perfect harmony with such principles is in actual uninterrupted operation. The idea of right and wrong is to the mind, from its nature and laws, an omnipresent reality, and the behests of the conscience in favor of the doing of the right, and avoiding the wrong, are always absolute, admitting of no exceptions, and of no excuse for non-compliance; and no one does or can perform an act in harmony with, or in opposition to, that law, without experiencing in himself corresponding retributions. The moral nature of mind is, in itself, a system of perfect moral government, in actual operation, — a moral government, the movements and powers of which fall directly and continuously under the eye of consciousness, and always reveal to the mind the absolute rectitude of the divine administration. Whatever apparent disorders may present themselves in the world without, whatever conclusion they might, by themselves, force upon the mind, when once it retires within and enters into converse with the laws and principles of its own moral being, it ever finds, in the operations of those laws and principles, a perpetual revelation of the absolute moral rectitude of God.

SECTION IV.

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS.

A few suggestions of a general nature will close this chapter, — remarks designed to elucidate still farther the great subject before us.

Bearing of the different sciences upon our deductions.

We are now prepared to contemplate the true bearing of the different sciences, pure and mixed, upon the results of our previous investigations. There are two distinct points of view from which the facts of the universe, material and mental, may be contemplated and are contemplated, by different classes of mankind: the spontaneous, and intuitive, — the common sense, if the expression may be allowed, and the reflective, or the scientific. The former is the stand-point from which all men, at the first, and the majority, for the most part, at all times, contemplate these facts. The latter is the light in which they are viewed when systematically referred to those fundamental laws and principles by which they are in reality controlled. Now, the legitimate deductions of science can never be in opposition to the necessary, intuitive convictions of the Universal Intelligence, in view of the facts referred to; but must, as far as they pertain to the same subjects, embody those convictions in a general and universal form. In the presence of a particular event, all mankind affirm a cause adequate to its production. Science embodies this conviction in a reflective and universal form, to wit, *every event must have a cause*. The same holds true in all other instances. Common sense, the spontaneous, necessary, and universal convictions of the race, embody those fundamental convictions which science develops and expresses in a reflective and universal form. The true deductions of the latter can never contradict the former, but must sustain to them the fixed relations above referred to. No systems of philosophy, mental or physical, no deductions of science, which contradict these convictions, can stand the test of time.

On the other hand, all the principles of science, and consequently all scientific deductions, resting, as they do, upon such principles, have their basis in, and borrow their validity from, such convictions. If the intuitive conviction, that each particular event has a cause, is not valid, then the principle and all the deductions based upon it, that every event must have a cause, are wholly destitute of validity. The same holds true in all other instances.

Now, the Universal Intelligence has, as we have seen, in the presence of the facts of the universe, spontaneously and intuitively affirmed the reality of the being and perfections of God. Assuming, as we are bound to do, the validity of this conviction, as embodying the necessary intuitions of the Universal Intelligence, it will follow, as an undeniable consequence, that all the legitimate deductions of the entire circle of the sciences, as far as they bear upon this subject, will culminate in this conviction, and reaffirm its validity. What are the facts of the case? Do the results of science affirm the validity of the conviction under consideration?

One thing is absolutely certain, and that is, that no principle, or legitimate deduction from any principle of science, affirms anything in opposition to that conviction. What fact or principle developed in the science of matter or of mind affirms the non-existence of God, or of any of his essential perfections? We may take the entire circle of the sciences, we may ascend to the utmost heights, and descend to the profoundest depths, of each and all of them, we may carefully survey all their principles, facts, and logical deductions, and we shall find absolutely nothing which even looks towards the proposition, "There is no God." Nature has no language to utter such a proposition.

A single consideration will render it demonstrably evident that all the legitimate deductions of real science will, in fact, harmonize with this conviction. The consideration is this: This conviction and the deductions of science have, for their basis, the same essential facts, the former resting upon the facts of the universe as presented to the Universal Intelligence, and the latter resting upon a wider induction of the same and similar facts, — facts at the same time more fully elucidated and systematically arranged and classified. If the universal and necessary conviction induced by the one is the affirmation of the reality of the divine existence and perfections, much more will the legitimate deductions of the other affirm the same great truths. If the necessary result of a knowledge of the end answered by the mechanism of the watch, without any particular acquaintance with the mechanism itself, is the affirmation that it had an intelligent author, much more would a minute and scientific examination of that mechanism itself, together with a full knowledge of the perfect adaptation of all its parts to produce the results referred to, induce and confirm the same affirmation. Such are the relations between the true deductions of real science, and the primary necessary affirmations of the Universal Intelligence in respect to the same subjects. They can, by no possibility, be opposed to each other, but must perfectly harmonize, especially in reference to the existence and character of the Unconditioned Cause of all the facts of the universe. We will elucidate and confirm this principle by the induction of a few examples.

In the first place, when mind first attains to a consciousness of its own existence and powers, by a necessary law of the Intelligence, it affirms of the Author of its being, as

the Unconditioned Cause, the possession of Intelligence and of all other corresponding perfections which render him the proper object of the supreme love, worship, and service of his rational offspring. What are the teachings of *mental science* on the same subject? Suppose we have attained to the most full and complete scientific development of the mental powers and susceptibilities. We then raise the inquiry, Whence originated this mysterious creation? Who was its Author, and what is his character? Did absolute non-intelligence originate Intelligence and so wisely adjust all its laws? Is the Author of mind in which are so mysteriously and harmoniously blended, the attributes of Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will, himself wholly destitute of these perfections, — himself a blind, undesigning, unconscious agency? While the Universal Intelligence, in its primitive, intuitive, and necessary activity, affirms the being and perfections of God, science affirms, with equal absoluteness, that mind, with its high endowments, could have been originated from no other cause. The more profound our knowledge of mind, the more wide and deep, and absolutely impassable does the gulf appear between an apprehension of its powers and susceptibilities, and the idea that they owe their existence and adaptations to a cause wholly void of intelligence, or any of its essential characteristics, or necessary accompaniments; that the “Father of our spirits” is any other than God.

Suppose we enter into the most profound study of the moral constitution of the human mind, till we have distinctly apprehended how perfectly adapted that constitution is, in all its functions, to the great law of duty, and what a perfectly adjusted system of moral government is

being administered in the action of the laws and susceptibilities of that constitution ; suppose that, when science has shed its fullest light upon this department of our being, we then put the question, Is the author of this constitution, and the establisher and upholder of this system of moral government, himself utterly destitute of all moral ideas and sentiments? A sentiment more opposite to the deductions of true science never “ danced in the brain of a maniac,” than is involved in an affirmative answer to this question.

Again ; if there is a principle sustained and affirmed by the deductions of universal science, it is this : the absolute adaptations of different departments of nature to each other. No sentient existence, for example, has a fundamental want, to which there is not a corresponding provision. Now, there is no principle more absolutely universal and fundamental, in the human mind, than that of religion. Religion is as natural to man as food, or breath, — so natural, that he will worship “ beasts and birds, and creeping things,” rather than have no religion at all. What is the all overshadowing reality to which this department of our nature, in all its entireness, vibrates, as its fixed and changeless centre? It is the idea of a personal God. Without this idea, and in the absence of an unshaken conviction of its absolute validity, the mainspring of the mind is broken ; its great central balance-wheel is gone. A dark void is also left in the soul which nothing can illumine or fill. Here, then, is a fundamental adaptation of universal mind, without an object, the great necessity of the highest department of creation, without a corresponding provision, if there is no God. Here, also, is the only solitary exception to a principle in all other departments

of the universe absolutely universal. The voice of universal nature is against such a conclusion. Science draws down upon it the weight of the entire facts of the universe. The more profoundly we study, the more fully we develop, the moral and spiritual departments of our nature, the more full and distinct are the affirmations of all our deductions in favor of the idea of God, and in opposition to every other assumption. The true science of mind, in all its departments, converges to this one fixed and changeless centre.

Let us now contemplate the relations of mind to the external material universe, as developed by scientific observation and deduction, and let us contemplate the facts presented in the light of those principles which lie at the basis of all correct procedures of true science, such, for example, as the following: A means supposes an end; order which once did not exist and began to be, supposes an intelligent designing cause; and the all-pervading influence of law supposes a lawgiver, a governor. All forms of scientific procedure, all legitimate deductions from effects to ultimate principles and final causes, from phenomena to substance, from the conditioned to the character of the Unconditioned and Absolute, have and must have their basis in the above principles and those of a kindred character. Indeed, in the absence of these principles there can be no real science of matter or of mind. Now, what are the relations of mind to the external universe? Nothing is or can be more evident than this, that the final cause of all things is mind. All things exist in fixed and exclusive adaptation to this one end, the wants of mind. The more profoundly we study nature, the wider and more universal our deductions, the more distinct does this great

fact become. The physical organization with which mind is connected, and the encircling universe in the midst of which it "lives and moves and has its being," converge to but one centre, mind. That is the fixed and changeless law, the final cause, of the entire activity of the entire powers of the universe. Such are the ultimate deductions and laws of the whole circle of the sciences in respect to the universe. What is the language of these deductions? What do they affirm of the character of the Unconditioned and Absolute Cause, — the cause which originated mind on the one hand, and the external material universe on the other, and then brought them into such relations, the one to the other? If we suppose that cause to be possessed of Intelligence to perceive the end, and the means requisite to its realization, and a Will to harmonize all things into fixed adaptation to the end, the great problem of the universe admits of a ready solution; and on no other assumption are the facts before us explainable or even conceivable. The mind can no more conceive that the universe of matter and mind was brought into such fixed and changeless relations to each other by a cause wholly void of Intelligence and Will, than it can conceive of the annihilation of space, or of an event without a cause. The more profound our study of nature, the wider and more universal our deductions of facts, the more full and distinct does the above affirmation become.

Let us now contemplate the relations of the universe to the laws and principles of *pure science*, as they are developed by science, in the Intelligence. The pure mathematics exist only in and for the Intelligence, all its principles being pure ideas of Reason, and all its results pure deductions from such principles. Now, when we

have fully mastered this science in all its departments, what are our relations to the universe around us? We have simply attained to that knowledge by which we are prepared to read the book of nature scientifically, as it lies open before us. We have attained to a knowledge of those principles and formulas by which alone we can understand the mechanism and solve the problems of the universe. Pure ideas of Reason, what are they but “the patterns of things in heaven, and of things in the earth, and of things under the earth”? How wonderful, for example, must it appear to the student, when he has fully developed the properties and laws of the circle, the ellipse, the parabola, and hyperbola, etc., to learn that by them alone all the movements and revolutions of every planet, and of every particle of matter in the universe, are directed, and that until he has attained to such knowledge, he cannot understand or explain any of these great facts! The more profoundly we study the pure sciences, on the one hand, and the mechanism of the universe, on the other, the more distinctly does the universal and perfect correspondence of the one with the other appear. When we have attained to this high stand-point, — when the perfect correspondence between the entire mechanism of the universe, and fundamental ideas of the pure intelligence, lie out distinctly before our minds, — how absolutely absurd and inconceivable does the assumption appear, that all this harmony between the Intelligence and the universe was produced by a cause wholly void of all ideas! In the presence of the two ideas, the Intelligence can, by no possibility, make but one affirmation in respect to them, to wit, their absolute incompatibility.

Equally absolute are the bearings of the science of Geol-

ogy and other connected sciences upon this great subject. The following may be enumerated as among the great principles of these sciences, bearing fundamentally upon our present inquiries. (1.) Nature never performs anything *per saltem*. All her creations are very gradually produced. (2.) Matter in a state of total unorganization indicates no power whatever to originate organizations, animal or vegetable, such as now exist on earth. (3.) Matter once existed in this precise condition, in the total absence of vital organizations of every kind, as well as of the embryo principles from which such organizations result. (4.) Every species of vital organization had an organization from some creative act, and that independent of all others. (5.) Absolutely no indications whatever exist of the remotest tendency on the part of any one species towards a transmutation into a different or opposite species. (6.) The original pair, from which every species of animals has descended, must have been created in such a state of maturity as to be capable, from the beginning of their existence, of self-sustentation. (7.) Throughout the wide domain of nature, there is the total absence of the remotest known tendency towards the production of any existing forms of animal and vegetable organization, but through one inclusive and immutable law, that of propagation and reproduction. Admitting these facts to be true, the conclusion is absolute, that the great leading races of animals, and species of vegetables, could have been originated from no power or law inhering in nature, but must owe their origin to some creative power out of nature. No one will pretend to account for such facts on any other supposition. Now, the more profound our researches, and the more widely extended our deductions in this department of science, the

more manifest does the reality of these facts become, and more absolute the conclusion referred to.

A NEW ASPECT OF THIS WHOLE SUBJECT.

An entirely new aspect of this whole subject has recently been presented by Prof. Agassiz, and, for its presentation, the scientific public will, unquestionably, to the end of time, regard itself as very highly indebted to this great thinker. Palpable facts have long been before the world, — facts indicating most clearly, that both continents, the Eastern and Western, must have been, by some general convulsion of nature, completely submerged by ice-floods from the direction of the North Pole, and that this general catastrophe must have occurred immediately prior to the present order of things. These facts the learned professor has carefully investigated, and is still pushing his inquiries in the same direction, with his usual diligence and care. The deduction yielded by the facts thus far developed, — a deduction which further investigations, will, no doubt, confirm so as to exclude doubt, — the deduction yielded by the facts thus far developed, we say, is this: A general state of coldness, so intense, was induced, as of necessity to put “an end to all living beings upon the surface of the globe.” This ice-period was too recent to admit of the origination of the races of living beings, now covering the surface of the earth, by transmutation from preceding ones, and leaves us with but one remaining hypothesis, the creation of the former “by the word of God.” Well may the learned professor say: —

“I attach great importance, in a philosophical point of view, to the study of this ice-period, because, if it can

be demonstrated that such was once the condition of our earth, it will follow that the doctrine of the transmutation of the species, and of the descent of the animals that live now from those of past days, is cut at the root by this winter, which put an end to all living beings upon the surface of the globe."

We hope that naturalists of the Development School will suspend their conjectures in favor of their theory, until all the facts of the period under consideration have been fully developed, and their bearings as fully determined. In the mean time religion can have nothing to fear from the progress of true science.

The bearings of the science of Physiology on this subject should not be overlooked in this connection. Matter and spirit, each in all respects diverse from and opposite to the other, and each having an existence totally independent of the other, have yet, throughout the universe, a mysterious connection the one with the other; the latter everywhere manifest as the end of creation, and the former organized throughout wholly as a means to this end. Take the human body as an illustration. How infinitely complicated is this wonderful specimen of divine mechanism, and yet how perfectly adapted is every part to every other, and the whole as a habitation of mind, and as an instrument for the accomplishment of its endlessly diversified purposes! The arm, for example, may properly be said to be an infinite machine, being capable of a diversity of motions strictly infinite. With it, together with the other organs, how absolutely complete is the human form! Without this organ, or with it in any other locality, how incomplete and defective that organization would be! If it is possible for Infinity and Perfection to manifest itself through any mate-

rial organization, it is done through this one organ in connection with the other parts of the system of organization with which it is connected.

But let us contemplate especially two other organs of this mysterious mechanism, the eye and the ear. Those organs have but one exclusive office, to enable mind to communicate with the external world. Here is the material creation, on the one hand, and Intelligence, on the other; and here are two organs formed for no other purpose but to enable the latter to know and communicate with the former. What shall we think of the assumption, that the Unconditioned, who created the Intelligence and established its laws, on the one hand, and then arranged the external universe as to that Intelligence an object of knowledge, on the other, and finally constructed these organs for no other purpose but to enable the latter to know the former, — what must we think, we say, of the assumption, that the Power who accomplished all this is himself utterly void of all ideas, of all knowledge? “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that planted the ear shall he not hear? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” He surely must have a wonderful capacity for digesting absurdities, who would answer these questions in the negative. Now, the more profound our study of these organs, — the more perfect our acquaintance with mind on the one hand, and with the adaptation of the body as a habitation of spirit, and as an instrument by which mind communicates with the external universe, and accomplishes its purposes, by means of the powers of nature, on the other, — the more clear and distinct do the manifestations of Divinity, through the relations of this science, become. Scientifically read, all its teachings speak but one language

exclusively, the affirmation of the being and perfections of God, and the absolute impossibility of accounting for the facts presented on any other supposition.

The same holds equally true, if we descend from animal to vegetable physiology. The vegetable is the grand medium between animal organization and matter in a state of unorganization. The vital principle in the vegetable has but one function, and that is to bring unorganized matter into a state in which it may sustain the animal. And how perfectly adapted is the vegetable kingdom to this one end! The wider and more particular our inductions, the more manifest does the perfection of these adaptations appear. What is the conclusion towards which all these great facts tend? The vital principle in the animal economy acts as a most wisely adapted means to one end, the exigencies of mind; and the same principle in the vegetable in subordination equally perfect to the animal. Mind is the centre, and all the infinitely complicated machinery of the universe moves around it, in the relations of a most wise and intelligent adaptation. Is the Author of mind and the Organizer of the material universe in such intelligent adaptation to the end to which the action of all its powers are subordinated, totally ignorant of both alike, and equally of the relations which he has established between them? Impossible, is the response of all the revelations of this science. The more profound our study of the science, the more deep and distinct does that response become.

The same holds equally true of all the sciences bearing directly or indirectly upon our present investigations. The time is not distant when the entire scientific movement of universal mind will be seen to culminate in the affirmation of one great central truth, the being and perfections of God.

There is an absolute unity in creation, and a real unity equally absolute in the sciences. Scientific research and deduction can lead in but one direction upon this subject.

Reasons for the apparent opposition between some of the sciences and religion.

We are now prepared to state the reasons for the *apparent* opposition between many of the sciences and religion. Every form of scepticism has professedly based itself upon the assumed deductions of Science. Religion, it is affirmed, teaches one thing, and Science another, and the friends of Religion have, in instances not a few, been too ready to admit the reality of such a contradiction. If we admit that the teachings of Religion are in fact opposed to the legitimate deductions of true Science, then we grant all that the opposers of the former can desire, to wit, that they have the highest possible reasons for rejecting Religion. But why this apparent contradiction? The following important reasons, may, among others, be assigned for the fact:

1. In the first place, all are not the legitimate deductions of real Science, which are held out before the world as such. There are systems of "Science falsely so called," and it is no matter of wonder that such systems should present deductions hostile to Religion. At the same time, theologians have erred in developing the system of truth revealed in the volume of inspiration, as well as philosophers, in their attempted solutions of the problems of the universe. Hence, it has often happened that false systems of Religion assumed as true have been arrayed against the teachings of true Science, on the one hand, and systems of false phi-

losophy have been arrayed against true Religion, on the other.

2. Another important fact deserves very special notice here. Most of the sciences, the physical and mental especially, have, when in their infancy, and while philosophers have "seen men as trees walking," — in other words, have seen only the shadows of the great realities, which the sciences in their maturity never fail to reveal, — we say, most of the sciences, while in their infancy, have appeared to reveal facts and principles opposed to Religion, while the same sciences, when they have advanced towards maturity of development, have invariably presented themselves as the handmaids of Religion. What a striking illustration of the above statement do the recent and mature revelations of Geology present! Everywhere amid those revelations "the footprints of the Creator" are most distinctly visible. There is not a solitary Science that has attained to anything like maturity, — a science whose early deductions were arrayed against Religion, — that is an exception to the above remark.

3. Wherever there has been an apparent conflict between Science and Religion, the real issue has invariably been between the original intuitions of the Universal Intelligence and the mere assumptions of philosophers, and not between true Science and real Religion. Wherever, philosophers, for example, have *assumed* that our knowledge of nature has only a *relative* validity, and have, therefore, repudiated the claims of Religion, no real issue has been raised between Science and Religion, but between these philosophers and the Universal Intelligence. They, in truth, impeach, not Religion, but the Intelligence itself, and before they are heard at all against Religion, they

should be called upon to settle finally the issue which they themselves have raised with said Intelligence. In the sphere of true Science there are no assumptions. Intuitions, on the other hand, lie at the basis of all deductions, and all real intuitions are held in equal respect, and occupy their appropriate positions, as the foundations and starting-points of scientific deduction in all its forms. In no systems of Science, in which real intuitions have their proper place and authority, has there ever been found even an apparent conflict between Science and Religion. In systems, on the other hand, in which assumptions occupy the place of principles, there and only there the conflict under consideration obtains. Religion, in fact, is the great central rock of eternal truth. Every system of philosophy that shall fall upon this rock will be broken, and upon whatever systems it shall fall, it will grind them to powder. The reason is obvious. Every system that wars upon Religion, wars, and that for the same reason, upon the Intelligence itself.

4. Before philosophers of any school are permitted to set forth their own conflict with the original and necessary intuitions of the Universal Intelligence, on the one hand, and with Theism, on the other, as a conflict between true Science and real Religion, they should be compelled to agree among themselves in regard to *some* principles of truth, and then to show wherein said principles conflict with the teachings of Religion. This they have never yet done. There has never yet been set forth against Religion, by any one school in philosophy, a single principle, the validity of which has not been absolutely denied by every other anti-theistic school that can be named. Outside of the sphere of real religious thought we meet with nothing but an ab-

solute chaos of warring systems, principles, and opinions. All here is "a land of darkness, as darkness itself, without form or order, where the light is as darkness." When philosophers shall unitedly set forth some form of real intuition as demonstrated truth, and show wherein said truth irreconcilably conflicts with Religion, then, and not till then, will they make manifest a real issue between Science and Religion. This, however, they have never yet accomplished, and we are quite sure they never will accomplish.

METHOD BY WHICH THE IDEA OF GOD IS DEVELOPED IN
THE SCRIPTURES.

We will suppose the Scriptures to have fallen into the hands of an individual of common intelligence, and that, with no knowledge of their claims to inspiration, he has read understandingly such passages as the following: "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth;" "And thou, Lord, in the beginning, hast laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of thy hands." Whatever the general impressions of this individual may be in regard to the whole book, he will necessarily and intuitively recognize these declarations as absolutely true. The reason is this: These passages, in the first place, assert a fact distinctly recognized by the race as true, to wit, creation as an event of time, — the fact that the worlds had a beginning. They then affirm a deduction, as intuitively and necessarily implied by this fact, to wit, that the ultimate cause of creation is a power out of and above nature, that is, God; in other words, that "the worlds were made by the word of God." No one can avoid the conclusion, that creation had a beginning, or that it is an event of time, and no one can reflect upon this fact,

which he must believe or stultify himself, and not intuitively affirm the author, or ultimate cause, of creation, to be a personal God.

FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT IN THE THEISTIC ARGUMENT, AS
DEVELOPED BY PALEY AND OTHERS.

The fundamental defect in the theistic argument, as presented by Paley, and others of the same school, now becomes perfectly obvious. They argue to a personal God, from mere facts of order, or marks of design, irrespective, wholly, *of the facts of creation as an event of time*. This defect Dr. Chalmers alludes to in his *Natural Theology*. Before we can affirm, he tells us, the existence of a maker, we must show that something has been made. Before we can affirm that "the worlds were formed by the word of God," we must show that they, too, are things "that were made." Take Paley's argument as illustrated by the case of the watch. Let us suppose that watches have ever been produced one from another, with no indications of an external agency, and that we have no evidence whatever that the line of succession has any beginning. Then, undeniably, watches are not to be reckoned among things made, and present no evidence of the existence of a watch-maker. So of the reality of a world-maker, if we leave out of view the great central fact of creation as an event of time. Recognizing the undeniable fact, however, that creation had a beginning, then, and that with infinite reason, and from absolute proof, "through faith we understand that the worlds were formed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of [developed from] things which do appear."

CHAPTER IV.

GOD THE INFINITE AND PERFECT.

WE are now at liberty, in view of the results to which we arrived in the preceding chapter, to assume, as the basis of our present investigations, the reality of the divine existence, as possessed of the attributes of *Creative Power, Eternity, Immutability, Free Will, Intelligence, and Moral Perfection*. The universe, material and mental, stands before us as the result of the agency of such a being. In what light shall we revere and worship the Author of our existence? Shall we regard him as finite and imperfect like ourselves, or as really and truly Infinite and Perfect? In which of these relations does *creation* reveal him? For this great inquiry we have been fully prepared through the train of thought thus far pursued. That God is possessed of the attributes of Infinity and Perfection is, in fact, a truth affirmed as such by the Universal Intelligence. This is evident from a single consideration. No individual, without conscious guilt, can attribute to the Most High any *known* and *acknowledged* imperfection. Men may, without conscious guilt, attribute real imperfections to him, not knowing and acknowledging them to be such. Whatever, on the other hand, they conceive and admit to be necessarily involved in the idea of Infinity and Perfection, they feel themselves under the most sacred obligations to attribute to God. Nor has there ever been a time, since the idea of

God first appeared upon the theatre of consciousness, that we did not regard him as Infinite and Perfect, and should not have felt ourselves involved in infinite guilt in attributing any acknowledged imperfection to him. The doctrine of God, as possessed of such perfections, is not only a *universal*, but a *first* truth of the Intelligence, — a first truth in the same sense that the idea of God is.

Now, as God, in his relations as Creator and Governor of the universe, stands revealed to the Universal Intelligence as Infinite and Perfect, there must be somewhere in the universe some great facts revealed to the Intelligence, — facts which lie at the basis of this conviction and affirm its validity. We must admit this, or convict the Intelligence itself of fundamental error, and then the validity of all principles and logical deductions fails entirely. If we convict the Universal Intelligence of fundamental error, the validity of all its affirmations, primary and deductive, must be denied.

Creation, then, does in fact reveal God as Infinite and Perfect. But where, and from whence, and in what form, is this revelation made? In what department of the divine works do we find the basis and source of the conviction that God is clothed with the perfections under consideration? Not surely in the mere *extent* of creation. The vastness of the divine works reveals their Author as possessed of very great, and to us incomprehensible power, but not as possessed of absolute infinity. If the creation of one single world does not reveal the Creator as Infinite, that of any number short of infinite cannot do it!

Where, then, shall we find the basis of the conviction which really and truly exists in all minds, that God is both Infinite and Perfect? Not, primarily nor chiefly, in the revelations of matter, but mainly of that which is “made

in the image and likeness" of the Infinite, amid the laws and susceptibilities of mind itself. If God, as we have seen that he has done, has pencilled out his own Infinity and Perfection anywhere in creation, it is, we may very safely conclude *à priori*, in that in which the Infinite is imaged forth in the finite. Infinity and Perfection are affirmed of God exclusively as a spirit, — a free, intelligent, self-conscious personality. Now, matter, in its nature finite and limited, and in all its essential characteristics the opposite of spirit, is unadapted to reveal these attributes in their absoluteness in its Author. Mind, in its laws, adaptations, and susceptibilities, must reveal them, if they are revealed at all in creation. That God might endow mind, made as it is "in his own image and after his own likeness," with such powers, laws, and susceptibilities, that it should be to itself a perpetual revelation of the Infinity and Perfection of its Author, appears to us to be self-evident. Let us turn our thoughts in this direction and see if we cannot find here the clear pencillings of the divine Infinity and Perfection. In conducting the argument on this head, the following principles are postulated as self-evident, or as necessarily involved in what has already been proved as true in respect to the character of God:

1. Mind, in all its original powers, laws, adaptations, and susceptibilities, is, in all respects, just what its divine Author intended that it should be.

2. Whatever indications we find in mind of the character of its Author, God intended them as such.

3. These indications, whatever they may be, accord with the real, and not with the unreal, in God. In other words, mind, in its original and immutable powers, laws, adapta-

tions, and susceptibilities, is correlative of the real and not the unreal attributes of its Author.

Should any one deny any of these principles, the last especially, he would be at once confronted by the deductions reached in the last chapter, and also by the great basis principle of all science pertaining to sentient existence, to wit, that for every original want of such existence, there is a corresponding provision, and for every fundamental adaptation a corresponding reality, or sphere of activity. Let the antitheist, if he chooses, assume that mind, in its fundamental adaptations and necessities, is an exception to this otherwise absolutely universal principle. The world, in that case, will no longer look to him as an oracle of reason or common sense. The way is now prepared to consider the great facts of creation—of mind especially—bearing upon the question before us.

If we should raise the inquiry pertaining to the *origin* of the *idea* of God as Infinite and Perfect, an answer may very readily be obtained. Mind is so constituted that, in the presence of the finite and imperfect, it necessarily conceives of the Infinite and Perfect. The terms finite and imperfect, and Infinite and Perfect, are correlative terms, and the ideas which they represent are correlative ideas. The one cannot be in the mind without the other. In conceiving of itself as a spirit finite and imperfect, the mind necessarily conceives of a personality endowed with absolute Infinity and Perfection. Hence the *origin* of the idea of God as such a being. The idea cannot but be in the mind, because that of the finite and imperfect is and must be there.

If we should ask after the *source* of the *conviction*, which really exists in all minds, that God is possessed of such perfections, it is undoubtedly to be found in the deep con-

consciousness that the mind cannot but have that its own mental nature is constituted in fixed and immutable harmony with that idea, and in opposition to all other ideas of the Unconditioned Cause. Throughout creation there is visible everywhere the perfect adaptation of one thing to another. Wherever there is a want there is a corresponding provision, and wherever there is an adaptation there is a corresponding reality. Mind has an intuitive conviction that its own immortal nature cannot be an exception to this universal law. Now, in the presence of the idea of God as Infinite and Perfect, mind has the intuitive consciousness that its entire mental and moral nature is constituted in immutable correlation to that idea. Action in harmony with that idea is action in conscious harmony with its own nature. Action in any other direction, or the entertaining of any other ideas of God, is an equally undeniably conscious violation of the laws of that nature. In the presence of this idea, then, from which it cannot escape if it would, mind is and must be to itself a perpetual revelation of the Infinity and Perfection of its Author. But more of this as we proceed to a more distinct and formal development of the basis of the conviction under consideration.

1. In whatever direction we turn our investigations, one thing is quite evident, and that is, that neither in the universe of matter or mind do we find anything to *limit* the Perfections of God. If the external creation does not affirm absolutely his Infinity and Perfection, neither does it affirm finiteness of him. Nor in the revelations of mind do we find the least indication of limitation in any attributes of the Author of our being. Nor can any such indications be found in any of the forms in which this idea appears in the human mind. In other words, there is and can be no *à pri-*

ori, or *à posteriori* evidence against the doctrine of the Infinity and Perfection of God. If he is finite and imperfect, no evidence of the fact can be adduced from any source whatever.

2. Nor is there any form or degree of *antecedent probability* against this doctrine. If God exists at all, — and he does exist, — no reasons whatever can be assigned why he should not exist as the alone Infinite and Perfect. As the Unconditioned Cause, no reasons can be assigned why he should not as well possess power adequate to all possible results, as to any whatever. He that exists from everlasting to everlasting the same, why should he not embody in himself all possible and conceivable perfections, and that in an infinite degree? No fact in the universe of matter or mind, and no element in the idea of God as the Unconditioned Cause, or in any form in which this idea exists in the mind, presents the least shadow of probability even, against the doctrine under consideration.

3. While there is, in fact, no antecedent probability whatever against the validity of the idea of God as the alone Infinite and Perfect, there is a form of antecedent probability in its favor, and that of an important and positive nature. The validity of the idea of God, as the Unconditioned and Absolute Cause, has already been established, and its validity none will question. Now, as Cousin has well observed, no other conception so fully and adequately represents our necessary idea of such a cause as that of Infinity and Perfection. In the undeniable absence of all evidence of every kind to the contrary, this one great central fact binds us absolutely to believe in, and worship as real, a Personal God, Infinite and Perfect.

4. While creation presents no indications whatever of

finiteness and imperfection in God, there is one general view of the universe which tends to impress upon the mind, and that very deeply, the opposite sentiment. The universe is, to our comprehension, of vast and boundless extent, and infinitely complicated in its structure, movements, and operations. Every particle of matter influences and is influenced by every other, however remote their distances from each other may be. The entire movements of creation, from the motion of the planets in their spheres, to that of the least mote that flits in the sunbeam, — all the productions of nature, animal, vegetable, and mineral, — are the result of the combined action and reaction of the entire individual particles of which the great whole is composed. Yet such is the perfect balance of the powers of nature, that the result is absolute harmony throughout. Everything is in its place, and everything in its season, and all things work together for one great end, the wants of mind. Now, there are the clearest indications possible, through the material creation, of *infallible* wisdom and guidance, on the part of the great First Cause, and the existence of these attributes necessarily implies absolute Infinity and Perfection in God. The more the mind reflects upon the subject, the more deep will the impression become, and the validity of the argument thus deduced cannot be shaken.

5. While there is also this total absence of all evidence that God is not Infinite and Perfect, there is, in the depths of our own mental being, a law or principle which presents a solemn protest against our affirming any form of imperfection of him, without proof the most absolute. We are conscious of doing no violence to any law or principle of our nature, when we affirm absolute Infinity and Perfection of God. On the other hand, we cannot but be conscious

of doing such violence, when we, for a moment, entertain the sentiment that he is anything else than Infinite and Perfect. Now, this feeling or sentiment lying in the depths of universal mind was not placed there by the Creator, without design; and what could that design have been, if not as an indication of the real character of God? Any other supposition is an impeachment of his integrity. God, then, is endowed with the attributes of Infinity and Perfection. If God is finite and imperfect, he should have so constituted finite minds, that an affirmation of his finiteness and imperfection would be no violence to the nature of such minds. The fact that he has so constituted them is a most absolute affirmation, on his part, of his own Infinity and Perfection.

6. We would now invite very special attention to a great fact, to which we have alluded before, and which has a fundamental bearing upon our present inquiries. As the powers and susceptibilities of the mind lie out under the eye of consciousness, it stands revealed to the general Intelligence as adapted to a state of *endless progression*,—progression in knowledge and capacities for virtue and happiness. The more profoundly we study these laws and susceptibilities, the more distinctly revealed do the adaptations of mind to such a state appear. It is no valid objection to the above statement, that, in the progress of life, the mental powers advance to a certain degree of development, and then appear to retrograde. Such effects are attendant upon the peculiarities of our own present condition. Certain conditions are requisite to mental progress, and mind can progress only while the conditions of its development are fulfilled. The original adaptation of mind to a state of endless progression, however, is manifest from the

nature of its fundamental ideas, and of its powers and susceptibilities. There can be no limit to the progress of mind when the necessary conditions of mental growth and development are fulfilled. Two great truths stand revealed in the fact before us. The first is the *immortality* of mind and its endless development during the progress of that immortality. It is an intuition of the Universal Intelligence, that every creature is created for a certain destiny, and that that destiny is as the original powers of the subject. In the adaptation of mind to a state of endless progression, its immortal existence in such a state is most clearly revealed.

In the same great fact the absolute Infinity and Perfection of God are revealed with equal distinctness. Here, in the most distinct and impressive form in which the thing is possible, the Infinite is embodied in the Finite. Here, in characters which no honest inquirer after the universal truth can fail to read and understand, God has pencilled out, upon the works of his hand, his own Infinity and Perfection. Mind, in its own nature finite, is adapted and destined to a state of endless expansion, — an expansion, in the progress of which it will and must outgrow all that is finite. Nothing but the Infinite and Perfect can, by any possibility, meet the endlessly growing necessities of such a being. God, then, is Infinite and Perfect, or he is wholly unable to fill out capacities for good which he has himself created. The conception itself of such a state, and the generation of powers destined and adapted to it, argue, most undeniably, Infinity and Perfection in the Author of our being. Such must be his character, else he has generated capacities for real good which nothing finite, not even himself, can fill. There must be an infinite blank in creation, if

God is not Infinite and Perfect. Who would, for a moment, entertain the sentiment, that mind, in its endless progression towards Infinity and Perfection, is advancing towards the unreal, and is drawn in that direction by ideas of the unreal instead of the real?

Let us again turn this thought over for a few moments. Suppose that it were the design of God, through some finite creation, to reveal his own Infinity and Perfection, and to embody, in the thing created, that by which these attributes of the Creator should be revealed and affirmed. How can this be done, unless by creating, in the finite and imperfect, capacities for an endless approach toward Infinity and Perfection? If such a fact does not reveal these perfections in God, nothing can. Mind, then, as "the image and likeness" of its Author, is and must be, to itself, a perpetual revelation of God's Infinity and Perfection.

7. To this one idea of God, and to that only, the entire nature of universal mind is fundamentally adapted. To it all its powers and susceptibilities exist in fixed and absolute correlation. If there is anything to which reason and science impart their absolute sanction, if there is anything that universal observation and induction affirm, it is, as we have before said, the validity of the principles, that for every universal want of sentient existence there is a corresponding provision, and for every fundamental adaptation, a corresponding reality. The direction of the needle indicates the existence and action of a cause attracting it thither. Nature never vibrates to the unreal, but ever to the real. When we find an agency adapted to a certain sphere of activity, we know that there is a corresponding sphere for the action of those powers. When

we find a susceptibility to a certain form of good, we know that there exists the corresponding provision. If this one principle should fail us, universal nature is a lie, and there is no faith to be reposed in her relations, — this one excepted, that she is never to be trusted. Now, universal mind is fundamentally constituted in fixed and changeless harmony with one idea of God and of that only, — of God as a self-conscious personality, possessed of all possible perfections, and each infinite in its nature; in other words, as the Infinite and Perfect.

This great fact of universal mind demands a somewhat extended elucidation. Mind, we would remark in the first place, is not only constituted for a state of endless growth and expansion, but this form of development is an immutable demand of its nature. Were it once brought into a state of hopeless stagnation and non-growth, it would, from necessity, be immeasurably wretched. Now, the growth of mind must depend upon the range and compass of its ideas of realities within and around it. It can never, by any possibility, expand beyond the circle of such ideas. Take from mind the idea and conviction of the reality of a self-conscious personality, endowed with Infinity and Perfection, and thus, by a necessary consequence, limit the range of its powers to the finite and imperfect, and ere long there is an inevitable termination of mental growth and expansion. Mind must, in that case, cease to be, or ever after remain in endless stagnation and wretchedness. If, on the other hand, its immortality is to be spent in the conscious presence of Infinity and Perfection, then this great demand of its immortal nature will be eternally met. That God should be both Infinite and Perfect, then, is an immutable demand of man's immortal nature. God is both

Infinite and Perfect, or he has created universal mind in fixed adaptations not only to immortality, but also to an immortality the most glorious and blessed conceivable, and this with the design of finally extinguishing the light of the soul in the abyss of annihilation, or necessitating it to spend that immortality in a state of hopeless wretchedness. Mind was not only constituted for immortal growth and expansion, and such development is not only a changeless demand of its nature, but there is an all-overshadowing reality, the Infinite and Perfect, upon the idea of which, our immortal powers may eternally expand in beauty and perfection, and under the influence of which this great demand of our being may be forever met, in a state of consequent ceaseless blessedness; and this great fact of universal mind is, in itself, the highest demonstration of the existence of this reality.

The history of universal mind, in all ages, is but an unvarying commentary upon, and an affirmation of, the truth of the above statements. Under a denial of the being and perfections of God, mind has ever put on a blind, bewildered and lawless form of activity, in which the harmonious growth and development of its powers have become an utter impossibility. Under any other idea of him, than as Infinite and Perfect, it has ever been subject to a process of intellectual and moral deterioration and degradation. Under the influence of this one idea of God, and just in proportion to its emancipation from all other forms of that idea, has the development of mind been uninterruptedly and harmoniously progressive. The history of mind, from the beginning of time to the present hour, presents us with not a solitary exception to the above statement. God is, then, both Infinite and Perfect, or the idea of the unreal

and immutable faith in the objective validity of that idea, is the irreversible condition of continued mental growth and blessedness.

Mind, also, must ever have its dwelling-place in the presence of the idea and conviction of its own immortality. Let this idea and conviction be attended with an implicit faith in the being and absolute Infinity and Perfection of God, and the vista of the eternal future is one of unmingled light and blessedness. Connect this idea and conviction with those of the finiteness and imperfection of God, and an impenetrable gloom envelops the entire vision of the soul's immortality. Mind cannot but be conscious that its endlessly growing necessities in the former case may be, and in the latter cannot be, met. Hence, it holds true, as a matter of fact, that the idea of immortality has ever been to the mind one of gloom and darkness, under any other idea of God than that of his Infinity and Perfection. Is an immovable faith in the unreal, the irreversible condition of mental blessedness, and that from the changeless laws of mind? It is so, or God is possessed of the attributes of Infinity and Perfection.

There is, also, in the depths of mind, an unchangeable demand for the continued contemplation of one all-over-shadowing reality, endowed with the attributes of Infinity and Perfection, and an adaptation equally fundamental to the relations of affectionate intercommunion with such a being. The individual who entertains the sentiment that there is no God, finds, from the fixed and immutable laws of his mental constitution, a painful vacancy in his mind, which nothing finite or imperfect can fill. He is, and cannot but be, mentally wretched, without, perhaps, knowing the cause. Similar experience is the immediate

and necessary result of entertaining any idea of God which does not involve the elements of Infinity and Perfection. The mere contemplation of a being embodying such perfections, on the other hand, is, of itself, a well-spring of life in the mind. In the conviction that it is the object of the approbation and favor of such a being, its blessedness is complete. Under the opposite conviction, it is, from the necessity of its nature, encompassed with the gloom of the eternal sepulchre. Cicero affirms that he always experienced a sentiment of dissatisfaction with the highest productions of himself and all other men, and assigns this as the reason, that his mind was ever aspiring after something Infinite. Here he has fixed upon a changeless law of universal mind, the natural and necessary tendency of the aspirations of whose nature is, above all that is finite, toward the Infinite and Perfect, as its fixed, final, and changeless centre. Are all these immutable attractions towards the unreal? Let antitheism base itself upon such an assumption, if it chooses. Universal mind, in the fundamental department of its nature, is the immutable correlative of the unreal, or God is both Infinite and Perfect.

Worship is another universal and changeless tendency of mind. It must have some object of worship, some object in which its supreme regard may centre. No principle of our nature is stronger or more universal in its action than this. Now, mind is so constituted that if anything finite becomes to it such an object, mental degradation is the necessary result, — a statement verified by the unvarying experience of the race. With no object of worship, it becomes dark and desolate, a lawless meteor, to which is “reserved the blackness of darkness forever.”

In an unwavering faith and a devout worship of God as Infinite and Perfect, this fundamental demand of its nature is not only fully met, but mind puts on its most beautiful and perfect forms of development. Such, then, is the character of God; or universal mind, in its strongest and highest attractions, is drawn towards the unreal instead of the real; than which no supposition is more unreasonable.

The well-being of mind is conditioned upon its *moral states* more than upon all other causes combined. This statement no one will deny. Now, when mind divorces itself from a belief in God and allegiance to his throne, or worships him in any other form than as the Infinite and Perfect, it becomes subject to an undivided and degrading selfishness, the slave of its own lower propensities. The history of the race presents us with not a solitary exception to this statement. Without God, or under the influence of any idea of him but one, mind, from the immutable laws of its moral nature, loses its moral balance; its action consequently becomes disordered, and its susceptibilities the prey of dark and desolating influences. It is only in the conscious presence of the Infinite and Perfect, and when all its powers are balanced by an unwavering faith in God as possessed of such perfections, that mind does or can attain to the mastery of its own spirit and to the consequent fruition of that form of blessedness to which all the higher departments of its nature are adapted. Such is the nature of mind, — the immutable law of its entire moral activity. Can we suppose that the only real regulative principle of moral action in universal mind is faith in the unreal? This must be true, we answer again, or God is both Infinite and Perfect.

Let us contemplate still further this important depart-

ment of our subject. Mind is so constituted that it must *apprehend* the idea of God as Infinite and Perfect, whether it believes in his existence or not. Now, in the presence of the idea of such a being, it cannot but apprehend also an idea of what such a being — supposing him to exist — would require, in every condition in life, that we should be and do. No idea conceivable is so well adapted to awaken in us correct apprehensions of what we ought to be and to do. As a regulative idea of moral judgment, none other does or can compare with that of God as the Infinite and Perfect. This is undeniable. Suppose that the mind apprehends this idea, which it must have, as representing an actually existing personality of corresponding perfections. It, then, as it apprehends the right and the wrong, must conceive of itself as actually required by such a being, — a being upon whom it apprehends its entire interests here and hereafter as hanging in absolute dependence, — to do the right and avoid the wrong. Then it finds itself under influences, of all others actual or conceivable, best adapted to induce absolute rectitude of character and conduct. The moral nature of mind, then, is fundamentally adapted to action under the influence of this one idea of God, and a corresponding belief in his actual existence, and is, also, as fundamentally unadapted to act under any opposite ideas and convictions. Either the moral nature of mind is a lie, therefore, or God exists as the alone Infinite and Perfect. There is no escaping this conclusion. If God does not exist as such a being, then the immutable condition of the highest possible form of moral beauty and perfection possible to finite rational beings is an immutable faith in the unreal and the untrue, than which no absurdity can be greater.

We remark, again, that all the *moral ideas* and *principles* of mind clearly indicate that it was created and fundamentally adapted to exist and act as the subject of a system of *moral government*. All the natural and moral tendencies of our nature render us governmental beings. When men are brought into social relations to each other, it is as natural for them to organize systems of civil, domestic, and moral administration, to which each and all are alike subject, as it is to seek any other good whatever. Government established supposes an administrator, and moral government a moral administrator. All the moral ideas and principles of our nature are correlative to one idea, to wit, that of an ultimate system of absolutely perfect moral administration; a system in which all the moral disorders now existing will be fully corrected and redressed, in which virtue and vice will each receive its appropriate rewards, and the reign of perfect justice and eternal truth be rendered forever triumphant over all opposition.

Such is the system of moral administration demanded by the moral nature of all rational existences, and nothing but Infinity and Perfection in the administrator can possibly realize such a system. Now, unless there is in the moral nature of universal mind a fundamental adaptation to the unreal, and to that only, a system of perfect moral administration does in fact exist, — a system administered by a moral governor Infinite and Perfect in all his attributes.

There is one other view of the present subject, — the demands of mind, — which should not be overlooked in this connection. Mind is constituted with a deep and profound consciousness of dependence, for the supply of its great and endlessly growing necessities, upon a power out of and

above itself. Its nature immutably demands some power higher than itself to lean and rest upon. This no one will deny. Now, this sentiment of want and dependence can be met and satisfied by nothing short of absolute all-sufficiency in the object of the mind's trust and confidence. Hence, in the midst of the mutable and transitory, it naturally seeks the immutable and permanent, and the sentiment under consideration never is and never can be fully met and satisfied till the mind finds itself leaning upon a trust in the Infinite and Perfect. Immutable necessities exist without corresponding provisions, and immutable adaptations without the correlated objects, or God is both Infinite and Perfect.

8. The argument above adduced will be seen to possess the highest possible force, when viewed in relation to a fundamental law of the Intelligence, — a law to which we have before alluded. To the Intelligence, the terms finite and infinite, imperfect and perfect, are correlative terms, and the ideas designated by them correlative ideas. The idea of the finite and imperfect cannot be in the mind without that of the Infinite and Perfect. We cannot conceive of a being of finite and consequently imperfect capacities, without, at the same time, having the idea of God as the Infinite and Perfect. While this is the fixed law of the Intelligence, that in the presence of the finite and imperfect it shall conceive of the Infinite and Perfect, we find that all the higher spiritual and moral departments of our nature exist in immutable correlation to two fundamental ideas, — that of a universe material and mental, — a universe finite and imperfect, on the one hand, and such a universe hanging in dependence upon and presided over by a being Infinite and Perfect, on the other. The universe we necessarily appre-

hend as thus finite and imperfect, and we cannot but know that, if its interests are under the control of Infinity and Perfection, then they are eternally safe, and that they can be safe on no other condition. Now, from the laws of our mental, moral, and spiritual constitution, we can be really and truly happy,—we can possess in ourselves, and relatively to ourselves and the universe, a deep and permanent sense of security such as our nature immutably demands, but under the conviction that, while such is the universe in fact, such also is its God. This fact cannot be denied. God, then, is both Infinite and Perfect, or he has intentionally created universal mind so that its highest well-being is irreversibly conditioned on its disbelief in the real and the true, and an immutable faith in the unreal and untrue. No demonstration is or can be more absolute than this.

There is a perfect analogy between the argument as above conducted and the entire procedure of the Intelligence in the natural sciences. The direction of the needle to the pole, for example, indicates the existence of a reality adequate and adapted to draw it in that direction. Nature has no attraction towards the unreal. This is a universal and necessary intuition. Now, mind is so constituted, that, in the presence of the finite and imperfect, it necessarily apprehends the Infinite and Perfect. Everything finite, also, has in it the element of imperfection; and mind, from its immutable constitution and laws, is impressed with the sentiment of want and dissatisfaction in the presence of the imperfect, and impelled to seek for the perfect,—in other words, the Infinite,—which alone does and can embrace the perfect in its absoluteness. The fixed and immutable tendency, therefore, of universal mind is, from nature, finite and imperfect, to something out of and above nature, the

Infinite and Perfect. This is the fixed and changeless centre towards which its immortal powers perpetually and immutably tend. Is that tendency towards the unreal? Anti-theism answers, Yes. The response of universal nature is, No. Otherwise the entire procedure of universal science has its basis in fundamental error.

9. One other great fact bearing upon our present investigations claims our special attention in this connection. We refer to the different effects which universal mind of necessity experiences in *acting* in harmony with the idea of God as Infinite and Perfect, on the one hand, and in harmony with the opposite idea, on the other. When our activity is in the direction of the real and in harmony with its character, we are conscious of acting in harmony with the fundamental laws and adaptations of our own being. When we act in the opposite direction, we cannot but be conscious of a violation of these laws and adaptations. In the former case, mind is conscious that it has found its appropriate sphere of action. In the latter, it cannot but feel that it is out of its place. There are no exceptions to these statements, and can be none. Now, when mind acts in harmony with the idea of God as Infinite and Perfect, we cannot be more distinctly conscious that we exist at all, than we are that all our activity is in full and perfect harmony with all the fundamental laws and adaptations of our entire mental being, our own nature giving its most absolute testimony to the reality of the object towards which our activity is directed. Precisely opposite results do, and cannot, from the changeless laws of our mental constitution, but attend all forms of activity in a different or opposite direction relative to the idea of God. All such forms of action are a war

upon nature, —a violent reversal of all the laws and adaptations of our immortal being.

Here is a form of evidence, of the highest validity, of the being and perfections of God, of which no one can be destitute without infinite guilt. No one will affirm that the universe of matter and mind presents no evidence of this great truth. On the other hand, he cannot but be aware that there is absolutely no evidence of an opposite nature. What excuse can we have, then, for not acting in the line of such evidence, whether we may regard it as demonstrative or not, when such an infinite reality draws us in that direction, and such infinite interests may, to say the least, be involved in such action, and when we thus act, the evidence that we are acting in the direction of the real, perpetually accumulates upon us (such being the harmony of our activity with the laws and adaptations of our entire mental nature) till conviction becomes absolute, and doubt an impossibility? Let us only follow the necessary instincts and convictions of our minds, and begin to worship, to pray, and to obey the behests of our own consciences, as our own nature prompts us to do, as the direct commands of the Infinite and Perfect, and we have a perpetually growing intuition of the reality of the being of God, which is as the “shining light,” continually dawning on to the “perfect day.”

THE ARGUMENT SUMMARILY STATED.

The following is a summary statement of the argument for the Infinity and Perfection of God presented in this chapter :

1. God, as shown in the preceding chapter, does exist as a free, intelligent, self-conscious Personality of absolute moral rectitude and excellence.

2. The necessary deduction from this fact is, that as the universe, material and mental, is what it is, from choice and design on the part of God, it is not in any department, much less in that of mind, correlated to the unreal in God. Not to suppose this would be a contradiction of his moral rectitude.

3. In no department of nature, mental or physical, does the least form or degree of evidence exist of finiteness or imperfection in God, nor is there any antecedent probability in favor of such a supposition.

4. While the material creation does not and cannot present absolute proof of God's Infinity, it does present all possible indications of an *infallible* wisdom which implies such Perfection in God.

5. Infinity and Perfection are involved in our necessary conception of God as the Unconditioned Cause: at least no other idea so truly and adequately represents the essential elements of our necessary conceptions of such a cause.

6. In constituting mind with capacities for the endless progression of all its faculties, God has pencilled out in the finite the most absolute indications of his own Infinity and Perfection.

7. While mind is so constituted that it must have the idea of God as a self-conscious Personality absolutely Infinite and Perfect, all the higher departments of its nature are immutably correlated to this one idea of him, and that exclusively. Mind, then, was intentionally constituted as the immutable correlation of the unreal and untrue, or God is both Infinite and Perfect. Such is and must be the attributes of God, or nature, in its highest developments, the laws of mind, and God, too, are a lie.

CHAPTER V.

THE DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENT; OR, REALISM AS OPPOSED TO MATERIALISM, ON THE ONE HAND, AND IDEALISM, ON THE OTHER.

THERE is a certain fixed relation between a man's system of philosophy and that of his theology, — the essential characteristics of the former always determining those of the latter. Antitheism, in all the multiplied phases which it has assumed, has always taken its peculiar forms from, and found its basis in, corresponding systems of philosophy. The same remarks holds also of Theism. The individual that believes in a God, holds a system of philosophy that conducts him to such belief. His theology may modify his philosophy. It will remain equally true, however, that his philosophy will act or react upon his theology, and, in many important particulars, determine its essential characteristics. From the laws of our mental constitution, it cannot be otherwise. God, in the establishment of that constitution, has joined these two departments of human research together, and man, if he would, cannot put them asunder. If an individual discards philosophy altogether, he does so, because he holds a system of philosophy which requires him to do it. The best antidote to false systems of theology is the rectification of those of the philosophy on which the former are based. The Antitheism of the present age is somewhat peculiar in its charac-

teristics, for the reason that it has its sources in systems of philosophy of corresponding peculiarities. We propose, in the present chapter, an examination of such systems as contrasted with what we regard as philosophy not "falsely so called." All such systems, whether true or false, borrow their fundamental characteristics from certain ideas entertained of the universe, material and mental, and consequently divide themselves into two classes, to wit, those which affirm said universe, in its fundamental characteristics, as apprehended by the Intelligence, to be *real*, and those which affirm it to be, in whole or in part, *unreal*.

"We have, therefore, intended to say," says Kant, in giving the results of his philosophy, "that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things which we envisage" [perceive and form notions and judgments of] "are not that in themselves for which we take them; neither are their relationships in themselves so constituted as they appear to us, and that if we do away with the subjective quality of our sense in general, every quality, all relationships of objects in space and time, nay, even space and time, would disappear, and cannot exist as phenomena in themselves, but only in us. . . . It remains wholly unknown to us what may be the nature of the objects in themselves, separate from all the receptivity of our sensibility. We know nothing but our manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which need not belong to every being, although to every man. With this we have only to do." Here is very clearly laid down the line of demarcation between the various possible systems of philosophy, to wit, those that maintain that the objects of our intuitions, ideas, notions, and judgments are, and those which maintain that they are not, in their

essential characteristics and relationships, “that for which we take them.” We purpose to consider the various systems which lie on each side of this line, in their order.

SECTION I.

PRELIMINARY TOPICS.

Before proceeding to these important inquiries, two topics, of fundamental importance to a right understanding of this whole subject, require special elucidation, to wit, the *number of possible hypotheses* which present themselves for our consideration, and *the tests* by which we may distinguish the true from the false. To these questions, attention will now be directed.

POSSIBLE OR SUPPOSABLE HYPOTHESES.

We will commence with a statement of the only possible hypotheses which present themselves for our consideration, — hypotheses, all of which have their bases in distinct and opposite theories of knowledge. As preparatory to a statement of these hypotheses, we would invite special attention to the following principles which have a fundamental bearing upon our inquiries, and which will be admitted by every reflecting mind to be self-evidently true :

Primary principles bearing upon our present inquiries.

1. Existence, in all its forms, actual and conceivable, is, as shown in the Introduction, a mystery. *A priori*, we can determine absolutely nothing in respect to the question, what forms of existence, the conception of which is not self-contradictory, do and do not exist. There is no

form or degree of antecedent probability for or against the idea that matter or spirit, as apprehended by our Intelligence, does or does not exist; and there is just as much *à priori* probability in favor of the hypothesis that both exist together, as that either exists alone, or that neither exists at all. So there is no antecedent or *à priori* probability for or against the hypothesis, that matter, finite spirit, and God, as apprehended by the general Intelligence, do all actually exist. Consequently,

2. Whatever is actually manifested as existing must be admitted as real, the question of its existence being absolutely settled by the fact of its manifestation.

3. When any reality is manifested as existing, its actual existence is not only to be admitted, but also that of all other realities necessarily implied by such fact. If, for example, we admit the actual existence of matter (body), we must also admit the objective reality of space, because, the latter not existing, the former could, by no possibility, exist. So in all other like cases.

4. *The condition of the possibility of knowledge* is the existence of a subject sustaining to actual existences the relation of a *power*, and they to it that of *objects* of real knowledge, and these in such relations to each other that actual knowledge arises in consequence of this correlation.

5. The sphere of the conceivably knowable is all realities as they are, with all their properties, laws, and relations; that of the actually knowable, in any given case, depends upon the extent in which the conditions of knowledge are or may be fulfilled between any given power of knowledge and its correlated objects.

6. We can no more determine, *à priori*, whether a power of knowledge does or does not exist, or what is its sphere,

than we thus determine what realities do or not exist. On the other hand, the existence of a power of knowledge can, by no possibility, be manifested but by its conscious exercise in a given subject, or by its manifestation as exercised by some other subject, and the great question in philosophy, to wit, What can I know? can be answered but through these two, namely, What *do* I in fact know? and What is *implied* in such knowledge?

7. There are but three conceivable forms in which any reality can be known to us: *presentatively*, that is, by direct and immediate perception or intuition; *representatively*, that is, as an unknown cause of some conscious mental state; and *impliedly*, that is, as necessarily supposed as the condition of the existence, or as the logical consequent of that which is known to exist.

8. In determining our theory of existence, that is, in determining what realities do exist, we are to admit nothing as real which is not manifested as such in one or the other of the forms named, and we are to hold, as actual, *all* forms of being thus manifested, and *as* manifested.* As all of the principles above named are too self-evident to admit of their being doubted or denied, we proceed, at once, to give a statement of the only conceivable or possible systems of Ontology, or hypotheses which claim our attention in the present chapter.

The only conceivable systems of Ontology.

In determining what realities do exist, and that from what have been known in one or the other, or all of the forms

* See all these principles stated and elucidated in "The Science of Logic," pp. 381-386.

named, as actually existing, the following hypotheses present themselves, namely : —

1. *Realism*. We may suppose that the knowing faculty has a direct and immediate or presentative knowledge of the existence and essential qualities of matter, on the one hand, and of mind or spirit (finite spirit as distinct from matter), on the other. We then affirm as realities actually known, matter and finite spirit both, and hold as real all existences and relations of existence necessarily implied by the existence and relations of these two substances. This gives us the system, or hypothesis, of Realism. According to its fundamental teachings and deductions, the universe, material and mental, as given in the Intelligence, is “that in itself for which we take it ;” and God, the Infinite and Perfect, as the Unconditioned Cause of the facts of this actually existing and really known universe, exists, also, as a real and actually known personality.

2. *Materialism*. We may assume, in the next place, that the knowing faculty has a real or presentative knowledge of matter only, the object, while the subject, what we call spirit, is wholly unknown. We, then, resolve all real existences into matter, and assume that what is called spirit, as distinct from matter, is nothing, after all, but matter in a certain state of development. This is Materialism, and the necessary logical consequence of the hypothesis is a denial of the being of God, or the dogma of Atheism.

3. *Ideal Dualism*. We may, in the next place, while we admit the reality of a subject and object in knowledge, assume that we have no real or presentative knowledge of either ; that all knowledge is exclusively phenomenal, and never real ; and that, consequently, both the subject and object, as they exist in themselves, are wholly unknown

and unknowable to us. The universe of matter and spirit, which we apprehend as real, is not that in reality "for which we take it." It has, on the other hand, only an ideal existence, and God is nothing but the ideal cause of that which, in reality, has no substantial being. This is the system of Ideal Dualism.

4. *Subjective Idealism.* While we assume that all knowledge is phenomenal, we may deny the reality of the external unknown cause, or object, and assume the unknown subject to be both subject and cause of all phenomena. The subject, the I, would, consequently, be the only real existence. The universe which we apprehend as real, would, as in the hypothesis of Ideal Dualism, have no real, but only an ideal existence, and God, as before, would be only the ideal author and cause of that which exists only in idea. This is the system of Subjective Idealism.

5. *Objective Idealism.* While we adopt the assumption, that all knowledge is phenomenal and not real, we may deny the reality of the subject, and assume that the object is the only reality, and that all phenomena, even the I itself, are only developments and forms of manifestation of this one alone real substance, — a substance commonly denominated the Infinite and the Absolute, or God. This object, God, and this alone, has real being. All else is phenomenal only. According to the logical consequences of this hypothesis, God and nature are not distinct, but one and the same existence, — the term nature representing the idea of God in a state of development. God, as distinct from nature, and the author of it, that is, — the God of Realism, — has no existence. This hypothesis, which is properly called Objective Idealism, has been denominated, inasmuch

as it identifies nature and all realities with God, the system of Universal Identity, or Pantheism.

6. *Pure Idealism.* While we assume that all knowledge is exclusively phenomenal, we may, we remark in the last place, deny the reality of both the subject and object as real existences, and assume that there is an absolute identity of being and knowing. Knowing, thought itself, according to this hypothesis, is the only and exclusive reality, and God is only an inhering law of thought. This is the system of Absolute Identity, or Pure Idealism.

Each of the above-named hypotheses takes, and that of necessity, its peculiar and special form from the peculiar and special theory of knowledge which lies at its basis. As these are the only possible theories of knowledge, so the above are the only possible systems of Ontology. As they are contradictory theories and really include all possible hypotheses relatively to being, or in respect to the question, What realities do and do not exist? one of these hypotheses must be true, and all the others false. If Realism is valid, all the others are false, and Theism is true. If any one of the others is true, Realism, and with it Theism, must be false. We are, therefore, now in the presence of the *disjunctive argument* for the being of God, and the argument may take either of two directions, or both together. We may, in the first place, prove Realism true, and then immediately infer that all the other hypotheses must be false. Or, we may prove all these hypotheses false, and hence infer the validity of that of Realism, and, as a necessary consequence, the truth of Theism. Or, finally, we may prove Realism true, and, by an independent train of argument, prove each of these hypotheses to be false, and then, for these double and demonstrably valid

reasons, infer the truth of Theism. We propose, in the following investigations, to accomplish all these objects. We shall then have the strongest possible argument for the truth of Theism, inasmuch as we shall have demonstrated the fact that it cannot be false, and must be true.

Tests to be applied, in determining which of these hypotheses is valid.

We now advance to a consideration of the fundamental criteria, or *tests*, by which we may determine which of these theories is true, and which is false. Among such criteria, we adduce the following: —

1. The true theory will take into account *all* the facts of Consciousness, with all their essential characteristics, just as they are, supposing nothing which does not exist, and omitting nothing which does exist.

2. The *principles* of this theory will readily account for *all* these facts, with *all their characteristics*, and that without exception.

3. The principles of this theory will be necessarily implied by these phenomena, and all its deductions will be necessary logical consequents of these principles and phenomena, so that it will be manifest, not only that this system must be true, but that all contradictory ones must be false.

Every theory possessing these characteristics, it will readily be seen, cannot be false, and every one wanting or contradicting them, cannot be true. Suppose, for example, a theory is constructed which accords only with a part of the real facts of Consciousness. That one circumstance is an absolute demonstration of the fact, that such theory is

founded in error; for, if it were true, it would not only accord with, but be demanded by, the facts referred to.

SECTION II.

THE TRUE HYPOTHESIS, OR REALISM.

We now return to an investigation of the theories under consideration. All systems which come under the first class, however diverse they may be in their details, with which we now have nothing to do, will possess the following characteristics :

General characteristics of this hypothesis.

1. Knowledge implies two things, — an object to be known, and a subject capable of knowing. Between the nature of the subject and object such a correlation exists that when the appropriate conditions are fulfilled, knowledge arises as the necessary result of this correlation.

2. Between mind and realities within and around it this correlation exists. It is relatively to them a *power*, and they are relatively to it *objects* of real knowledge. Matter, Spirit, Time, and Space, for example, are to mind such objects, and it is to them such a power. When the appropriate conditions are fulfilled, mind attains to a knowledge of their essential characteristics, for the reason that they are to it objects, and it is to them a power of knowledge.

3. As a power of knowledge, the action of the Intelligence will be as the fundamental characteristics and relations of the *objects* of knowledge. Mind, for example, knows matter as a substance having extension, form, and solidity; spirit as endowed with the functions of thought,

feeling, and will, and space and time as the places of substances and events, for the reason that such are their essential characteristics, the knowing faculty being so constituted that its activity is in harmony with the objects of knowledge and is determined by such objects.

According to this theory, "the things which we invisage are that in themselves for which we take them," and "their relationships are so constituted as they appear to us." All "our intuition is" not "nothing but the representation of phenomena," but that of real qualities of objects which have, not an ideal, but a real existence. "Every quality," "all relationship of objects in space and time," and space and time themselves, would remain what our Intelligence now affirms them to be, whatever changes should take place in the "subjective quality of our senses," or if the Intelligence itself be done away with. Matter and spirit, in their essential characteristics, as apprehended by the Intelligence, are realities in themselves. The universe, material and mental, and God as the author of each, are realities also.

Mind knows not only its own *manner* of perceiving objects, but the objects themselves, and "has to do" with each alike, because each alike is real. According to this theory, mind is not in the midst of a universe of fictions of its own creation, but of realities, — realities finite and infinite, — realities which it knows because they are objects, — and it is a faculty of knowledge, and to which it sustains relations infinitely solemn and momentous. That this is the true and only true theory, we argue from the following considerations :

VALIDITY OF THIS THEORY ESTABLISHED.

Cannot be disproved.

1. By no possibility can this hypothesis be shown to be false, and any one of an opposite character true. It cannot, in the first place, be proven that the realities, matter and spirit, which it affirms to be real, do not, in fact, exist, and exist as apprehended by the general Intelligence. The proposition that matter, for example, as a solid and extended substance, really exists, is not self-contradictory nor opposed to any necessary intuitive or deductive truth. The same holds equally true of the proposition, mind, as endowed with the faculties of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, exists. Nor is the idea of the actual coexistence of these two substances, in any form or degree, self-contradictory, or opposed to any of the necessary intuitions or deductions of the Intelligence.

Equally incapable of disproof is the hypothesis that the mind is, relatively to these substances, a *power*, while they sustain to it the relation of *objects*, of real knowledge. That such a power may not exist, and that the mind does not exist, in fact, as such a power, are alike, and undeniably, incapable of proof.

The very attempt to disprove this hypothesis involves the most palpable contradiction and absurdity conceivable. Suppose an individual should undertake to prove that "the things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them." How could he do it? He has in the whole procedure to employ the very faculty which he affirms to "take things" and their "relationships for that in themselves" which they are not. Then, by the fundamen-

tal demands of his theory, we are bound to say, that his arguments and their relationships and bearings are not that in themselves for which he takes them. Nor is his theory of knowledge that in itself for which he takes it. No theory of knowledge the opposite of that under consideration can be devised which does not render real knowledge on all subjects alike impossible, and the supposition of its reality or possibility an absurdity. According to the fundamental assumptions of all such theories, the very first step which the Intelligence takes — the step which constitutes the exclusive basis of all its subsequent procedures — is a lie, and nothing else. How, then, can anything be really proved or disproved by such a power or agent as that?

Nor, permit us to remark, in the last place in this connection, can the fundamental assumption on which all theories opposed to Realism rest, be shown to be valid, to wit, that our knowledge of matter on the one hand, or of spirit on the other, or of both alike, is not direct, immediate, or presentative, but indirect and mediate, that is, representative or phenomenal exclusively. The only standard or test of judgment in this case is Consciousness, and its testimony is absolute against this assumption, and in favor of that of Realism. All this is undeniable. The validity of the theory under consideration, therefore, can, by no possibility, be disproved.

A common absurdity of philosophers relatively to perception.

It is surprising the contradictions and absurdities into which philosophers often fall, in reasoning upon external perception. From the physiological conditions of perception they often attempt to show what perception itself must be, and to prove that our knowledge of matter is not pre-

sentative, but representative. Now, if our knowledge of matter is exclusively representative or phenomenal, such also must be our knowledge of the conditions of perception. The conditions of vision, for example, are the production of an image of the object upon the retina by means of rays of light proceeding from said object. The inference is drawn, from hence, that in vision the image and not the object is the thing really perceived. But how do we, how can we, know that the retina itself, the image upon it, or the rays of light proceeding from the object to form the image, are real? By external vision exclusively. This is undeniable. The explanation of vision assumes what that explanation denies, to wit, that in vision the *object* and not the *image* is the thing really perceived. So the attempt to show, as is often done, what perception is, by referring to the physiological conditions of perception, assumes what was intended to be disproved by the reference, to wit, that our knowledge of matter, so far forth as physiology is concerned, is not phenomenal, but real. It should ever be borne in mind that by reference to the conditions of perception we can determine nothing whatever relatively to the nature of perception, — a question which can be correctly resolved but by an appeal to Consciousness. Perception is exclusively an intellectual state, of the nature of which Consciousness only takes cognizance. Whether perception is, in any case, or in all cases, really and truly presentative, or in all instances exclusively representative, can be determined but by an appeal to this one tribunal.

No antecedent probability against this theory.

2. Our next position is this: that no form or degree of *antecedent probability* exists against the hypothesis of Real-

ism. Every hypothesis, actual or conceivable, assumes and affirms that *something exists*, and exists as an actually and truly *known* reality. If we assume, for example, that there is an absolute identity between being and knowing, we even then admit and affirm *knowing* to be real, and really known as such. We admit, also, that knowing exists both as a power and object of real knowledge ; for we affirm that knowing is known. Something then exists as an object of real knowledge, and this is and must be admitted and affirmed by every hypothesis whatever. Now, if we must suppose something to exist, and to exist as a truly known reality, then it is undeniable that no form or degree of antecedent probability does or can exist against the hypothesis that matter and spirit do in fact exist as such realities. No antecedent probability can be shown to lie against the hypothesis of Realism, which does not, in fact, lie in all its force against every other that can be named or conceived of. In other words, no form or degree of antecedent probability does or can exist against this hypothesis. This leads us to remark :

This hypothesis involved in no difficulties not common to all others.

3. That the hypothesis of Realism is involved in no difficulties which are not common to all others, and rests upon the very principle, as far as the *mode* of knowledge is concerned, upon which in the last analysis all others must rest. If Intelligence be given as in its nature a faculty, and realities as in their nature objects of real knowledge, all difficulties, as far as the facts of knowledge are concerned, disappear, and that totally. The reason for knowledge is, that the Intelligence is a faculty, and realities within and around it

are objects of real knowledge. Now the same reason precisely must be assigned, if we assume that such a relationship does not exist between the Intelligence and realities. Why is it that they are not to it objects, and it to them a faculty of real knowledge? The answer, and the only answer that in the last analysis can be given, is, that such is the nature of mind, on the one hand, and of realities, on the other. Why is it that the Intelligence takes things and their relationships to be that in themselves which they are not? The answer is, such is the nature of the Intelligence as a faculty, and of realities as objects of real knowledge. Why is it that the Intelligence, in the first instance, invisages things and their relationships as possessed of given real characteristics, and then the same Intelligence affirms the same things to be not that in themselves which it had previously invisaged them to be? But one answer can be given, to wit, that such is the nature of the Intelligence as an invisaging faculty. If we assume, we remark finally, an absolute identity between being and knowing, and ask the reason, as we must do, why knowing really and truly exists both as the subject and object of real knowledge; the same answer as before, and that only, presents itself, to wit, such is the nature of knowing that it is and must be both a subject and object of real knowledge. As this is the reason which in the last analysis must be given for all the procedures of the Intelligence, whatever their nature may be, it is surely infinitely more reasonable to stop just where the Universal Intelligence in fact does stop, to wit, with the principle that mind is a faculty, and realities around it are objects of real knowledge. We are then involved in no difficulties not common, and escape those which are perfectly fatal, to all others.

The validity of Realism affirmed absolutely by the intuitive convictions of the race.

4. This leads us to remark, in the next place, that while the validity of Realism can by no possibility be disproved, while no form or degree of antecedent probability exists against it, and while it is encumbered with no difficulties whatever not common to every other hypothesis, it, and it alone, accords with the intuitions and necessary convictions of the Universal Intelligence on the subject. All men do and must believe, whatever their speculative theories may be, that they have an actual presentative knowledge, not only of their *manner* of perceiving, but also and equally of the *objects* of perception themselves. To this statement there is absolutely no exception. Either the Universal Intelligence is a lie, or this is the true theory of knowledge.

Every one has an absolute consciousness of the validity of this hypothesis.

5. Our next argument is this: Every individual has an absolute consciousness of the truth of this hypothesis. If we have, or can have, such a consciousness of any mental state whatever, we have such a consciousness of a direct and immediate, or presentative, knowledge of the existence and essential qualities of matter, on the one hand, and of spirit, on the other. This no one will deny. We have, then, the highest evidence we possibly can have of the existence and character of any reality whatever, — that “the things we invisage” are “that in themselves for which we take them.” And why should we question the validity of our knowledge in either case? For no valid reason whatever; not even on the ground of an antecedent probability

in any form or degree. The hypothesis of Realism can be denied but upon one condition exclusively: a fundamental impeachment of the validity of the faculty of knowledge on all subjects whatever, and all this for no assignable reasons which have even the appearance of validity.

All the activities of universal humanity, and all scientific procedures have their basis in the assumed validity of this hypothesis.

6. All the activities of universal humanity, and the entire procedure of the Intelligence in all the sciences mental and physical, we remark in the next place, have their actual basis in the assumption of the truth of the theory of knowledge under consideration, and are the heights of absurdity on any other assumption. The science of mind is based throughout upon the assumption that the phenomena of spirit as given in Consciousness — phenomena which lie at the basis of that science — are to the Intelligence real objects, and it is to them a real power of knowledge. The science of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy, and all the natural sciences, proceed entirely upon the assumption that a relation precisely similar exists between the Intelligence, on the one hand, and the qualities of external material substances, on the other. The same is true of the Mathematics and all the activities of humanity. All have their basis in one assumption exclusively, to wit, that mind, as a faculty of knowledge, knows things and their relationships as they are, and are the perfection of absurdity on any other supposition. How infinitely absurd was it in Kant, for example, to spend his life in writing books to convince the world that “things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them,” when, according to his theory,

there was no such world as he was writing to, such as he took them to be, — there were no real beings to be convinced, — no real beings holding any theory at all, — nor was his own theory that in itself for which he took it! So of all the activities of humanity, whatever their objects or directions.

Objections urged against the validity of this hypothesis most puerile and absurd, namely, “the antitheses of science falsely so called.”

7. The only objections which have ever been urged against the validity of this hypothesis, or against that of our knowledge of matter on the one hand, and of spirit on the other, claim a moment's attention in this connection. On examination, said objections will be found to be, without exception, most puerile and absurd, — mere philosophical puzzles, as we have before called them, — mere puzzles utterly unworthy the dignity of science. They are all in common based upon certain affirmed contradictions involved, we are told, in all our ideas of matter, spirit, time, space, and God. From these contradictions we are also assured that our knowledge of such realities can have no real validity. “Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy.” In the Logic, we have laid down the following, as an immutable principle of science, and which we here repeat as a self-evident truth that none will deny, to wit, that *an objection, or argument, which lies, in all its force, against a known truth, can have real validity against no proposition whatever.* Now, the identical contradictions which antitheists professedly find in our ideas of the realities named above we will show to be involved, in all their force, in ideas absolutely known to be valid. By the same arguments, for example, by which Kant pro-

fessedly draws from our ideas of the world the contradictory demonstrations, that it is both temporary and eternal in its duration, and finite and infinite in its dimensions, we will demonstrate the same contradictions to be involved in our idea of any globe, real or ideal, one inch in diameter. The same identical contradictions which Mr. Herbert Spencer professedly finds in our ideas of matter, or body, we will demonstrate to be involved just as fully in our conception of a straight or crooked line one inch long. To verify this statement, we will give an extract from the author last named,—an extract which embraces his entire argument,—to prove the utter invalidity of our ideas of matter. Whenever the term matter, or body, exists in the copy, we will substitute the words, “a line one inch long,” inserting in brackets the word which stands in the original. “Were it not for the necessities of the argument, it would be inexcusable to occupy the reader’s attention with the threadbare, and yet undecided, controversy respecting the divisibility of *a line one inch long* [matter]. *A line one inch long* [matter] is either infinitely divisible or it is not: no third possibility can be named. Which of the alternatives shall we accept? If we say that *a line one inch long* [matter] is infinitely divisible, we commit ourselves to a supposition not realizable in thought. We can bisect and re-bisect *a line one inch long* [body], and continually repeating the act, until we reduce its parts to a size no longer physically divisible, may then mentally continue the process without limit. To do this, however, is not really to conceive the infinite divisibility of *a line one inch long* [matter], but to form a symbolic conception incapable of expansion into a real one, and not admitting of other verification. Really to conceive the infinite divisibility of *a line one inch long*

[matter], is mentally to follow out the divisions to infinity, and to do this would require infinite time. On the other hand, to assert that *a line one inch long* [matter] is not infinitely divisible, is to assert that it is reducible to parts which no conceivable power can divide; and this verbal supposition can no more be represented in thought than the other." Who, in view of such nonsensical quibbling as this, would assert the absolute invalidity of our idea of a line one inch long, and consequently of every line straight or crooked? Yet the reasoning of this author, as the reader cannot fail to perceive, is just as conclusive against the validity of our ideas of all lines in empty space, and in the world around us, as it is against the validity of our conception of matter, or of any other reality. So, as we have said, in the reasonings, or rather philosophical quibblings, of Kant, to prove from our ideas of matter that the world is both temporary and eternal in duration, and finite and infinite in extent, we may substitute for the term world a material or immaterial globe one inch in diameter, and his arguments in that case will have the same identical force that they now possess. Now, reasonings which lie in all their force against *known truths* can have validity nowhere. Yet these philosophic puzzles contain the only objections which ever have been, or can be, brought against the hypothesis of Realism; in other words, against the validity of our ideas of matter, spirit, time, space, cause, substance, immortality, and God. We should justly involve ourselves in the charge of absolute mental inanity, if, for such reasonings, we should surrender our faith in these eternal verities.

Take another view of this subject. Space and time, as demonstrated by Mr. Spencer against Kant, are realities in themselves, and not mere subjective laws of thought. Nor

are they, what Mr. Spencer affirms them to be, unknown and unknowable realities. On the other hand, both are distinctly represented in human thought, with these necessary and immutable characteristics, that it is absolutely impossible for us even to conceive of their non-reality, or that as realities they are in any respects different from what we conceive them to be. Our knowledge of space and time, therefore, is absolutely valid for the reality and character of their objects. To affirm the opposite, is, in reality, to affirm that absolute knowledge is not knowledge at all. Now all the difficulties and contradictions which Mr. Spencer professedly finds in our conception of matter, he also affirms to exist in our ideas of space and time. These difficulties and affirmed contradictions, undeniably, do not invalidate our knowledge of these infinite and eternal verities, and, therefore, are utterly void of force against the validity of our knowledge of matter, or of any other substance. This is undeniable. These antitheses of "science falsely so called" have been the bane of philosophy in all ages. Under the appellation of "antinomies of pure Reason," they were introduced, as a deadly disease, into the vital centres of philosophic thought in Germany, where they induced the death of philosophy itself. Recently, they have assumed, in the philosophic thinking of such authors as Mansell and Spencer, the form of a chronic diarrhœa, attended with all their former fatal symptoms.

In the Intellectual Philosophy, as stated in the Introduction, we have fully explained the sophistry which characterizes these antinomies. But, suppose that they are, in fact, inexplicable. For such reasons as this, shall we deny the validity of absolute knowledge? Is not existence itself an inexplicable mystery? Shall we, for this reason, deny

the existence of all realities? Suppose, that what we know to be real involves questions which we cannot answer, and difficulties which we cannot explain, — which shall control our faith, the known, or the inexplicable? We must bear in mind that the idea of existence, whether of the known or unknown, involves all the difficulties and apparent contradictions which these authors professedly find in our ideas of the realities under consideration. The unknown, say these authors, has real being. Now, in all their reasonings to prove that our ideas of matter, spirit, space, time, substance, and God, involve the elements of contradiction, and are, therefore, void of validity, we may, whenever either of these terms are employed, substitute the term *existence*, or the words, *unknowable and unknown entity*, and the reasoning will have the same identical force as before; a fact rendering it undeniable that such reasonings have no validity whatever in respect to any forms of thought of any kind. If these seeming contradictions have the force claimed for them, — if nothing is to be admitted as real the conception of which involves said contradictions, — then, to be logically consistent, we must be absolute nihilists; for we can affirm nothing whatever, whether known or unknown, to be real, without involving ourselves in all these affirmed contradictions in all their force. But something is real. This is undeniable. These affirmed contradictions, therefore, are utterly void of force against the validity of any of our ideas of any objects whatever. There is no escaping this conclusion. The hypothesis of Realism, consequently, stands revealed before us as resting upon no other basis than the rock of truth itself. This subject will be fully elucidated in the next chapter.

SECTION II.

MATERIALISM.

We will now pass over to the other side of the gulf which separates the hypothesis which we have considered from all others of an antitheistic character, and will commence with that which stands first in order, to wit, Materialism, which affirms the validity of human knowledge as far as matter, and denies its validity as far as spirit, is concerned. In its fundamental assumptions and deductions, this hypothesis is a system of absolute atheism. If matter is, in fact, the only reality, the inhering laws of this one substance must be the real ultimate cause of all the facts of the universe, and there can be no God aside from these laws. If matter is the only reality, it must have existed from eternity with all its present qualities, attributes, properties, and laws, absolutely the same as at the present moment. It must, from eternity, have contained within itself, and that without change or modification to eternity, the Unconditioned Cause of all its tendencies, dispositions, arrangements, and operations. Such is the materialistic hypothesis.

POSITIONS, ONE OR THE OTHER OF WHICH THE MATERIALIST
MUST ASSUME.

In his attempts to prove the validity of his hypothesis, the materialist must assume one or the other of these two positions, to wit, that our knowledge of matter is direct and immediate, or presentative; or, that it is indirect and mediate, or representative. Let us, for a few moments, contemplate the subject from each of these two distinct and opposite points of view.

First position — that our knowledge of matter is presentative.

The materialist, we will suppose, in the first place, affirms our knowledge of the primary qualities of matter, such, for example, as real solidity, extension, and form, to be, in fact, direct and immediate, or presentative, and, therefore, valid for the reality and essential characteristics of its object. Matter, as possessed of the qualities above named, he affirms, has, consequently, not an ideal or possible, but a *real* existence. So far, the position of the materialist is absolutely impregnable. This form of knowledge in respect to this substance, does, in fact, exist, and its absolute validity for the reality and character of its object cannot be denied, without an absolute denial of the validity of knowledge in all its forms, actual and conceivable. The materialist, we repeat, is right, in affirming real existence of matter as apprehended by the general Intelligence. But what must we think of the assumption based upon this fact, to wit, that matter is the *only* substance that has being? The fact presented yields no such deduction as that. The propositions, mind exists, and matter exists, are in no sense or form contradictory or incompatible propositions. The admitted existence of one of these substances does not in the remotest degree render the existence of the other even improbable. All this is undeniable.

On the other hand, we have absolute knowledge of both of these substances as really existing entities. In external perception we have a direct and immediate knowledge of matter, as possessed of the qualities of real extension and form; and in internal perception we have a consciousness equally absolute, of mind as endowed with the attributes of Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will. In the unveiled

presence of the attributes and relations of these knowable and known entities, we have a knowledge equally absolute of the being and perfections of a personal God. Contemplated from this one, the true, stand-point, Materialism has not only no form or degree of positive proof, evidence, or antecedent probability, in its favor, but also stands revealed as demonstrably false.

Second position, to wit, that our knowledge of matter is indirect and mediate.

We will now suppose the materialist to shift his ground, and, assuming the truth of the sensational theory of external perception, to affirm that our knowledge of matter is wholly indirect and mediate, and, as a consequence, that it has only a *relative* validity. According to this hypothesis, the substance called matter, if it exists at all, has being merely and exclusively as an unknown and unknowable entity. On what grounds, then, can the materialist assume or affirm this unknown and unknowable something to be the only reality? How can he prove, for example, from his present stand-point, that what we call matter and spirit do, or do not, exist as distinct and separate entities, or that they have, or have not, a real community of properties and attributes? Of the nature and relations of any substance of which we have no positive knowledge, we can legitimately make no positive affirmations of any kind. When the materialist, therefore, affirms that our knowledge of matter is wholly indirect and mediate, and that, as a consequence, it has no validity for the reality and character of its object, and then assumes for this unknown and unknowable something an exclusive existence, he simply convicts himself of the grossest conceivable absurdity and self-contradiction.

The doctrine of Materialism, therefore, viewed from the first position, — the only true stand-point, — is, past contradiction, demonstrably false. Viewed from the second, the only remaining position, it stands revealed as one of the most palpable and gross absurdities that was ever intruded into the sphere of science.

SECTION III.

IDEALISM.

GENERAL REMARKS UPON IDEALISM IN ITS VARIOUS FORMS.

In passing from Materialism to Idealism, four distinct, and in some respects opposite, systems, as we have shown, present themselves, all alike having their basis in the common assumption, that neither the objects nor the relationships of objects which we conceive of as existing in time and space, nor time and space themselves, are “that in themselves for which we take them.” According to all these systems, mind is not, as a faculty of knowledge, placed in the midst of realities material and mental, finite and infinite, where it attains to actual knowledge of such realities, and makes this attainment because it is, relatively to them, a faculty, and they, relatively to it, are objects of knowledge. The universe which we contemplate, on the other hand, is in reality a fiction of the mind’s own creation, — a fiction rendered to the mind a reality, and just such a reality, by reason and virtue of the mind’s internal laws and susceptibilities. “Up to this time,” says Kant, “it has been received that all our cognition must regulate itself according to the objects, yet all attempts to make out something *à priori* by means of conceptions respecting such, whereby our cognition would be extended, have proved

under this supposition abortive. Let it be once, therefore, tried, whether we do not succeed better in the problems of metaphysics, when we admit that the objects must regulate themselves according to our cognition, — which thus accords already better with the desired possibility of their cognition *à priori*, which is to decide something with respect to objects before they are given to us. The circumstances in this case are precisely the same as with the first thoughts of *Copernicus*, who, since he did not make any way in the explanation of the motions of the heavenly bodies when he supposed the whole firmament turned round the spectator, sought whether it might not answer better if he left the spectator himself to turn, and the stars, on the contrary, at rest. Now, in metaphysics, as to what concerns the *intuition* of objects, we may try in the same way. If the intuition must regulate itself according to the property of the objects, I do not see how one can know anything with regard to it *à priori*; but if the object regulates itself (as object of the senses), according to the property of our faculty of intuition, I can very well represent to myself this possibility. But, since I cannot remain stationary with these intuitions if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them, as representations, to something as object, and determine this object by means of them, I can admit that the *conceptions*, whereby I bring about this determination, either regulate themselves according to the object, — and then I am again in the same difficulty respecting the mode, — as I can, *à priori*, thereof know anything; or I admit that the objects, or what is the same thing, *experience*, in which alone (as given objects) they are known, regulates itself according to these conceptions, and I thus see immediately an easy escape, because experience itself is a mode of cognition which requires

Understanding, the rule of which I must suppose in myself, before objects yet are given me, — consequently *à priori*, which rule is expressed in cognitions *à priori*, and according to which cognitions, therefore, all objects of experience must necessarily regulate themselves, and coincide therewith. As to what concerns objects, so far as they can be thought by means of reason merely, and, indeed, necessarily, but which (so at least reason thinks them) cannot be given at all in experience, the attempts to think them (for still they must let themselves be thought) will hereafter furnish an excellent touchstone of that which we admit as the changed method of the mode of thinking, namely, that we only know that *à priori* of things which we place in them ourselves.”

“We have sufficiently shown,” he says, again, “in the transcendental *Æsthetic*, that all which is perceived in space or time, consequently all objects of an experience possible to us, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere perceptions, which, so far as they are represented as extended beings, or series of changes, have no existence founded in itself, independent of our thoughts.”

“Thus the objects of experience are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and do not at all exist out of the same.”

According to the teachings of these systems, as stated in the above extracts, perceptions and the objects of perception are one and identical. “All objects of experience possible to us are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere perceptions.” So also space and time are not realities in themselves of which we have ideas, but the ideas and their objects also, time and space, are the same. “Space represents no property of things themselves, nor does it represent

them in their relationships to each other." Again: "Space is nothing else but the form of all phenomena of the external senses, that is, the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone external intuition is possible."

Again: "Time is nothing but the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our internal state." "The representation of time is itself intuition." "If we make abstraction of our manner of envisaging ourselves internally, and by means of this intuition [time] of embracing also all external intuitions in the representative faculty, and, consequently, if we take the objects as they may be in themselves, time is thus nothing."

As the necessary consequence of the principles above elucidated, there are according to these systems, we remark finally, in reality, no such thing as bodies possessing form and extension existing actually in space, nor successive events occurring in time. "We can only, from the point of view as men, speak of space, extended beings," etc. "On the contrary, the transcendental conception of phenomena in space, is a critical reminding that nothing generally which is perceived in space is a thing in itself, — that space is not a form of things which perhaps was proper to them in themselves; but that objects in themselves are not at all known to us, and that what we term external objects are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility." Again: "Time is certainly something real, that is to say, it is the real form of the internal intuition. It has, therefore, subjective reality in regard to internal experience; that is, I have really the representation of time, and of my determinations in it. It is, therefore, not to be looked at really as object, but as the mode of representing myself as object. But if I myself could envisage myself, or if any

other being could envisage me, without this condition of sensibility, the self-same determinations which we represent to ourselves as changes would then afford us a cognition, in which the representation of time, and, consequently, also of change, would not at all occur." If time and space are not realities in themselves, then there can, by no possibility, be real events succeeding each other in time, nor real objects existing in space. Whatever else is real, there can be no such realities as these. Such are the fundamental principles of Idealism, in all the different forms and phases which it assumes. Knowledge is wholly confined to the experience of the subject, and pertains to nothing real exterior to it. The only faculty of perception possessed by the mind is Consciousness, which has two functions, the exterior and interior. The only objects of perception are nothing but different mental states. What we regard as the perception of an object external to the mind is nothing but a state of sensibility seen by the Consciousness in its exterior function, and, consequently, postulated as the quality of an object exterior to the mind. A state of the sensibility perceived by Consciousness in its exterior function, and, consequently, postulated as a quality of an external object, gives us such object. A mental operation seen by Consciousness in its interior function, and, consequently, postulated as the quality of the perceiving subject, gives the subject. Thus arises the apprehension of the universe of matter and spirit, neither of which, however, being in themselves, or their relationships, "that for which we take them."

I said, that in passing from Materialism to Idealism, four distinct, and, in some respects, opposite systems, present themselves. Each of these systems has its basis in,

and takes form from, peculiar ideas of Ontology, or ideas of realities as they exist in themselves.

1. The first assumes that there are two unknown and unknowable realities immediately concerned in all intellectual operations; realities called noumena, to wit, the subject which invisages, and the object which in some unknown and unknowable manner effects the sensibility of the invisaging subject, and thus calls into exercise its intellectual activities. This is the ideal Dualism of Kant.

2. The system next in order takes away the object entirely, and assumes the finite invisaging subject to be the only thing real, resolving the universe and God into this subject. We thus attain to the subjective Idealism of Fichte.

3. The third system takes away wholly the finite subject and object alike, and assumes the Infinite and Absolute as the only reality, and resolves the universe, material and mental, into the diverse forms in which the Infinite and Absolute develops itself. Here we meet with the ideal Pantheism of Schelling.

4. The fourth and last system takes away all such substances, subjective and objective, finite and infinite, alike, and resolves all realities into pure thought, — thought without a real subject or object either. Idealism here attains its consummation in the Nihilism of Hegel. Nor can Idealism, without the most palpable self-contradiction, stop short of this consummation, resting as it does and must upon the assumption, that ideas of Reason, such as those of Space, Time, Substance, and Cause, are not valid for things in themselves. The theory of Kant assumes and is based upon the assumption of the reality of two substances, the subject and object, — substances sustaining the relation of

dependence the one upon the other ; in other words, of cause and effect. Now, if these ideas of Reason are valid for things in themselves, why should not all others be? No possible reason can be assigned why they should not, and thus we should have a real and not an ideal universe. Indeed, if, as the system of Kant assumes, the ideas of cause and effect are valid for things in themselves, then the idea of Time must be ; for cause and effect suppose succession as real, which is impossible, excepting on the condition of the non-ideality, but objective reality of Time. Fichte and Schelling attempted to escape this difficulty, so absolutely fatal to Idealism, whatever form it may assume, by taking away the object and cause, and assuming the subject to be the only reality. But each of their systems was found still to rest upon the very principle which both alike denied as fatal to their own claims to all validity, to wit, the idea of substance and attribute. In admitting the subject, whether assumed as finite or infinite, to be something real, together with thought as phenomenon of that subject, they admitted the validity of the idea of substance for things in themselves. If the validity of this idea of Reason be admitted, why not that of all others, and thus conduct us wholly out of the sphere of Idealism into that of Realism? Hegel, to escape this fatal contradiction, took a leap into pure Idealism, denying the reality of all substances, material and mental, finite and infinite, alike, assuming that thought itself is the only thing real, and resolving the universe, material and mental, and God, as apprehended by the Intelligence, into pure ideas or laws of thought. But in this cold region of absolute nonentity the system of Hegel even, the last and final consummation of Idealism, is found impaled upon the very rock on which all prior systems of the same

class had split, to wit, the assumption of one or more ideas of Reason as valid for things in themselves. In deducing one form of thought from another, the real relation of cause and effect, antecedence and consequence, is admitted and affirmed. When one thing arises from another in the order of necessary succession, whatever the things in themselves may be, they do and must sustain to each other the relation of real cause and effect, chronological antecedence and consequence. In admitting the reality of such succession, as the system of Hegel does, and as all others must, we admit and affirm the ideas of cause and effect and also of time as valid for things in themselves, and thus open the way for the system of universal Realism, as the system demanded and affirmed by Philosophy itself.

Having thus demonstrated that Idealism, whatever form it may assume, involves the most palpable and fatal self-contradictions, we might dismiss the subject here, as no system involving such contradictions can be true. As modern Antitheism, however, bases itself exclusively upon the principles which lie at the foundation of this system, in some or in all its varied forms, we shall, for the interests of truth, enter into a more full discussion of the subject. As Idealism, in all its forms, rests upon common principles, and as the same observations are equally applicable to all its forms, and as said forms must fall with the system itself, we shall discuss said system without reference to its specific developments. In accomplishing our object, we shall, as occasion requires, repeat some of the statements which have just been made in the preliminary exposition.

THE COMMON BASIS ON WHICH THIS HYPOTHESIS IN ALL ITS
FORMS RESTS.

The common basis on which Idealism in all its forms rests, is this: We have valid knowledge of mental states only; all our knowledge of realities, as they exist in themselves, being exclusively relative, and consequently utterly void of objective validity. "We have therefore intended to say," says Kant, — a statement accepted by all schools of Idealism as lying at the basis of the system in all its forms, — "that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena, — that the things which we envisage [perceive, and form conceptions and judgments of] are not that in themselves for which we take them; neither are their relationships so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we do away with our subject, or even only the subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality, all relationships of objects in space and time, nay, even space and time themselves, would disappear, and cannot exist as phenomena in themselves, but only in us. It remains utterly unknown to us what may be the nature of the objects in themselves, separate from all the receptivity of our sensibility. We know nothing but our manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us and which need not belong to every being, although to every man. With this we have only to do." The above extract all Idealists of all schools, as we have said, will accept as announcing the common basis of all their systems. All these systems, therefore, stand committed, and that absolutely, to the following dogmas: 1. Of mental states we do have a valid knowledge. 2. Of all realities, aside from said states, our ignorance is absolute. 3. Space and time exist, not as realities in themselves, but

only in the mind, as mere subjective laws of thought. Such are the real characteristics of this system in all its varied forms and developments. While the principles of the system do not permit us to make any positive affirmations in regard to real existences of any kind, the following negative affirmations are demanded by said principles relatively to all such objects.

NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL REALITIES ACCORDING TO
THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF IDEALISM.

1. According to the immutable principles of this system in all its forms, there can, by no possibility, be any substances having real extension or form. Body implies space, — space, not as a subjective law of thought, but as represented in our ideas of this reality. If space, as this system affirms, is a mere law of thought, and no reality in itself, as represented in our Intelligence, then, undeniably, nothing having real extension or form can have being. Nor is it possible for us, according to the immutable principles of this system, to conceive of the possibility of any real substance of any kind as existing, it being impossible to conceive of substance of any kind as a real existence, and that substance not have a positive location somewhere in space.

2. Nor can there be, according to the fundamental principles of this system in any of its forms, any real successive events, or any existences having real successive experiences of any kind. Succession implies time, — time, not as a law of thought, but as a reality in itself. Time is the place of events, just as space is the place of substances, — a reality in itself in accordance with our mode of conceiving the same. If time, as these systems unitedly affirm, is

no such reality in itself, then there can be no real succession of any kind. This is undeniable.

3. For the reasons above assigned, there can, in no form of existence, be any real development through inhering law, any kind of voluntary activity, nor any real progression in any direction whatever. Development and progression both in common undeniably imply succession, and succession as undeniably implies time, — time, not as a mere law of thought, but as a reality in itself, the reality represented in our necessary idea of time.

Such are the fundamental principles and necessary consequences of Idealism in all its forms, — consequences which demonstrably verify it as a system of total error. If anything is real, and is the subject of absolute knowledge as such, succession, and with it time, is real. Yet both succession and time are absolute impossibilities according to the immutable principles of this system. The same remarks are equally applicable to space. It is absolutely impossible for us to conceive that space, *as represented* in human thought, does not exist. In other words, we have absolute knowledge of it as such a reality. This is admitted by Idealists of all schools. “We can never make to ourselves,” says Kant, “a representation of this, — that there is no space, — although we may very readily think that no objects therein are to be met with.” “Take away,” he says again, “from our experience conceptions of a body, gradually, everything which is empirical therein, color, hardness, softness, weight, impenetrability, still the space remains which it (the body) that has now disappeared, occupied, and this (space) you cannot leave out.” Yet this known reality, which, as Kant and all other Idealists affirm, the Intelligence “cannot leave out,” their system in all its forms does

“leave out” and reduces from a known external reality infinite in itself, to a mere unknown internal law of thought. Such a system must be utter error and nothing else.

Idealism throughout fundamentally violates its own essential principles.

Idealism, we remark in the next place, in all its forms and developments, exists in utter violation of its own avowed and fundamental principles. It affirms, as the fixed basis of all its procedures, our absolute ignorance of all realities of every kind as they exist in themselves. It then, with the most imperious assurance, propounds its own exclusive theory of existence, telling us what realities do and do not exist, and what are their nature, principles, and laws, and modes of being and development. “What can we reason but from what we know?” Idealism lays down as the exclusive basis of positive systems of Ontology, absolute ignorance of existence in all its forms. “Objects in themselves,” says Kant, “are not at all known to us.” “It remains wholly unknown to us,” he says again, “what may be the nature of objects in themselves.” “We know nothing but our manner of perceiving them.” “The reality existing behind all appearances is,” says Mr. Hubert Spencer, “and ever must be, unknown.” Such are the united teachings of all Idealists and sceptics of all schools. Where is the place, then, for systems of Ontology, for dogmatic theories of existence, or for a philosophy of being and its laws? What must be the character of such systems? The highest claim that they can present to our regard is that of well-developed systems of guessing. To baptize such systems with the name of science is one of the greatest absurdities conceivable.

All the fundamental principles of Idealism mere assumptions.

All the avowed principles of Idealism in all its forms, we remark in the next place, are, without exception, mere *assumptions*, utterly void of all intuitive or deductive claims to validity. We refer to such dogmas as the following: That there is but one substance, and but one principle of all things; that, in all forms of valid knowledge, there must be “a synthesis of being and knowing in the I,” or “an absolute identity of being and knowing.” Take away these asserted principles, and Idealism in all its forms falls to pieces at once, and utterly vanishes into naught. Yet all these avowed principles of science have been demonstrated in the introduction to be nothing but mere assumptions, not, in any sense, of self-evident validity, nor capable of proof, and not having the least degree of antecedent probability in their favor. Theories and systems resting upon such assumptions—and Idealism rests upon none but such—can have no higher merits than mere well-constructed logical fictions. A rigid scientific scrutiny can award no other claim to this system in any form which it has ever assumed.

Idealism has no valid claims against any system to which it stands opposed.

Idealism in all its forms, we remark in the next place, while it proudly arrogates to itself the high and exclusive merit of scientific development throughout, can offer no valid or scientific reasons whatever in favor of its own claims, or against those of other and opposite systems. Idealism, for example, claims for spirit or its operations an exclusive existence; while Materialism puts forward the

same exclusive claims in respect to matter. Between these two conflicting and opposite systems the evidence is absolutely balanced. Not a shadow of proof, valid evidence, or even antecedent probability, can, by any possibility, be adduced in favor of either as against the other. Both in common rest exclusively upon mere unauthorized and reckless assumptions and nothing else, — assumptions whose merit is, in all respects, equal, for the reason that neither class has any merits at all, the demerit of occupying false positions in so-called systems of science excepted. The varied forms which Idealism itself has assumed are special and peculiar, each standing in direct and open antagonism against every other. Ideal Dualism, Subjective Idealism, Pantheism, and Pure Idealism, or Nihilism, all rest, as we have said, on common assumptions. Yet each stands alone, and neither has any fellowship with either of the others. But the advocates of neither can offer any valid reasons whatever for holding their own theory and rejecting either of the others. All alike affirm absolute ignorance of all realities as they exist in themselves. How, then, can they prove their own hypothesis true, or that of either of their opponents to be false? Of mere conjectures in respect to that of which nothing is confessedly known, how can one claim validity over the other?

Idealism self-contradictory.

Idealism throughout, we remark in the next place, is characterized by interminable self-contradictions and absurdities. It professes, for example, an absolute scientific insight into that which it affirms to be utterly unknowable and unknown. It affirms all our intuitions, conceptions, and ideas, empirical and, *à priori*, contingent and necessary,

to be utterly void of validity for realities as they exist in themselves ; and, then on the exclusive authority of assumed *à priori* ideas and principles, constructs its systems of Ontology, and theories of existence and its laws. It utterly repudiates all original and necessary intuitions and principles of science as utterly “invalid for things in themselves ;” and then, upon the exclusive authority of mere assumptions, for the validity of which no reasons whatever can be presented, proudly dogmatizes in regard to the nature and laws of time, space, substance, cause, the universe material and mental, God, duty, and immortality, — all existences, indeed, and forms of existence, finite and infinite. It affirms the validity of our knowledge of mind or its operations, on the ground that such knowledge is direct and immediate, or presentative, and then rejects as utterly invalid the same identical form of knowledge in respect to external material substances. It affirms the non-being of realities, — time and space, — of which it is absolutely impossible, as Idealists themselves confess, for the Intelligence even to conceive as not being, and as not being what they are represented in human thought to be ; and then affirms as real, forms of existence which it is utterly impossible for the Intelligence to conceive as actual ; as, for example, phenomena without substance, thought without a thinker, as affirmed by pure Idealism, and real existences which have being nowhere and in no time, as affirmed by Idealism in all its forms. These must suffice as examples of contradictions and absurdities fundamentally involved in this system in all its forms.

The method of Idealism utterly false and deceptive.

Cousin has well observed, that “as is the *method* of a

philosopher, such will be the destiny of his philosophy." A system of philosophy developed in accordance with the principles of a method fundamentally false and deceptive, cannot fail to lead the teacher and the pupil both widely astray from the track of truth. True science is the philosophy of the knowable and the known. Of the unknowable and the unknown it has nothing whatever to do, but to assert its absolute ignorance of the same, and to explain the reason and grounds of that ignorance. In imparting to real knowledge a systematic development, true science, first of all, determines the valid tests, or criteria, by which real knowledge — knowledge which has actual validity for the reality and character of its objects — may be distinguished from cognitions which have no such validity. It then determines its theory and facts of real existence by a rigid application of said criteria, admitting nothing to be real not thus determined as such, and omitting nothing thus affirmed. Finally, in the light of fundamental principles whose validity cannot be questioned, the facts of existence thus given are elucidated, and their characteristics, laws, and causes proximate and ultimate, determined. By such a method we attain to a knowledge of truth itself. Now, the entire method of Idealism, in all its forms, utterly violates all the principles and procedures of true science. The latter, as we have said, gives us, exclusively, the philosophy of the knowable and the known. The former, by profession, is as exclusively the philosophy of the unknowable and unknown. The Idealist, when he "begins to philosophize," in the language of one of its great expounders before quoted, "puts himself into a state of not knowing," "assuming that all his previous knowledge is uncertain," and "compelling himself to treat that knowledge as nothing

but a prejudice." Disregarding all proper psychological investigations as unworthy the dignity of science, assuming all existing forms of knowledge to be nothing but appearances, and finally asserting that all realities lying behind and beyond said appearances are absolutely unknown and unknowable entities, he launches forth into the "palpable obscure" of infinite ignorance, and then upon mere assumptions, such as these, — that there is in reality "but one substance, and one principle of all things," and that in all forms of valid knowledge "there is an absolute synthesis of being and knowing in the I," or "an absolute identity of being and knowing," — upon mere assumptions such as these, we say, he constructs his system of Ontology, — his absolute theory of all real existences and their laws and forms of development. We have stated the method of Idealism in our own language, but in strict conformity to the expositions of its own advocates. What can rationally be expected from such a method of philosophizing? Nothing, of course, but systems of all of which that may be truly said, which a distinguished author did affirm of that of Hegel, to wit: "Hegel's philosophy is nothing in itself; nor was its author in himself, but beside himself." Standing in these regions of the deep profound of the unknowable and unknown; closing their eyes and their faith to all which the Universal Intelligence has given as visible and real, and assuming that even necessary ideas represent no realities as they are in themselves; what did these great and world-renowned thinkers discover and reveal in respect to the high sphere of the science of Ontology, or the doctrine of Universal Being, its facts and laws? Hegel, for example, discovered by direct and immediate intuition, — intuition as clear as midnight, and as valid as the contradictions of

“Chaos and Old Night,” — that pure thought is the only and exclusive reality, — thought without subject or object ; that matter and spirit, the finite and infinite, time and space, are nothing but pure thought in its various forms and developments ; and that God, the Infinite and the Absolute, is the one thought which comprehends and determines all others. He thus, in the language of the author above referred to, gave us “a God without holiness, a Christ without free love, a Holy Ghost without illumination, a gospel without faith, an apostasy without sin, wickedness without conscious guilt, an atonement without remission of sin, a death without an offering, a religious assembly without divine worship, a release without imputation, justice without a judge, grace without redemption, dogmatical theology without a revelation, a this side without a that side, immortality without existence, a Christian religion without Christianity, and in general a religion without religion.”

By means of an assumed faculty of direct and absolute intuition, — a faculty vouchsafed (as a punishment, it must be) to philosophers, and withheld (in mercy, we judge) from the rest of mankind, — Schelling saw that being and knowing are one and identical ; that, consequently, but one substance and principle of all things has being ; that, in this one indefinite something called the Infinite and the Absolute, two opposite forces, each infinite and indestructible, exist and act, the one tending to expand infinitely, and the other seeking to know itself in this infinity ; that creation, which is God in a state of development, — creation with all its finite individualities, — is the exclusive result of the action and reaction of these two forces interpenetrating each other in this single substance ; and, that, while the Infinite and Absolute is perpetually seeking to know itself, the highest

form of knowledge to which it ever does or can attain is realized in the consciousness of man. We give but an epitome of the forms of intuitive knowledge to which our seer attained relatively to the unknowable and unknown, — an epitome sufficient, however, to characterize the system of being and of life which he constructed in that “land of darkness as darkness itself.” While we hold ourselves responsible for giving that system as it is, we do not vouch for all the elements which he has put into it, — the idea, for example, of Infinity seeking to *expand* itself, and also of seeking, from eternity, for self-knowledge, without attaining to any higher forms of thought than have yet had being in the human mind. As man is the highest form of development to which the Infinite and Absolute has yet attained, God, as manifested in man, should be to us the exclusive object of religious homage and worship; and the two young disciples of this philosophy, who had graduated with high honors from one of our eastern colleges, were right and self-consistent in the reverential worship they habitually paid to each other when they met, each addressing the other in such language as this: “Good morning, God!” “How do you do, Jehovah?” We relate facts of actual occurrence. It is due to these youth to add, that they recovered at length their common-sense, through the ridicule to which they were subject even from the boys in the streets.

Fichte, on the other hand, through the same insight, perceived with equal distinctness that mind — finite spirit — is the sole and exclusive existence; that creation in all its developments is nothing but the different forms in which the I sees itself in its varied processes of self-development; that time, space, God, duty, and immortality, are nothing but regulative ideas through which the I gives shape

and exteriority to its own subjective states, and that God, instead of being the creator of finite mind, is himself, as “a regulative idea,” created by finite mind. Hence, the great expounders of the system of Subjective Idealism, in the German universities, were accustomed to address their pupils in language like the following: “To-morrow, gentlemen, I will generate God.”

Kant, “the venerable sage of Königsberg,” we remark once more, and with the same identical form of insight employed by the great seers above named, perceived and affirmed, not the exclusive existence of one substance, and one principle of all things, but the actual being of two, and but two, unknown and unknowable entities, — entities existing nowhere and acting in no time; and that creation is the sole result of the action and reaction of these two substances the one upon the other. Space, time, and God have place in this system, not as realities in themselves, but as mere “regulative ideas.”

Now, all these contradictions and absurdities are the natural results of the false methods of philosophizing which characterize Idealism in all its forms.

Idealism, in all its forms, a system of partialism.

Every form and system of Idealism is professedly based, and that wholly, upon facts of Consciousness; yet it explains, and that wrongly, only a part of them, and in its fundamental principles and deductions palpably contradicts all the rest. In their entire explications they all rest upon a basis which, of necessity, wholly excludes the phenomena of the Will; while others as necessarily exclude those of the Sensibility, and all unitedly, as we have seen, wrongly explain all the essential facts of Intelligence.

At the best, Idealism is, throughout, a system of partialism, and a very poor one at that.

Idealism confounds truth with error.

Another universal characteristic of Idealism is this: It absolutely confounds truth with error, and leaves us with no *tests* whatever by which the one can be distinguished from the other. One fact of consciousness is just as real in itself as another, and if none of "the things which we envisage are that in themselves or in their relationships for which we take them," then facts of Consciousness, as facts, are to us the only truths we do or can know, and as one such fact is just as real as another, one is just as true as another. One system of philosophy, inasmuch as all alike are real facts of consciousness, — that is, as systems have really been thought out, — is just as true as another. Our sleeping dreams are just as true as our waking ones, and the wild fancies of the maniac as the most sane deductions of the mathematician or philosopher. This is precisely where the system of Kant leaves us, and it cannot, by any possibility, do anything better for us. Remarks precisely similar are equally applicable to all the other forms of Idealism. If "*the me*" is the only reality, one of its developments is just as real, and consequently just as true, as another. The philosophy of Fichte, Locke, Candillac, and the Christian system of Reid, are all and equally products of "*the me*," and, therefore, all are equally true, and that with no intermixture of error whatever. If the Infinite and Absolute, or thought itself, is the only thing real, and all things are only necessary development of the same, one is just as necessary as another and just as real, and, therefore, just as true. Error, according to all forms

of Idealism alike, has no place in the universe. One act, according to its fundamental principles, is just as right, and one form of thought just as true, as another. The individual that holds that the same thing at the same time can be and not be, holds a proposition as really true as he that holds the opposite axiom. The writer of this work, when a child, stoutly and sincerely maintained for a long time, in opposition to all his brothers and sisters (the first discussion he ever held in his life), that two and two make three. His argument was this: that as two is but one more than one, twice two can be but one more than twice one. Now, we may safely challenge any Idealist on earth to show, from the fundamental principles of his system, that the proposition which the writer then maintained is not just as true and as valid for things in themselves, as the one which he now maintains, to wit, that two and two make four. The former, according to the fundamental teachings of Idealism, was as much a reality in itself as the latter, and just as real and necessary a development of "the me" or of the Infinite and Absolute. Such is Idealism. True philosophy, if it accomplishes anything, lays broad and deep, and makes eternally visible, the distinctions between the real and unreal, the true and the false. The system which not only fails to do this, but which, as Idealism undeniably does, totally confounds such distinctions, must be a system of unmingled error.

Idealism utterly subversive of morality and religion.

We have already indicated the bearings of Idealism upon religion. We may well be permitted to allude to this subject again, referring now to its bearings upon morality as well as religion. Every such system, as we have seen,

either gives us no God at all, or gives one who cannot be to us an object of religious worship in any proper sense of the term. To the God which it gives us, prayer is an absurdity, and so of all other acts of religious homage. All such systems also give deductions utterly subversive of all forms of morality, domestic, civil, social, and religious. If the universe is not a real, but only an ideal existence, the same must be held as true of all the individualities of which that universe is constituted, with all their apprehended relations to us. The family, the community, and the state are nothing in themselves. They are splendid creations of our own minds, and nothing else. The child begets the father, instead of the father the child, and the thing begotten is in reality, excepting as an idea, an absolute nonentity. The individual generates the community, and the subject the state, and the thing generated is a mere ideal unsubstantiality. Now, if the Idealist would only be self-consistent, he would be as reckless of all the claims of domestic, social, and civil virtue, as he is of those of religion. The moment the world, with all its inhabitants, ceases to have to us any real or external existence out of ourselves, that moment all real moral ties, domestic, social, and civil, between us and the world, are forever sundered. The reader is doubtless familiar with the account of optical illusions which sometimes occur in connection with certain diseases, — illusions by which the room of the patient appears to be filled with men and women. Suppose that while the patient knows perfectly that such spectral illusions are nothing else but such, he should find that their conduct and states depended on his volitions ; that, by his willing it, they would apparently revel in bliss, writhe in agony, manifest the tenderest affections, indulge in the most ferocious and brutal pas-

sions, lovingly caress, or madly bite and devour one another. Suppose the patient now makes his room a theatre for the enactment of such scenes as may afford him the greatest interest or gratification. Whom has he wronged? Which of those forms of illusion can charge him with wrong? What substantial moral ties bind him to those real and so regarded unsubstantialities? Now, this is the spectacle of the universe, according to the deductions of Idealism: a man seems to be a child and brother, in one circle, and a husband and a parent in another. Now, if these circles and those within them are realities, capable of receiving good or ill at his hands, then the claims of morality in respect to them are also a substantiality. But if there are no such beings present; if, as Idealism affirms, the circles and the objects in them which he has envisaged are not that in themselves nor in their relationships for which he has taken them; if, indeed, as the system further teaches, they are nothing in themselves; then, what laws of filial, fraternal, conjugal, or parental morality rest upon him relatively to those images of his own creation? A man must know himself a real child of real parents, before he can recognize himself as really reached by the precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother." However long a known and recognized unsubstantiality may nestle in a man's bosom, and by whatever titles it may be called, it can lay no real claim upon him, or with justice cry out against any violence which he may perpetrate upon it. A man must be convicted of standing upon real flesh and bones, before he can be reached by the precept, "Take thy foot from thy brother's neck." A man must be convicted of holding *realities* in chains, before he can be bound by the requirement, "Sunder the bonds of oppression and let the oppressed go

free." There are no wrongs to be redressed, no broken hearts to be bound up, no prodigals to be reclaimed, no guilt that can be incurred, no crimes that can be perpetrated, and nothing in "man's inhumanity to man, making countless thousands mourns," if Idealism is true. It must be a somewhat painful process for a man to get out of his head, or to get beside himself. So the Infinite and Absolute, in its attempts to attain to self-knowledge and self-development, may find it somewhat difficult to get out of itself into the finite, and a still greater difficulty in "its regress back into itself; and thus, in these painful processes, may produce finite generations," sustaining, as a necessary consequence, not the happiest apparent relations to each other, while no real harm is done on the part of one to the other. But this is no concern of the generations themselves, but wholly that of the Absolute that produced them. Well may the German youth boast, that being delivered by their philosophy from all sense of moral obligation, and from all fear of consequences hereafter, "nothing remains but to live a merry life." Such is Idealism, giving in all its principles and deductions "the lie direct" to every moral and religious sentiment in man.

Idealism void of all utility.

The absolute practical inutility of Idealism is another of its essential characteristics, — a characteristic perfectly fatal to all its claims to validity. The natural and philosophical, the practical and theoretical procedures of the Intelligence should not be in essentially different, and above all in opposite and contradictory, directions. Theory, on the other hand, should give laws to practical life, and should impart to its procedures the most perfect forms and

directions. But there is not a single principle or deduction of Idealism that can be of the least use in any of the sciences, pure or mixed, or in any of the concerns of practical life. A certain Idealist having completed his system, remarked that it had in it absolutely nothing possessing any form or degree of utility, or tending in any manner in that direction. And here, he remarked, were to be found its high claims to regard. Here was truth, disconnected from all considerations but the idea itself. Truth could now be embraced from pure disinterestedness, — from no other motives than the simple love of truth itself. There is not a solitary form of Idealism that can rest upon any higher claims as far as its principles and logical deductions are concerned. Idealists may have said, as they really have done, many useful things. Such utterances, however, are not in consequence of their systems, but in spite of them. In the systems themselves there is absolutely nothing looking at all in the direction of any form of utility whatever.

Idealism limits mind.

There is, we remark again, in all the forms of Idealism alike, a fundamental tendency to *limit* mind, and prevent its permanent growth and expansion. This statement has been fully verified by undeniable facts of history. In India, for example, all the forms which Idealism has ever assumed, from Kant down to Hegel, exist in a state of development which, in almost no respect, modern philosophy has improved. There, its influence has been fully tested by an experience of ages in continuance; and what has been the result? When the system first opened upon the Hindoo mind, it, as did the German mind in similar circumstances,

received a wonderful expansion. Civilization, almost at once, sprang into being under the plastic influence shed down upon humanity. The ultimate and no distant result, however, was a permanent and immovable mental stagnation from which there is no possible recovery, only by the actual emancipation of the mind from the influences by which its powers are paralyzed. From the nature of the case, from the necessary intrinsic tendencies of the system, it cannot, in any case, be otherwise. The reason is obvious. All proper conceptions of God, Immortality, and Retribution, under the influence of which alone the mental powers can permanently expand, are either totally obliterated in these systems, or else so utterly degraded that, under their influence, mind cannot but receive corresponding degradation. When God, for example, is, in our conceptions, degraded from a self-conscious Personality, clothed with absolute Infinity and Perfection, to a mere idea of Reason, Law of Thought, or to an unconscious, undeveloped Impersonality, which can attain to the exercise of conscious intelligence only in the Consciousness of man, the mind experiences of necessity in itself, in thus "changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like unto corruptible man," the consequences of its own folly, by being held down in a state of mental and moral degradation. Then, in the development of this system, mind is carried round in a perpetual circle, where nothing elevating or expanding presents itself, and where the endless recurrence of precisely the same forms of thought produces ultimately a state of immovable *ennui* and stagnation. When you have once travelled the ground with Kant, Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel, Idealism can do no more for mental development, but just to repeat over and over again,

in endless cycles, the same changeless successions of utterly barren ideas. Such are the intrinsic tendencies of the system itself. Germany has experienced the expanding power of Idealism in its early developments, and she is beginning to feel the deadening reaction. Her lecture-rooms of philosophy are not now filled with eager listeners, as they once were, nor is philosophy the theme of the public mind there, as it once was. Everywhere the intense interest with which philosophy once electrified the public mind is dying out, and a deadening influence has taken the place of that interest, — an influence pressing as an incubus upon the Intelligence and heart, and preventing mental progress in any direction. No other results can follow under the influence of Idealism.

Idealism fails to meet the scientific wants of mind.

We remark, finally, that Idealism utterly fails, and from its own nature and the immutable laws of mind, must utterly fail, to meet the philosophic wants not only of the public mind generally, but equally those of the philosophic mind. The philosophic idea realized is one of the great wants of humanity, and it is the special want of philosophic minds. This want, whenever it exists, is correlative to truth, and nothing but a true system of philosophy can meet that want. Present to the mind any false system, however self-consistent and perfect in its developments, and however well sustained by apparent evidence, and the mind, after revolving around it for a period, begins to experience a kind of heart-sickness which necessarily results from “hope deferred,” and disappointed expectation. The mind may continue to revolve about the system, under the assumption that it is true, and under the conviction

that truth must be useful to man. Yet, in the centre of the soul there will be a continued voice of remonstrance, an inward protest against the claims of the system. This is not your resting-place. This is not the temple of truth; for here the genial warmth and vivifying radiance which truth radiates upon all who find her, is not experienced. Now, this is peculiarly true of Idealism, in all its forms. The palpable contradictions which it presents between the natural and philosophical procedures of the Intelligence, the mind, by an intuitive and necessary conviction, knows cannot be true, and hence it must ever experience a restless dissatisfaction under the pressure of any system of philosophy which involves them. While those contradictions and antagonisms remain, the mind cannot but know in itself that the great problem of philosophy yet remains to be solved.

The ideas of God, Liberty, and Immortality, presented in these systems, also are, in all respects, the reverse of those to which the moral and spiritual departments of universal mind are unchangeably correlative, and thus a painful void is left unfilled in the very centre of our inner being. Then, finally, these systems, while they promise to explain all the facts of Consciousness, as they are, necessarily omit, and in their developments palpably contradict, an essential part of them,—a part just as real and as fundamental as those which are professedly explained. Thus, such systems equally fail to meet the philosophic wants of common and of philosophic minds. What universal mind demands is a philosophy which shall omit none of the real facts of Consciousness which do exist, and suppose none which do not exist; which shall explain them all alike, and not, in the explanation, transform them into

something which they are not, — a philosophy all of whose principles shall be the necessary logical antecedents of these facts, and whose conclusions shall all alike be the necessary deductions of these principles and facts, and thus leave the mind explained to itself as it is, and not as it is not. Now, this is just what Idealism necessarily fails to accomplish. There is not a single fact of Consciousness of which it gives a satisfactory explanation. Take the phenomena of external perception as an illustration. In the consciousness of perception, the mind affirms to itself, I perceive an external object having real extension and determinate form. Such is the perception as given in Consciousness. How does the Idealist explain the fact? He tells us there is no such object as we have supposed, — no object whatever external to the mind, — that a “trick has been played upon Reason,” “a natural, unavoidable illusion,” in which a mere subjective phenomenon has been postulated as the quality of an external object. This is his explanation of this great fact. Now, the philosopher that will give, in the name of philosophy, such an explanation of such a fact, will be internally *felt* by the common and philosophic mind alike to be himself a philosophic mountebank, intentionally or unintentionally attempting to play tricks upon the public mind. Idealism can never stand the test of time, for the undeniable reason that it fundamentally fails to meet the deep philosophic wants of humanity.

Bearing of the discussion upon the Theistic problem.

We are now prepared to state the bearing of the investigations brought to close in the present chapter, upon the theistic problem which we are investigating. In the pre-

ceding chapters the argument was direct. In this it is indirect, but nevertheless of fundamental importance. The argument, in its disjunctive form, as now developed, stands thus: If neither the hypothesis of Materialism, nor that of Idealism, in any of its forms, can be true, then Realism, and consequently Theism, must be true. Neither Materialism nor Idealism, in any of its forms, can be true. Realism, and consequently Theism, must, therefore, be true. The argument is left for the candid consideration of the reader.

CHAPTER VI.

THE DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENT COMPLETED, OR
REALISM AS CONTRASTED WITH THE SCEP-
TICAL PHILOSOPHY.

THE disjunctive argument in favor of the claims of Theism would be left in a somewhat obscure and incomplete state, if one more topic bearing upon the question before us did not receive a special consideration. We refer to the Sceptical Philosophy; and if we did not contrast its claims with those of Realism, we should fail, in the present *form* of the argument, of a complete vindication of the claims of Theism.

THE SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY DEFINED.

All the systems whose claims were examined in the last chapter fall really and truly under the category of Positivism. Each one is based upon the assumption, that the facts of the universe as given, in the Intelligence, are not either unindicative or sceptical, but indicative or dogmatical, in their bearing upon the great question of Ultimate Causation, and that, when scientifically interpreted, they affirm the validity of this one theory and deny that of all others. This is what Realism, Materialism, and Idealism in its various forms, affirm each system for itself. The Sceptical Philosophy affirms that the facts of the universe,

as thus given, are neither wholly unindicative, nor strictly indicative or dogmatic, in their bearing upon this question. On the other hand, they are of such a nature as necessarily to suggest the different theories above named as each *possibly* true, without presenting any scientific grounds whatever for determining which, in distinction from the others, is true. As these are the only systems conceivable or possible, and as each stands to each and all the others in the relation of contradiction, one of them, to the exclusion of each and all the others, must be true, and they false. But when we raise the inquiry which system is true, and which false, facts, it is affirmed, present us with no scientific basis whatever for the determination of such a question. On the other hand, these facts, in their entirety, sustain the relation of absolute and equal compatibility with each and all these systems alike. They present no clue whatever for the determination of the question which of these systems is the valid one. Hence, Scepticism affirms of each system alike, this system may be true, and it may not be true, and there is no possibility of determining whether it is, or is not true. Either hypothesis we choose may be assumed as the ground of explaining the facts of the universe. One class may be explained by one theory, and another by another; and at different times, as occasion, convenience, or pleasure demands, different hypotheses may be assumed as the ground of the explanation of the same facts or classes of facts. We err only when we dogmatize, — that is, put forward any given hypothesis as exclusively true, and require others thus to receive it. The logical consequence of the sceptical hypothesis is free thinking, and this is what its advocates claim for it as the glory of the system. Thought, it is affirmed, is unbound.

Of all conceivable theories of existence, and especially of ultimate causation, it is free to select the most perfect to thought, and forever to luxuriate amid the endless forms of beauty and perfection which its own continually expanding powers shall image forth. We may be permitted to allude, in this connection, to one fundamental want of universal mind, — a want which Scepticism totally fails to meet. Amid the endlessly diversified forms of beauty and perfection which mind images forth to itself, it desires immutably to be able to say to itself, This is true; and to be able, amid these forms of thinking, to distinguish the true from the false. This liberty Scepticism denies absolutely to universal mind, and that on all subjects alike. It denies to us totally the consolation of thinking that on any subject whatever we have found the pearl of great price, — the truth. It holds out to us the high promise of liberty in its most absolute and perfect forms, and then denies to us, with equal absoluteness, the privilege of thinking we know what we are, where we are, what we ought to be or to do, or whither we are bound.

Religious bearings of Scepticism.

It will readily be perceived, on a moment's reflection, that Scepticism, in its fundamental principles and deductions, their validity being granted, is utterly subversive of all the claims of religion, natural and revealed. Scientific knowledge is the highest and most authoritative form of knowledge of which we can form a conception. Science is not opposed to intuition, but includes as principles all valid intuitions of every kind. Nor is science opposed to revelation, supposing the fact of a revelation to be established by valid evidence. Science, on the other hand, takes into

account all valid principles and facts given in the Intelligence, and as thus given. Let us suppose, what Scepticism affirms to be true, that all valid principles and facts given in the Intelligence, when scientifically classified and elucidated, lead to the absolute deduction, that Theism has no higher claims to validity than either of the other hypotheses to which it stands opposed. What basis exists for the positive institutions, commands, and prohibitions of religion? What authenticated revelation can come to us from a Being whose existence even is revealed to us by no valid evidence whatever? If God exists, the fact that he has left us without any valid evidence of his being or perfections is the highest indication that he could, by any possibility, give us, that it is his will not to be to us an object of fear, love, or worship. Of distinct and opposite hypotheses, each of which is sustained by precisely the same evidence, no obligations do, or can, bind us to hold and treat one as true and the other as false. All this is undeniable. If the sceptical hypothesis is true, religion is not only not reason, but opposed to reason. What obligations, we repeat, do or can rest upon us to treat and worship as a real existence a Being whose existence has been revealed to us by no valid evidence? The Scriptures expressly base the claims of Theism upon the fact that the being and perfections of God are "clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made;" and the necessary intuitions and deductions of universal mind land us in the conclusion, that on no other conditions can we be bound to worship or serve God, as the Creator and Governor of all.

It is a very singular fact that not a few advocates of Theism, who stand before the world as Christian theologians, admit, with Coleridge, that upon strictly scientific

ground, we have no valid proof of the being of God, and they suppose that, in granting such a conclusion, the highest vantage ground is gained for the system they advocate. Science, they say, leaves the question wholly undecided. We are, therefore, at liberty to follow our intuitive convictions and higher instincts upon the subject. No conflict, it is further said, can exist between science and religion, for the reason that where the former leaves the subject, and admits its own utter want of light and authority, the latter takes it up, and leads us onward by its own authoritative teachings and mandates. The conflict referred to, it should be borne in mind, is not thus avoided. According to the hypothesis, religion makes positive affirmations just where science affirms absolutely that there are no grounds for such affirmations. Science and religion, then, are irreconcilable antagonisms. We may ask further, in this connection, the important question, What is really and truly meant, when it is affirmed that, upon strictly scientific grounds, we have no valid proof of the being of God? It is this: When *all* the facts of the universe, — facts of matter and spirit, all our intuitive convictions and higher instincts included, — are scientifically examined, classified and elucidated, they leave us wholly without any valid proof of the being and perfections of God. On the other hand, they leave the Theistic hypothesis without any higher claims to validity than is possessed by either of the hypotheses to which it stands opposed. To admit, then, that upon scientific grounds we have no valid proof of the Theistic hypothesis, is to admit and affirm, that in acting as religious, we act as unreasonable, beings. There is no escaping this conclusion.

THE ASSUMPTION UPON WHICH THE SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY
IS BASED.

When we inquire for the foundation of the sceptical philosophy, we shall find that it rests as its exclusive basis upon a certain assumption which has entered as a common principle into most of the systems of mental science which have obtained currency among mental philosophers in ancient and modern times. The assumption is this: Our knowledge of the universe, material and mental,—that knowledge from which all our conclusions relatively to ultimate causation must be deduced, is wholly and exclusively *phenomenal* and not *real*, *mediate* and not *immediate*, *relative* or *representative* and not *presentative*. All our inquiries, says the sceptic, in regard to ultimate causation, relate exclusively to questions pertaining to *real* being or existence, and not to mere phenomena. We assume that there is a real universe which we call nature, and a real ultimate cause of the real facts of *the* nature which is real. If we know nature as it is, we may, through the real facts of a real universe, find out the real ultimate cause of these facts. If, on the other hand, we do not and cannot know nature itself, we cannot know the real ultimate cause of the actual facts of nature. This is undeniable. Now, Scepticism affirms that these are the precise relations which we do in fact sustain to nature, according to the fundamental principles of every system of philosophy, which teaches that our knowledge of nature is exclusively phenomenal and not real. From such knowledge we cannot, without a violation of all the laws and principles of true science, reason at all to the real ultimate cause of the real facts of nature. If between us and all realities of every kind,—realities subjective and

objective, — there spreads out the veil of the exclusively phenomenal, that is, mere appearances in which no realities as they are appear; if it is absolutely impossible for us to pierce this veil and find out what realities lie behind it; then it is the height of presumption in us to attempt to determine what realities do and do not exist, and what is the ultimate cause of the present facts of said realities. Such are the deductions of Scepticism, and how we can, without a most palpable violation of all the laws and principles of true science, avoid these deductions, we confess ourselves wholly unable to determine. We freely confess that we would just as soon attempt to point out a fallacy in that scientific process by which we are conducted to the conclusion that the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of its two sides, as to point out the want of connection between the theory of knowledge under consideration and the inference which Scepticism deduces from that theory. The connection between the premises and conclusion is no more necessary and absolute in one case than it is in the other.

FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

The validity of all the above statements will be fully evinced by a critical examination of the fundamental characteristics of the philosophy from whose principles the sceptical conclusions are deduced. We shall present the characteristics of this philosophy as they are exhibited by its great German expounder, Kant, and its hardly less able American expositor, Prof. Hickok. According to the express and fundamental teachings of each of these philosophers, the mind, in no intellectual act of any kind, has any

direct and *immediate* perception of any external object whatever. The object, if it exists at all, by acting on our sensitivity, induces a certain mental state called *sensation*. In the act of perception the *object* is not perceived at all. Nothing whatever is perceived but the sensation, which is exclusively a mental state, a *feeling* of the mind itself. The sensation, when first induced, is wholly formless and indistinct. As thought is directed to it, however, in the act of observation and attention, it takes on a definite appearance, appearing to the mind as an object external to it, and as such object having extension and form. How is this sensation—this formless and undefined feeling of the mind, a feeling wholly subjective, and as such utterly void of all exteriority, extension, and form—made to *appear* to the mind as an object wholly exterior, and as such having definite extension and form? The reason assigned is this: On occasion of the origination of the sensation in the mind the ideas of substance, space, and time are developed in the Intelligence. When the sensation appears, some substance external to the mind is supposed to be the cause of the sensation, and the various elements given in the sensation are, by an intellectual operation, connected with said substance as qualities of the same. Thus the object is perceived as an object external to the mind and having an existence independent of it. Through the ideas of space and time, pre-existing in the Intelligence, this object is made to appear to the mind, that is, is perceived by it, as having real extension and form. In all these operations, however, the mind perceives no external object whatever. It has actually perceived nothing but a purely and exclusively mental state, — a mere sensation, a subjective feeling, — utterly void of all exteriority, extension, and form. It is thus that we come

to an apprehension of our own physical organizations and of the external universe around us.

The above statements verified.

Such is a brief statement of the philosophy under consideration. That we have correctly interpreted this philosophy we will now proceed to show by citations from the authors above named. Sensation is thus defined by Prof. Hickok: "The action of the outer world upon the living organ may be known as an *impression*, and such impression met by the reaction of the living organ constitutes what we now term a *sensation*." Again: "The impression upon the organ of sense may be termed a feeling; but, inasmuch as it is antecedent to all consciousness of it, such feeling can be blind only and operate solely as instinct." The author distinguishes this blind, unconscious feeling from those feelings which come after it, and "by occasion of it through a perception." The former exclusively he denominates *sensation*. The latter, he says, "is properly an *emotion*." Hence he concludes: "Sensation is never to be taken as feeling except in a blind and unconscious state." Here we have it distinctly stated that sensation is exclusively a subjective state, — a state of the sensibility, a feeling of the mind, — and that, prior to its recognition in consciousness, it is wholly formless and indistinct. In this state our author affirms, "It is not matter; it is not object; it is not anything yet perceived; it is solely a content in the organ, out of which a perceived phenomenon is to be elaborated by a farther mental operation." Here we have the germ and substance of our author's theory of external perception. The "content" of such perception — that is, the thing really perceived as an object — is the sensation itself and nothing

else. To show this we must now recur to the article on Sense, the faculty of external perception. This function of the Intelligence our author defines as "*the faculty for attaining cognitions through sensation.*" "In it [sensation] we have a content that is, as yet, wholly undiscriminated and undefined. It is in the living organ only, and not yet in the consciousness as any known object. In order that it [the sensation] may be so known, an intellectual operation is necessary, by which this content in blind feeling shall be completely set in clear consciousness.

"Two things are to be effected. The intellectual agency must first determine *what* the content is, as distinguished from all others that have been or may be given; and, secondly, this agency must determine its limits in all the ways in which limitation can be referred to it, and in this how much the content. The first operation may be known as *Observation*, and the second as *Attention*. We will give each of these more particularly.

"*Observation.* Sensation merely gives a content in the organ for a perception, but it does nothing towards making that content to appear in consciousness as a distinct object. It is occasion for the self-active mind to pass into an intellectual state, and by a pure intellectual process to *distinguish* the sensation. The purely distinguishing act is what is meant by observation. It avails to give the content in sensation as a distinct object."

Here we are expressly taught that the entire content of the object perceived, that is, all that is embraced in perception, is the sensation. Observation pertains to no object external to the mind, but simply makes the content given in sensation, that is, the sensation itself, "*appear* in consciousness as a distinct object." Our author then goes on

to show that *attention* as well as observation is completely exhausted upon the sensation, and pertains not at all to any external object. In the latter the sensation is given as "a distinct," and in the former, "a definite," object. "When a sensation," he says, "has been distinguished in kind and variety by an observing act, there is given in this a *distinct*, but not yet a *definite*, object to the consciousness. We need, farther, a purely intellectual agency which shall completely define the quality within its own limits. When we have distinct quality, we need also to go farther to complete the perception and attain a definite quality. This is effected in the attention."

What our author means by the term *quality* is now very evident. It is nothing but sensation distinctly perceived in consciousness as an object, through observation and attention. "As thus brought into distinct appearance," he says, "it [the sensation] becomes properly a *phenomenon*, and what was before undistinguished content in sensation now becomes a *quality*, discriminated from all others and known in its own peculiarity."

The result of such an exposition of perception is perfectly obvious. Perception pertains exclusively to the sensation, and not at all to the external object supposed to be the cause of this feeling, if indeed such object does exist. That which is to the mind such object is nothing whatever but a mental state, a feeling of the mind itself, a sensation made such object by an "intellectual process of bringing out the sensation to a clear perception." Such are the express teachings of our author upon the subject. "The fact of sensation is given as primitive; the intellectual operations, distinguishing in observation and defining in attention, bring the content in sensation distinctly and definitely into

consciousness. A complete object is thus before the *mind*, and we are said to *apprehend* it in thus getting it within the mind's *grasp*, out of its former darkness. In its [the sensation's] *appearance* in the light of consciousness it is known as *phenomenon*; and, inasmuch as it has been *taken through* the medium of sensible organs, it is termed perception. As the impression on the organ has been made by an existence from without [supposed to have been thus made, as the author subsequently teaches], the phenomenon [the sensation made an object by the intellectual operation referred to] is ascribed to outer nature as some quality of an external world, and perceived through an external sense." Again, our author says, in summing up the results of the previous analysis: "It follows, that what has been given in the sense [external perception] is not the thing itself. That outer thing has in some way affected the organ and induced sensation, and this sensation it is which the intellect distinguishes and defines." Nothing can be more explicit, and at the same time confirmatory of our previous exposition of the principles of this philosophy, than the above statements.

One inquiry remains, which is this: How is it that through sensations thus converted into *appearances* of objects external to the mind, we come to apprehend the *universe* in which we conceive ourselves as having our being? This process is given by our author in the chapter on *The Understanding*. "The Understanding," he says, "is that intellectual faculty by which the single and fleeting phenomena of sense are known as qualities inhering in permanent things, and all things as cohering to form the universe." As perception is wholly exhausted upon sensation, and the content furnished by the same, so the action of the Under-

standing is as exclusively, in the formation of world-conceptions, confined to and exhausted upon the material furnished by perception. "When distinct and definite phenomena," he says, "are perceived in sense, they are not allowed to remain single and separate in the mind just as the sense has taken them. A further operation succeeds; and a ground is thought in which they inhere; and the single qualities become thus known as the connected qualities of a common substance. The redness, the fragrance, the smoothness, etc., which have been separately attained by different senses, are successively thought into one thing, and the mind forms the several judgments that the *rose* is red, and is fragrant, and is smooth, etc. And so, also, with the distinct and definite inner phenomena. The thought, emotion, volition, etc., are successively connected in their common source as the exercises of the one and the same agent; and thus the successive judgments are formed, that the *mind* thinks and feels and wills. A common subject is thought for the qualities, and a common source for the changes, and they become thus connected as substances and qualities, cause and events. And, still farther, the different substances are also thought as standing in communion together, and reciprocally influencing each other; and causes and events are thought as produced the one from the other, and thus in dependence; and in this way the cohering things and the adhering changes are all connected together in one nature, and judged so to inhere with each other through space and time that they all together make the universe." The substances themselves in which phenomena, external and internal, are *thought* as inhering, are not objects of perception at all. The mind itself originates

the idea of substance, and then connects with the same the phenomena it has perceived.

“The genesis of the understanding-conception,” our author goes on to say, “as notion — may be apprehended as follows: Some external thing is supposed to have occasioned the impression made upon the organ which induced the sensation, and then this sensation, and not the thing which made the impression, is taken up by an intellectual operation which distinguishes and defines it, and thereby makes it appear complete in the consciousness; and thus the phenomenon is solely the mode in which the external thing has revealed itself in the sense. This external thing, thus making itself to be known in the sense only by its phenomenal qualities, is thought to be the ground of these qualities.”

The above extracts abundantly verify our entire statements in regard to the system of philosophy under consideration. The external world, if it exist at all, is to the mind no object of direct and immediate knowledge. All that we perceive, when we suppose ourselves to perceive objects external to the mind, is nothing but our own mental states, — our sensations rendered to the mind, — such objects by laws inhering in the intelligence itself. In a subsequent chapter on Reason, our author endeavors to show that this faculty, through the fundamental ideas and principles which it originates, — ideas such as substance, space, time, cause, etc., — first of all determines the character of our *perceptions*, and then of all our conceptions, judgments, and reasonings. A sensation appears or is induced in the mind. The idea of substance “*supposed*” to pertain to a something out of the mind, — a something which caused the sensation, — makes this sensation *appear* to the mind as the

quality of such object. The sensation, as such external object, *appears* to possess extension and form. It is made thus to appear through the ideas of time and space. "Space and time," says Kant, "are the pure forms of them" [external perceptions], "sensation in general the matter." So says Prof. Hickok, in his Rational Psychology. So of all our mental operations in regard to external nature. All such operations are exhausted upon the crude material of sensation, and determined in all their forms and characteristics by ideas of Reason pre-existing in the Intelligence. We shall have occasion to refer to this fact again in another connection.

Principle common to all forms of the sensational theory.

Such is this system of philosophy. In its fundamental principles and deductions all must agree who hold that all our knowledge of external nature is exclusively through the medium of sensation. There is one principle strictly common to all such theories, whatever their specific forms may be, — a principle to which very special attention is now invited. It is this: *Our sensations as they are, being given, together with the mind, constituted as it now is, and the same universe that we now seem to perceive, would be present to us in all respects as it now is, and that whether any external objects whatever do or do not exist.* The universe which we actually perceive, and which is the only real universe to us, is wholly the creation of the mind itself, — a universe brought into its present form by the mind itself through its own inhering ideas and laws working upon the crude material of sensation, and nothing else. This, to us the only real universe, has nothing of real substance in it, — nothing more real or substantial than our own fleeting and crude sensa-

tions. This is the principle strictly common to the sensational theory in all the forms which it does or can assume.

NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SYSTEM.

We now invite very special attention to a consideration of some of the necessary consequences of the fundamental principles of this philosophy. We do not affirm that all the advocates of this philosophy actually hold all these deductions as true, or admit all these consequences as real. What we do affirm is this: that they must, to be logically consistent, hold all these consequences in their entirety. Among these consequences we notice the following:

The external universe, which we contemplate as real, has no existence out of our own minds.

The first that we notice is this: The external universe — that universe which is alone *real to us* — *has, in fact, no existence whatever, out of the mind itself.* Where the content, the real substance of a thing is, there, and only there, we find the thing itself. Now what, according to the fundamental teachings and principles of this philosophy, is the exclusive content, or substance, of this whole world of perception? It is sensation and nothing else. Not a solitary element, “from the heavens above, or the earth beneath, or the waters under the earth,” if indeed such realities do exist, enters into the composition of *this* universe. All here is sensation transformed, and nothing else. Sensation, we must remember, has no existence out of the mind, but is exclusively a feeling of the mind itself. Where, then, must be the exclusive dwelling-place of this whole universe of perception? It has no being, no dwelling-place, out of the mind itself. There is no escaping this conclusion; and

this necessary deduction is avowed and gloried in by the leading advocates of the system. Such men we refer to, as Coleridge, and the entire school of the strictly German philosophy.

This universe has no existence at all, excepting when we are in the very act of perception.

Another deduction, equally necessary and unavoidable, is this: The universe of perception, the only external universe which has reality to us, has no existence, in any form, excepting when we are in *the act of perceiving it*. Take away the content, the substance of a thing, and you take away the thing itself. The exclusive content, or substance, of the universe of external perception, we repeat, is, according to this philosophy, sensation, and nothing else. When we suppose ourselves to be looking at the sun and stars of heaven, or at “the great globe itself;” when we suppose ourselves “beholding with open face” the father that begot, the mother that bore and nursed us, the wife that lies upon our bosom, and those children standing around as the pledges of our mutual love, — we are, in fact, perceiving no external existences whatever. We are simply perceiving and observing certain feelings, sensations, of our own minds. And when these sensations and the consequent perceptions disappear, as they often do, what becomes then of this world, this universe of perception? The very content or substance of it has gone into utter annihilation. It has no existence whatever. This is an immutably necessary deduction from the fundamental principles of this philosophy.

“The things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them.”

Another necessary consequence of this philosophy is this, — a consequence which we will give in the language of its great expounder, Kant: “We have, therefore, intended to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomenon, — that the things which we envisage [perceive and think of as real external existences] are not that in themselves for which we take them; neither are their relationships in themselves so constituted as they appear to us.” Grant the validity of the fundamental principles of this philosophy, and there is no escaping this conclusion. The world of perception, as perceived and taken by us, has an existence out of and independent of ourselves. The world of perception, according to the fundamental teachings of this philosophy, has no existence whatever, out of or independent of ourselves. In the world of perception, as we *take* them, and as objects *appear* to us, objects are related to each other as having real and relative extension and form, as mutually affecting each other, — as suns and planets, as parent and child, husband and wife, etc. In the world of perception, according to this philosophy, no such objects do exist, and no such relationships of objects. Nothing whatever is perceived out of the mind, and nothing within but mere subjective feelings, — sensations which do and can possess no such properties, and sustain no such relations to each other as these above named. This is undeniable. Whatever may exist beyond the world of perception, the things envisaged within it are not and cannot be, if this philosophy is true, “that in themselves for which we

take them, neither are their relationships in themselves so constituted as they appear unto us.”

The universe of perception the exclusive product of the mind, itself, from the materials furnished, to wit, sensations.

We now invite special attention to another necessary deduction from the fundamental principles of this philosophy. It is this: The universe of perception, that alone which is real to us, as an external universe, is the exclusive creation of the mind itself from the materials furnished, to wit, sensation, and owes its existence to no cause whatever, out of and above the mind itself. Some power may have created mind and determined its laws. Not so with the world of perception. It had no existence prior to our own minds, and was never previously fitted up for our place of abode by a divine and beneficent cause. This universe the mind created by and for itself. This universe owes its being and characteristics to no power out of, or above, or other than the mind which perceives it. This is an immutably necessary deduction from the fundamental principles of this philosophy.

It is absolutely impossible for us to determine what realities, proximate or ultimate, finite or infinite, do or do not exist.

Another consequence equally necessary, which arises from the fundamental principles and deductions of this philosophy, is this: From sensation itself, and from no facts of perception, external or internal, can we determine what realities, proximate or ultimate, finite or infinite, do or do not exist. This will be rendered demonstrably evident from the following considerations:

1. It is absolutely impossible for us, according to the fundamental principles and deductions of this philosophy, to determine what *sensation itself* is. This is admitted of such mental states prior to observation and attention. Sensation, in this state, lies back of, and out of, the sphere of consciousness. Of its nature, therefore, we can know absolutely nothing. As soon as it comes within the sphere of consciousness, through observation and attention, it *appears* to the mind, in consciousness, in all respects, the opposite of what really and truly it is in itself. It now appears as the actual quality of an object having real exteriority, extension, and form; while, in fact, it is nothing but an exclusively mental feeling, utterly void of all such characteristics. It is absolutely evident, therefore, that we can, by no possibility, determine, if this philosophy is true, what sensation really and truly is, — sensation, either in its original state, or subsequent to its development in consciousness. For aught that we do or can know, what is called sensation may be no *feeling* at all of any kind, but pure thought according to the teachings of Pure Idealism. Now, while it is thus self-evident that, according to the express teachings of this philosophy, we can, by no possibility, know what sensation is, it is equally evident that, through this unknown and unknowable something, we cannot determine what other realities do, or do not exist. The real can never be found through the unknown. This we hold to be self-evident.

2. Equally impossible is it, according to the fundamental principles and deductions of this philosophy, to find any such reality, through any of *the facts of perception*, external or internal. Throughout the wide domain of perception, in all its forms alike, we are in a universe of mere appear-

ances, — appearances in and through which no realities, as they are, appear. “The things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them; neither are their relationships so constituted as they appear to us.” This is fundamental in this philosophy. How can we, by means of such appearances as these, determine what realities proximate or ultimate, finite or infinite, do or do not exist? The thing is impossible, and the attempt an absurdity.

3. Nor do our prospects brighten at all when we turn from sensation and the facts of perception, to Reason, the organ of the supersensuous, and attempt to determine, through that, what realities do and do not exist. Prof. Hickok appears to be distinctly aware that, according to the fundamental principles and deductions of his philosophy, we can never find the Unconditioned — that is, God — through the facts of nature, or the Conditioned. “The Reason,” he says, “by its insight into nature, determines for nature an absolute Author and Finisher. There is no attempt to attain the Absolute from the conditioned processes of logical thought (that is, through any scientific deductions from the known facts of nature); but, inasmuch as human reason knows itself, and is thus a law to itself, so it knows that the Absolute Spirit must have within himself his own rule and stand forever *absolved* from all rule and authority imposed upon him by another.” We are, then, to find the God of nature, not through nature, or “the things that are made,” but through the intuitions of Reason. Now, before we take this higher faculty, as it is called, as our guide, we should, as prudent disciples of nature and of truth, inquire carefully into the trustworthiness of this new teacher who is to be placed over us as our all-authoritative guide.

What, then, is Reason, as the organ and source of ultimate truth, according to the fundamental representations of this philosophy upon the subject? We answer, that Reason itself, as set forth in this philosophy, is “a liar from the beginning,” and nothing else. “The Reason,” says Prof. Hickok, “modifies Sense [external perception], and the Understanding” [all our conceptions and judgments in regard to the objects of perception, etc.]. In what form does Reason, according to this philosophy, modify these phenomena? In the first instance, it makes a mere and exclusive subjective or mental feeling, a sensation, *appear* as the quality of an object wholly external to the mind, and makes this feeling, which is undeniably in itself void of all form and extension, *appear* as the quality of an external object having both extension and form as its primary qualities. This same Reason, then, determines the Understanding to form conceptions of objects whose sole content is sensation, as objects wholly exterior to the mind and having an existence independent of it, when, in reality, they have no such form of existence whatever, and are not that in themselves or their relationships for which we take them. Throughout the whole domain of Sense and Understanding, — that is, the whole universe of perception, — Reason, as set forth in this philosophy, is wholly a false light and nothing else. Now, suppose that in reference to the great facts of ultimate causation, this same Reason professes to find “a supernatural in nature,” and to define for us the character of the Great Supreme. If she has demonstrated herself a false light, an *ignis fatuus*, as she has done, according to the express teachings of this philosophy throughout the entire domain of the world of perception, — that is, of Sense and Understanding, what infinite folly and presumption would

it be for us to take her as our sole guide through “the palpable obscure” which lies beyond the sphere of the perceptive faculties! In more than one respect, Reason stands revealed before us, in the light of the teachings of this philosophy, as fundamentally fallacious. It would be unreasonable in us, then, — yes, more, infinitely absurd and presumptuous, — we repeat, not to hold her as a false light everywhere. This is Reason, as set forth in this philosophy, and we challenge the world to show, that we have not correctly expounded the necessary deductions from the fundamental teachings and principles of this philosophy upon the subject.

According to the fundamental principles and deductions of this philosophy, an authenticated revelation from God, if we suppose him to exist, is an absolute impossibility.

That this philosophy is utterly subversive of Natural Religion, there can be no rational doubt whatever. The same holds equally true of Revealed Religion. “Science,” says Prof. Lewis, one of the leading advocates of this philosophy, “has indeed enlarged our field of thought, and for this we will be thankful to God and to scientific men. But what is it, after all, that she has given us, or can give us, but a knowledge of phenomena, — appearances? What are her boasted laws, but generalizations of such phenomena, ever resolving themselves into some one great fact that seems to be an original energy, while evermore the application of a stronger lens to our analytical telescope resolves such seeming primal force into an *appearance* or manifestation of something still more remote, which in this way, and in this way alone, reveals its presence to our senses? Thus the course of human science has ever been the substitution of one set

of conceptions for another." This is science, according to the immutable principles and deductions of this philosophy. Now, let us suppose that a new class of facts, — facts called miracles, — present themselves as authenticating a revelation from God. What have we here, according to this philosophy? *Appearances* in which nothing real appears, as before. "The application of a stronger lens to our analytical telescope" may resolve these new appearances into others more general and comprehensive, and so on forever, without our arriving at any possible proof of a revelation from the Infinite. That which may result from the inhering laws of nature can be no proof of the presence and action of a power above nature. This is self-evident. As, according to this philosophy, we know and can know nothing of nature as it is, we, of course, must be equally ignorant of the real laws of nature, — laws which determine the *appearances* by which we are deluded. How, then, do we, how can we know, but that all the so-called miracles of Scripture are the result of a law inhering in nature itself, — a law necessitating such occurrences from time to time, and that in the very circumstances and forms in which they do appear? Miracles, prophetic and otherwise, may be but the necessary forms in which phenomena, appearances, in which nothing whatever of a supernatural character appears, or is, present themselves to our minds. How, upon any scientific or rational grounds, can such appearances be adduced as authenticating a revelation from God? We have been utterly misled in reference to the whole world of perception. So this philosophy teaches. How, then, we ask again, can any appearances in such a world authenticate a divine revelation? The thing is impossible. A philosophy which denies, and in its funda-

mental principles necessarily implies, the absolute impossibility of real science in respect to nature, must, to be logically consistent, affirm the absolute impossibility of an authenticated revelation through any appearances in the world of perception. This philosophy, then, is just as utterly subversive of Revealed as it is of Natural Religion. Not a few of the advocates of this philosophy are accustomed, like Prof. Lewis, to deny science for the purpose of exalting revelation. The very principles on which they do the former, however, renders the authentication of the latter an utter impossibility.

This philosophy equally subversive of all the principles of common morality.

We deduce but one additional consequence from the fundamental principles and deductions of this philosophy. We have shown that, in its fundamental principles and necessary deductions from such principles, it is utterly subversive of Natural and Revealed Religion both. We now affirm it to be equally subversive of all the principles of common morality. All such principles are based upon the assumption — and have and can have no real validity but upon the assumption — that “the things which we envisage are that in themselves for which we take them,” and that “their relationships are so constituted as they appear to us.” All the duties imposed upon us in the domestic, social, civil, and religious relations in life have their exclusive basis in the assumption that real individuals truly exist in the world of perception around us, — individuals sustaining to each other the actual relations of parent and child, husband and wife, brother and sister, members of the community, the state, and the church, etc. Take away the

idea that such individuals really and truly exist, and that their relations are so constituted as they appear to us, and then all these principles cease, and must cease, to bind us. If the words, father and mother, husband and wife, parent and child, citizens of the state, etc., represent nothing but "baseless fabrics of a vision," appearances, whose sole content is sensation, each individual, if individuals do exist, is utterly absolved from all obligation to any existence or form of existence but himself. There is no escaping this conclusion. Now, this philosophy teaches, and its fundamental principles allow no other deductions, that all this is true of all existences and relations of existence in the world of perception, the only world that is immediately known to us. "The things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them, neither are their relationships so constituted as they appear to us." Where is the place for the principles of common morality in such a world as that? They have, and can have, no place in it whatever. All the principles of common morality imply that this philosophy, in all its fundamental principles and deductions, is false, and utterly so, and are themselves so many absolute falsehoods, if that philosophy is true.

Such are the necessary consequences of the essential principles of this philosophy. We may safely challenge the world to show that we have misstated its principles, or drawn any consequences from them which they do not, by logical necessity, yield. If we accept its principles and deductions, we must also accept these consequences, or involve ourselves in the grossest inconsistencies and self-contradictions.

BEARING OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND NECESSARY DEDUCTIONS OF THIS PHILOSOPHY UPON THE DEDUCTIONS OF SCEPTICISM.

We now advance to a consideration of the bearing of the fundamental principles and necessary consequences of this philosophy upon the deductions of Scepticism. The doctrine of Scepticism has already been stated, and need only be alluded to in this connection. This doctrine is this: As all our knowledge of realities is indirect and mediate, and derived ultimately and primarily through one medium, sensation, it must be held as exclusively phenomenal and not real, and can never, on scientific grounds, be held as valid for truth, that is, for the real character and relations of real existences. All that can properly be claimed for it is a mere *relative* validity. Further, if we attempt to transcend the limits of the exclusively phenomenal, and to determine what realities do and do not exist, we shall find that we have attempted an absolute impossibility. *A priori*, we can determine nothing in regard to the question, what is real, — the sphere, and the exclusive sphere, of *à priori* knowledge being the *possible*, and not the *actual*. *A posteriori*, we can determine nothing; for this form of knowledge, by hypothesis, pertains exclusively to the phenomenal, and not to the real. If we attempt to find the real through, or by means of, the phenomenal, this is impossible; because we do not and cannot know that the two have any, even the remotest, resemblance to each other. The real may and may not correspond to the phenomenal. But whether such correspondence does or does not obtain, we have no means of forming even a rational conjecture. Hence, of the various conceivable theories of existence, proximate and

ultimate, all that we can, upon scientific grounds, affirm of any or all of them, is this: Each system alike may or may not be true, and we have no means of knowing, or even of forming a probable conjecture, in regard to the question, which, in distinction from the others, is, and which is not, true. We cannot prove that there is or is not a universe, material and mental, corresponding to appearances within and around us. We cannot prove that the God of Theism does, or that he does not, exist. So of the theory of Materialism, on the one hand, and of Idealism in its various forms, on the other. Hence, we are utterly free from all obligation to hold any one theory as true and the others as false. On the other hand, in explaining the facts of nature, we are free to *assume* for the time any theory we please as true, and explain the facts before us accordingly. What we are prohibited doing is *dogmatizing*, that is, affirming any one theory to be true, and as true imposing it upon others.

THESE DEDUCTIONS OF SCEPTICISM VERIFIED AS NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THIS
PHILOSOPHY.

Such are the deductions of scepticism from the fundamental principles of this philosophy. Are these deductions valid? This is the great question now before us. In determining this question, different aspects of the subject present themselves. To these special attention is now invited.

The convictions and affirmations of sceptics themselves.

Let us, in the first place, contemplate the convictions and affirmations of sceptics of all classes upon this subject.

Ever since the sensational theory has been developed, — and it was one of the earliest that was developed, — a very large and leading class of philosophic thinkers have pointed to the fundamental principles of that theory, and affirmed the doctrine of scepticism as a necessary deduction from the same. On no other assumption has this doctrine ever been advocated but this, — that our knowledge is, in its nature, exclusively *mediate*, or phenomenal, and in no form, *immediate*, or real. In the honest judgment of all such minds, there is an absolutely necessary connection between the principle under consideration and the doctrine deduced from it. No deduction in the mathematics is to their minds more certain or necessary than the connection of premise and conclusion, principle and consequence, in the case before us. Nor has any philosopher or theologian ever shown, or even attempted to show, that this necessary connection does not exist. The sceptical doctrine has been combated on other grounds, but never as a deduction from the principles of this philosophy. Why this silence here? Because, in the necessary convictions of all thinking minds, no other doctrine can be deduced from the principles of this philosophy than that under consideration. Of no conclusion is the sceptic more certain than of this, — that, granting the fundamental principles of this philosophy, the truth of his doctrine follows by absolute logical necessity from those principles. The reason is obvious. This relation of necessary antecedent and consequence does, in fact, obtain between these principles and this doctrine. There is no escaping such a conclusion but by closing our eyes to the light of truth.

General admissions of theists who advocate this philosophy.

Among the advocates of Theism who hold and advocate the validity of the claims of this philosophy, there exists a general unanimity of opinion and concession on the subject before us, which should not be overlooked in this connection. We know of no theistical writer of note, in this country or in Europe, who holds and advocates the essential principles of this philosophy, who does not admit that we have, upon scientific grounds, no valid evidence, from the facts of the universe as given in our intelligence, of the being and perfections of God. Ever since the time of Kant, in Germany, and Coleridge, in England, there has been among theistic thinkers who have admitted the claims of this philosophy, a marked and growing unanimity of conviction and teaching on this subject. In general, if not without exception, the logical or scientific argument has been given up, and the question of Theodicy handed over to the Reason, to "the grasp of intuition." "The process of thought," says Prof. Hickok, "as it develops itself in reflection, to attain the truth in the valid being of the self and its objects, is wholly for Rational Psychology." Now, why have all such thinkers thus abandoned the field of experience, or the facts of the universe as given in our intelligence, as the basis for scientific deduction relatively to the problem of Theism? Why have they so generally if not universally admitted, that upon scientific grounds, relatively to "the things that are made," we have no valid proof of the being of God? But one answer can be given. Those thinkers are too well trained in the processes of logical thought, not to perceive that the necessary principles of their philosophy take away utterly the possibility

of finding among the phenomena of nature (appearances in which nothing real, as it is, appears) any valid proof whatever of the nature of any reality, finite or infinite, much less of the being and perfections of the great First Cause of all things.*

The validity of the doctrine of Scepticism a necessary deduction from the fundamental principles of this philosophy.

We now proceed to show directly that the validity of the doctrine of Scepticism is an absolutely necessary deduction from the fundamental principles of this philosophy. According to its fundamental principles, all perception, all direct and immediate knowledge with us, pertains exclusively to the phenomenal and not to what is real, that is, to mere appearances in which no substances, — real exist-

* Mr. Thomson, for example, in his Christian Theism, as we have shown in the Logic, formally admits, first, that our knowledge of the infinite has no higher validity than our own knowledge of the finite, — and then, secondly, affirms absolutely, that if the question, Is our knowledge of this latter kind valid? is pressed upon us, all basis for the theistic deduction is taken away at once and forever. This whole treatise is based upon this principle. “We profess to find,” he says, “in the foregoing observations a basis for the demonstration that our knowledge of the Infinite Being is as valid as our knowledge of the finite. If the question is to be pressed further, it must be admitted assuredly, that the depths of being are unfathomable.” This is said, after a distinct and formal admission, that the various theories of Materialism and Idealism cannot be refuted on scientific grounds. Now, when we admit that our knowledge of the Infinite Being has the same and no more validity than our knowledge of the finite, we must and ought to push the inquiry, Is the latter form of knowledge valid? We have no right to build up the superstructure of knowledge on such a subject, without careful inquiry after the foundation on which that structure rests. If we do push this necessary inquiry, then it is admitted as a necessary deduction of this philosophy, that the whole doctrine of Theism is found to rest upon “airy nothing.” Why this admission? Because the author knew absolutely, and every real thinker cannot but know, that it followed as a necessary consequence from his philosophy. Nothing remains for us but “the palpable obscure” of Scepticism. There is no escaping such a conclusion, and thinkers of all classes are rapidly advancing to an absolute unity of sentiment on this subject.

ences, — as they are, appear. Realities as they are, whether finite or infinite, proximate or ultimate, lie wholly without and beyond the sphere of perception with us. Suppose we attempt to transcend the sphere of the phenomenal, and endeavor to determine the nature and character of the real. This, as we have already shown, we can never determine *à priori*, — this form of knowledge pertaining exclusively to the possible, and not at all to the actual. Equally impossible is it for us, as we have also demonstrated, to determine the nature and character of the real through the mere phenomenal, inasmuch as we have no means whatever of determining whether the two do or do not correspond with each other. All this is self-evident, as a necessary consequence of the fundamental principles of this philosophy. Suppose, now, that we lay down the proposition that the real does in fact correspond with the phenomenal, — that is, that there is a universe material and mental corresponding to what *appears* to us as real. How can we determine whether this proposition is true or false? The thing is impossible, if the teachings of this philosophy are true. *A priori*, we cannot affirm that such a universe may not exist. At the same time it is impossible for us thus to determine whether such a universe does in fact exist, or not exist, any more than we can thus determine whether Bonaparte was or was not actually defeated at Waterloo. Equally impossible is it for us to determine this question *à posteriori*, for the undeniable reason that we have no means whatever of comparing the phenomenal with real, and finding whether they agree or disagree. Nor can we, from the mere phenomenal itself, determine what is real. We have already shown that we cannot, according to the teachings of this philosophy, determine what sensation is. How then can we determine through it

the nature of its cause? The thing is undeniably impossible. But suppose that we can know sensation? What is it? A mere *feeling* of the mind, a state of the sensibility. How can we prove that the cause of such a state must be a solid and extended substance? We cannot at all reason from any mere feeling to the nature of its cause, and determine the latter through the former. This, all admit. It follows, then, as a necessary consequence, that we cannot determine whether a universe corresponding to our perceptions and apprehensions does or does not exist? So far, therefore, the doctrine of Scepticism follows as a necessary deduction from the fundamental principles of this philosophy.

Suppose, again, that we lay down the proposition that God — the God of Theism — exists. How can we, according to the principles of this philosophy, know whether this proposition is or is not true? All that we can determine *à priori* is, that, as the proposition is not self-contradictory, it *may* be true. But whether it is or is not true, we can thus determine absolutely nothing. How stands the case when we attempt to determine the question *à posteriori*, or by an appeal to the facts of nature as given in our intelligence? If God exists at all, he exists as the real ultimate cause of the real facts of a real universe. To know him as such a cause, we must know “the things that are made,” and know them as they are. This is undeniable. Now, from all knowledge of the real finite we are wholly precluded by the fundamental principles of this philosophy. Till we know nature, we cannot know whether realities that may properly be regarded as “things that are made” do or do not exist. But nature itself we cannot know, according to the teachings of this philosophy. We are wholly within the

veil of the mere phenomenal, and have no access whatever to the real. How then can we know whether a real creator and governor of a real universe does or does not exist? The thing is impossible. The proposition, therefore, God exists, can neither be proved nor disproved, and we have, as a necessary deduction from the fundamental principles of this philosophy, the second element of the doctrine of Scepticism.

Let us next contemplate the principles of the hypothesis of Ideal Dualism, to wit, that two unknown and unknowable realities (noumena) do exist, and that the phenomenal, as given in our intelligence, is the result of the action and reaction of these two substances upon each other. It will be seen at once, without enlargement, from the train of argument pursued above, that this hypothesis, like those just considered, is utterly incapable, on the principles of this philosophy, of proof or disproof. As we do not and cannot know the *cause* of the phenomenal, we do not and cannot know whether the real cause is or is not given in this hypothesis. This no one will deny.

We will next contemplate the assumption that lays at the foundation of Materialism, on the one hand, and of Idealism, on the other, — the system just named excepted, to wit, that but one *principle* or *substance* of all things does exist. To prove or disprove this proposition, we must know things as they are. To this knowledge we can make no approach according to the fundamental principles of this philosophy. Of realities we know and can know nothing. Of the phenomenal we do not and cannot know whether it is the result of the action of one or of many real substances. The assumption before us, therefore, is utterly incapable of

proof or disproof. There is no possible escape from this conclusion.

Let us now contemplate some of the applications of this principle, as given in the hypothesis of Materialism and Idealism. As we do not know, according to the teachings of this philosophy, what matter, on the one hand, or spirit, on the other, as a substance, really is, and as we cannot know but that there is in fact but one principle or substance as the basis and source of all phenomena, we do not and cannot know but that the hypothesis of Materialism, on the one hand, or of Idealism in any of its forms, on the other, may be true. Each hypothesis stands revealed as in itself possibly true, and we have no means of determining whether it is or is not true. As a possible truth, each hypothesis stands before us as absolutely incapable of being proved or disproved. We may challenge the world to show that all this does not follow as a necessary consequence of the principles of this philosophy. We will take as an illustration the hypothesis of subjective Idealism, — the hypothesis which locates the cause of sensation within the limits of the subject of this phenomenon. As sensation in its primary state, according to the teachings of this philosophy, lies wholly beyond the sphere of consciousness, how do we, how can we, know but that sensation in this state may be the exclusive result of the spontaneous self-activities of the soul itself, — activities which lie still farther beyond and below the reach and soundings of consciousness? To this question this philosophy can give us no answer. It, therefore, cannot inform us or demonstrate to us, whether the hypothesis of Subjective Idealism is or is not true. So of the hypothesis of Materialism, on the one hand, and of Idealism in all its forms, on the other. All the deductions

which this philosophy can give us is, that each of these hypotheses may and may not be true, and that each alike, in common with that of Realism, is utterly incapable of being proved or disproved. Thus the doctrine of Scepticism in its entirety stands before us as a necessary deduction from the fundamental principles of this philosophy. This holds equally true of every system, whatever its features in other respects, which is based upon the assumption that our knowledge of the primary qualities of matter, on the one hand, and of mind, on the other, is phenomenal and not real, mediate and not immediate, representative and not presentative, and, therefore, having only a relative and not an absolute validity. No individual holding any such theory of knowledge can be anything else than an absolute and universal sceptic, excepting by a denial of the immutably necessary consequences of his own principles, and, therefore, involving himself in logical inconsistency, contradiction, and absurdity. Scepticism has absolute self-consistency relatively to its own fundamental principles and assumptions. Theism, resting upon any system but that of Realism, presents nothing but a confused mass of monstrous self-contradictions and absurdities. We would be very thankful to any individual who would show us, or the world, that we have erred at all in deducing from the essential principles of the philosophy under consideration their necessary logical consequences.

THIS PHILOSOPHY IN ITS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FALSE,
WHILE THAT OF REALISM IS TRUE.

How can we escape from these deductions of Scepticism? On one condition only: a denial of the validity of the fundamental principles of this philosophy, and an affirmation

of the validity of those of Realism. The sceptical syllogism is this :

Knowledge exclusively indirect and mediate, with its logical antecedents and consequences, can have no real and only a relative validity.

Our knowledge of nature, material and mental, is exclusively of this character.

This knowledge, therefore, has no validity whatever for truth. Its exclusive validity on the other hand is only relative.

The syllogism of Realism stands thus :

Presentative knowledge, that is, knowledge direct and immediate, with its logical antecedents and consequences, must be held as having not only a *relative* but also an absolute validity for the real existence and character of its objects.

Our knowledge of mind, on the one hand, as a real substance exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination ; and of matter, on the other, as a real substance existing exterior to the mind, and as such an existence possessed of the real qualities of extension and form ; is of this character, being given in consciousness as direct and immediate, or presentative.

This knowledge, therefore, has an absolute and not a mere relative validity, and mind, on the one hand, and matter, on the other, must be held as real substances actually possessed of the distinct and opposite qualities named above.

The philosophy which we have been considering, by necessary consequence gives us the first, or sceptical syllogism, and can give us no other. It is, therefore, properly denominated the Sceptical Philosophy. Realism, on the other hand, by consequence equally necessary, gives us the sec-

ond syllogism, with all the theistic deductions thence arising. It may, therefore, with equal propriety, and, also, as being the only philosophy which does or can, upon scientific grounds, yield these deductions, be denominated the Theistic Philosophy. Let us now turn our attention to some considerations bearing upon the question, which of these systems shall be regarded as true, and which, consequently, as false?

This sceptical philosophy cannot possibly be proved to be true, nor that of Realism proved to be false.

The first consideration which we present is this: This sceptical philosophy can, by no possibility, be proved to be true, while it is equally impossible to prove that of Realism false. *A priori*, we, of course, cannot determine the matter of fact to which category, the mediate or immediate, the representative or presentative, our knowledge of nature does belong. This is self-evident. Our only appeal is to consciousness. Now, who will pretend that, as a matter of fact, we are conscious of knowing matter, on the one hand, and mind, on the other, only mediately, and not immediately? Who will pretend that we are conscious of knowing matter exclusively through the medium of sensation, and not of having a direct or presentative knowledge of it as having a real exteriority, extension, and form? No philosopher will confront the facts of universal consciousness by making any such assertions.

It is a singular fact, that, while many philosophers have asserted the principles of the sensational or sceptical philosophy, no one has ever presented even the show of an argument to prove it true. The reader will search in vain throughout the work of Prof. Hickok for any form or ap-

pearance of an argument in favor of his theory of external perception. The title of his work, "Empirical Psychology," authorizes us to expect that all his principles and deductions will be verified by an appeal to consciousness. When we come to the principle which he lays at the very foundation of the whole superstructure, however, — his theory of external perception, — here we look in vain for argument, for an appeal to facts of conscious experience. All is mere assumption now, and nothing else. This holds equally true of every philosopher who has ever advocated this theory. No one ever did, and, we may confidently affirm, no one, in his senses, ever will attempt to prove his theory by an appeal to the only possible source of proof, the facts of conscious experience. The reason is obvious. Every thinking mind cannot but know that this theory is absolutely incapable of being proved true by any form of rational argument whatever. For the same reasons the theory of Realism cannot be proved to be false.

No antecedent probability in favor of this philosophy, and against that of Realism.

Nor can there be shown to exist any form or degree of antecedent probability in favor of this sceptical philosophy, and against that of Realism. The idea that all our knowledge of mind and matter is direct and immediate, or presentative, is just as antecedently probable as it is that it should all be indirect and mediate, or representative. Equally probable in itself is it that this knowledge should be partly presentative and partly representative, as that it should possess one or the other of these exclusive characteristics. There are no external or internal facts, nor any rational considerations, which can be adduced to show that

any form or degree of antecedent probability exists in favor of this philosophy, and against that of Realism. To every reflective mind the truth of these statements will appear as undeniably self-evident.

There is the greatest antecedent probability against this philosophy, and in favor of that of Realism.

On the other hand, it can most readily be shown that the greatest antecedent probability exists against this philosophy, and in favor of that of Realism. The former theory affirms that a mere feeling of the mind, a sensation utterly void in itself of extension and form, is directly and immediately perceived by the mind, such being the nature of the intellect, as an object existing wholly external to the mind and independent of it, and having as such object real extension and form. The latter theory affirms that, whatever object is presentatively known to the mind as having these or any other qualities, said qualities really and truly exist attaching to such object. Now, which in itself is the most antecedently probable, the theory that the intelligence should be, and is, so constituted that a mere subjective feeling, utterly void of certain qualities, should be directly and immediately perceived by the mind as an external object having such qualities, or the theory that affirms that what the intelligence directly and immediately perceives, as such object, is in fact what it is presentatively known and affirmed to be? We affirm, without the fear of contradiction, that the latter theory has, in view of every consideration drawn from the idea of mind as a power of knowledge, from all our intuitive convictions, from all principles of science, and from all honorable views of the Author of our being, infinitely the highest antecedent proba-

bility in its favor. Nor do we think that any candid, reflective mind will question the truth of this statement. So far, then, we have advanced on perfectly safe grounds.

This philosophy stands revealed as false, and that of Realism as true, in the light of all the tests of truth laid down by Prof. Hickok himself, and in the light of all other valid tests.

We now affirm that this philosophy stands revealed as false in its fundamental principles, and that of Realism as true, in the light of the universal criteria of truth laid down by Prof. Hickok himself, and in the light of all other valid tests. Speaking of common-sense, our author uses the following language :

“ Rightly used, the test of common-sense is conclusive, for only that which common-sense sanctions can have any place in our psychology. But this appeal to the common-sense must, in all the process, be legitimately pursued. Three important rules must be observed in order to insure a safe decision.

“ 1. The facts must be within the range of the common consciousness.

“ 2. The decision must be general.

“ 3. The decision must be unbiassed.

“ These three requisites in the application of common-sense, the *competency*, *generality*, and *honesty* of the decision, will give validity to any fact that may be so sustained.”

These certainly are valid tests of truth, or none such exist. What are the bearings of these tests upon the question before us? To this question special attention is now invited.

That the question of fact whether we are conscious of a

direct and immediate, or presentative perception of matter, as an object having real extension and form, "does lie within the range of the common consciousness," and that that decision is strictly "general" and "impartial," is undeniable. Nothing whatever exists to prevent a general and impartial decision in "the common consciousness" on this subject. What is this decision? There is not a philosopher on earth, of common honesty, and who has any regard to his own reputation, who will deny that in the consciousness of the act of external perception, universal mind is, without prejudice, distinctly conscious of a direct and immediate, or presentative perception of an external object, an object having the real qualities of extension and form. On no question whatever is the decision of the common consciousness more strictly general and impartial and absolute than on this. We must, then, deny utterly the validity of all our author's own tests of truth, or affirm that his theory of external perception is false,—utterly so,—and that of Realism true.

In another place our author thus speaks of certain deductions of the German philosophy: "But it is itself a perpetual demonstration against this conclusion that the human mind never gave submissive assent to it." Now, for this admitted demonstrative reason, we affirm that our author's theory is demonstrably false, and that of Realism true. "The human mind never gave its submissive assent" to the dogma, that in external perception, when we are conscious of a presentative knowledge of an external object having real extension and form, we are in reality only perceiving our own mental states, to wit, sensations. Kant admits that it is inherent in reason to believe in the objective validity of our external perceptions, and that this conviction

so immutably inheres in the universal mind that no deductions of philosophy can eradicate it. And who would dare deny such statements? The very criteria of universal truth, on the authority of which Prof. Hickok denies certain deductions of the German philosophy, affirms absolutely and demonstratively, that the fundamental principles of his own philosophy are false, and those of Realism true. There is no escaping this conclusion.

The same holds equally true of any valid criteria of truth that can be adduced. All such criteria, without exception, give their united testimony against the validity of the fundamental principles of this philosophy, and in favor of those of Realism. We must either conclude, therefore, that this philosophy is false, or that we have no criteria by which we can even form a conjecture, much less determine with certainty, what is true, and what is false.

This philosophy affirmed to be false, and that of Realism true, by the united convictions of universal mind.

We have already anticipated, in some form, the argument next to be presented. We refer to the necessary intuitive convictions of universal mind upon this subject. If there is any point in which the necessary and intuitive convictions of the universal intelligence absolutely meet and harmonize, it is this: that we do, in fact, have a direct and immediate knowledge of mind as a real substance, exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, and of matter as an external object possessing the qualities of real extension and form, and in the conviction that these substances, as possessed of these distinct and opposite qualities, do exist. The common consciousness, the intuitive convictions of the universal mind, and

the common-sense of the race, must all be assumed to be a lie, and that without any evidence whatever, of the truth of this assumption, or any antecedent probability in its favor, and with an antecedent probability correspondingly strong against it, or we must affirm this philosophy, in its fundamental principles, to be false, and that of Realism consequently true. Every advocate of this philosophy is perfectly aware that he has against him, the common-sense and intuitive convictions of the race upon this subject. And when we refer to them upon the subject, he cannot but be aware that he has no real reasons whatever by which he can show these convictions to be invalid. Now, while this philosophy, in all its fundamental principles, thus stands opposed to the united intuitive convictions of universal mind, those of Realism, in their entirety, perfectly accord with these convictions. This none will deny. What higher evidence can we have, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, that this latter theory is true, and the former false? We leave these considerations to the careful reflection of the thoughtful reader.

This philosophy affirmed to be false, and that of Realism true, by the direct and immediate testimony of Consciousness.

We have but one additional argument to present, in addition to those already presented. We refer to the direct and immediate testimony of universal Consciousness. We have already indicated what this testimony is, and have, in other connections, fully spread out this whole subject before the reader's mind. We need not repeat here what has been so fully presented elsewhere. The argument upon this point has never been met, and we are quite confident it never will be. The fact that we are distinctly conscious

of a real presentative knowledge of matter, for example, as an external object, having the qualities of real extension and form, is absolutely undeniable. If it should be denied, the denial would at once be confronted by the united testimony of universal mind. If we deny the validity of this form of knowledge, we impeach the intelligence itself, as a faculty of knowledge, and thus deny the possibility of valid knowledge on any subject whatever. But this one alternative is left us, to admit the validity of our knowledge of matter, on the one hand, and of mind, on the other, for the real existence and character of their respective objects, or to affirm the intelligence itself to be a lie, and nothing else, and thus deny the possibility of valid knowledge on any subject whatever. We conclude, then, that this sceptical philosophy is nothing else but "science falsely so called." It is a crazy and rude philosophy, and not real science, which thus denies to us the possibility of knowing ourselves, external nature, immortality, and God.

MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.

We now advance to a consideration of a few topics of a more general nature, — topics, however, which have a fundamental bearing upon our present inquiries.

The idea of a positive religion having its basis in the philosophy under consideration.

Among these topics, we will first contemplate the idea of a *positive* religion as having its basis in the system of philosophy which we have just investigated, — a religion we refer to, which speaks by authority, requiring us, under pains and penalties, to hold certain doctrines as true, and

their opposite as false, and certain mental states and courses of conduct as right, and their opposites as wrong. We judge that we are perfectly safe in the affirmation that we have rendered it demonstrably evident that the two following propositions follow as necessary deductions from the fundamental principles of this philosophy, to wit: 1. That the being and perfections of God, according to the theistic hypothesis, supposing him to exist, is a truth utterly unascertainable by us. 2. That an *authenticated* revelation from him, if he does exist, is to us, in our present relations to the real facts of nature, an absolute impossibility. Where, then, is there, or can there be, a basis for a religion speaking to us by divine authority? No such basis does or can exist. On the other hand, the Most High, if we suppose him to exist, has, as we have already stated, in placing us in such relations to the works of his own hands, given us the most positive indication that he possibly can, that it is his will that we should not act religiously at all, or treat any professed revelation from him as a real one. We hold both of these propositions as self-evidently true.

But it is said, by the advocates of this philosophy, that while it remains true that, upon rational or scientific grounds, the truth of the being of God is wholly unascertainable by us, and an authenticated revelation from him an impossibility, yet, if we act conscientiously and follow our intuitive convictions, we shall act religiously, and receive and treat the Bible as a real revelation from God. And here, it is affirmed, lie the superlative claims of this philosophy. It takes the whole question of natural and revealed religion entirely out of the domain of science, or of the logical faculty, and places it wholly within the sphere

of the conscience and intuition, thus making its claims absolute. Just as if the sphere of the conscience and intuition does not lie at the very centre of the true and proper domain of real science! What a strange delusion is here. On the other hand, we affirm, without the fear of contradiction, that it is an absolute intuition of the universal intelligence, that we cannot be morally bound to treat as real any being or object, finite or infinite, whose existence has not been, and cannot be, ascertained by us; and that an unauthenticated revelation from God cannot bind the conscience as a real revelation from him. Place before the conscience the proposition, as an admitted truth, that the facts of the universe as revealed to man, when scientifically classified and elucidated, leave the question of the being of God utterly unascertainable, and render an authenticated revelation from him, if he does exist, an impossibility, and it will absolutely absolve us from all obligation to act as religious beings, much less as Christians. According to the intuitive convictions of the Universal Intelligence, also, we shall act most irrationally, if we thus act at all.

The bearing of this philosophy upon the doctrine of the being of God, considered as a probable truth.

The utmost that can be said, as we have already seen, in favor of the claims of theism, according to the fundamental principles of this philosophy, is this: that it stands as one among a certain number of contradictory hypotheses of ultimate causation,—hypotheses, some one of which must be true, while each has precisely equal claims to validity with every other. The question which we now propound is this: Which of these, the theistic, or any one of the antitheistic hypotheses, has, in the light of the funda-

mental principles of this philosophy, the greatest antecedent probability in its favor? If God, as a self-conscious personality possessed of the attributes of absolute infinity and perfection, which is the theistic hypothesis, does exist, we must, of course, suppose that all realities, as they are in themselves, are fully and perfectly known to him. In constituting mind, it is, to say the least, just as conceivable, and consequently, in itself, just as possible for God to have so constituted it, that realities, within and around it should be to it objects, while it should sustain to them the relations of a power of real knowledge, as that he should have so constituted it, as this philosophy teaches us that he did, that mere feelings of the mind itself should be perceived by the intelligence, as the qualities of objects external to the mind, and in their nature wholly unlike the objects actually perceived, and thus making perception, when understood, a lie, and nothing else. In itself, we affirm, without fear of contradiction, that it is infinitely more probable, that such a being, in constituting the human intelligence, would constitute it a faculty of real and not of mere relative or deceptive knowledge. On the supposition, therefore, that the mind is constituted in accordance with the principles of this philosophy, we say that it is far more probable that that constitution is the result of the necessary action of some law inhering in nature, than that it is the effect of the voluntary agency of such a being as the God of theism. If this philosophy is true, then, any hypothesis which stands opposed to that of theism, has far more antecedent probability in its favor than the latter. We submit this deduction, without fear, to the reflection of every candid inquirer for the truth.

The high merit often ascribed to Kant in his critique on the theistic argument.

As the result of his examination of all actual, and, as he asserts, of all possible arguments to prove the being of God, Kant affirms that the theistic hypothesis is wholly incapable of proof on scientific grounds. This is conceded by not a few theistic writers and thinkers. At the same time, great merit is ascribed to the argument, as conducted by this author, from the fact that that argument is equally applicable to every antitheistic hypothesis. If theism, as this philosopher professedly shows, cannot be proved true, neither, and for the same reasons, can any hypothesis opposed to theism, be proved true. Some individuals appear to hail this conclusion as a triumph of theism. But where has Kant really and truly placed us, if we admit the validity of his theistic deductions? Just where we cannot, without the most manifest self-contradiction and absurdity, be anything else than absolute sceptics. If no one hypothesis, as Kant's argument professedly shows, can be proved true, no one, for the same reason, can be proved false. All alike stand upon the same basis, and scepticism is the only true philosophy. This is just where this author intended to place us, and here, if we maintain logical consistency, we shall remain, or deny the validity of this philosophy. How often do the friends of truth admit, and even glory in that which utterly subverts the truth itself! The truth is, that few treatises can be named, more utterly subversive, on the one hand, of all religion, and, on the other, more demonstrably sophistical and fallacious, than is Kant's

“Critical Inquiry into the Grounds of Proof for the Existence of God.”

Mr. R. W. Emerson's avowed relations, as a professed teacher of truth, to what he announces as such.

It will be recollected by many, if not by most of our readers, when Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson had began to attract public attention on account of his apparently lawless and wayward modes of thinking, that he, in a letter to a ministerial friend, — a letter published at the time, — made a full and distinct avowal of his real relations, as a professed teacher of truth, to the dogmas which he avowed and put forth as such. In this communication, he distinctly avows the fact that he had no reasons whatever to assign to himself, or to the public, for any sentiment which he held or avowed as true, and that he was the weakest of men when called upon to assign such reason, and this because no such reason whatever existed even in his own mind. He simply announced what, for the time being, appeared to him as true, and that without himself knowing, or being able to tell, *why* that sentiment thus appeared to his mind. Such was his character throughout as a thinker. This avowal struck the public as very singular and strange. Yet there was in it the most rigid and logical consistency with the philosophical principles which lie at the basis of all his intellectual activities. Mr. Emerson is a self-consistent disciple of the philosophy which we have been elucidating. With him, consequently, all knowledge pertaining to realities, objective and subjective, has no real, and only a relative, validity. Mind, in all its perceptions, external and internal, is encircled with mere appearances, in which no realities as they are appear, — appearances in

which "the things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them, nor are their relationships so constituted as they appear to us." When Mr. Emerson sounded the depths of this philosophy, he saw, with absolute distinctness, that it left the mind with no grounds or reasons whatever, for holding any one doctrine in distinction from any other, on any subject as true. To be logically consistent, therefore, free thinking must become the law of all our mental activity. Whatever, at any one moment, may *appear* to any mind as true, let that mind enunciate as a truth, and that without attempting to assign to itself or the public any reasons of any kind for that announcement. Here, to say the least, is the merit of absolute self-consistency; and no man, holding this philosophy, can take any other position, without the demerit of undeniable logical inconsistency and self-contradiction. Mr. Emerson has rightly interpreted the philosophy of which he is a devoted disciple, and no one can show that this is not the fact. Nor can any one, holding in common with this individual the fundamental principles of this philosophy, assign any valid reason for not being, not only almost, but altogether, the lawless free-thinker that Mr. Emerson is. A philosophy which locates the mind, as this does, in a universe of mere appearances, in which no realities as they are do or can appear, can give us no valid criteria of truth on any subject whatever. It utterly removes all grounds and reasons for holding any one sentiment as true and its opposite as false.

SCEPTICISM, AS A SPECIAL FORM OF THOUGHT.

SCEPTICISM NOT WHOLLY NEGATIVE IN ITS CHARACTER.

At first view, Scepticism presents itself as "a mere bundle of negations," merely affirming absolute ignorance of all realities of every kind, and, therefore, making no positive affirmations or denials in respect to them. On a nearer view, however, Scepticism, like all other forms of thought and belief, has its positive element, to wit: the dogma, that all our knowledge is exclusively phenomenal, mere appearance in which no reality whatever appears, and that, consequently, "the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must ever be, unknown." Take away this one dogma, and this system falls at once, and wholly and forever disappears. This dogma the sceptic adopts, not as the result of original psychological investigation, but as a truth assumed to have been verified as such by prior dogmatic systems, to wit, Materialism and Idealism. Antitheism has never, in the history of the world, been, for any considerable time, fixed in its principles or form; but has always moved round in a circle, occupying, at each successive stage of its progress, the centre of some special system of antitheistic form of thought, which, for the time, obtained popular favor, — these forms of thought, also, having always been the same and ever following each other in the same order. For a time, Materialism sways the popular thought, and Antitheism takes on the form of blank Atheism. Materialism is then supplanted by Ideal Dualism; this is, at length, superseded by Subjective Idealism; this, by Pantheism; and this last, by Pure

Idealism or Nihilism. The mind, at length wearied and dissatisfied with all these systems, takes refuge in Scepticism, beyond which there is no advance. Finding this the most unsatisfactory of all other dwelling-places, the popular mind, as far as it has swung from its proper moorings, returns to its point of departure, Materialism, to repeat the same circle as before. Antitheism, as a lost spirit, has ever been wandering through these dry and barren systems, "seeking rest and finding none," always dwelling in each, and taking form from each, so long as it commanded popular favor; appearing first of all as blank Atheism; then as "a regulative idea;" then as "the substance and principle of all things;" then as "a law of thought;" and lastly, in the system of Scepticism, as "the unknowable and unknown,"—the form which it now assumes. Let us now turn our attention to the positive element in the sceptical form of thought, the element to which we above referred. This element takes on two forms, each equally positive. The first pertains to the character of our knowledge, and may be thus expressed: *I do know that my knowledge is all exclusively phenomenal, mere appearance in which nothing real appears.* The second pertains to our relations to all realities that lie behind all appearances. This article of the sceptic's faith may be thus announced: *I do know that I do not know anything at all.* These two articles embrace and express the sum and substance of his entire creed. This phenomenal character of all our knowledge pertains, we must bear in mind, not merely to the world itself, but to all specific forms of being and of life which seem to have existence in the world, as, for example, the individual, the family, the community, and the state. In regard to all forms of knowledge pertaining to such apparent

realities, his creed is this: *I do know* that knowledge pertaining to these and all other seeming realities is mere appearance, in which no reality appears. *I do know* that such is the character of my knowledge of those seeming substantialities represented by the terms father, mother, brother and sister, husband and wife, friend and benefactor. In regard to the realities which lie behind all these appearances, *I do know* that my ignorance of them is absolute. When this creed is fully understood, the world will rise up and affirm to these sceptics, one and all of them, Gentlemen, *we know* that you do not know what you affirm that you do know. We also know that you do not yourselves believe your own creed. You are not and cannot be such infinite fools as to put real faith in any such absurdity as that. If science cannot clear the brain of a philosopher from a known absurdity, the name and title of philosopher should not shield him from the reputation of holding an absurdity. But what are the essential characteristics of this dogma in both the forms above stated? On this subject we remark, —

The dogma of Scepticism not intuitively true.

1. This dogma, in neither of its forms, is an *intuitive* truth. This is self-evident. We are, in fact, conscious of a direct and immediate, or intuitive, knowledge of matter as an actually existing reality having extension and form, on the one hand; and of mind, as possessed of the powers of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, on the other. To affirm that we also know by intuition that our knowledge of these realities is exclusively phenomenal, is to affirm what we are not conscious of, in the first instance, and in the next, to make intuitive knowledge contradict

itself; for we are conscious of knowing these realities as they are in themselves, that is, as possessed of the actual qualities and attributes named above. To affirm that we also know intuitively that we know nothing whatever of these realities, is to affirm that knowledge is, and is not, knowledge, — in other words still, that we intuitively know ourselves to be utterly ignorant of that of which we have an intuitive knowledge. On this topic, however, we need not enlarge, as sceptics themselves do not regard their own dogma as having intuitive certainty.

This theory opposed to the absolute testimony of Consciousness.

2. This dogma in both its forms, we remark in the next place, stands directly opposed to the absolute testimony of Consciousness. If we are conscious of any fact whatever, we are conscious of a direct and immediate, or an intuitive knowledge of both matter and spirit as realities possessed of the qualities above designated. In other words, we are conscious that our knowledge of these realities is not exclusively phenomenal, but has absolute validity for the reality and essential characteristics of its objects. Sceptics themselves will not deny the truth of these affirmations. Hence we remark, —

Also opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race.

3. That this dogma in both forms stands opposed to the necessary intuitive convictions of the race, sceptics themselves included. Whatever theories of knowledge individuals may entertain, all admit, that, from the constitution and laws of the Universal Intelligence, all men do and must believe intuitively in the reality of the world of matter and of spirit, and in the validity of our knowledge of the same.

With this necessary intuitive conviction, therefore, the sceptical dogma in every form which it can assume, is directly and openly confronted.

Of no validity as an inductive truth.

4. As an inductive proposition, the only form in which it can be held, this sceptical dogma can by no possibility have any real validity. An inductive proposition which stands in direct opposition to intuitive knowledge, as this dogma undeniably does, must be false. The basis of all valid deduction is intuition, and when the former contradicts the latter, we must have erred in our deductions. But this dogma not only stands in open opposition to empirical intuition, the absolute testimony of Consciousness, but to intuitive knowledge which has necessary or apodictic validity, to our intuitive knowledge of time and space. Time and space are both in common, as we have already seen, represented in the universal Consciousness as realities, with these immutable characteristics, that it is absolutely impossible for us even to conceive of them as not existing, or as not being in themselves the identical realities which in human thought they are represented as being. Here, then, is a dogma which affirms our absolute ignorance of all realities of every kind, — a dogma, which by no possibility can be true, unless necessary knowledge, which it is impossible for us to conceive as not having absolute validity, is utterly false.

The dogma of Scepticism a mere assumption.

5. What, then, in reality, is this imposing dogma in each of its forms? It is and must be, we answer, a mere *assumption* and nothing else, — an assumption wholly unindicated by the intellect, and adopted by mere force of will, by an

act of self-compulsion. No higher claims can possibly be vindicated for it by any facts of Consciousness, or by any valid deductions of science. Void utterly of all claims to any place as an intuitive truth or principle of science, standing in direct and open opposition to the absolute testimony of Consciousness and the intuitive convictions of the race, and absolutely void of all validity as an inductive truth, it stands revealed as a naked assumption forced into the sphere of human thought through "the antitheses of science falsely so called."

Arguments adduced to sustain this assumption.

6. The arguments, or rather sophisms, by which the advocates of the sceptical hypothesis have endeavored to sustain the validity of this assumption, have already, perhaps, received a sufficient refutation. As, at this one point, the fundamental issue is presented between the sceptical and the theistic philosophy, and as we here meet with the only appearance of argument which can be adduced in favor of the former hypothesis, we crave indulgence for a fuller examination of the dogma under consideration than we had ourselves originally intended. The advocates of this dogma enter into no proper investigation of the facts of Consciousness bearing upon the subject. On the other hand, they analyze ideas and conceptions existing in the mind pertaining to matter, spirit, nature, substance, cause, and God, and finding, as they opine, in said ideas and conceptions, certain elements of contradiction, they conclude that human knowledge in no form can have objective validity. This is the argument. Let us now contemplate certain facts and considerations having a final bearing upon this subject.

The fact that existence is a mystery overlooked in this argument.

(1.) Those who employ this argument forget that existence itself, aside from the specific forms in which it is manifested to us, is a *mystery*, — a mystery which lies wholly below and beyond our comprehension. If we attempt to fathom and comprehend the deep profound of being, we shall, of course, involve ourselves in difficulties and perplexities from which there is no extrication. When we take the facts of existence just as they are manifested to us, with all that said facts imply; when, upon rigid scientific principles, we classify and generalize the knowledge we thus obtain, and deduce from it all the conclusions it yields, in moving along this, the only track of true science, no contradictions whatever appear. Suppose, now, that instead of thus moving along the line of scientific inquiry and deduction, we attempt to solve all the extraneous problems which the mystery of being involves, and refuse to accept as real what we actually know to be such, until these insolvable problems are all resolved to our perfect satisfaction. In adopting such principles and such a method of inquiry, we shall, of course, ere long find ourselves involved in an endless maze of inexplicable contradictions. If we will stop right here and take a sober second thought upon the subject, we shall find that we have not been led into these perplexities by following the light of true science, but by following the ignis fatuus of “science falsely so called.”

Body, for example, as manifested to universal mind, is a compound constituted of simple parts, which, of course, are not compounded. The compound we perceive; the simple we do not perceive, but apprehend as a reality necessarily

implied as such by the compound which is known to be real. Apprehended as a compound constituted of simple parts, the conception of body involves no element of contradiction whatever, — the idea of the compound and the simple being perfectly compatible ideas, and they yield no deductions involving in any form the elements of contradiction. Suppose, that we take this compound and push the question, How far can the principle of division in respect to it be carried? We may then find ourselves, with Mr. Spencer and his associates, “in wondering mazes lost.” But what has all this to do with the other question, to wit, whether the compound constituted of simple parts does in fact exist? Nothing whatever. The question, Whether the compound constituted of perfectly simple parts does in fact exist, and the other question, How far the principle of divisibility in respect to said compound may, in thought, be carried, are questions totally distinct the one from the other, — questions which have not the remotest bearing upon one another.

Take one other illustration. We perceive body as real, and apprehend space as a reality necessarily implied by that of the object perceived. We also perceive succession, and apprehend duration or time as similarly implied. When we turn our contemplation upon these implied verities, both in common present themselves to thought as absolutely infinite, the one infinite in two, and the other in all directions. On further reflection we find it utterly impossible to conceive of their non-existence, or of their not being in any respects in themselves the identical realities which they are represented in human thought as being. In the conceptions of body and succession, and in the ideas of space and time, as thus given, no elements of contradiction whatever ap-

pear. The same holds true of all the sciences, pure and mixed, to which such conceptions, together with the subjective knowledge perceived and implied, given through Consciousness, give rise. All, throughout, is perfect harmony, with the utter absence of all appearance of contradiction, and it is amid such problems of existence exclusively that true science conducts us. Its light never "leads to bewilder, or dazzles to blind."

Suppose, now, that, turning away from the light of science, we moot such questions as the following: Whether space and time are or are not to be considered as "entities or the attributes of entities;" "whether space and time must be claimed as things," things having attributes; and, finally, whether extension is one of their attributes? It is, by mooting these identical questions, that such thinkers as Mr. Spencer involve, not space and time, but themselves, in endless perplexities and contradictions. But what have these questions, or the contradictions which their attempted solution implies, to do with the other question, to wit, Whether space and time, *as* represented in human thought, are realities? Nothing whatever. If calling them entities, or things, or attributes of the same, involves the subject in contradictions, true science requires us to change our nomenclature, and not to deny the reality of objects which it is absolutely impossible for us to conceive of as not being, and not being what they are actually represented in thought to be. Here we have the exclusive source and cause of all the perplexities and contradictions which such thinkers imagine to exist in our ideas of nature, substance, cause, time, space, and God. Such contradictions have no place in these ideas themselves, but have being exclusively

from foreign questions which false science forces into the sphere of human thought and inquiry.

That the terms entities and things, as employed by Mr. Spencer, are identical in meaning is obvious from the fact, that in the same paragraph he employs them interchangeably. Now, a thing is not space, as any authoritative dictionary will show, but some entity or substance existing in space. To reason about the realities represented by these terms as if they were one and the same, will, of course, involve, not our ideas of said realities, but ourselves, in endless contradictions. Take these realities, *as* actually represented in thought, and no contradictions can be found in them. The idea represented by the term space, it should be remembered, is an absolutely simple and ultimate idea, — an idea utterly unlike any other that exists in the mind. The same holds in respect to the idea represented by the term time. To reason correctly about the realities represented by these terms, we must take said realities just as they are represented in thought. We shall then find that our ideas of said realities are absolutely free from even the appearance of contradiction.

The occasion and cause of the seeming contradictions by which the argument is sustained.

(2.) The occasion and the cause of the varied contradictions which philosophers of a certain school professedly find in all our world conceptions and necessary ideas, seem to have, thus far, escaped the notice of the analyzers of human thought. Let us turn our attention, for a few moments, to this subject. We shall then find, that, by a perfectly explicable process of thought, these philosophers have not

found the contradictions affirmed by them to exist, but that they have unconsciously perpetrated a singular deception upon themselves. The idea of body, for example, is, as we have seen, that of a compound made up of simple parts; the two classes of elements entering into the composition of this idea being given by the two primary faculties, Sense, the faculty of external perception, and Reason, the faculty of *implied* knowledge. These two classes of elements, the perceived and implied, the former represented by the term compound, and the latter by the word simple, on being brought within the sphere of Consciousness, are, by a secondary intellectual process through a secondary faculty, the Understanding, the conceptive faculty, or notion-forming power of the mind, — these two classes of elements, the perceived and implied, are, we say, by this secondary faculty combined into a specific conception represented by the term body. Here we find ourselves in the presence of one of the fixed laws of this conceptive faculty, the Understanding. If through the action of this faculty we form a conception of any material object, — a conception represented by the term body, — we must blend into the conception the two elements under consideration, the perceived and the implied, the idea of the compound on the one hand, and of the simple on the other. These philosophers affirm that our idea of body is self-contradictory, and, therefore, of impossible objective validity. To prove this, they must take this conception as given in Consciousness, and show that its constituent elements are incompatible the one class with the other. What are, in truth, the constituent elements of this conception? They are that of a compound, on the one hand, and those of simples, or ultimate elements not compounded, on the other. This, and nothing else, is the conception as given in Con-

sciousness. Now, there is undeniably no relation of incompatibility existing between these two distinct classes of elements in respect to each other. The idea of a compound is, in no sense whatever, incompatible with that of the simple. Equally compatible is the latter idea with the former. This is undeniable. In the same manner, it may be shown that not one of our real world-conceptions is, in any sense or form, self-contradictory. On what conditions would such conceptions be self-contradictory? On such conditions exclusively as these, that our conception of body, for example, is wholly that of a compound made up entirely of parts which are themselves compounds, and not simples. This is what the sceptical philosophers of all schools affirm our conception of body to be. This is what all the philosophers named by Mr. Spencer, from Protagoras to Kant, affirmed of this conception. In the name of the Universal Intelligence, we affirm, that no such conception of body has place in the general Consciousness; that the monstrous absurdity of a compound constituted exclusively of compounded parts has being nowhere but in the brain of a self-deceived and crazy philosophy.

How do these philosophers professedly show that such is the character of our world-conceptions? In this form. Suppose we recur to the conception represented by the term, body, — a conception constituted of the two elements referred to, — the idea of a compound, on the one hand, and of the simple, on the other. We conceive this object, body, to be divided. We then attempt to form, through the Understanding, a conception of each of the divided parts. By the immutable laws of this faculty, we must conceive of said parts, if we form conceptions of them at all, as themselves compounds made up of parts more

simple We may repeat this dividing process *ad infinitum*, and as long as we keep the divided parts within the sphere of this conceptive faculty, and compel it to form conceptions of the same, so long shall we obtain the same result as before, the conception of a compound constituted wholly of un-compounded parts. If we assume that it is exclusively by such a process of successive divisions and bisections, that we obtain our idea of the simple, and this is just what these philosophers do assume, then our conceptions of body would have in them the monstrous absurdity of a compound wholly constituted of compounds. It is by no such process, however, that the idea of the simple is obtained. On the other hand, through the action of Sense, the faculty of external perception, the compound is directly and immediately given as real. On such perception, Reason directly and immediately apprehends the simple, as necessarily and absolutely implied by the compound which is perceived. As soon as these two elements, the perceived and the implied, appear in Consciousness, the Understanding takes the initiative, and blends said elements into a conception represented by the term body. Such is the origin and genesis of this conception. The elements entering into it are all absolutely compatible with one another, and it is only by a false psychological process, the process above explained, that these, or any other of our world-conceptions, can, by any possibility, be made to appear as self-contradictory.

Let us now, for a moment, contemplate two other necessary laws of the Understanding. Two other elements do and must enter into all our world-conceptions, that of quality given by perception, and that of substance given by Reason, as implied by the quality perceived. Between these two elements no appearance of incompatibility can be

shown to exist. Further, body is conceived, as an extended substance, existing in space and occupying space. Here, too, the same relations of absolute compatibility as before, do, undeniably obtain. Space is given, as the place of body and substance in all their forms, as implied by the same, and as the necessary condition of their existence. Suppose, now, that we take idea of space, force said idea into the sphere of the Understanding, and compel it to form a conception of the object represented by the term, space. By the immutable laws which control the action of this faculty, it will, and it must, in such a case, give forth a conception, not of space as really represented in human thought, but of some substance, having attributes, — that is, of some object existing in space. Now, if we confound, as Mr. Spencer and others have done, the conception thus obtained with our idea of space, then, of course, and not otherwise, will that idea appear as self-contradictory. It is by just such unscientific processes as these, taking conceptions and ideas from the cognizance of the only faculties to whose cognizance they exclusively belong, and forcing them into the spheres of other faculties which cannot act upon said phenomena, without fundamentally erring, that all our world-conceptions and necessary ideas have been made to appear as self-contradictory and absurd. The error of such processes, and the nature of that error, are now distinctly exposed.

All the sceptical difficulties equally pertain to what sceptics affirm to be real.

(3.) Sceptics of all schools, as we remarked in another chapter, admit and must admit, that *something* is real, appearances, to say the least. All the difficulties and seeming

contradictions which they affirm to exist in our world-conceptions and necessary ideas are involved in all their force and in the same identical forms, in the idea, the validity of which they admit and affirm, to wit, that something does in fact exist. That which is equally involved in all conceivable and possible hypotheses, some one of which must be true, can have no force whatever against the validity of any of them. Appearances, for example, are real. This none will deny. Now, appearances must, if they do occur, occur *somewhere and in some time*. But this implies the absolute validity of our ideas of time and space, and involves Mr. Spencer in all the contradictions which he professedly finds in said ideas. There is not a difficulty which he thinks he finds in any of our world-conceptions which may not be demonstrated to be involved in every conception which he will affirm must be true. How infinite, then, the absurdity of urging these difficulties as valid for the invalidity of said conceptions!

The sophistry involved in this argument exposed.

(4.) An ingenious and subtle sophism may not unfrequently be most effectively exposed by applying the argument to some specific subject, in respect to which it is well known that it can have no validity whatever. The argument by which certain schools in philosophy have professedly demonstrated the invalidity of all our world-conceptions and necessary ideas must have in it the appearance of conclusiveness. Else it could not have deceived so many exceedingly shrewd thinkers. The argument, it will be remembered, is this: Our world-conceptions and necessary ideas cannot have real objective validity, for the obvious

reason, that they all, in common, are self-contradictory, yielding with the same consecutiveness, two distinct, opposite, and irreconcilably contradictory propositions. Take, for example, the idea of body as made up of simple parts. From this idea, the two contradictory propositions result, as demonstrably evident, to wit, that "every compound body is made up of simple parts," and that "no compound body does or can exist which is made up of simples." So in all other cases; and there is, it is affirmed, but one escape from these contradictions, and that is, to deny utterly the validity of all our knowledge.

Let us now apply this argument to a given case. We have, seemingly, to say the least, a certain book before us, — a book affirmed on its title-page to have been written by a certain thinker living in a certain locality in a place called England. The name of said thinker is Herbert Spencer. We will take the work as represented in the thought of all who seem to themselves to have read it, and will demonstrate by the same process of deduction by which he argues the utter invalidity of all our world-knowledge and necessary ideas, that no such work as the one which seemingly lies before us, does or can have being, nor can there be anywhere any such thinker as said title-page seemingly affirms. Now for the proof.

This seeming work is or is not the product of a thinking mind, no other hypothesis being conceivable. According to the philosophy seemingly taught in this seeming production, both the hypotheses above stated are encompassed with inextricable difficulties and contradictions. To suppose it to be the product of such a thinker is to affirm as real successive events, the existence of the cause, and the subsequent occurrence of the event. This would imply

absolutely the real validity of our idea of time ; for, if succession is real, time, as we apprehend it, must be real also. But time is no such reality, and cannot be, according to the fundamental teachings of this book. Such a supposition is therefore utterly inadmissible. On the other hand, to suppose the thoughts apparently contained in this seeming book not to be the product of a thinking mind, is to affirm an event without a cause, phenomena without a subject, and thought without a thinker, — the most impossible of all conceptions. There is but one possible escape from these palpable contradictions. We must affirm that no such book, no such train of thought as that seeming book seemingly contains, and no such thinker as this book and train of thought are referred to, have or can have being anywhere, or in any time. We would be thankful to any one who should show us wherein the above argument is not perfectly parallel to, and equally conclusive with, that by which our author professedly demonstrates the invalidity of all our world-conceptions and necessary ideas.

There is a still more fundamental view of this “high argument.” It is undeniable that the author of this work, if he exist at all, is either “in his head” “or out of his head,” no other supposition being possible. Now, from the work itself, by a process of reasoning identical with the process in Kant’s “Antinomies of pure Reason,” of which the work of our author is but a rehash, we can demonstrate the validity of both the above propositions. To parallel fully the antinomies we will argue the first proposition as our Thesis, and the second as our Antithesis.

Thesis.

To demonstrate the thesis, we need only refer to the general character of this work,—to the undeniable fact that it fully realizes the idea of a systematized whole, with every part in its proper place. No thinker who was not in, but “out of his head,” could originate such a production. The validity of our thesis, then, has been fully demonstrated.

Antithesis.

What are the infallible indications that a thinker is and must be, “out of his head”? They are such as these: He will deny the most obvious truths, and adopt as true the wildest conjectures and assumptions. He will deny propositions whose validity has been established by the most absolute proof, and hold as demonstrated truths dogmas unsustained by any form or degree of valid evidence. He will treat with contempt the most perfect forms of thought conceivable, and manifest great respect for puerile absurdities. To go no farther, we simply add, that such individuals will regard and treat elements of thought the most obviously compatible the one with the other, as irreconcilably contradictory to one another, and then avow the most palpable contradictions without any consciousness of their real character and mutual relations. Who can doubt that a thinker whose productions are prominently marked by all the above characteristics must be “out of his head”? What are the real facts of the case in regard to our author as presented in the work before us? We will give a few leading and characteristic examples.

Mr. Spencer has been during his entire life an open-faced

spectator of the world of matter and of spirit. So obvious to himself are the objects which he perceives, and the validity of his knowledge of the same, that it is utterly impossible for him, excepting "when he begins to philosophize," to doubt for a single moment that he does know realities as they are. So obvious is the absolute validity of his world-knowledge, that in the act of philosophizing, while he is "compelling himself to treat this knowledge as nothing but a prejudice," the conviction that his philosophy is a delusion, and that he is in fact "beholding with open face" realities as they are, will return upon him, and that with immutable fixedness. Yet, despite all this, and in open opposition to the absolute testimony of his own consciousness, and the immutable convictions of the race, and without any valid evidence whatever on the other side, he affirms that he does know that all this knowledge is exclusively phenomenal,—mere appearance,—and that, of "the reality behind all appearances," he knows nothing at all. But further than this, and worse by far, our author denies wholly the validity of forms of knowledge given in his own and the universal Consciousness, as strictly necessary and absolute. Of space and time, for example, he has perfectly distinct apprehensions,—apprehensions attended with the absolute consciousness that it is utterly impossible for himself even to *conceive* of them as unreal, or as being in any respects whatever, as realities, different from what he apprehends them to be. Yet, with an absolute consciousness of the immutable characteristics of our knowledge of these eternal verities, with the acknowledgment before him of all philosophers from Protagoras to Kant, that such are the changeless characteristics of that knowledge, and in open opposition to the immutable affirmations of his own and of the

universal Intelligence, he still affirms in this book that he does know that our knowledge of space and time has no real, but a "purely relative" validity. "All that we can assert," he says, "is that space is a relative reality." The same, he afterwards affirms to be true of time. Is it possible for us to conceive that a thinker is "in his head" who will positively deny such consciously obvious and absolute truths as these? On the authority of the most shallow sophisms that ever appeared within the sphere of human thought, he denies utterly the validity of all our world-knowledge and necessary ideas of every kind, and that, when he could not but know, if he was in his head, that the same objections which he urges as conclusive against the possible validity of the forms of knowledge referred to, do in fact lie in all their force against forms of knowledge the absolute validity of which he himself admits and affirms, to wit, the idea that *something* does exist. He thus practically denies the validity of the principle, that things equal to the same things are equal to one another. In his chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," he thus argues against the monstrous absurdity of Kant, that space and time are nothing in themselves but "*à priori* laws or conditions of the conscious mind": "If space and time present to our minds belong to the *ego*, then of necessity they do not belong to the *non ego*. Now, it is absolutely impossible to think this" (that they do belong to the *ego*). Again: "The direct testimony of Consciousness is, that time and space are not within but without the mind; and so absolutely independent of it that they cannot be conceived to become non-existent, even were the mind to become non-existent." Here our author reasons like a philosopher. To be self-consistent, he must affirm the absolute validity, throughout, of our own knowledge of these reali-

ties. If the fact, that we are conscious of Space and Time as exterior to and independent of the mind, proves that, in fact, they are thus exterior and independent; and further, if the fact that we cannot conceive them to be "laws or conditions of the conscious mind," proves that they cannot be such laws and conditions, — and all this our author absolutely affirms, — then, if he were really "in his head," he would admit and affirm that Space and Time are not only realities in themselves, but the identical realities that we conceive them to be. We have, undeniably, a consciousness of them, not only as realities, but as realities of a fixed character, and all this, with the absolute impossibility of conceiving that they are, or can be, in any respects, different from what we conceive them to be. But, in the same connection, he affirms the absolute validity of the direct testimony of Consciousness, and of necessary knowledge, in certain respects in regard to these objects, and absolutely denies the validity of the same identical testimony and knowledge relatively to the same objects in other particulars no more fundamental. Having proven, as he imagines, that Space and Time cannot be entities or things, nor the attributes of such realities, he then launches off into the following strange and sweeping deduction: "It results, therefore, that Space and Time are wholly incomprehensible. The immediate knowledge that we seem to have of them proves, when examined, to be total ignorance." He had just affirmed our knowledge of these realities, in certain particulars perfectly fundamental, to be absolute. Here, on the next page, he affirms our ignorance of the same realities to be equally absolute. But what thinker, who is "in his head," could draw, from the premises laid down, the sweeping deduction above cited? The fact that we do know, that

Space and Time are not things nor the attributes of things, that we know that they cannot be "laws or conditions of conscious mind," and that they are absolutely exterior to and independent of our minds, "this immediate knowledge which we seem to have of them, proves," he says, "when examined, to be total ignorance," and shows them to be "wholly incomprehensible." Further, if a direct and immediate consciousness of an object, in any one particular, is valid for the reality and character of said object in that one respect, the same form of consciousness is, and must be, valid for the reality and character of all objects to which it pertains in the same form. In the extracts above given, our author does affirm the absolute validity of this form of Consciousness for the reality and character of Space and Time, in particulars perfectly fundamental. In the same form, we have undeniably a consciousness of both matter and spirit, so far as their essential characteristics are concerned. Our author affirms the absolute authority of Consciousness in the former case, and as absolutely denies it, in the latter. This author, therefore, is "out of his head," or things equal to the same things are not equal to one another. In this book, we are assured that there is a reality higher than that represented in the idea of an infinite and perfect personal God, as much higher as "Intelligence will transcend mechanical motion," and that we must make an election between "personality and something higher." Why did he not assure us, to reconcile our minds to the loss of our hopes of immortality, that our choice is between immortality and something higher; that there may be forms of non-being, as much superior to conscious being as the latter is superior to mere mechanical existence? The idea, also, that "the worlds were made by the word

of God," he regards as deserving no higher appellation than "the carpenter theory." We refer to such facts to show how palpably, in our author's mind, things which differ as the finite and the infinite, are utterly confounded, just as they are with all thinkers who are out of their heads. The work before us is full of just such contradictions and absurdities as those above adduced. If such facts and considerations have not fully demonstrated our Thesis, on the one hand, and our Antithesis, on the other, and we freely admit that they have not, then we say before the world, that all "the antitheses of science falsely so called," together with all "the antinomies of pure reason," and the mountain ridges of contradictions which our author and others professedly find in our world-conceptions and necessary ideas, are the merest sophisms and paralogisms that ever disgraced science during the history of the race. If it is claimed that these antitheses, antinomies, and affirmed contradictions, are valid for the end for which they are adduced, then we put forward our Thesis and Antithesis, as rendering demonstrably evident the fact, that no such thinker as Mr. Spencer is supposed to be, and no such work as seemingly comes from him, and no such train of thought as is seemingly developed in that work, have, or can have, being anywhere in Space and Time, or out of Space and Time. If it should be affirmed that such forms of presentation as we have just exhibited in regard to our author, do not become the dignity of the Science of Natural Theology, we admit the fact, and confess a feeling of shame, that the sophistries of false science render such presentations proper and necessary. Sophistry is always undignified, and never permissible, but when its use is necessary to expose sophistry. This is our apology.

THE DESTINY OF THESE TWO HYPOTHESES, THE SCEPTICAL
AND REALISTIC, OR THEISTIC.

We are now prepared for a deliberate contemplation of the certain destiny of these two distinct and opposite hypotheses, Realism, and with it, Theism, on the one hand, and Scepticism, on the other. On this topic, in drawing the disjunctive argument to a final close, we would, at the expense of appearing sometimes rather repetitious, invite special attention to the following important suggestions :

The one, a system of blank Atheism. The other, theistic in all its principles and deductions.

No one will deny the fact, that Realism, in its principles and logical deductions, is throughout strictly theistic. Modern Scepticism, in opposition to the system as we have defined it, and as it was in former years, is positive Atheism, and nothing else. While, on its negative side, it affirms the Unconditioned to be both unknowable and unknown, on its positive side, it denies absolutely of said Unconditioned, intelligence, sensibility, free will, and personality. Whatever else may, or may not, be real, all the elements embraced in the idea of such a personality being absolutely self-contradictory and of impossible validity, such a personality cannot exist. Such are the absolute teachings of modern Scepticism. If this is not blank Atheism, we should be glad to know what is. Any system, also, which locates the Unconditioned in the sphere of the absolutely unknowable and unknown is, in no respects, practically different from Atheism, and is fundamentally subversive of all rational worship. To worship we "know not what," is pronounced by the author of Christianity to be

an irrational service. "We know what we worship," or Christ is not "a teacher sent from God." Modern Scepticism, however, in its absolute denial of the existence of an intelligent personal God, takes rank as blank Atheism, or we have no standard definition of the term Atheism.

All thinkers must adopt one or the other of these hypotheses.

The time has arrived, we remark, in the next place, when all thinkers must adopt one or the other of these systems, as immutable truths of science. The reason is obvious. There is no intermediate hypothesis on which they can make a stand, without consciously violating their own convictions of what real science demands of them. The materialist, as we have seen, must take one of two positions, no third being possible, — that our knowledge of matter is direct and immediate, or presentative, and, therefore, valid for the reality and character of its objects, — or that our knowledge of this substance is indirect and mediate, and, therefore, utterly void of such validity. In taking the first, the only true, position, he is, at once, confronted with a form of knowledge of the same identical character as the other, — a form of knowledge revealing absolutely the existence of another substance utterly, in all its fundamental qualities, unlike and opposite to matter, and never to be confounded with it, to wit, spirit. Thus, his own doctrine becomes demonstrably false. If he takes the second position, then, by his own hypothesis, his ignorance of the nature of all substances in common, is absolute, and he convicts himself of the grossest contradiction and absurdity conceivable, if he asserts his own doctrine to be true or false. Idealism sets out with the positive affirmation, that we know nothing of realities of any kind, as they exist in themselves, "but

our manner of perceiving them ;” that “ with this only we have to do ;” that none of our perceptions, conceptions, ideas, or cognitions, have any validity for real existences in themselves, and that of such existences our ignorance is necessary and absolute. Now, the time has come, or will soon come, when the world will justly laugh at the philosopher, as involving himself in the valid charge of philosophic idiocy, who shall profess to give the ontology of that of which he himself affirms an absolute ignorance. Materialism and Idealism, it must be borne in mind, are the only conceivable hypotheses which lie between Realism, on the one hand, and Scepticism, on the other. Between the two last named, therefore, all thinkers must make their election.

The exclusive sphere of Science in accordance with the fundamental principles of each of these hypotheses is absolutely fixed and definable.

Our next position is this: The true and only valid sphere of Science in accordance with the fundamental principles of each of these hypotheses is perfectly fixed and definable. Realism commences with the original intuitions of the Intelligence, and, upon strictly scientific grounds, vindicates for said intuitions an absolute validity for the reality and character of their respective objects. It then, by the application of criteria which cannot mislead, discriminates between forms of knowledge which have a mere relative, and no real validity, on the one hand, and those which have an absolute validity, on the other, and by a rigid adherence to such a method of investigation, the only strictly scientific method conceivable, vindicates for science a known and knowable universe, and for humanity a known

God. By the strictest application of scientific principles, it discriminates between all forms of empirical and *à priori* knowledge, explains fully the origin and genesis of each, demonstrates the real relations and dependency of each to and upon the other, and thus fully elucidates and determines the nature, and sphere, and validity, of all the sciences, pure and mixed. There is not a form of experience or thought that has being in the mind, Materialism, Idealism, and Scepticism included, which this system does not fully, and that upon strictly scientific grounds, explain and elucidate. The true and proper sphere of Realism, therefore, is not mere appearances in which no reality, as it is in itself, appears, but actual realities as they are, to wit, — matter, finite spirit, substance, cause, time, space, duty, immortality, and God, the infinite and perfect mind, — a personal God, the real Father of our spirits, and the known Creator and Governor of a known universe.

Scepticism, on the other hand, affirms absolutely, that all our knowledge of realities, within and around us, is exclusively *phenomenal*, *mere* appearance, in which no reality whatever appears, and “that the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must ever be, unknown.” What, then, is the true and proper and exclusive province and sphere of science, according to the fundamental principles of this hypothesis, — principles, as announced by its own leading advocates? It is this, and nothing else than this, — to *classify and generalize these appearances*. With realities in themselves, and in their relationship to the phenomenal, science, as limited by the principles of this hypothesis, has absolutely nothing whatever to do, and that for the obvious and undeniable reason, that said hypothesis affirms our absolute and hopeless ignorance of these realities and of their

entire relationships. In regard to the questions, whether the realities which cause these appearances are in themselves, exclusively subjective or objective, material or spiritual, personal or impersonal, finite or infinite, the immutable principles of this hypothesis leave all such questions wholly undetermined and undeterminable. If the advocates of this hypothesis put forth any affirmations, or positive conjectures even, in regard to the character or relations of these realities, they subject themselves, thereby, to the just charge of hypocrisy; inasmuch as they thus betray an internal disbelief in their own openly avowed and fundamental principles. Such are the exclusive spheres clearly and distinctly marked out for science, by the essential principles of these two distinct and opposite hypotheses.

While the exclusive foundation of Realism is original intuitions, that of Scepticism is an unauthorized assumption.

Another fundamental distinction between these conflicting hypotheses is this: Realism, as we have already shown, rests exclusively upon original intuitions verified by scientific criteria, as possessed of an absolute validity for the reality and character of their objects. Scepticism, on the other hand, has been as clearly evinced, as having no other foundation than a mere assumption, — an assumption, void utterly of all claims to the high prerogatives of a first truth, or principle of science, — an assumption, in favor of which no form or degree of valid proof, evidence, or antecedent probability, can be adduced, and which has been demonstrated to be nothing but a fundamental error. We refer, of course, to the assumption, that all our knowledge of realities within and around us is exclusively phenomenal. Either Consciousness is “a liar from the beginning,” or

Scepticism has no other foundation than such an assumption as that. This we have already shown, and need not enlarge in this connection. How widely diverse must be the destiny of two distinct and opposite hypotheses, one of which must be true and the other false, when one stands out visibly before the eye of the mind as resting upon a strictly scientific basis, and the other as resting upon no other foundation than an unauthorized and false assumption!

The principles of Realism accord with, and those of Scepticism are antagonistic to, the intuitive convictions of the Universal Intelligence.

Another fundamental fact having a corresponding bearing upon our present inquiries is this: The essential principles and deductions of Realism correspond, in their entirety, with the necessary intuitive convictions of the Universal Intelligence, while those of Scepticism, throughout, stand forth as irreconcilable antagonisms to said convictions. On this subject there can be no dispute. The Universal Intelligence — that of every materialist, idealist, and sceptic included — has, in its natural and spontaneous procedures, affirmed absolutely the real existence of matter and spirit as distinct, separate, and actually known entities, and also that of substance, cause, space, time, and a personal God. Mind, in its natural and intuitive procedures, no more doubts the reality of any of these objects, or the validity of its knowledge of the same, than it does those of its own existence or any of its conscious states. Realism recognizes the validity of such procedures, and constructs its theory of existence accordingly. Scepticism, without any valid basis for such a procedure, impeaches the Intelligence itself of fun

damental error, and constructs a theory of existence in the real validity of which sceptics themselves no more believe than the rest of mankind, excepting in those moments in which, as philosophers, by voluntary acts of self-stultification, "they compel themselves to treat as a prejudice" what, in all times in which they are possessed of common-sense, they absolutely know to be real. Now, the world—the disciples of sober science included—will not, when the question is distinctly submitted, be long in deciding, what the history of philosophy fully justifies, that so-called philosophers, after "putting themselves into a state of not knowing," and "regarding all their previous knowledge as uncertain," and, finally, upon mere assumptions, constructing systems of Ontology in respect to the existence and laws of realities of which they themselves affirm their ignorance to be absolute,—the world, we say, will not be long, nor wrong, in concluding that philosophers, in such procedures as these, are far more likely to err, than the Intelligence itself is, in all its natural and necessary intuitions, to be a lie. Realism, and with it Theism, in being thus sustained by the necessary intuitions of the Universal Intelligence, will ever find itself in a citadel of impregnable strength; while Scepticism, as the irreconcilable antagonist of those intuitions, must fall upon the rock of truth and be broken there.

Realism furnishes infallible tests of truth, while Scepticism utterly confounds truth with error.

Realism, we remark in the next place, furnishes, as we have shown, universally valid tests of truth and error. The sceptical philosophy, on the other hand, absolutely confounds truth with error. As all our knowledge, according

to its teachings, is exclusively phenomenal, mere appearance in which no reality appears, and as one form of appearance is just as real as any other, it is just as true as any other. All is true and equally so, or all in common is utterly false. No advocate of this philosophy can give us any valid criteria on the authority of which we can affirm of different forms of thought, this is true, and that is false. or by which we can affirm of any form of activity, this is right, and that is wrong. Scepticism, as we have said, may classify and generalize its empty appearances. It can furnish no tests, however, by which it can classify or generalize them as true or false, right or wrong. Appearance is what actually appears to the individual, and as appearance represents no reality but itself, one appearance is and must be just as real, and, consequently, just as true, as any other. Scepticism can never free itself from this difficulty. To such individuals as Messrs. Mansell and Spencer, for example, all our ideas of all realities in common, realities finite and infinite, *appear* as utter and irreconcilable contradictions. To us, all these seeming contradictions *appear* as perfectly explicable, and, when explained, utterly disappear. Can these individuals tell which of these forms of appearance are true, and which false, both being equally real in themselves, and neither class, according to their philosophy, representing realities as they are?

Their distinct and opposite tendencies.

If we should refer to the idea of utility and contemplate these two systems with reference to their intrinsic tendencies, the contrast between them we should find to be infinitely wide and impressive. There is not a demand of our intellectual or sensitive nature which Realism is not adapted

to meet. It opens to us the volume of universal nature, mental and physical, and assures us that, in the diligent study of that volume, we are perpetually enriching our minds with the imperishable treasures of truth itself. It sanctifies all the relations of existence, — relations individual, domestic, social, civil, and religious, — by presenting them as actual and known realities, imparting a solemn and enduring *substantiality* to the individual, the family, the community, the state, and the race, and, in all relations of existence, rendering that all-overshadowing idea sacred, — the idea of *duty*. It meets the demands of our higher nature, — the moral and spiritual, — by rendering omnipresent in thought a personal God, infinite and perfect, and impresses us, on the one hand, with the consciousness of the intrinsic worth of our deathless spirits by the revelation of the great fact, that “we are all his offspring;” and, on the other, gives us an object upon which the mental powers may forever expand, and in that expansion take on the most perfect forms of intellectual and moral beauty and perfection possible to our nature. To the instinctive and changeless desire for continued existence, it opens the vista of an assured immortality. In opening upon the vision of the mind a knowable and known universe, it assures to the Intelligence a solid basis for an authenticated revelation from the “Father of our spirits.” There is not, we repeat, an essential demand of our nature to which this system does not exist in fixed adaptation. Nor is there a solitary element in it that can be shown to tend in any direction but good, and that in the highest degree.

On the other hand, there is not a solitary element or principle in the sceptical philosophy that has the remotest tendency towards anything good. Nor is there a single

demand of our nature which any such element or principle has the least adaptation to meet. Instead of this, its exclusive tendency is to induce throughout every department of our nature an omnipresent sense of hopeless emptiness and desolation. With a deathless desire in the centre of the soul for knowledge, — for the conscious possession of the priceless treasures of truth itself, — all realities, under the influence of this philosophy, pass away to an unapproachable distance from the mind into the eternal regions of the unknowable and unknown, leaving it encircled by nothing but empty shadows, less substantial than the shadow which is cast by a real shade, — delusive appearances which represent and reveal nothing whatever that is real. To those questions of deathless interest, from the presence and pressure of which we cannot escape if we would, — the questions, What am I? Where am I? What ought I to be? What ought I to do? Whither am I bound? — all such questions this philosophy involves in “a darkness which may be felt,” — in the “palpable obscure” and endless contradictions of “Chaos and Old Night.” Under its sightless illuminations, also, the individual, the family, the community, the state, and humanity itself, become soulless fabrications as unsubstantial as “the baseless fabric of a vision.” The more fully the mind comprehends the principles and enters into the spirit of this philosophy, the more distinctly conscious does it become of the death-frosts which are falling upon it, until the death-chill becomes as absolute and permeating throughout all departments of our mental being, as we should feel through all the vitalities of our physical nature were we encased in the heart of an iceberg. “I would give all the world,” said a German philosopher of this school, to one of our ambassadors to a foreign court, — and this was said with

bitter weeping and tears,—“ I would give all the world, could I believe as you do ; if I could have faith in the encircling presence and guardian care of a personal God whom I could call my Father. But my philosophy has taken from me the possibility of believing.” An accursed philosophy is that which thus takes from the heart of suffering humanity such an object, a form of good to which all the deathless principles of our immortal natures are immutably and exclusively adapted. From what good motives can any man rob the heart of that eternal good, in the place of which nothing can be substituted but what tends immutably in the direction of death,—death to virtue, and death to real happiness? From no commendable intent can a philosopher, though he does so under the professed teachings of science, transform, in the mind’s regard, the individual, the family, and the state, from substantial and sacred creations of Infinity and Perfection, into mere shadows of no realities known or knowable to the mind. Through original and necessary intuitions, and by a most rigid classification and generalization of the facts thus revealed, together with the equally rigid deductions yielded by said facts, the mind, keeping all the while strictly within the natural and proper sphere of the Intelligence, and never violating one of its natural laws, arrives to a distinct and absolute conscious knowledge of the world of matter and spirit, of substance, cause, personal identity, the individual, the family, the state, duty, time, space, immortality, and God the Infinite and Perfect, as absolutely real and known verities of infinite worth. Under the influence of the knowledge thus acquired life becomes real and earnest, existence has an intelligible purpose and end, and we know what we are, where we are, what we ought to be and do, and whither we are bound.

From what motives of utility, permit us to ask, — duty out of the question, — can a philosopher employ his high mental gifts in persuading mankind that all this knowledge is a mere delusive and shadowy appearance in which no reality appears? What form of good can he hope to receive by persuading us that “the things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them, neither are their relations so constituted as they appear unto us;” that these, to be sure, are “connatural and necessary beliefs,” — beliefs so immutably “inhering in Reason itself,” that, by no scientific deductions can we, by any possibility, divest ourselves of them, — beliefs, however, which we are to “compel ourselves to treat as a prejudice,” that is, as Kant expresses it, as mere “tricks played upon Reason”? How long will such a useless, ghostly philosophy maintain its ascendancy over the human mind, — a philosophy utterly unsustained by any valid facts whatever, — which thus reverses all the natural and intuitive procedures of the Intelligence, — which does murderous violence to all the original instincts and laws of our sensitive nature, — which stands out visibly before the mind as resting upon mere assumptions and nothing else, and which by no possibility can be true, unless the contradiction can hold, that knowledge is not knowledge?

Realism the natural, and Scepticism the most unnatural, state of thought conceivable.

We have yet one more suggestion to make, pertaining to the destiny of these two distinct and opposite forms of thought. Realism, throughout, is a perfectly natural and genial form of thought and belief. This is universally admitted. Scepticism — a fact which none will deny — is the

most unnatural state in which the mind can possibly find itself. Let any one seriously attempt to *think* in accordance with the fundamental principles of this philosophy, and the necessary effect upon his understanding will be, in the language of a distinguished writer, “the antithesis to that in which a man is when he makes a *bull*.” In other words, he will feel as if he “had been standing on his head.” The first effect upon the feelings, after the momentary excitement induced by new views is passed, will be a state of utter confusion and bewilderment, as if “chaos had come again.” The final result will be a sense of hopeless bereavement, abandonment, and lostness, which leave the mind dead to all which constitutes its true and proper life, — a state so vividly described by Byron, — a state rendered real in his experience by Scepticism, on the one hand, and vice and crime, the natural daughters of Scepticism, on the other.

“ And dost thou ask, what secret woe
I bear, corroding joy and youth,
That bids me loathe my present state,
And fly from all I prized the most ?

“ It is not love, it is not hate,
Nor low ambition’s honors lost,
That bids me loathe my present state,
And fly from all I prized the most.

“ It is that weariness which springs
From all I meet, or hear, or see ;
To me no pleasure Beauty brings ;
Thine eyes have scarce a charm for me.

“ It is that settled, ceaseless gloom,
The fabled Hebrew wanderer bore,
That will not look beyond the tomb,
But cannot hope for rest before.”

How long will the general mind remain under the influence of a form of belief so unnatural, on the one hand, and which cannot, in its final results, but induce "that state of settled, ceaseless gloom" above described?

So distinctly conscious are modern sceptics of the impossibility of securing for their philosophy a permanent ascendancy with the public, while that public is distinctly aware of the real character of the system, that they are now attempting to secure this result by imposing upon said public what we must regard as known deceptions. Mr. Spencer, for example, tells us, that, in regard to ultimate causation, "the choice is not between personality and something lower than personality; whereas the choice is between personality and something higher." In affirming that our choice is between a personal God, and "something higher," he, in fact, affirms, as the result of the principles of his philosophy, that one or the other of these objects *must* exist. He thus presents to the mind, as the crowning glory of said philosophy, an object of positive belief, and thus, also, deceptively meets a fundamental want of our being. Now, when he penned those lines, he could not but have been aware, aside from the intrinsic absurdity of the dogma presented, that the fundamental principles of his philosophy present us with no such alternative as that. "The reality," he tells us, "existing behind all appearances, is, and must ever be, unknown." How, then, does he, how can he know, that any such choice remains for us? In affirming that such choice does remain, he, in truth, affirms a knowledge and comprehension of what he affirms to be unknowable and unknown. He thus deceives his readers in regard to the principles of his philosophy by professedly

giving them that, the possibility of which that philosophy denies, to wit, an object of positive belief.


Similar remarks are equally applicable to the *doctrine of Force*, which is made to play such a conspicuous part in the teachings of the advocates of this philosophy. They everywhere employ the term force as if it represented a real entity of which we have a positive conception. Now, their philosophy denies absolutely the being of an entity of which we have, or can have, any such conception. In these writings, this term has, in reality, two meanings: the apparent, by which the masses are deceived, and the real, by which it represents nothing whatever, but an utterly unknown element of the absolutely unknowable and unknown. If the word *abracadabra* was substituted for the term force, whenever the latter term appears in these writings, said writings would have all the real consecutiveness and conclusiveness that they now possess. Now, it is, by such deceptions, giving to mind positive objects of thought and belief, where none whatever really exist, that a temporary ascendancy is secured for this philosophy over the public mind. The mask, however, will soon drop from the face of this "Gorgon dire," and then, mankind will flee from it as they would from the embrace of a vampire.

Concluding thought.


We here draw our argument on this greatest of all themes to a close, and leave the subject to the reflection of the reader. Our object, throughout, has been the induction of positive conviction, as the basis of a consciously rational faith in the being and superintendence of an infinite and perfect *personal* God. Our work must speak for itself.

Bearing of the doctrine of Probability on this subject.

It may be, that there will be found, here and there, a solitary individual in whose mind *absolute* conviction may not have been induced. To such, if, unhappily, any such there be, we would say, that for such a reason you are by no means free from the obligations of religion. They may still remain upon you in all their force. Two hypotheses are before you, the Theistic, and that of Natural Law. One of these must be true. In favor of the latter, no intelligent reader of this treatise will pretend that there exists any form of proof, positive evidence, or antecedent probability. Even probability in favor of the former hypothesis, in all such cases, and that on all such subjects, just as strictly and sacredly binds the conscience, as proof the most conclusive and absolute. If any one should affirm that the argument, as we have conducted it, is not absolutely demonstrative, will he deny that it throws the probabilities, as infinity to unity, in favor of the theistic hypothesis? For a want of faith, then, in an infinite and perfect personal God, every man must stand convicted at the bar of the universal Conscience as without excuse.



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